

One of the most important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might undermine the music, film, book and software industries and therefore it brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed requires to study ways of embedding copyright information and serial numbers in audio and video data.

Steganography and **watermarking** bring a variety of techniques how to hide important information, in an undetectable and/or irremovable way, in audio and video data.

Steganography and watermarking are main parts of the fast developing area of **information hiding**.

IV054 INFORMATION HIDING SUBDISCIPLINES

Covert channels occurs especially in operating systems and networks. *They are communication paths that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information at all, but can be used that way.*

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Anonymity is finding ways to hide meta content of the message (for example who is the sender and/or the recipients of a message). Anonymity is need, for example, when making on-line voting, or to hide access to some web pages, or to hide sender.

Steganography - covered writing – from Greek στεγαν-ξ γραφ-ειν

Watermarking - visible digital watermarks and also imperceptible (invisible, transparent,....) watermarks.

IV054 COVERT CHANNELS

Covert channels are communication paths that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information at all, but are used that way, using means that were not intended for such use.

Such channels often occur in multilevel operating systems in which security is based on availability of several levels of channels.

Example. Let **A** be a process capable to write on a harddisk and **B** be a process of a lower security level that cannot read data from that harddisk, but has an access to the corresponding file allocation table.

All that creates a potential cover channel in which process **A** can transmit information to **B** by writing this information, using names of files and their sizes on the harddisk, into the file allocation table, what the process **B** can read.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING.II

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

In watermarking, the important information is in the cover data. The embedded data is added for protection of the cover data.

In steganography, the cover data is not important. It mostly serves as a diversion from **the most important information that is in embedded data.**

Steganography tools typically hide relatively large blocks of information while watermarking tools place/hide less information in an image or sounds.

Data hiding dilemma: to find the best trade-off between three quantities: **robustness, capacity and security.**

IV054 STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and essential.

The main goal of **steganography** is **to hide** a message m in some audio or video (cover) data d , to obtain new data d' , in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot detect the presence of m in d' .

The main goal of **watermarking** is **to hide** a message m in some audio or video (cover) data d , to obtain new data d' , practically indistinguishable from d , by people, in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot remove or replace m in d' .

Shortly, one can say that **cryptography** is about **protecting** the content of messages, **steganography** is about **concealing** its very existence.

Steganography methods usually do not need to provide strong security against removing or modification of the hidden message. Watermarking methods need to be very robust to attempts to remove or modify a hidden message.

BASIC PROBLEMS

- Where and how can secret-data be undetectably hidden?
- Why and who needs steganography?
- What is the maximum amount of information that can be hidden, given a level of degradation, to the digital media?
- How one chooses good cover media for a given stego message?
- How to detect, localize a stego message?

To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.

- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.
- In some cases, for example in military applications, even the knowledge that two parties communicate can be of large importance.
- The health care, and especially medical imaging systems, may very much benefit from information hiding techniques.

An important application of watermarking techniques is to provide a proof of ownership of digital data by embedding copyright statements into a video or into a digital image.

Other applications:

- Automatic monitoring and tracking of copy-write material on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for marked material and thereby identifies potential illegal issues.)
- Automatic audit of radio transmissions: (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)
- Data augmentation - to add information for the benefit of the public.
- Fingerprinting applications (in order to distinguish distributed data)

Actually, watermarking has recently emerged as the leading technology to solve the above very important problems.

All kind of data can be watermarked: audio, images, video, formatted text, 3D models, ...

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicating data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:
 - The attacker can detect that steganography/watermarking has been used;
 - The attacker is able to read, modify or remove the hidden message.

A steganography/watermarking system is considered as insecure already if the detection of steganography/watermarking is possible.

Cryptography and steganography

Both, steganography and watermarking, are used to provide security and both may be used together.

When steganography is used to hide the encrypted communication, an enemy is not only faced with a difficult encryption problem, but also with the problem of finding the communicated data.

- In the sixteenth century, the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta described how to conceal a message within a hard-boiled egg by making an ink from a mixture of one ounce of alum and a pint of vinegar, and then using ink to write on the shell. The ink penetrated the porous shell, and left the message on the surface of the hardened egg albumen, which could be read only when the shell was removed.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered in wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- Special “inks” were important steganographic tools even during Second World War.
- During Second World War a technique was developed to shrink photographically a page of text into a dot less than one millimeter in diameter, and then hide this microdot in an apparently innocuous letter. (The first microdot has been spotted by FBI in 1941.)

IV054 HISTORY of MICRODOTS

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".
- In 1860 the problem of making tiny images was solved by French photographer Dragon.
- During Franco-Prussian war (1870-1881) from besieged Paris messages were sent on microfilms using pigeon post.
- During Russo-Japanese war (1905) microscopic images were hidden in ears, nostrils, and under fingernails.
- During First World War messages to and from spies were reduced to microdots, by several stages of photographic reductions, and then stuck on top of printed periods or commas (in innocuous cover materials, such as magazines).

IV054 FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

A variety of methods was used already in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music, and string knots, to invisible inks).

In 1499 Johannes Trithemius, opat from Würzburg, wrote 3 out of 8 planned books “Steganographia”.

In 1518 Trithemius printed 6 books, 540 pages, on cryptography and steganography called **Polygraphiae**.

This is Trithemius' most notorious work. It includes a sophisticated system of steganography, as well as angel magic. It also contains a synthesis of the science of knowledge, the art of memory, magic, an accelerated language learning system, and a method of sending messages without symbols.

In 1665 Gaspari Schotti published the book “Steganographica”, 400pages. (New presentation of Trithemius.)

IV054 TRITHEMIUS

- Born on February 2, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectual of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.
- He fixed creation of the world at 5206 B.C.
- He described how to perform telepathy.
- Trithemius died on December 14, 1516.

A general model of a steganographic system:




Figure 1: Model of steganographic systems

Steganographic algorithms are in general based on replacing *noise component* of a digital object with a to-be-hidden message.

Kirchoffov principle holds also for steganography. Security of the system should not be based on hiding embedding algorithm, but on hiding the key.

IV054 BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data - cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** (ukryvací proces) in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E: C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where C is the set of possible cover- and stegotexts, K is the set of keys, and M is the set of messages.
- **Stegotext (stego-data - stego-object)**
- **Recovering process** (or extraction process – odkryvací proces) in which the receiver, Bob, tries to get, using the key only but not the coverttext, the hidden message in the stegotext.

The recovery (decoding) process D can be seen as a mapping $D: C \times K \rightarrow C$.

- **Security requirement** is that a third person watching such a communication should not be able to find out whether the sender has been active, and when, in the sense that he really embedded a message in the coverttext. In other words, stegotexts should be indistinguishable from coverttexts.

IV054 BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS

There are three basic types of stegosystems

- Pure stegosystems - no key is used.
- Secret-key stegosystems - secret key is used.
- Public-key stegosystems - public key is used.

Definition Pure stegosystem $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible covertexts, M is the set of secret messages, $|C| \geq |M|$, $E: C \times M \rightarrow C$ is the embedding function and $D: C \rightarrow M$, is the extraction function, with the property that $D(E(c,m)) = m$, for all $m \in M$ and $c \in C$.

Security of the pure stegosystems depends completely on its secrecy. On the other hand, security of other two stegosystems depends on the secrecy of the key used.

Definition Secret-key (asymmetric) stegosystem $S = \langle C, M, K, E_K, D_K \rangle$, where C is the set of possible covertexts, M is the set of secret messages with $|C| \geq |M|$, K is the set of secret keys, $E_K: C \times M \times K \rightarrow C$, $D_K: C \times K \rightarrow M$ with the property that $D_K(E_K(c,m,k),k) = m$ for all $m \in M$, $c \in C$ and $k \in K$.

PUBLIC-KEY STEGANOGRAPHY

Similarly as in the case of the public-key cryptography, two keys are used: a **public-key E** for embedding and a **private-key D** for recovering.

It is often useful to combine such a public-key stegosystem with a public-key cryptosystem.

For example, in case Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, she encodes first m using Bob's public key e_B , then makes embedding of $e_B(m)$ using process E into a cover and then sends the resulting stegotext to Bob, who recovers $e_B(m)$ using D and then decrypts it, using his decryption function d_B .

A variety of steganography techniques allows to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic**. A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.

Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.

- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- Line shifting encoding.
- Word shifting encoding.
- Data hiding through justifications.
- Feature coding (for example in the vertical lines of letters *b, d, h, k*).

IV054 ACROSTIC

Amorosa visione by **Giovanni Boccaccio** (1313-1375) is said to be the world largest acrostic.

Boccaccio first wrote three sonnets (1500 letters together) and then he wrote other poems such that the initials of the successive tercets correspond exactly to the letters of the sonnets.

In the book *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, published by an anonymous in 1499, and considered as one of the most beautiful books ever, the first letters of the 38 chapters spelled out as follows:

Poliam frater Franciscus Columna peramavit

with the translation

Brother Francesco Colonna passionately loves Polia

In order to define secrecy of a stegosystem we need to consider

- probability distribution P_C on the set C of covertexts;
- probability distribution P_M on the set M of secret messages;
- probability distribution P_K on the set K of keys;
- probability distribution P_S on the set $\{E_K(c, m, k), | c \in C, m \in M, k \in K\}$ of stegotexts.

The basic related concept is that of the **relative entropy** $D(P_1 || P_2)$ of two probability distributions P_1 and P_2 defined on a set Q by

$$D(P_1 || P_2) = \sum_{q \in Q} P_1(q) \lg \frac{P_1(q)}{P_2(q)},$$

which measures the inefficiency of assuming that the distribution on Q is P_2 if it is really P_1 .

Definition Let S be a stegosystem, P_C the probability distribution on covertexts C and P_S the probability distribution of the stegotexts and $\varepsilon > 0$. S is called – ε -secure against passive attackers, if

$$D(P_C || P_S) \leq \varepsilon$$

and **perfectly secure** if $\varepsilon = 0$.

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

Proof. Let n be an integer, $C_n = \{0,1\}^n$ and P_C be the uniform distribution on C_n , and let $m \in C_n$ be a secret message.

The sender selects randomly $c \in C_n$, computes $c \oplus m = s$. The resulting stegotexts are uniformly distributed on C_n and therefore $P_C = P_S$ from what it follows that

$$D(P_{C_n} || P_S) = 0.$$

In the extraction process, the message m can be extracted from s by the computation

$$m = s \oplus c.$$

IV054 DETECTING SECRET MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether the data sent to Bob by Alice contain a secret message or not.

The above task can be formalized as a **statistical hypothesis-testing problem** with the test function $f: C \rightarrow \{0,1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

There are two types of errors possible:

Type-I error - a secret message is detected in data with no secret message;

Type-II error - a hidden secret message is not detected

Practical steganography tries to minimize probability that passive attackers make type-II error. In the case of ϵ -secure stegosystems, there is a well know relation between the probability β of the type II error and probability α of the type I error.

Theorem Let S be a stegosystem which is ϵ -secure against passive attackers and let β be the probability that the attacker does not detect a hidden message and α be the probability that the attacker falsely detects a hidden message. Then

$$d(\alpha||\beta) \leq \epsilon,$$

where $d(\alpha,\beta)$ is the binary relative entropy defined by $d(\alpha || \beta) = \alpha \lg \frac{\alpha}{1-\beta} + (1-\alpha) \lg \frac{1-\alpha}{\beta}$.

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in a communication process.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is naturally to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic method is to replace, in some of c_i 's, chosen using an algorithm and a key, the least significant bits by the bits of the message that should be hidden.

Unfortunately, this method does not provide high level of security and it can change significantly statistical properties of the cover-data.

IV054 ROBUSTNESS of STEGOSYSTEMS

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to modifications of covers, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any m, c, k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.
- Some stegosystems are designed to be robust against a specific class of mappings (for example JPEG compression/decompression).
- There are two basic approaches to make stegosystems robust:
 - By foreseeing possible cover modifications, the embedding process can be robust so that possible modifications do not entirely destroy embedded information.
 - Reversing operations that has been made by an active attacker.

IV054 ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

At the design of stegosystems special attention has to be paid to the presence of active and malicious attackers.

- Active attackers can change cover during the communication process.
- An attacker is malicious if he forges messages or initiates a steganography protocol under the name of one communicating party.

In the presence of a malicious attacker, it is not enough that stegosystem is robust.

If the embedding method does not depend on a key shared by the sender and receiver, then an attacker can forge messages, since the recipient is not able to verify sender's identity.

SECURITY of STEGOSYSTEMS

Definition A steganographic algorithm is called secure if

- Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key. The secret key must identify the sender uniquely.
- Only the holder of the secret key can detect, extract and prove the existence of the hidden message. (Nobody else should be able to find any statistical evidence of a message's existence.)
- Even if an enemy gets the contents of one hidden message, he should have no chance of detecting others.
- It is computationally infeasible to detect hidden messages.

Stego-only attack Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Known-message attack Sometimes the hidden message may become known to the stegoanalyser. Analyzing the stego-object for patterns that correspond to the hidden message may be beneficial for future attacks against that system. (Even with the message, this may be very difficult and may even be considered equivalent to the stego-analysis.)

Chosen-stego attack The stegoanalysis generates a stego-object from some steganography tool or algorithm from a chosen message. The goal in this attack is to determine corresponding patterns in the stego-object that may point to the use of specific steganography tools or algorithms.

Known-stego attack The steganography algorithm is known and both the original and stego-objects are available.

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

Transformed domain techniques: embed the secret message in a transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency domain).

Spread spectrum techniques: embed the secret messages adopting ideas from the spread spectrum communications.

Statistical techniques: embed messages by changing some statistical properties of the cover-objects and use hypothesis-testing methods in the extraction process.

Cover generation techniques: do not embed the message in randomly chosen cover-objects, but create covers that fit a message that need to be hidden.

IV054 COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover** c is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image** C can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x, y)$ to each pixel $p(x, y)$.

A color value is normally a three-component vector in a **color space**. Often used are the following color spaces:

RGB-space - every color is specified as a weighted sum of a *red*, *green* and a *blue* component. A vector specifies intensities of these three components.

YCbCr-space It distinguishes a *luminance* Y and two *chrominance* components (Cb, Cr).

Note A color vector can be converted to **YCbCr** components as follows:

$$Y = 0.299 R + 0.587 G + 0.114 B$$

$$Cb = 0.5 + (B - Y) / 2$$

$$Cr = 0.5 + (R - Y) / 1.6$$

- **LSB substitution** - the LSB of an binary block c_{k_i} is replaced by the bit m_i of the secret message.

The methods differ by techniques how to determine k_i for a given i .

For example, $k_{i+1} = k_i + r_i$, where r_i is a sequence of numbers generated by a pseudo-random generators.

- **Substitution into parity bits of blocks**. If the parity bit of block c_{k_i} is m_i , then the block c_{k_i} is not changed; otherwise one of its bits is changed.
- **Substitution in binary images**. If image c_i has more (less) black pixels than white pixels and $m_i = 1$ ($m_i = 0$), then c_i is not changed; otherwise the portion of black and white pixels is changed (by making changes at those pixels that are neighbors of pixels of the opposite color).
- **Substitution in unused or reserved space in computer systems**.

LSB substitution pluses and minuses

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply on images and radio data.
- (d) Many tools for LSB substitutions are available on the internet

Disadvantages:

- (a) It is relatively simple to detect the hidden data;
- (b) It does not offer robustness against small modifications (including compression) at the stego images.

IV054 HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade papermaking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

Paper watermarks was a perfect technique to eliminate confusion from which mill paper is and what are its parameters.


Legal power of watermarks has been demonstrated in 1887 in France when watermarks of two letters, presented as a piece of evidence in a trial, proved that the letters had been predated, what resulted in the downfall of a cabinet and, finally, the resignation of the president Grévy.

Paper watermarks in bank notes or stamps inspired the first use of the term *water mark* in the context of digital data.

The first publications that really focused on watermarking of digital images were from 1990 and then in 1993.

in WATERMARKING SYSTEMS

Figure 2 shows the basic scheme of the **watermarks embedding systems**.



Inputs to the scheme are the **watermark**, the **cover data** and an optional **public or secret key**. The **output** are **watermarked data**. The key is used to enforce security.

Figure 3 shows the basic scheme for **watermark recovery schemes**.




Figure 3: Watermark recovery scheme

Inputs to the scheme are the **watermarked data**, the **secret or public key** and, depending on the method, the **original data and/or the original watermark**.

The **output** is the **recovered watermark** W or some kind of **confidence measure** indicating how likely it is for the given watermark at the input to be present in the data under inspection.

Private (non-blind) watermarking systems require for extraction/detection the original cover-data.

- Type I systems use the original cover-data to extract the watermark from stego-data and use original cover-data to determine where the watermark is.
- Type II systems require a copy of the embedded watermark for extraction and just yield a yes/no answer to the question whether the stego-data contains a watermark..

Semi-private (semi-blind) watermarking does not use the original cover-data for detection, but tries to answer the same question. (Potential application of blind and semi-blind watermarking is for evidence in court ownership,....)

Public (blind) watermarking - neither cover-data nor embedded watermarks are required for extraction - this is the most challenging problem.

IV054 INVISIBLE COMMUNICATIONS

We describe some important cases of information hiding.

Subliminal channels. We have seen how to use a digital signature scheme to establish a subliminal channel for communication.

Covert channels in operating systems. Covert channels can arise when one part of the system, operating at a specific security level, is able to supply a service to another system part with a possibly different security level.

Video communicating systems. Steganography can be used to embed secret messages into a video stream recorded by videoconferencing systems.

Data hiding in executable files. Executable files contain a lot of redundancies in the way independent instructions are scheduled or an instruction subset is chosen to solve a specific problem. This can be utilized to hide messages.

A simple technique has been developed, by [Naor and Shamir](#), that allows for a given n and $t < n$ to hide any secret (image) message m in images on transparencies in such a way that each of n parties receives one transparency and

- no $t-1$ parties are able to obtain the message m from the transparencies they have.
- any t of the parties can easily get (read or see) the message m just by stacking their transparencies together and aligning them carefully.

IV054 TO REMEMBER !!!

There is no use in trying, she said: one cannot believe impossible things.

I dare to say that you have not had much practice, said the queen,

When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day and sometimes I have believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.

Lewis Carroll: *Through the Looking-glass*, 1872