

## 2007 - Exercises IX.

1. Alice wants to login to a computer system and needs to communicate her password to the system.

Alice uses a wireless keyboard but her husband Bob has infected her computer by a key-logger program. Bob also intercepts wireless communication between the keyboard and the computer. However, neither Alice's display nor the connection between Alice's computer and the system can be monitored.

Propose a simple protocol that allows Alice to securely authenticate to the system.

2. Let CBC-MAC be of the following form:

$$\text{CBC-MAC}_k = f_k(f_k(\dots f_k(f_k(m_1) \oplus m_2) \dots \oplus m_{n-1}) \oplus m_n),$$

where  $f_k : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  is an encryption function with a key  $k$  and  $m = m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_n$  is a message of length  $nm$ .

- (a) Show that CBC-MAC is not secure if messages can be of varying lengths. (Show that if messages have variable length then it is possible to mount a chosen message attack, *ie.* given valid MACs for messages  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N$ , an attacker can produce a valid MAC for a new message  $M \neq M_i$ .)
- (b) Suppose that we append the length of the message,  $l$ , as an extra block at the end ( $m = m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_n || l$ ), before computing the MAC. Show that it is still possible to mount a chosen message attack.

3. Consider a generic secret sharing scheme.

A dealer  $D$  wants to share a secret  $s$  between  $n$  parties so that  $t$  of them have no information about  $s$ , but  $t + 1$  of them can reconstruct the secret.

Let  $v$  denote the number of possible values of  $s$  and let  $w$  denote the number of different possible share values that a given party might receive, as  $s$  varies. Assume that  $w$  is the same for each party.

What is the relation between  $v$  and  $w$ ? Explain.

4. There are four people in a room and exactly one of them is an adversary. The other three people share a secret using Shamir's  $(3, 2)$ -secret sharing scheme over  $\mathbb{Z}_{11}$ . The adversary has randomly chosen a pair of numbers for himself. The four pairs are  $(x_1, y_1) = (1, 4)$ ,  $(x_2, y_2) = (3, 7)$ ,  $(x_3, y_3) = (5, 1)$  and  $(x_4, y_4) = (7, 2)$ .

Determine which pair was created by the adversary. Determine also the shared secret. Explain your reasoning.

5. Let  $p$  be a large prime and let  $n < p$ ,  $t \leq n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

Propose a protocol which enables  $n$  parties to collectively choose a secret random number  $s \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$ . After executing the protocol the parties should share  $s$  using Shamir's  $(n, t)$ -secret sharing scheme.

6. Suppose that Alice uses the Okamoto identification scheme with  $p = 88667$ ,  $q = 1031$ ,  $\alpha_1 = 58902$  and  $\alpha_2 = 73611$ .
- Alice chooses exponents  $a_1 = 846$  and  $a_2 = 515$ . Compute in detail  $v$ .
  - Alice chooses exponents  $k_1 = 899$  and  $k_2 = 16$ . Compute in detail  $\gamma$ .
  - Bob sends the challenge  $r = 489$  to Alice. Compute in detail Alice's response  $y_1$  and  $y_2$ .
  - Perform Bob's calculations to verify  $y_1$  and  $y_2$ .
7. Consider the following protocol, involving a dealer and  $n$  recipients, for distributing information.

Framework of the protocol is the following:

- Let  $t$  be a fixed number,  $0 \leq t \leq n$ .
- Each participant can send a private message to any other participant.
- The dealer begins with information  $v$ .
- After execution of the protocol, each recipient either accepts or rejects.
- The dealer and/or up to  $t$  recipients may cheat.

Steps of the protocol are as follows:

- The dealer sends  $v$  to each recipient.
- Each recipient sends to each other recipient the value received in the previous step.
- Each recipient verifies whether more than  $t$  of the values received in the previous step are different from the value received in the first step. If more than  $t$  values are different, it sends a complaint to each recipient.
- Each recipient accepts if it receives at most  $t$  complaints (including its own). Otherwise the recipient rejects.

Answer the following questions. Explain your reasoning.

- Suppose that the dealer is honest. For which  $t$  every honest recipient accepts?
- Suppose that the dealer cheats. For which  $t$  the honest recipients either all accept or all reject?
- Suppose that no recipient complains in the third step. For which  $t$  all honest recipients have the same value from the dealer after the protocol has finished?
- Suppose that the recipients later reconstruct the dealer's value by sending their values to a trusted (and honest) party who decides by majority. Suppose further that the dealer is honest. For which  $t$  the values which the cheating recipients send to the trusted party cannot influence the outcome of the reconstruction?