
PV204 Security technologies

In-Memory Malware Analysis

Václav Lorenc Principal Security Engineer, Here Technologies



Centre for Research on Cryptography and Security




Agenda

- Motivation!
 - No x86 assembly required
 - No malware (de)obfuscation magic
- How does an OS look "inside"?
 - Processes and other data structures
 - How the memory is organized
- Common tools used for analysis
- Searching for system "oddities"
 - What are the important system indicators?
- Real samples discussed and analyzed! (Labs)

Why memory analysis?


- It's fun!
- Acquiring evidence for legal investigations
 - It used to be different in the past
- Technical simplification of reverse engineering
 - No binary obfuscation present the code has to run
- Incident response activities
 - Easy way how to learn more about the attackers
 - Malicious binary may only be present in memory
 - Fast: RAM is (usually) smaller than full hard-drive images





Challenges in Reverse Engineering (RE)

- Assembly language (for multiple platforms)
 - Along with undocumented instructions (or behavior)
- Anti-debugging tricks
 - Exceptions, interrupts, PE manipulations, time checking, ...
- Anti-VM tricks
 - Uncommon behavior of known instructions
 - Registry detections, HW detections
- Code obfuscation/packing
 - The most challenging to overcome, mostly



'cause reverse engineering ninjas are busy

MEMORY ANALYSIS






x86/x64 Memory organization


- Physical memory
 - RAM; what we really have installed
- Virtual memory
 - Separation of logical process memory from the physical
 - Logical address space > physical (e.g., swap)
 - Address space shared by several processes, yet separated
- Paging vs. Segmentation
 - Possible memory organization approaches


Paging **Physical Address Segmentation** Logical Address Linear Address **Physical Address** 16 32 10 10 12 20 12 Selector Offset Dir Table Offset PPN Offset +12 20 20 12 32 1023 PPN Flags 16 >8 Base Limit Flags 20 12 0 1023 1 GDT/LDT 0 Page Table PPN Flags 0 CR3 Page Directory

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Win32 Address Space






Process 2



Operating System Data Structures

- How the OS knows about processes, files, ...?
 - A lot of 'metadata' for important data
 - Based on C/C++ data structures (see MSDN documentation)
- (Double-)linked list
 - Another common data structure (not only in OS)
 - Method for implementing lists in computer memory
- Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
 - Used for manipulating the structures to hide malicious stuff

Double Linked Lists



DKOM – Direct Kernel Object Manipulation

- Dozens of various (double-)linked lists in Windows
 - Maintained by kernel
 - Processes, threads, opened files, memory allocations, ...
- DKOM is used by rootkits
 - Hiding from the sight of the user
- Rootkit paradox
 - Rootkits need to run on the system
 - ... and need to remain hidden at the same time
- Memory analysis can help to discover DKOM
 - Anti-analysis techniques are known as well

Interesting OS Structures

- Suspicious Memory Pages
- Processes
- Threads
- Sockets (Connections)
- Handles (Files)
- Recently executed binaries

- Modules/Libraries
- Mutexes
- LSA (Local Security Authority)
- Registry
- ...
- Files
- Caches

Memory Pages


- Various 'flags'
 - Read/write/executable pages
 - Helping OS to organize memory efficiently
- Executable + Writable pages
 - Why is it bad?


Process Injection Technique(s)

- Allocating a memory that can be modified (unpacked, decoded, decrypted) and executed.
- Used by legitimate processes too (Windows OLE)

DLL/Process Injection


So that Internet Explorer behaves like a malicious process...





PRACTICAL

AND NOW SOMETHING COMPLETELY...



Phase #1


MEMORY ACQUISITION



Memory (re)sources

- Live RAM
 - The most common source for analysis
 - Easier to obtain from virtualized hosts
- Paging file/Swap
 - Used by operating systems to allocate more memory then available RAM
- Hibernation file
- Memory crash dumps
 - Limited analysis options

Memory Acquisition



Memory Acquisition

Virtual Machines

- VMWare, VirtualBox, ...
- VirtualBox -dbg -startvm "MalwareVM" (and .pgmphystofile command or vboxmanage debugvm)
- Directly from the system! (if we have permissions to do that)
 - windd, fastdump, dumpit, memorize, winpmem
 - Or we can hibernate the system (hiberfil.sys)
- Remotely
 - Encase Enterprise, Mandiant Intelligent Response, Access Data FTK
- Common issues
 - Unsupported OS (Linux, MacOS; 32bit/64bit)
 - Swap (portions of memory on drive)
 - Malware not running inside a virtual machine

Memory Acquisition (2)

• Local memory acquisition notes

- Unless you have plenty of money, try to get root/admin access to the host
- Better to acquire to external storage (USB, network)
- The lower tool's memory footprint, the better
- If you run malware in VM, better have less RAM
 - Faster analysis
 - .. And configure no swap for the system too
 - However: malware can check for the available memory

Memory Acquisition (3)

Remote memory acquisition

- Very useful for fast Incident Response
- Requires enterprise licenses for the commercial tools
- Acquisition is done over network
- Agents already in memory, no extra memory demands
- Modern EDR/XDR solutions support this too
- Open-source alternative?
 - GRR (Google Rapid Response)
 - Still in development, primarily Incident Response tool
 - Allows remote memory acquisition



MEMORY ANALYSIS



Memory Analysis Tools

- FireEye Redline
 - Free, available for Windows
- HBGary/GoSecure Responder Pro
 - Community Edition used to be available
- Volatility Framework
 - Open source, no GUI

FireEye Redline

- Free tool for Incident Response
 - Not open-source, though
 - .NET executable (runs only under Windows)
 - Support OS X and Linux artifacts too
- Nice and simple user interface
 - Very nice analysis workflow
 - Perfect for searching for string information
 - Rates the level of suspiciousness over processes
- Sad things
 - Memory analysis not reliable, process rating as well

Redline®

5

Collect Data

Create a Standard Collector > Create a Comprehensive Collector > Create an IOC Search Collector >

Analyze Data

From a Saved Memory File > Open Previous Analysis >

Recent Analysis Sessions

AnalysisSession4.mans > AnalysisSession3.mans > AnalysisSession2.mans >

AnalysisSession1.mans >

Redline: Start

Timeline

Host

Tags and Comments

Acquisition History

IOC Reports

Not Collected

Home ► Host ► Timeline

svchost.exe (1112)

Svchost.exe (1144)

svchost.exe (1152)

STacSV.exe (1184) Itilwebget.exe (130) Explorer.EXE (1336)

Dwm.exe (1384)

Tags/Comments

Users

TimeWrinkles™ 0


4

111

Processes

TimeCrunches[™] 1

Fields



Redline: Timeline

R G T Home + Timeline					
Investigative Steps	Timeline Configuration	Timestamp	Field	Summary	
Review Processes by MRI Scores Review Network Ports / Connections	2013-04-23 12:57:27Z	2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\ajax\Ocean.apt	MD5:
Review Memory Sections / DLLs	Show:	2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Modified	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash	MD5:
Review Untrusted Handles	5 🗘 minutes before and after				
Review Hooks Review Drivers and Devices		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash	MD5:
]	2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\Aluminum.aftpl	MD5:
Processes Host IOC Reports		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	$Path: \ C:\ Program \ Files\ ATOMI\ Active \ Presenter\ templates\ flash\ Aluminum. aftpl$	MD5:
Processes		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\Aluminum.aftpl	MD5:
 Handles Memory Sections 		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\Aluminum.aftpl	MD5:
Strings		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\components.swf	MD5:
Ports Hierarchical Processes		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\components.swf	MD5:
Hooks			-		
Drivers Enumerated by Walking List		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\components.swf	MD5:
Device Tree System Information		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\components.swf	MD5:
Network Adapters		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	$Path: \ C:\ Program \ Files\ ATOMI\ Active \ Presenter\ templates\ flash\ express \ Install.swf$	MD5:
Users System Restore		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\expressInstall.swf	MD5:
Prefetch		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\expressInstall.swf	MD5:
Disks		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\expressInstall.swf	MD5
Volumes File System					
Imports		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\infobox.swf	MD5:
Exports Strings		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\infobox.swf	MD5:
Alternate Data Streams		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	$Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\infobox.swf$	MD5:
PEInfo Version Information Resource Data		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	$Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\infobox.swf$	MD5:
Event Logs		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\json.as	MD5:
Windows Services		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\json.as	MD5:
Registry Hives Registry		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\json.as	MD5:
Tasks					
Network Information Ports		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\json.as	MD5:
ARP Entries		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\language.as	MD5:
DNS Entries		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Changed	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\language.as	MD5:
Route Entries Browser URL History		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameCreated	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\language.as	MD5:
Cookie History		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/FilenameChanged	Path: C:\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\language.as	MD5:
Form History File Download History		2013-02-14 17:23:47Z	File/Created	Path: C\\Program Files\ATOMI\ActivePresenter\templates\flash\No_Toolbar.aftpl	MD5:
Persistence	New Custom TimeWrinkle				
Timeline	Fields TimeWrinkles™ 1	Ron	NII n	o' limo Wr	
Acquisition History	TimeCrunches™ 0 Users Process <mark>es</mark>	1760		$\Box \cdot I I I I I \Box \nabla V I$	
	The fine fine fine fine fine fine fine fin	Rec	dline	e: Time Wr	

HBGary Responder (Pro/CE)

- Professional Tool
 - Very expensive
 - Yet not very well maintained in the last few years
- Windows only
 - .NET written, supports only Windows images
- 'Killer' features
 - Digital DNA
 - automatic rating of suspicious processes
 - Visual 'Canvas' debugger
- Supports the analysis of (unpacked) binaries
- Replaced with CounterTack Responder Pro

HBGary Responder Pro -- DDNA


- Examples of the 'reasoning' behind DDNA
 - Does the process communicate over TCP/IP?
 - Does it manipulate with registry?
 - Did the analysis reveal any known bad stuff (strings, IPs, mutexes?)
 - Does the process access any other process in the system?
 - Does it access some system-critical process?
 - Did the analysis find any evidence of obfuscation?

	Digita	al DNA Sequence	Name	Process Name
CKy	> r"	04 D3 C5 00 B4 EE 00 5A	syshost.exe	syshost.exe
		00 5D 09 01 4D F2 00 B4		
	E	05 0E 3A 05 DD 33 05 73	firetdi.sys	System
) OF 20 22 00 66 09 03 1B	hippssa.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5D 09 00 5A 6A 01 1E	mso.dll	
		00 5D 09 00 5A 6A 01 1E	mso.dll	
	<u> </u>	2A 80 AC 00 67 6C 00 66	memorymod-pe-0x75350000-0x7539b000	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
	> 🗹	00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
	III	00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
	> [2]	00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
	> 🗹	00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	nond
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	pond
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	shell32.dll	
		00 5A 6A 00 67 6C 00 66	sheli32.dli	
		00.54.64.00.67.60.00.66	shell32 dll	

	Size	Severity	Weigl
	114688		
-	9490432		
	139264		
	61440		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	17330176		
	17330176		
	307200		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	12886016		
	12886016		
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ler F	2886016		
	12 36(16	DDNA	
	12886016		

z

	Size	Severity	Weight ⊽				Trait:	B8 98	
CR	114688		61.9		-	<u> </u>	Description:	Program appears to communicate over	
	9490432		39.8					the network using TCP/IP.	
	139264		34.6				Trait:	C1 7C	
	61440	111111	32.5			-5	Description:		
	12886016		29.8				Description.		
	12886016		29.8						
	17330176		28.6						
	17330176		28.6				Trait:	1B 2A Program is reading the memory of	
	307200		28.5			<u> </u>	Description:		1
	12886016		27.1					another process. This is not typical to	
	12886016		27.1					most programs and is usually only found in system utilities, debuggers, and	
	12886016		27.1					hacking utilities.	
	12886016		27.1		-	-			
	12886016		27.1				Trait:	DF 37	
	12886016		27.1				Description:	Program uses web or ftp addresses and possibly URL's to access one or more	
	12886016		27.1					sites on the Internet for downloading	
	12886016		27.1				files or posting up data.		
	12886016		27.1				Trait:	35 99 This module has the ability to manipulate process tokens and their privileges.	
	12886016		27.1			G	Description:		
	12886016		27.1						
128	12886016		27.1						
	12886016		27.1			-	T	ac cr	
	12886016		27.1			C C	Trait:	85 56 Program is deleting files using a shell command.	
	12886016		27.1			• •	Description:		
	12886016		27.1						
	12886016		27.1	4	🔒 Trait:	Trait:	F6 E3		
	12886016		27.1		-		Description:	Process may inject or write data into	
	12886016		27.1					other processes.	
	12886016 27.1 Tra	Trait:	21 E3						
	12886016		27.1			-5	Description:	This module may attempt to shutdown	
	12886016		27.1					or reboot the operating system.	
	12886016		27.1				M.D.		
	12886016		eso				rait:	CO: UUNA	
	12886016		27.1				Description:	This module appears to manually	
	12886016		27.1					suspicious.	huni.cz
	12886016		27.1						runn.cz



Volatility Framework

- Open-source tool
 - GPL licensed
- Written in Python
 - Available for variety of platforms (Linux, Windows, Mac OS)
 - Can be automated; many contributed plugins
- Supports analysis of memory dumps from various OSs
 - Windows, Linux, MacOS, Android
 - Both 32-bit and 64-bit versions
- Command-line driven
- Two (experimental) web GUIs

Google Rekall

- Another open source tool
- Supported by Google
 - Included as a part of GRR (Google Rapid Response) agent
- Originally based on the code of Volatility
 - Shared commands
 - Different architectural concepts
- Proof-of-concept GUI
 - Better workflows
- Discontinued since 2020

Additional Important Tools

• Strings

- Both *nix and Windows
- Extracts strings information from the file
- Can be used in cooperation with Volatility/Rekall
- Beware of text encoding! (ascii, utf-8, ...)

Foremost

- Forensic tool
- Can extract various data files from an image (or process)
 - Images, executables, documents, ...

Forensic analysis of RAM?

- Are there any benefits?
- Collecting forensic evidence
 - Executable images
 - PDF/Doc documents
 - Possible origin of the infection?
 - Images
 - URLs
- Getting approximate timeline
 - Works better on servers (always online, higher uptime, way more RAM)

What to search for in Operating System?

- Command & Control (C2) communication
- Hidden processes

CROCS

- Process/DLL injection evidence
- Non-standard/infamous binaries/mutexes
- Open sockets and files
- Registry records
- Command-line history
- Encryption keys!

Known Bad Mutexes

- *Conficker*: .*-7 and .*-99
- *Sality.AA*: Op1mutx9
- Flystud.??: Hacker.com.cn_MUTEX
- NetSky: 'D'r'o'p'p'e'd'S'k'y'N'e't'
- Sality.W: u_joker_v3.06
- *Poison Ivy*:)!VoqA.I4 (and 10 thousand others)
- *Koobface*: 35fsdfsdfgfd5339

Known Good Processes/Locations

Process Name	Expected Path
lsass.exe	\windows\system32
services.exe	\windows\system32
csrss.exe	\windows\system32
explorer.exe	\windows
<pre>spoolsv.exe</pre>	\windows\system32
smss.exe	\windows\system32
<pre>svchost.exe</pre>	\windows\system32
iexplore.exe	∖program files ∖program files (x86)
winlogon.exe	\windows\system32

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Operational Security (OpSec)

- Basics of OpSec
 - "Think before you act" mentality
 - Limited information sharing
- Specifics of memory analysis
 - You can often upload acquired executables to VirusTotal
 - MD5/SHA1 of the dump is different from the executable
 - This doesn't apply for documents/HTML pages!
 - However, incomplete binaries still can infect your system!
 - Running in VM or other OS is recommended

Recommended Analysis Process

- Use Internet! (Google, VirusTotal, ...)
- Make notes!
 - What OS is being analyzed? (imageinfo)
 - Network connections? (+ whois records, ...)
 - Processes (hidden, odd, non-standard; timestamps, ...)
 - Mutexes (+ files open)
 - Dump processes when needed (OpSec!)
 - Strings (URIs, C-like strings %s %d, domains, ...)
- Summarize your findings in final report

More information

- Web pages of this course
 - https://dior.ics.muni.cz/~valor/pv204
- Additional resources
 - Public memory images for analysis
 - <u>Reverse Engineering for Beginners</u> (amazing PDF doc)
 - <u>REMnux</u>: All you need to start with RE
 - <u>ContagioDump</u> blog (for additional malware samples)
 - <u>Malware Traffic Analysis</u> (both traffic & samples)

Thank you for your attention.

ANSWERS & QUESTIONS





LAB

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Lab Requirements

- Oracle VM VirtualBox
 - And enough space on your hard drive (12 GB at least)
- Volatility Framework
 - Version 2 (version 3 is available in the VM too)
- Unix tools
 - strings, foremost
- Your favorite text editor for notes
- Voluntary:
 - Javascript/PDF analysis tools

CRତCS

Recommended Analysis Process

- Use Internet! (Google, VirusTotal, ...)
- Make notes!

— …

- What OS is being analyzed?
- Network connections? (+ whois records, ...)
- Processes (hidden, odd, non-standard; timestamps, ...)
- Mutexes (+ files open)
- Strings (URIs, C-like strings %s %d, domains, ...)
- Summarize your findings in final report

Volatility2 Framework – cheat sheet

- psxview (search for hidden processes)
- apihooks
- driverscan
- ssdt/driverirp/idt
- connections / connscan (WinXP, active network connections)
- netscan (Win7, opened network sockets and connections)
- pslist / psscan (process listing from WinAPI vs. EPROCESS blocks)
- malfind / ldrmodules (code injection + dump / DLL detection)
- hivelist (registry lookup and parsing) / hashdump
- handles / dlllist / filescan (filelist / DLL files / FILE_OBJECT handles)
- cmdscan / consoles (cmd.exe history / console buffer)
- shimcache (application compatibility info)
- memdump / procemendump / procexedump

Analysis: xp-infected.vmem

- Recommended tools
 - Volatility, Rekall (or Redline)
- Objectives:
 - Get familiar with memory of your first infected system

Analysis: win7_x64.vmem

- Recommended tools
 - Volatility, Rekall (or Redline)
- Objectives:
 - Get familiar with memory of Win7 x64 system
 - Can you see any differences from the previous sample?

Analysis: zeus.vmem

- Recommended tools
 - Volatility, Rekall
- Objectives:
 - Find suspicious network connections
 - Find process responsible for the network activity
 - Can you figure out what infections this

Analysis: zeus2x4.vmem

- Recommended tools
 - Volatility, Rekall
- Objectives:
 - Find suspicious network connections
 - Find process responsible for the network activity
 - Can you figure out what infections this
 - Can you dump the virus configuration?

Analysis: bob.vmem

- Recommended tools
 - Volatility, Rekall, Foremost, Strings
- Objectives:
 - Find suspicious network connections
 - Find process responsible for the network activity
 - Can you figure out what caused the infection?
 - Can you dump the initial source vector?
 - What known vulnerability (CVE) has been exploited?

More information

- Web pages of this course
 - https://dior.ics.muni.cz/~valor/pv204
- Additional resources
 - Public memory images for analysis
 - <u>Reverse Engineering for Beginners</u> (amazing PDF doc)
 - <u>REMnux</u>: All you need to start with RE
 - <u>ContagioDump</u> blog (for additional malware samples)
 - <u>Malware Traffic Analysis</u> (both traffic & samples)

Thank you for your attention.

Answers & Questions

crocs.fi.muni.cz