



PA152: Efficient Use of DB

13. Advanced Topics

sequences, security, spatial indexes

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Credits

- Materials are based on presentations:
 - Courses CS245, CS345, CS345
 - Hector Garcia-Molina, Jeffrey D. Ullman, Jennifer Widom
 - Stanford University, California
 - Course CS145 following the book
 - Hector Garcia-Molina, Jeffrey D. Ullman, Jennifer Widom: Database Systems: The Complete Book
 - Book
 - Andrew J. Brust, Stephen Forte: Mistrovství v programování SQL Serveru 2005
 - MSDN library by Microsoft

Contents

- Generating IDs
- DB security
 - Access control in DB
 - Stored procedures
 - Attacking DBMS
- Spatial data
 - Data types, indexing

Generating PK values

- Typically, a sequence of numbers
 - Increasing monotonically
- Example:
 - `student(učo, first_name, last_name)`
- Ad-hoc solution 1:
 - Getting current maximum
 - `maxučo := SELECT max(učo) FROM student;`
 - Incrementing and using in new record
 - `INSERT INTO student`
`VALUES (maxučo+1, 'Mad', 'Max');`
 - Disadvantage:
 - Concurrent use → duplicate values

Generating PK values

■ Ad-hoc solution 2:

- Combining INSERT and SELECT in a statement
INSERT INTO student VALUES (
 (SELECT max(učo) FROM student)+1,
 'Mad', 'Max');
- Updates to index are atomic
 - Looks promising....
 - Nested select may be evaluated on “stale data”
- Duplicate values are less probable.
 - Improved performance only
 - i.e., sending one statement to DB

Generating PK values

- Ad-hoc solution 2: Concurrency Issues
 - Always in transaction
 - Depends on the way of locking DB uses:
 - SELECT locks data (but request exclusive lock)
 - Others are blocked
 - Locks are always released after commit
 - INSERT
 - → values are correct (no dups), but others are waiting

Generating PK values

■ Ad-hoc solution 3:

□ Auxiliary table

```
keys(table VARCHAR, id INTEGER)
```

1. UPDATE keys SET id=id+1
WHERE table='student';
2. newid := SELECT id FROM keys
WHERE table='student';
 - Or one statements:
newid := UPDATE keys SET id=id+1
WHERE table='student' RETURNING id;
3. INSERT INTO student
VALUES (newid , 'Mad', 'Max');

Generating PK values

■ Ad-hoc solution 3:

□ Inconvenience in concurrency when in transaction:

- UPDATE locks the record in *keys*
- Locks get released after commit (after INSERT)
- → values are correct (no dups), but others are waiting

□ Advantage:

- If combined with Solution 1
 - i.e., two consecutive transactions
- → values are correct (no dups) and nobody is blocked!

Generating PK values

- Recommended to use DB tools
 - Data types
 - PostgreSQL: SERIAL, BIGSERIAL
 - SQLServer: IDENTITY
 - Sequences
 - Oracle, PostgreSQL
 - Toggle at attribute
 - MySQL
- Support for getting last generated number
 - Good for inserting to tables with foreign keys
 - E.g., inserting first item into e-shopping basket
 - Creating a new basket & inserting goods

Generating PK values

■ CREATE SEQUENCE ...

- Numeric sequence generator
- Is parameterized:
 - Min / max value, cyclic

■ Functions in PostgreSQL

- `nextval` – generate new value
- `currval` – get last generated value
- Can be imbedded in INSERT
 - `INSERT INTO table_name
VALUES (nextval('sequence_name'), ...);`

Generating PK values: Performance

■ Example for Solution 3:

- accounts(number, branchnum, balance);
 - Clustered index on *number*
- counter(nextkey);
 - One record with value 1
 - For generating values of *id* by Solution 3

■ Configuration:



- Transaction isolation: READ COMMITTED
 - Only committed data are visible.
- Dual Xeon (550MHz,512Kb), 1GB RAM, RAID controller, 4x 18GB drives (10000RPM), Windows 2000.

Generating PK values: Performance

- Batch of 100 000 insertions into *accounts*
- Generating ID values:
 - DB support:
 - SQLServer 7 (identity)
 - insert into accounts (branchnum, balance) values (94496, 2789);
 - Oracle 8i (sequence)
 - insert into accounts values (seq.nextval, 94496, 2789);
 - Solution 3:

```
begin transaction
  update counter set nextkey = nextKey+1;
  :nk := select nextkey from counter;
commit transaction
begin transaction
  insert into accounts values( :nk, 94496, 2789);
commit transaction
```

Generating PK values



- X axis:
 - Increasing number of parallel insertions
- *DB tools* outperforms *ad-hoc* solution.

Generating PK values

■ PostgreSQL

- CREATE TABLE product (
 id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
 title VARCHAR(10)
);

- Internal implementation

- Create new sequence

- product_id_seq

- Attribute *id* has defaults value:

- nextval('product_id_seq')

Generating PK values

■ PostgreSQL (hand-crafted)

- CREATE SEQUENCE product_id_seq;
- CREATE TABLE product (
 id INT PRIMARY KEY
 DEFAULT nextval('product_id_seq'),
 title VARCHAR(10)
);

■ Usage:

- INSERT INTO product (title)
 VALUES ('Coil');
- INSERT INTO product (id, title)
 VALUES (DEFAULT, 'Coil');

Contents

- Generating IDs
- **DB security**
 - **Access control in DB**
 - Stored procedures
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Access Control – Authorization

■ Analogy to file systems

□ Objects

- File, directory, ...

□ Subject

- Typically: owner, group, others (all users)

□ Access Right

- Defined on an object O for a subject S
- Typically: read, write, execute

Privileges

■ Database systems

- Typically, finer granularity than the typical file system
- Access rights vary for objects
 - Tables, views, procedures, sequences, schema, database, ...
 - Views are an important tool for access control
- Subjects are typically user and group
 - Often referred as *authorization id* or *role*
 - Subject “others“ is denoted as PUBLIC
 - Granting access for PUBLIC means allowing access to anyone.

Privileges

■ For relations/tables:

□ SELECT

- Query the table's content (i.e., list rows)
- Sometimes can be limited to selects attributes

□ INSERT

- Sometimes can be limited to selects attributes

□ DELETE

□ UPDATE

- Sometimes can be limited to selects attributes

□ REFERENCES

- Create foreign keys referencing this table

Privileges

■ Example

□ INSERT INTO Beers(name)

```
SELECT beer FROM Sells
WHERE NOT EXISTS
  (SELECT * FROM Beers
   WHERE name = beer);
```

We add beers that do not appear in Beers; leaving manufacturer NULL.

□ Requirements for privileges:

- INSERT on the table *Beers*
- SELECT on *Sells* and *Beers*

Privileges

■ Views as Access Control

□ Relation

- Employee(id, name, address, salary)

□ Want to make salary confidential:

- CREATE VIEW EmpAddress AS
SELECT id, name, address
FROM Employee;

■ Privileges:

- Grant SELECT on EmpAddress
- Revoke SELECT from table Employee

Privileges

- Granting privileges

- GRANT <list of privileges>
ON <relation or object>
TO <list of authorization ID's>;

- You may also grant “grant privilege”

- By appending clause “WITH GRANT OPTION”
 - GRANT SELECT
ON TABLE EmpAddress
TO joe
WITH GRANT OPTION

Privileges


- Example (to be run as owner of *sells*)
 - GRANT SELECT, UPDATE(price)
ON *sells* TO *sally*;
- User *sally* can
 - Read (select) from table *sells*
 - Update values in attribute *price*

Privileges

- Example (to be run as owner of *sells*)
 - GRANT UPDATE ON *sells* TO *sally*
WITH GRANT OPTION;
- User *sally* can
 - Update values of any attribute in *sells*
 - Grant access to other users
 - Only UPDATE can be granted but can be limited to some attributes.

Privileges – Diagram

- Diagram depict privileges granted by a grantor to a grantee



- Each object has its diagram
- Node is specified by
 1. Role (user / group)
 2. Granted privilege
 3. Flag of ownership or granting option
- Edge from X to Y
 - Role X has granted the privilege to role Y.

Privileges – Diagram

- „*root,all*“ denotes
 - user *root* has privilege *all*.
- Privilege „*all*“ on table means
 - = insert, update, delete, select, references
- Grant option “*“
 - The privilege can be granted by the user
- Option “**“
 - Object owner (root node of each diagram)
- Object owner
 - All is granted by default
 - Can pass the privileges to other users


Privileges – Testing for Access

- DBMS grants User C the privilege Q as long as there is a path from XP^{**} to OP , OP^* or OP^{**} .

□ where

- P is a superprivilege of Q or the same as Q , and
- $O = C$ or C is a member of group O

joe\$ SELECT * FROM T WHERE A=5;



Privileges

- Revoking statement

- REVOKE <list of privileges>
ON <relation or object>
FROM <list of authorization ID's>;

- Can listed users no longer use the privileges?

- But they may still have the privilege

- → because they obtained it independently from elsewhere.

- Or they are members of a group or PUBLIC is applied

Privileges

■ Revoking privileges

□ Appending to REVOKE statement:

- CASCADE – Now, any grants made by a revokee are also not in force, no matter how far the privilege was passed
- RESTRICT (implicit)
 - If the privilege has been passed to others, the REVOKE fails as a warning
 - So, something else must be done to “chase the privilege down.”

□ REVOKE GRANT OPTION FOR [select, update, ...] ...

- Removes only the “grant option”.
 - Omitting this prefix leads to removing the privilege and also the grant option!

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 - Attack on DB
- Spatial data
 - Data types, indexing

Stored Procedures

- User-defined program implementing an activity
 - E.g., factorial computation, distance between GPS coords, inserting rows to multiple tables, ...
- PostgreSQL
 - `CREATE FUNCTION name ([parameters,...])
[RETURNS type]
...code...`

Stored Procedures

■ Example:

- Compute average salary without revealing the individual salaries

- Table Employee(id, name, address, salary)

- PostgreSQL:

- CREATE FUNCTION avgSal() RETURNS real
AS 'SELECT avg(salary) FROM employee'
LANGUAGE SQL;

- User executes the procedure (function):

- SELECT avgSal();

Stored Procedures

■ Example (cont.):

- Salaries are not *secured*

- To secure we need to

- REVOKE SELECT ON Employee FROM ...

- GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION avgсал() TO ...

- By running “SELECT avgсал();” the procedure is executed with privileges of current user.

- → it needs SELECT on Employee!

Stored Procedures

■ Context of execution

- Can be set during procedure creation

- Types:

- **INVOKER** – run in the context of user that calls the function (typically current user)
- **DEFINER** – run in the context of the owner of function
- „**particular user**“ – run in the context of the selected user
- ...

Stored Procedures

- Execution context in PostgreSQL
 - SECURITY INVOKER
 - SECURITY DEFINER
- Solution: set the context to owner
 - CREATE FUNCTION LANGUAGE SQL
SECURITY DEFINER;
 - Assumption: owner has the SELECT privilege to Employee

Attacks to DB system

■ Network connection

- DB port open to anyone → use firewall
- Unsecured connection
 - Apply SSL

■ Logging in

- Weak password
- Limit users to logging in
 - Allow selected user accounts, IP addresses and databases
- Using one generic (admin) DB account

Attacks to DB system

- SQL injection

- Attack by sending SQL commands in place of valid data in forms.
- Typically related to using only one DB account
 - which is admin)-:

SQL injection: Example

- App presents a form to enter string to update customer's note in DB:

- Internally the app use the following DB statement:

```
UPDATE customer SET note='$note'  
WHERE id='$login';
```

- Malicious user 'johnd' enters to the form:

```
Vader'; --
```

- After variable expansion we get string:

```
UPDATE customer SET note='Vader'; --'  
WHERE id='johnd';
```

SQL injection – another example

- App presents a form to enter string to update customer's note in DB:

- Internally the app use the following DB statement:

```
UPDATE customer SET note='$note'  
WHERE id='$login';
```

- Malicious user 'johnd' enters to the form:

```
Vader'; DROP TABLE customer; --
```

- After variable expansion we get string:

```
UPDATE customer SET note='Vader'; DROP  
TABLE customer; --'  
WHERE id='johnd';
```

All in one line!

SQL Injection: Countermeasures

- Use specific user account
 - Avoid using admin account
- Check input values
 - Input length, escape characters,...
- Functions in programming language
 - *mysql_real_escape_string()*, *add_slashes()*
 - *\$dbh->quote(\$string)*
- Functions in DBMS
 - *quote_literal(str)*
 - returns a string *str* suitably quoted to be used as a string literal in an SQL statement

SQL Injection: Countermeasures

■ Prepared statements

- Parsed statements prepared in DB
 - i.e., compiled templates ready for use
- Values are then substituted
 - Parameters do not need to be quoted then
- May be used repetitively

□ Example:

```
$st = $dbh->prepare("SELECT * FROM emp WHERE name LIKE ?");  
$st->execute(array( "%$_GET[name]%" ));
```


SQL Injection: Countermeasures

- Prepared statements at server-side programming
 - The same concept, but stored in DB
 - Typically, in procedural languages in DB
 - PostgreSQL
 - ```
PREPARE emp_row(text) AS SELECT * FROM emp
WHERE name LIKE $1;
EXECUTE emp_row('%John%');
```
- Query is planned in advance
  - Planning time can be amortized
  - But: the plan is generic!
    - i.e., without any optimization induced by knowing the parameter
  - Lasts only for the duration of the current db session

# Prepared Statements: Performance

- Prepared execution yields better performance when the query is executed more than once:

- No compilation
- No access to catalog.



- Experiment performed on Oracle8iEE on Windows 2000.

# Attacking Views

- Views protect data rows...
  - even if permissions are correctly set
  - E.g., student(studentid, firstname, lastname, fieldofstudy)
    - CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW studentssme AS SELECT \* FROM student WHERE fieldofstudy = 'N-SSME';
  - But, creating a “cheap” function
    - CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION test(name text, study text) RETURNS boolean AS \$\$  
begin  
raise notice 'Name: %, Study: %', name, study;  
return true;  
end;  
\$\$ LANGUAGE plpgsql VOLATILE COST 0.00001;
  - The query leaks other students in a side channel...
    - SELECT \* FROM studentssme WHERE test(lastname, fieldofstudy)
      - NOTICE: Name: Nový, Study: N-AplInf
      - NOTICE: Name: Dlouhý, Study: N-Inf
      - NOTICE: Name: Svoboda, Study: N-AplInf
      - NOTICE: Name: Starý, Study: N-SSME
      - NOTICE: Name: Lukáš, Study: N-SSME
      - ...
- Countermeasures:
  - Ban creating new DB objects.
  - Use security\_barrier in Pg.conf or in create view.

# Contents


- Generating IDs
- DB security
  - Access control in DB
  - Stored procedures
  - Attack on DB
- **Spatial data**
  - **Data types, queries**
  - **Indexing – Quad-tree, Grid index, R-tree**

# Processing Spatial Data

## ■ Spatial data

□ Typically geographic, 2d geometry

■ X, Y coordinates



E.g.,

$\langle X_1, Y_1, \text{Name}_1, \text{Descr}_1 \rangle$

$\langle X_2, Y_2, \text{Name}_2, \text{Descr}_2 \rangle$

...

# Processing Spatial Data

## ■ Spatial queries

- What city is at position  $\langle X_i, Y_i \rangle$ ?
- What is in neighborhood of 5km from position  $\langle X_i, Y_i \rangle$ ?
- What is the closest site to  $\langle X_i, Y_i \rangle$ ?



## ■ Without DBMS support

- How to measure distance?
  - E.g., for GPS coordinates
    - We can create a user-defined function
- (Traditional) Index on  $X$ , or on  $XY$ , ...
  - May not help for some queries

# Processing Spatial Data

- Geometric constructs:

- lines, rectangles, polygons, ...



- Operations:

- Is point inside a polygon? Do polygons intersect?

...



# Processing Spatial Data

- DBMS support is convenient

- Special data types and functions/operators

- PostgreSQL

- Types: point, line, box, circle, ...
      - Functions: area(), center(), length(), ...
      - Operators:  $\sim =$  *same as*,  $\sim$  *contains*,  $? \#$  *intersects*, ...
      - Index: R-tree

- SQL Server 2008

- Types: point, linestring, polygon, geography, ...
      - Index: Grid



- Oracle 9i

- Types: SDO\_GEOMETRY (SDO\_POINT, SDO\_LINE,...)
      - Index: R-tree, Quad-tree

# Processing Spatial Data

## ■ Quad-tree



- Search tree, where each node splits data space into  $2^d$  regions of equal size
  - e.g., 2d data  $\rightarrow$  4 regions
- Leaf nodes may be of larger capacity than 1.



# Processing Spatial Data

## ■ Quad-tree

- Supports points only
- Extension to complex data:
  - Item stored in many regions
  - Complex objects wrapped in rectangle



# Processing Spatial Data


## ■ Grid

□ Bounded data space:  $x_{\min}$ ,  $y_{\min}$ ,  $x_{\max}$ ,  $y_{\max}$

□ SQL Server

■ Grid of fixed dimensions: 4x4, 8x8, 16x16 cells

■ Multiple levels



Source: Microsoft MSDN, <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb964712.aspx>

# Processing Spatial Data


## ■ R-tree (Rectangle Tree)

- Extension of B<sup>+</sup> trees to  $d$ -dimensional data
  - Insertion, deletion – almost identical to B<sup>+</sup> tree
- Leaves may contain more data items
  - List is represented by *minimum bounding rectangle (MBR)*
- Internal nodes
  - References to child nodes and their MBRs
  
- Node MBRs may overlap → search procedure has to follow more colliding tree branches.
- Each data item stored exactly once
  - Advantage over Grid and Quad-tree

# Processing Spatial Data

## ■ R-tree

- Organizing complex spatial data done by wrapping them in MBR.  
(an object<sub>0</sub> is represented as a rectangle)



# Lecture Takeaways

- Primary key value generation
- Securing DB
  - Avoid using admin account for general use
  - Mind “no-action” revoke command and recheck the resulting graph of grants.
- Extensions to more complex data with indexing support