Digital signatures are one of the most important inventions/applications of modern cryptography.

The problem is how can a user sign a message such that everybody (or the intended addressee only) can verify the digital signature and the signature is good enough also for legal purposes.

Example: Assume that each user A uses a public-key cryptosystem (e_A, d_A).

Signing a message w by a user A, so that any user can verify the signature;

$$d_A(w)$$

Signing a message w by a user A so that only user B can verify the signature;

$$e_B(d_A(w))$$

Sending a message w, and a signed message digest of w, obtained by using a hash function h:

$$(w, d_A(h(w)))$$

Example Assume Alice succeeds to factor the integer Bob used, as modulus, to sign his will, using RSA, 20 years ago. Even the key has already expired, Alice can rewrite Bob's will, leaving fortune to her, and date it 20 years ago.

Moral: It may pay of to factor a single integers using many years of many computers power.

Digital sigantures should be such that each user should be able to verify signatures of other users, but that should give him/her no information how to sign a message on behind of other users.

An important difference from a handwritten signature is that digital signature of a message is always intimately connected with the message, and for different messages is different, whereas the handwritten signature is adjoined to the message and always looks the same.

Technically, a digital signature signing is performed by a signing algorithm and a digital signature it is verified by a verification algorithm.

A copy of a digital (classical) signature is identical (usually distinguishable) to (from) the origin. A care has therefore to be made that a classical signature is not misused.

This chapter contains some of the main techniques for design and verification of digital signatures (as well as some attacks to them).

If only signature (but not the encryption of the message) are of importance, then it suffices that Alice sends to Bob

$$(w, d_A(w))$$

Caution: Signing a message w by A for B by

$$e_B(d_A(w))$$

is O.K., but the symmetric solution, with encoding first:

$$c = d_A(e_B(w))$$

is not good.

An active enemy, the <u>tamperer</u>, can intercept the message, then can compute

$$d_T(e_A(c)) = d_T(e_B(w))$$

and send the outcome to Bob, pretending it is from him/tamperer (without being able to decrypt/know the message).

Any public-key cryptosystem in which the plaintext and cryptotext spaces are the same can be used for digital signature.

Digital signatures are basic tools for authentication and non-reputation of messages.

A digital signature scheme allows anyone to verify signature of any sender S without providing any information how to generate signatures of S.

A Digital Signature Scheme (M, S, K_s, K_v) is given by:

– M - a set of messages to be signed
– S - a set of possible signatures
– K_s - a set of private keys for signing
– K_v - a set of public keys for verification

Moreover, it is required that:

– For each k from K_s, there exists a single and easy to compute signing mapping
$$sig_k: \{0,1\}^* \times M \rightarrow S$$
– For each k from K_v there exists a single and easy to compute verification mapping
$$ver_k: M \times S \rightarrow \{true, false\}$$

such that the following two conditions are satisfied:

Correctness:

For each message m from M and public key k in K_v, it holds

$$ver_k(m, s) = true$$

if there is an r from $\{0, 1\}^*$ such that

$$s = sig_l(r, m)$$

for a private key l from K_s corresponding to the public key k .

Security:

For any w from M and k in K_v , it is computationally infeasible, without the knowledge of the private key corresponding to k, to find a signature s from S such that $ver_k(w, s) = true$.

Attacks on digital signatures

Total break of a signature scheme: The adversary manages to recover the secret key from the public key.

Universal forgery: The adversary can derive from the public key an algorithm which allows to forge the signature of any message.

Selective forgery: The adversary can derive from the public key a method to forge signatures of selected messages (where selection was made prior the knowledge of the public key).

Existential forgery: The adversary is able to create from the public key a valid signature of a message m (but has no control for which m).

Let us start with a very simple but much illustrating (though non-practical) example how to sign a single bit.

Design of the signature scheme:

A one-way function f(x) is chosen.

Two integers k_0 and k_1 are chosen, by signer, kept secret, and items

$$f, (0, s_0), (1, s_1)$$

are made public, where

$$s_0 = f(k_0), s_1 = f(k_1)$$

Signature of a bit b:

$$(b, k_b).$$

Verification of such a signature

$$s_b = f(k_b)$$

SECURITY?

Let us have an RSA cryptosystem with encryption and decryption exponents *e* and *d*.

Signing of a message *w*: $s = (w, \sigma),\ \text{where } \sigma = w^d$

Verification of a signature $s = (w, \sigma):$

$$w = \sigma^e\ ?$$

Attacks

• It might happen that Bob accepts a signature not produced by Alice. Indeed, let Eve, using Alice's public key, compute w^e and say that (w^e, w) is a message signed by Alice.

Everybody verifying Alice's signature gets $w^e = w^e$.

• Some new signatures can be produced without knowing the secret key.

Indeed, is σ_1 and σ_2 are signatures for w_1 and w_2, then $\sigma_1 \sigma_2$ and σ_1^{-1} are signatures for $w_1 w_2$ and w_1^{-1}.

Let each user U uses a cryptosystem with encryption and decryption algorithms: e_U, d_U

Let w be a message

PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

Encryption: $e_U(w)$

Decryption: $d_U(e_U(w))$

PUBLIC-KEY SIGNATURES

Signing: $d_U(w)$

Verification of the signature: $e_U(d_U(w))$

A digital signature system (DSS) consists:

- P - the space of possible plaintexts (messages).
- S - the space of possible signatures.
- K - the space of possible keys.

- For each $k \in K$ there is a signing algorithm $sig_k \in S_a$ and a corresponding verification algorithm $ver_k \in V$ such that

- $sig_k : P \rightarrow S$.
- $ver_k : P \otimes S \rightarrow \{true, false\}$

and

$$ver_k (w,s) = \begin{cases} \text{true, if } s = sig (w); \\ \text{false, otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Algorithms sig_k and ver_k should be computable in polynomial time.

Verification algorithm can be publically known; signing algorithm (actually only its key) should be kept secret.

Any public-key cryptosystem in which the plaintext and cryptotext space are the same, can be used for digital signature.

Signing of a message w by a user A so that any user can verify the signature:

$$d_A(w).$$

Signing of a message w by a user A so that only user B can verify the signature;

$$e_B(d_A(w)).$$

Sending of a message w and a signed message digest of w obtained by using a (standard) hash function h:

$$(w, d_A(h(w))).$$

If only signature (but not the encryption of the message) are of importance, then it suffices that Alice sends to Bob

$$(w, d_A(w)).$$

Design of the ElGamal digital siganture system: choose: prime p, integers $1 \le q \le x \le p$, where q is a primitive element of $Z_p{}^*$;

Compute: $y = q^x \bmod p$

key K = (p, q, x, y)
public key (p, q, y) - **trapdoor**: x

Signature of a message w: Let $r \in Z_{p-1}{}^*$ be randomly chosen and kept secret.

$$sig(w, r) = (a, b),$$

where $\qquad a = q^r \bmod p$

and $\qquad b = (w - xa)r^{-1} \ (\bmod \ (p-1)).$

Verification: accept a signature (a,b) of w as valid if

$$y^a a^b \equiv q^w \ (\bmod \ p)$$

(Indeed: $y^a a^b \equiv q^{ax} q^{rb} \equiv q^{ax + w - ax + k(p-1)} \equiv q^w \ (\bmod \ p)$)

Example   choose: $p = 11$, $q = 2$, $x = 8$

compute: $y = 2^8 \bmod 11 = 3$

Signing of $w = 5$ as (a,b), where $a = q^r \bmod p$, $w = xa + rb \bmod (p-1)$

choose r = 9 – (this choice is O.K.   because gcd(9, 10) = 1)

compute $a = 2^9 \bmod 11 = 6$

solve equation: $5 \equiv 8 \cdot 6 + 9b \pmod{10}$

that is $7 \equiv 9b \pmod{10} \Rightarrow b = 3$

signature: (6, 3)

Note: equation that has to be solved: $w = xa + rb \bmod (p-1)$.

Let us analyze several ways an eavesdropper Eve can try to forge ElGamal signature (with x - secret; p, q and $y = q^x \bmod p$ - public):

$$sig(w, r) = (a, b);$$

where r is random and $a = q^r \bmod p$; $b = (w - xa)r^{-1} \pmod{p - 1}$.

1. First suppose Eve tries to forge signature for a new message w, without knowing x.

• If Eve first chooses a value a and tries to find the corresponding b, it has to compute the discrete logarithm

$$\lg_a q^w y^{-a},$$

because $a^b \equiv q^{r(w - xa)r^{-1}} \equiv q^{w - xa} \equiv q^w y^{-a}$.

• If Eve first chooses b and then tries to find a, she has to solve the equation

$$y^a a^b \equiv q^{xa} q^{rb} \equiv q^w \pmod{p}.$$

It is not known whether this equation can be solved for a given a efficiently.

2. If Eve chooses a and b and tries to determine w, then she has to compute discrete logarithm

$$\lg_q y^a a^b.$$

Hence, Eve can not sign a "random" message this way.

There are ways how to produce, using ElGamal signature scheme, some valid forged signatures, but they do not allow an opponent to forge signatures on messages of his/her choice.

For example, if $0 \le i, j \le p - 2$ and $\gcd(j, p - 1) = 1$, then for

$$a = q^{\,i}\, y^{\,j} \bmod p; \quad b = -aj^{-1} \bmod (p-1); \quad w = -aij^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$$

the pair

$$(a, b) \text{ is a valid signature of the message } w.$$

This can be easily shown by checking the verification condition.

There are several ways ElGamal signatures can be broken if they are used not carefully enough.

For example, the random r used in the signature should be kept secret. Otherwise the system can be broken and signatures forged. Indeed, if r is known, then x can be computed by

$$x = (w - rb)\, a^{-1} \bmod (p - 1)$$

and once x is known Eve can forge signatures at will.

Another misuse of the ElGamal signature system is to use the same r to sign two messages. In such a case x can be computed and system can be broken.

In December 1994, on the proposal of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the following Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) was accepted as a standard.

Design of DSA

1. The following global public key components are chosen:

• p - a random l-bit prime, $512 \leq l \leq 1024$, $l = 64k$.

• q - a random 160-bit prime dividing p -1.

• $r = h^{(p-1)/q}$ mod p, where h is a random primitive element of Z_p, such that r>1
  (observe that r is a q-th root of 1 mod p). $r \neq 1$

2. The following user's private key components are chosen:

• x - a random integer, $0 < x < q$,

• $y = r^x$ mod p.

3. Key is $K = (p, q, r, x, y)$

Signing and Verification

Signing of a 160-bit plaintext w

- choose random $0 < k < q$ such that $\gcd(k, q) = 1$
- compute $a = (r^k \bmod p) \bmod q$
- compute $b = k^{-1}(w + xa) \bmod q$ where $kk^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$
- signature: $sig(w, k) = (a, b)$

Verification of signature (a, b)

- compute $z = b^{-1} \bmod q$
- compute $u_1 = wz \bmod q$,

    $u_2 = az \bmod q$

verification:

$$ver_K(w, a, b) = \text{true} <=> (r^{u1} y^{u2} \bmod p) \bmod q = a$$

DSA is a modification of ElGamal digital signature scheme. It was proposed in August 1991 and adopted in December 1994.

Any proposal for digital signature standard has to go through a very careful scrutiny. Why?

Encryption of a message is usually done only once and therefore it usually suffices to use a cryptosystem that is secure **at the time of the encryption**.

On the other hand, a signed message could be a contract or a will and it can happen that it will be needed to verify a signature **many years after the message is signed**.

Since ElGamal signature is no more secure than discrete logarithm, it is necessary to use large p, with at least 512 bits.

However, with ElGamal this would lead to signatures with at least 1024 bits what is too much for such applications as smart cards.

In DSA a 160 bit message is signed using 320-bit signature, but computation is done modulo with 512-1024 bits.

Observe that y and a are also q-roots of 1. Hence any exponents of r, y and a can be reduced module q without affecting the verification condition.

This allowed to change ElGamal verification condition: $y^a a^b = q^w$.

Choose primes p, q, compute $n = pq$ and choose:

as public key $v_1,\ldots,v_k$ and compute secret key $\quad s_1,\ldots,s_k, s_i = \sqrt{v_i^{-1}} \bmod n.$

Protocol for Alice to sign a message w:

(1) Alice chooses t random integers $1 \le r_1,\ldots,r_t < n$, computes $x_i = r_i^2 \bmod n$, $1 \le i \le t$.

(2) Alice uses a publically known hash function h to compute

$$H = h(wx_1x_2\ldots x_t)$$

and then uses first kt bits of H, denoted as b_{ij}, $1 \le i \le t$, $1 \le j \le k$ as follows.

(3) Alice computes $y_1,\ldots,y_t$ $\qquad y_i = r_i \prod_{j=1}^{k} s_j^{b_{ij}} \bmod n$

(4) Alice sends to Bob w, all b_{ij} all y_i and also h

{ Bob already knows Alice's public key $\qquad v_1,\ldots,v_k$ }

(5) Bob computes $z_1,\ldots,z_k$ $\qquad z_i = y_i^2 \prod_{j=1}^{k} v_j^{b_{ij}} \bmod n = r_i^2 \prod_{j=1}^{k}\left(v_j^{-1}\right)^{b_{ij}} \prod_{j=1}^{k} v_j^{b_{ij}} = r_i^2 = x_i$

and verifies that the first $k \times t$ bits of $h(wx_1x_2\ldots x_t)$ are the b_{ij} values that Alice has sent to him.

Security of this signature scheme is 2^{-kt}.

Advantage over the RSA-based signature scheme: only about 5% of modular multiplications are needed.

Sad story

Alice and Bob got to jail – and, unfortunately, to different jails.

Walter, the warden, allows them to communicate by network, but he will not allow that their messages are encrypted.

Problem: Can Alice and Bob set up a subliminal channel, a covert communications channel between them, in full view of Walter, even though the messages themselves that they exchange contain no secret information?

Story Alice and Bob are in different jails. Walter, the warden, allows them to communicate by network, but he will not allow messages to be encrypted. Can they set up a <u>subliminal channel</u>, a covert communications channel between them, in full view of Walter, even though the messages themselves contain no secret information?

Yes. Alice and Bob create first the following communication scheme:

They choose a large n and an integer k such that $\gcd(n, k) = 1$.

They calculate $h = k^{-2} \bmod n = (k^{-1})^2 \bmod n$.

Public key: h, n

Trapdoor information: k

Let secret message Alice wants to send be w (it has to be such that $\gcd(w, n) = 1$)

Denote a harmless message she uses by w' (it has to be such that $\gcd(w', n) = 1$)

Signing by Alice:

$$S_1 = \tfrac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\tfrac{w'}{w} + w \right) \bmod n$$

$$S_2 = \tfrac{k}{2} \cdot \left(\tfrac{w'}{w} - w \right) \bmod n$$

Signature: (S_1, S_2). Alice then sends to Bob (w', S_1, S_2)

Signature verification by Walter: $w' = S_1^2 - hS_2^2 \pmod n$

Decryption by Bob: $w = \dfrac{w'}{\left(S_1 + k^{-1} S_2 \right)} \bmod n$.

Lamport signature scheme shows how to construct a signature scheme for one use only from any one-way function.

Let k be a positive integer and let $P = \{0,1\}^k$ be the set of messages.
Let $f: Y \to Z$ be a one-way function where Y is a set of `"signatures".

For $1 \leq i \leq k$, $j = 0,1$ let $y_{ij} \in Y$ be chosen randomly and $z_{ij} = f(y_{ij})$.

The key K consists of $2k$ y's and z's. y's are secret, z's are public.

Signing of a message $x = x_1 \ldots x_k \in \{0,1\}^k$

$$sig(x_1 \ldots x_k) = (y_{1,x1}, \ldots, y_{k,xk}) = (a_1, \ldots, a_k) \text{ - notation}$$

and

$$ver_K(x_1 \ldots x_k, a_1, \ldots, a_k) = true \iff f(a_i) = z_{i,xi}, \; 1 \leq i \leq k$$

Eve cannot forge a signature because she is unable to invert one-way functions.

Important note: Lampert signature scheme can be used to sign only one message.

Undeniable signatures I

Undeniable signatures are signatures that have two properties:

- A signature can be verified only at the cooperation with the signer – by means of a challenge-and-response protocol.
- The signer cannot deny a correct signature. To achieve that, steps are a part of the protocol that force the signer to cooperate – by means of a disavowal protocol – this protocol makes possible to prove the invalidity of a signature and to show that it is a forgery. (If the signer refuses to take part in the disavowal protocol, then the signature is considered to be genuine.)

Undeniable signature protocol of Chaum and van Antwerpen (1989), discussed next, is again based on infeasibility of the computation of the discrete logarithm.

Undeniable signatures consist:

- Signing algorithm
- Verification protocol, that is a *challenge-and-response protocol*.

In this case it is required that a signature cannot be verified without a cooperation of the signer (Bob).

This protects Bob against the possibility that documents signed by him are duplicated and distributed without his approval.

- Disavowal protocol, by which Bob can prove that a signature is a forgery.

This is to prevent Bob from disavowing a signature he made at an earlier time.

Chaum-van Antwerpen undeniable signature schemes (CAUSS)

- p, r are primes $p = 2r + 1$
- $q \in Z_p^*$ is of order r;
- $1 \leq x \leq r - 1$, $y = q^x \bmod p$;
- G is a multiplicative subgroup of Z_p^* of order q (G consists of quadratic residues modulo p).

Key space: $K = \{p, q, x, y\}$; p, q, y are public, $x \in G$ is secret.

Signature: $s = sig_K(w) = w^x \bmod p$.

Since it holds:

Theorem If $s \neq w^x \bmod p$, then Alice will accept s as a valid signature for w with probability $1/r$.

Bob cannot fool Alice except with very small probability and security is unconditional (that is, it does not depend on any computational assumption).

Disallowed protocol

Basic idea: After receiving a signature s Alice initiates two independent and unsuccessful runs of the verification protocol. Finally, she performs a "consistency check" to determine whether Bob has formed his responses according to the protocol.

- Alice $e_1, e_2 \in Z_r^*$.
- Alice computes $c = s^{e1} y^{e2} \bmod p$ and sends it to Bob.
- Bob computes $d = c^{x^{\wedge}(-1) \bmod r} \bmod p$ and sends it to Alice.
- Alice verifies that $d \neq w^{e1} q^{e2} \pmod{p}$.
- Alice $f_1, f_2 \in Z_r^*$.
- Alice computes $C = s^{f1} y^{f2} \bmod p$ and sends it to Bob.
- Bob computes $D = C^{x^{\wedge}(-1) \bmod r} \bmod p$ and sends it to Alice.

- Alice verifies that $D \neq w^{f1} q^{f2} \pmod{p}$.
- Alice concludes that s is a forgery iff

$$(dq^{-e2})^{f1} \equiv (Dq^{-f2})^{e1} \pmod{p}.$$

CONCLUSIONS

It can be shown:

Bob can convince Alice that an invalid signature is a forgery. In order to that it is sufficient to show that if $s \neq w^x$, then

$$(dq^{-e2})^{f1} \equiv (Dq^{-f2})^{e1} \pmod{p}$$

what can be done using congruency relation from the design of the signature system and from the disallowed protocol.

Bob cannot make Alice believe that a valid signature is a forgery, except with a very small probability.

Signatures scheme presented so far allow to sign only "short" messages. For example, DSS is used to sign 160 bit messages (with 320-bit signatures).

A naive solution is to break long message into a sequence of shortones and to sign each block separately.

Disadvantages: signing is slow and for long signatures integrity is not protected.

The solution is to use fast public **hash functions h** which maps a message of any length to a fixed length hash. The hash is then signed.

Example:

message	w	arbitrary length
message digest	$z = h(w)$	160bits
El Gamal signature	$y = sig(z)$	320bits

If Bob wants to send a signed message w he sends $(w, sig(h(w))$.

For a hash function it is necessary to be good enough for creating fingerprints that do not allow various forgeries of signatures.

Example 1, Eve starts with a valid signature (w, $sig(h(w))$), computes $h(w)$ and tries to find w' such that $h(w) = h(w')$. Would she succeed, then

$$(w', sig(h(w)))$$

would be a valid signature, a **forgery**.

In order to prevent the above type of attacks, and some other, it is required that a hash function h satisfies the following **collision-free property**.

Definition A hash function h is strongly collision-free if it is computationally infeasible to find messages w and w' such that $h(w) = h(w')$.

Example 2: Eve computes a signature y on a random fingerprint z and then find an x such that $z = h(x)$. Would she succeed (x,y) would be a valid signature.

In order to prevent the above attack, it is required that in signatures we use one-way hash functions.

It is not difficult to show that for hash-functions (strong) collision-free property implies the one-way property.

There are various ways that a digital signature can be compromised.

For example: if Eve determines the secret key of Bob, then she can forge signatures of any Bob's message she likes. If this happens, authenticity of all messages signed by Bob before Eve got the secret key is to be questioned.

The key problem is that there is no way to determine when a message was signed.

A timestamping should provide proof that a message was signed at a certain time.

A method for timestamping of signatures:

In the following *pub* denotes some publically known information that could not be predicted before the day of the signature (for example, stock-market data).

Timestamping by Bob of a signature on a message *w, using a hash function h.*

- Bob computes $z = h(w)$;
- Bob computes $z' = h(z \,||\, pub)$;
- Bob computes $y = sig(z')$;
- Bob publishes (z, *pub*, y) in the next days's newspaper.

It is now clear that signature was not be done after triple (z, *pub*, y) was published, but also not before the date *pub* was known.

Blind signatures

The basic idea is that Sender makes Signer to sign a message m without Signer knowing m, therefore blindly – this is needed in e-commerce.

Blind signing can be realized by a two party protocol, between the Sender and the Signer, that has the following properties.

- In order to sign (by a Signer) a message m, the Sender computes, using a blinding procedure, from m an $m*$ from which m can not be obtained without knowing a secret, and sends $m*$ to the Signer.
- The Signer signs $m*$ to get a signature s_{m*} (of m*) and sends s_{m*} to the Sender. Signing is done in such a way that the Sender can afterwards compute, using an unblinding procedure, from Signer's signature s_{m*} of $m*$ -- the signer signature s_m of m.

Chum's blind signatures

This blind signature protocol combines RSA with blinding/unblinding features.

Bob's RSA public key is *(n,e)* and his private key is *d*.
Let *m* be a message, *0 < m < n*,

PROTOCOL:

- Alice chooses a random *0 < k < n* with *gcd(n,k)=1*.
- Alice computes *m* = mk^e (**mod** n)* and sends it to Bob (this way Alice blinds the message m).
- Bob computed *s* = (m*)^d(**mod** n)* and sends *s** to Alice (this way Bob signs the blinded message *m**).
- Alice computes *s = k^{-1}s*(**mod** n)* to obtain Bob's signature m^d of m (Alice performs unblinding of m*).

Verification is equivalent to that of the RSA signature scheme.

Fail-then-stop signatures

They are signatures schemes that use a trusted authority and provide ways to prove, if it is the case, that a powerful enough adversary is around who could break the signature scheme and therefore its use should be stopped.

The scheme is maintained by a trusted authority that chooses a secret key for each signer, keeps them secret, even from the signers themselves, and announces only the related public keys.

An important idea is that signing and verification algorithms are enhanced by
a so-called proof-of-forgery algorithm. When the signer see a forged signature he is able to compute his secret key and by submitting it to the trusted authority to prove the existence of a forgery and this way to achieve that any further use of the signature scheme is stopped.

So called Heyst-Pedersen Scheme is an example of a Fail-Then-Stop siganture Scheme.

Digital signatures with encryption and resending

1. Alice signs the message: $s_A(w)$.

2. Alice encrypts the signed message: $e_B(s_A(w))$.

3. Bob decrypt the signed message: $d_B(e_B(s_A(w))) = s_A(w)$.

4. Bob verifies signature and recovers the message $v_A(s_A(w)) = w$.

Resending the message as a receipt

5. Bob signs and encrypts the message and sends to Alice $e_A(s_B(w))$.

6. Alice decrypts the message and verifies the signature.

Assume now: $v_x = e_x$, $s_x = d_x$ for all users x.

1. Mallot intercept $e_B(s_A(w))$.

2. Later Mallot sends $e_B(s_A(w))$ to Bob pretending it is from him (from Mallot).

3. Bob decrypts and "verifies" the message by computing

$$e_M(d_B(e_B(d_A(w)))) = e_M(d_A(w))$$ - a garbage.

4. Bob goes on with the protocol and reterns Mallot the receipt:

$$e_M(d_B(e_M(d_A(w))))$$

5. Mallot can then get w.

 Indeed,   Mallot can compute $$e_A(d_M(e_B(d_M(e_M(d_B(e_M(d_A(w)))))))) = w.$$

A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE attack

Consider the following protocol:

1. Alice sends Bob the pair $(e_B(e_B(w)A), B)$ to B.
2. Bob uses d_B to get A and w, and acknowledges by sending the pair $(e_A(e_A(w)B), A)$ to Alice.

(Here the function e and d are assumed to operate on numbers, names $A, B, \ldots$ are sequences of digits and $e_B(w)A$ is a sequence of digitals obtained by concatenating $e_B(w)$ and A.)

What can an active eavesdropper C do?

- C can learn $(e_A(e_A(w) B), A)$ and therefore $e_A(w')$, $w' = e_A(w)B$.
- C can now send to Alice the pair $(e_A(e_A(w') C), A)$.
- Alice, thinking that this is the step 1 of the protocol, acknowledges by sending the pair $(e_C(e_C(w') A), C)$ to C.
- C is now able to learn w' and therefore also $e_A(w)$.
- C now sends to Alice the pair $(e_A(e_A(w) C), A)$.
- Alice acknowledges by sending the pair $(e_C(e_C(w) A), C)$.
- C is now able to learn w.

Let us have integers *k, l, n* such that *k+l< n*, a permutation

$$f : D \to D, \ D \subset \{0,1\}^n,$$

a pseudorandom bit generator

$$G : \{0,1\}^l \to \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{n-(l+k)}, \ w \to (G_1(w), G_2(w))$$

and a hash function

$$h: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^l.$$

The following PSS scheme is applicable to messages of arbitrary length.

Signing: of a message $w \in \{0,1\}^*$.

1. Choose random $r \in \{0,1\}^k$ and compute $m = h(w \,||\, r)$.
2. Compute $G(m) = (G_1(m), G_2(m))$ and $y = m \,||\, (G_1(m) \oplus r) \,||\, G_2(m)$.
3. Signature of *w* is $\sigma = f^{-1}(y)$.

Verification of a signed message (w, σ).

• Compute $f(\sigma)$ and decompose $f(\sigma) = m \,||\, t \,||\, u$, where $|m| = l$, $|t| = k$ and $|u| = n - (k+l)$.

• Compute $r = t \oplus G_1(m)$.

• Accept signature σ if $h(w \,||\, r) = m$ and $G_2(m) = u$; otherwise reject it.

Let each user U have a signature algorithm s_U and a verification algorithm v_U.

The following protocol allows Alice and Bob to establish a key K to use with an encryption function e_K and to avoid the man-in-the-middle attack.

1. Alice and Bob choose large prime p and a generator $q \in Z_p{}^*$.
2. Alice chooses a random x and Bob chooses a random y.
3. Alice computes $q^x \bmod p$, and Bob computes $q^y \bmod p$.
4. Alice sends q^x to Bob.
5. Bob computes $K = q^{xy} \bmod p$.
6. Bob sends q^y and $e_K(s_B(q^y, q^x))$ to Alice.
7. Alice computes $K = q^{xy} \bmod p$.
8. Alice decrypts $e_K(s_B(q^y, q^x))$ to obtain $s_B(q^y, q^x)$.
9. Alice verifies, using an authority, that v_B is Bob's verification algorithm.
10. Alice uses v_B to verify Bob's signature.
11. Alice sends $e_K(s_A(q^x, q^y))$ to Bob.
12. Bob decrypts, verifies v_A, and verifies Alice's signature.

An enhanced version of the above protocol is known as Station-to-Station protocol.

It is very non-trivial to define security of digital signature.

Definition A <u>chosen message attack</u> is a process which on an input of a verification key can obtain a signature (corresponding to the given key) to a message of its choice.

A chosen message attack is considered to be successful (in so called existential forgery) if it outputs a valid signature for a message for which it has not requested a signature during the attack.

A signature scheme is secure (or unforgeable) if every feasible chosen message attack succeeds with at most negligible probability.

Treshold Signature Schemes

The idea of a *(t+1, n) treshold signature scheme* is to distribute the power of the signing operation to *(t+1)* parties out of *n*.

A *(t+1)* treshold signature scheme should satisfy two conditions.

Unforgeability means that even if an adversary corrupts *t* parties, he still cannot generate a valid signature.

Robustness means that corrupted parties cannot prevent uncorrupted parties to generate signatures.

Shoup (2000) presented an efficient, non-interactive, robust and unforgeable treshold RSA signature schemes.

There is no proof yet whether Shoup's scheme is provably secure.

Can we make digital signatures by digitalizing our usual signature and attaching them to the messages (documents) that need to be signed?

No, because such signatures could be easily removed and attached to some other documents or messages.

Key observation: Digital signatures have to depend not only on the signer, but also on the message that is being signed.

• Append-Only Signatures (AOS) have the property that any party given an AOS signature $sig[M_1]$ on message M_1 can compute $sig[M_1 \text{ll } M_2]$ for any message M_2. (Such signatures are of importance in network applications, where users need to delegate their shares of resources to other users).

• Identity-Based signatures (IBS) at which the identity of the signer (i.e. her email address) plays the role of her public key. (Such schemes assume the existence of a TA holding a master public-private key pair used to assign secret keys to users based on their identity.)

• Hierarchically Identity-Based Signatures are such IBS in which users are arranged in a hierarchy and a user at any level at the hierarchy can delegate secret keys to her descendants based on their identities and her own secret keys.

• At Group Signatures (GS) a group member can compute a signature that reveals nothing about the signer's identity, except that he is a member of the group. On the other hand, the group manager can always reveal the identity of the signer.

• Hierarchical Group Signatures (HGS) are a generalization of GS that allow multiple group managers to be organized in a tree with the signers as leaves. When verifying a signature, a group manager only learns to which of its subtrees, if any, the signer belongs.

Any of the digital signature schemes introduced so far can be forged by anyone having enough computer power.

Caum and Rojakkers (2001) developed, for any fixed set of users, an unconditionally secure signature scheme with the following properties:

• Any participant can convince (except with exponentially small probability) any other participant that his signature is valid.

• A convinced partipant can convince any other participant of the signature's validity, without interaction with the original signer.