

2007 - Exercises IX.

1. Alice wants to login to a computer system and needs to communicate her password to the system.

Alice uses a wireless keyboard but her husband Bob has infected her computer by a key-logger program. Bob also intercepts wireless communication between the keyboard and the computer. However, neither Alice's display nor the connection between Alice's computer and the system can be monitored.

Propose a simple protocol that allows Alice to securely authenticate to the system.

2. Let CBC-MAC be of the following form:

$$\text{CBC-MAC}_k = f_k(f_k(\dots f_k(f_k(m_1) \oplus m_2) \dots \oplus m_{n-1}) \oplus m_n),$$

where $f_k : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ is an encryption function with a key k and $m = m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_n$ is a message of length nm .

- (a) Show that CBC-MAC is not secure if messages can be of varying lengths. (Show that if messages have variable length then it is possible to mount a chosen message attack, *ie.* given valid MACs for messages M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N , an attacker can produce a valid MAC for a new message $M \neq M_i$.)
 - (b) Suppose that we append the length of the message, l , as an extra block at the end ($m = m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_n || l$), before computing the MAC. Show that it is still possible to mount a chosen message attack.
3. Consider a generic secret sharing scheme.
A dealer D wants to share a secret s between n parties so that t of them have no information about s , but $t + 1$ of them can reconstruct the secret.
Let v denote the number of possible values of s and let w denote the number of different possible share values that a given party might receive, as s varies. Assume that w is the same for each party.
What is the relation between v and w ? Explain.
 4. There are four people in a room and exactly one of them is an adversary. The other three people share a secret using Shamir's $(3, 2)$ -secret sharing scheme over \mathbb{Z}_{11} . The adversary has randomly chosen a pair of numbers for himself. The four pairs are $(x_1, y_1) = (1, 4)$, $(x_2, y_2) = (3, 7)$, $(x_3, y_3) = (5, 1)$ and $(x_4, y_4) = (7, 2)$.
Determine which pair was created by the adversary. Determine also the shared secret. Explain your reasoning.
 5. Let p be a large prime and let $n < p$, $t \leq n \in \mathbb{N}$.
Propose a protocol which enables n parties to collectively choose a secret random number $s \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$. After executing the protocol the parties should share s using Shamir's (n, t) -secret sharing scheme.

6. Suppose that Alice uses the Okamoto identification scheme with $p = 88667$, $q = 1031$, $\alpha_1 = 58902$ and $\alpha_2 = 73611$.
- Alice chooses exponents $a_1 = 846$ and $a_2 = 515$. Compute in detail v .
 - Alice chooses exponents $k_1 = 899$ and $k_2 = 16$. Compute in detail γ .
 - Bob sends the challenge $r = 489$ to Alice. Compute in detail Alice's response y_1 and y_2 .
 - Perform Bob's calculations to verify y_1 and y_2 .
7. Consider the following protocol, involving a dealer and n recipients, for distributing information.

Framework of the protocol is the following:

- Let t be a fixed number, $0 \leq t \leq n$.
- Each participant can send a private message to any other participant.
- The dealer begins with information v .
- After execution of the protocol, each recipient either accepts or rejects.
- The dealer and/or up to t recipients may cheat.

Steps of the protocol are as follows:

- The dealer sends v to each recipient.
- Each recipient sends to each other recipient the value received in the previous step.
- Each recipient verifies whether more than t of the values received in the previous step are different from the value received in the first step. If more than t values are different, it sends a complaint to each recipient.
- Each recipient accepts if it receives at most t complaints (including its own). Otherwise the recipient rejects.

Answer the following questions. Explain your reasoning.

- Suppose that the dealer is honest. For which t every honest recipient accepts?
- Suppose that the dealer cheats. For which t the honest recipients either all accept or all reject?
- Suppose that no recipient complains in the third step. For which t all honest recipients have the same value from the dealer after the protocol has finished?
- Suppose that the recipients later reconstruct the dealer's value by sending their values to a trusted (and honest) party who decides by majority. Suppose further that the dealer is honest. For which t the values which the cheating recipients send to the trusted party cannot influence the outcome of the reconstruction?