Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 1 CHAPTER 4: Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems • • In this chapter we deal with some of the very old or quite old classical (secret-key or symmetric) cryptosystems that were primarily used in the pre-computer era. IV054 • These cryptosystems are too weak nowadays, too easy to break, especially with computers. • However, these simple cryptosystems give a good illustration of several of the important ideas of the cryptography and cryptanalysis. • Moreover, most of them can be very useful in combination with more modern cryptosystem - to add a new level of security. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 2 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptology, Cryptosystems - secret-key cryptography •Cryptology (= cryptography + cryptoanalysis) •has more than two thousand years of history. IV054 Basic historical observation • People have always had fascination with keeping information away from others. • Some people – rulers, diplomats, militaries, businessmen – have always had needs to keep some information away from others. Importance of cryptography nowadays • Applications: cryptography is the key tool to make modern information transmission secure, and to create secure information society. • Foundations: cryptography gave rise to several new key concepts of the foundation of informatics: one-way functions, computationally perfect pseudorandom generators, zero-knowledge proofs, holographic proofs, program self-testing and self-correcting, … ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 3 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Approaches and paradoxes of cryptography •Sound approaches to cryptography • •Shannon’s approach based on information theory (enemy has not enough information to break a cryptosystem) •Current approach based on complexity theory (enemy has not enough computation power to break a cryptosystem). •Very recent approach based on the laws and limitations of quantum physics •(enemy would need to break laws of nature to break a cryptosystem). IV054 Paradoxes of modern cryptography • Positive results of modern cryptography are based on negative results of complexity theory. • Computers, that were designed originally for decryption, seem to be now more useful for encryption. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 4 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptosystems - ciphers •The cryptography deals the problem of sending a message (plaintext, cleartext), through a insecure channel, that may be tapped by an adversary (eavesdropper, cryptanalyst), to a legal receiver. IV054 01 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 5 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Components of cryptosystems: IV054 •Plaintext-space: P – a set of plaintexts over an alphabet • •Cryptotext-space: C – a set of cryptotexts (ciphertexts) over alphabet • •Key-space: K – a set of keys • • • Each key k determines an encryption algorithm ek and an decryption algorithm dk such that, for any plaintext w, ek (w) is the corresponding cryptotext and or Note: As encryption algorithms we can use also randomized algorithms. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 6 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 100 – 42 B.C., CAESAR cryptosystem, Shift cipher •CAESAR can be used to encrypt words in any alphabet. In order to encrypt words in English alphabet we use: • IV054 Key-space: {0,1,…,25} An encryption algorithm ek substitutes any letter by the letter occurring k positions ahead (cyclically) in the alphabet. A decryption algorithm dk substitutes any letter by the one occurring k positions backward (cyclically) in the alphabet. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 7 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 100 – 42 B.C., CAESAR cryptosystem, Shift cipher •Example e2(EXAMPLE) = GZCOSNG, • e3(EXAMPLE) = HADPTOH, • e1(HAL) = IBM, • e3(COLD) = FROG • ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ • IV054 Example Find the plaintext to the following cryptotext obtained by the encryption with CAESAR with k = ?. Cryptotext: VHFUHW GH GHXA, VHFUHW GH GLHX, VHFUHW GH WURLV, VHFUHW GH WRXV. Numerical version of CAESAR is defined on the set {0, 1, 2,…, 25} by the encryption algorithm: ek(i) = (i + k) (mod 26) ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 8 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems POLYBIOUS cryptosystem •for encryption of words of the English alphabet without J. • •Key-space: Polybious checkerboards 5×5 with 25 English letters and with rows + columns labeled by symbols. •Encryption algorithm: Each symbol is substituted by the pair of symbols denoting the row and the column of the checkerboard in which the symbol is placed. •Example: • • • • • •KONIEC -- •Decryption algorithm: ??? IV054 F G H I J A A B C D E B F G H I K C L M N O P D Q R S T U E V W X Y Z ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 9 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Kerckhoff’s Principle •The philosophy of modern cryptoanalysis is embodied in the following principle formulated in 1883 by Jean Guillaume Hubert Victor Francois Alexandre Auguste Kerckhoffs von Nieuwenhof (1835 - 1903). IV054 The security of a cryptosystem must not depend on keeping secret the encryption algorithm. The security should depend only on keeping secret the key. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 10 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Requirements for good cryptosystems •(Sir Francis R. Bacon (1561 - 1626)) • •1. Given ek and a plaintext w, it should be easy to compute c = ek(w). IV054 2. Given dk and a cryptotext c, it should be easy to compute w = dk(c). 4. It should be unfeasible to determine w from ek(w) without knowing dk. 5. The so called avalanche effect should hold: A small change in the plaintext, or in the key, should lead to a big change in the cryptotext (i.e. a change of one bit of the plaintext should result in a change of all bits of the cryptotext, each with the probability close to 0.5). 6. The cryptosystem should not be closed under composition, i.e. not for every two keys k1, k2 there is a key k such that ek (w) = ek1 (ek2 (w)). 7. The set of keys should be very large. 3. A cryptotext ek(w) should not be much longer than the plaintext w. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 11 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptoanalysis •The aim of cryptoanalysis is to get as much information about the plaintext •or the key as possible. •Main types of cryptoanalytics attack • •1.Cryptotexts-only attack. The cryptanalysts get cryptotexts •c1 = ek(w1),…, cn = ek(wn) and try to infer the key k or as many of the plaintexts w1,…, wn as possible. IV054 2. Known-plaintexts attack (given are some pairs plaintextàcryptotext) The cryptanalysts know some pairs wi, ek(wi), 1 <= i <= n, and try to infer k, or at least wn+1 for a new cryptotext many plaintexts ek(wn+1). 3. Chosen-plaintexts attack (given are cryptotext for some chosen plaintexts) The cryptanalysts choose plaintexts w1,…, wn to get cryptotexts ek(w1),…, ek(wn), and try to infer k or at least wn+1 for a new cryptotext cn+1 = ek(wn+1). (For example, if they get temporary access to encryption machinery.) ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 12 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptoanalysis 4. •4. Known-encryption-algorithm attack •The encryption algorithm ek is given and the cryptanalysts try to get the decryption algorithm dk. IV054 5. Chosen-cryptotext attack (given are plaintexts for some chosen cryptotexts) The cryptanalysts know some pairs (ci , dk(ci)), 1 Ł i Ł n, where the cryptotexts ci have been chosen by the cryptanalysts. The aim is to determine the key. (For example, if cryptanalysts get a temporary access to decryption machinery.) ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 13 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems WHAT CAN a BAD EVE DO? •Let us assume that a clever Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob. What can a bad enemy, called usually Eve (eavesdropper), do? • · Eve can read (and try to decrypt) the message. • · Eve can try to get the key that was used and then decrypt all messages encrypted with the same key. • · Eve can change the message sent by Alice into another message, in such a way that Bob will have the feeling, after he gets the changed message, that it was a message from Alice. • · Eve can pretend to be Alice and communicate with Bob, in such a way that Bob thinks he is communicating with Alice. •An eavesdropper can therefore be passive - Eve or active - Mallot. IV054 > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 14 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Basic goals of broadly understood cryptography •Confidentiality: Eve should not be able to decrypt the message Alice sends to Bob. •Data integrity: Bob wants to be sure that Alice's message has not been altered by Eve. •Authentication: Bob wants to be sure that only Alice could have sent the message he has received. •Non-repudiation: Alice should not be able to claim that she did not send messages that she has sent. •Anonymity: Alice does want that Bob finds who send the message IV054 > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 15 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems HILL cryptosystem •The cryptosystem presented in this slide was probably never used. In spite of that this cryptosystem played an important role in the history of modern cryptography. • •We describe Hill cryptosystem or a fixed n and the English alphabet. • •Key-space: matrices M of degree n with elements from the set {0, 1,…, 25} such that M-1 mod 26 exist. • •Plaintext + cryptotext space: English words of length n. • •Encoding: For a word w let cw be the column vector of length n of the integer codes of symbols of w. (A -> 0, B -> 1, C -> 2, …) • •Encryption: cc = Mcw mod 26 • •Decryption: cw = M-1cc mod 26 IV054 > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 16 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems HILL cryptosystem •Example A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z • • •Plaintext: w = LONDON • • • • • •Cryptotext: MZVQRB • • •Theorem • • •Proof: Exercise IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 17 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Secret-key (symmetric) cryptosystems •A cryptosystem is called secret-key cryptosystem if some secret piece of information – the key – has to be agreed first between any two parties that have, or want, to communicate through the cryptosystem. Example: CAESAR, HILL. Another name is symmetric cryptosystem (cryptography). IV054 Two basic types of secret-key cryptosystems • substitution based cryptosystems • transposition based cryptosystems Two basic types of substitution cryptosystems • monoalphabetic cryptosystems – they use a fixed substitution – CAESAR, POLYBIOUS • polyalphabetic cryptosystems– substitution keeps changing during the encryption A monoalphabetic cryptosystem with letter-by-letter substitution is uniquely specified by a permutation of letters. (Number of permutations (keys) is 26!) ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 18 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Secret-key cryptosystems •Example: AFFINE cryptosystem is given by two integers •1 Ł a, b Ł 25, gcd(a, 26) = 1. • •Encryption: ea,b(x) = (ax + b) mod 26 • •Example • a = 3, b = 5, e3,5(x) = (3x + 5) mod 26, • e3,5(3) = 14, e3,5(15) = 24 - e3,5(D) = 0, e3,5(P) = Y • • •Decryption: da,b(y) = a-1(y - b) mod 26 IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 19 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptanalysis’s •The basic cryptanalytic attack against monoalphabetic substitution cryptosystems begins with a frequency count: the number of each letter in the cryptotext is counted. The distributions of letters in the cryptotext is then compared with some official distribution of letters in the plaintext laguage. •The letter with the highest frequency in the cryptotext is likely to be substitute for the letter with highest frequency in the plaintext language …. The likehood grows with the length of cryptotext. •Frequency counts in English: • • • •and for other languages: • • • • •The 20 most common digrams are (in decreasing order) TH, HE, IN, ER, AN, RE, ED, ON, ES, ST, EN, AT, TO, NT, HA, ND, OU, EA, NG, AS. The six most common trigrams: THE, ING, AND, HER, ERE, ENT. IV054 % % % E 12.31 L 4.03 B 1.62 T 9.59 D 3.65 G 1.61 A 8.05 C 3.20 V 0.93 O 7.94 U 3.10 K 0.52 N 7.19 P 2.29 Q 0.20 I 7.18 F 2.28 X 0.20 S 6.59 M 2.25 J 0.10 R 6.03 W 2.03 Z 0.09 H 5.14 Y 1.88 5.27 70.02 24.71 English % German % Finnish % E 12.31 E 18.46 A 12.06 T 9.59 N 11.42 I 10.59 A 8.05 I 8.02 T 9.76 O 7.94 R 7.14 N 8.64 N 7.19 S 7.04 E 8.11 I 7.18 A 5.38 S 7.83 S 6.59 T 5.22 L 5.86 R 6.03 U 5.01 O 5.54 H 5.14 D 4.94 K 5.20 French % Italian % Spanish % E 15.87 E 11.79 E 13.15 A 9.42 A 11.74 A 12.69 I 8.41 I 11.28 O 9.49 S 7.90 O 9.83 S 7.60 T 7.29 N 6.88 N 6.95 N 7.15 L 6.51 R 6.25 R 6.46 R 6.37 I 6.25 U 6.24 T 5.62 L 5.94 L 5.34 S 4.98 D 5.58 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 20 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptanalysis’s •Cryptoanalysis of a cryptotext encrypted using the AFINE cryptosystem with an encryption algorithm •ea,b(x) = (ax + b) mod 26 = (xa+b) mod 26 •where 0 Ł a, b Ł 25, gcd(a, 26) = 1. (Number of keys: 12 × 26 = 312.) •Example: Assume that an English plaintext is divided into blocks of 5 letter and encrypted by an AFINE cryptosystem (ignoring space and interpunctions) as follows: • • • • • How to find •the plaintext? IV054 B H J U H N B U L S V U L R U S L Y X H O N U U N B W N U A X U S N L U Y J S S W X R L K G N B O N U U N B W S W X K X H K X D H U Z D L K X B H J U H B N U O N U M H U G S W H U X M B X R W X K X L U X B H J U H C X K X A X K Z S W K X X L K O L J K C X L C M X O N U U B V U L R R W H S H B H J U H N B X M B X R W X K X N O Z L J B X X H B N F U B H J U H L U S W X G L L K Z L J P H U U L S Y X B J K X S W H S S W X K X N B H B H J U H Y X W N U G S W X G L L K ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 21 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptanalysis’s • •Frequency analysis of plainext and •frequency table for English: • • •First guess: E = X, T = U •Encodings: 4a + b = 23 (mod 26) •xa+b=y 19a + b = 20 (mod 26) •Solutions: a = 5, b = 3 à a-1 = •Translation table • • • • • • •provides from the above cryptotext the plaintext that starts with KGWTG CKTMO OTMIT DMZEG, what does not make a sense. IV054 % % % E 12.31 L 4.03 B 1.62 T 9.59 D 3.65 G 1.61 A 8.05 C 3.20 V 0.93 O 7.94 U 3.10 K 0.52 N 7.19 P 2.29 Q 0.20 I 7.18 F 2.28 X 0.20 S 6.59 M 2.25 J 0.10 R 6.03 W 2.03 Z 0.09 H 5.14 Y 1.88 5.27 70.02 24.71 X - 32 J - 11 D - 2 U - 30 O - 6 V - 2 H - 23 R - 6 F - 1 B - 19 G - 5 P - 1 L - 19 M - 4 E - 0 N - 16 Y - 4 I - 0 K - 15 Z - 4 Q - 0 S - 15 C - 3 T - 0 W - 14 A - 2 B H J U H N B U L S V U L R U S L Y X H O N U U N B W N U A X U S N L U Y J S S W X R L K G N B O N U U N B W S W X K X H K X D H U Z D L K X B H J U H B N U O N U M H U G S W H U X M B X R W X K X L U X B H J U H C X K X A X K Z S W K X X L K O L J K C X L C M X O N U U B V U L R R W H S H B H J U H N B X M B X R W X K X N O Z L J B X X H B N F U B H J U H L U S W X G L L K Z L J P H U U L S Y X B J K X S W H S S W X K X N B H B H J U H Y X W N U G S W X G L L K crypto A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X plain P K F A V Q L G B W R M H C X S N I D Y T O J E Y Z Z U ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 22 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Cryptanalysis’s •Second guess: E = X, A = H •Equations 4a + b = 23 (mod 26) • b = 7 (mod 26) •Solutions: a = 4 or a = 17 and therefore a=17 •This gives the translation table • • •and the following •plaintext from the •above cryptotext IV054 S A U N A I S N O T K N O W N T O B E A F I N N I S H I N V E N T I O N B U T T H E W O R D I S F I N N I S H T H E R E A R E M A N Y M O R E S A U N A S I N F I N L A N D T H A N E L S E W H E R E O N E S A U N A P E R E V E R Y T H R E E O R F O U R P E O P L E F I N N S K N O W W H A T A S A U N A I S E L S E W H E R E I F Y O U S E E A S I G N S A U N A O N T H E D O O R Y O U C A N N O T B E S U R E T H A T T H E R E I S A S A U N A B E H I N D T H E D O O R crypto A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X plain V S P M J G D A X U R O L I F C Z W T Q N K H E Y Z B Y ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 23 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Example of monoalphabetic cryptosystem •Symbols of the English alphabet will be replaced by squares with or without points and with or without surrounding lines using the following rule: • • • •For example the plaintext: • WE TALK ABOUT FINNISH SAUNA MANY TIMES LATER •results in the cryptotext: • • • •Garbage in between method: the message (plaintext or cryptotext) is supplemented by ''garbage letters''. • •Richelieu cryptosystem • used sheets of card • board with holes. IV054 08a 08b 08c 08d ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 24 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Polyalphabetic Substitution Cryptosystems •Playfair cryptosystem •Invented around 1854 by Ch. Wheatstone. •Key - a Playfair square is defined by a word w of length at most 25. In w repeated letters are then removed, remaining letters of alphabets (except j) are then added and resulting word is divided to form an 5 x 5 array (a Playfair square). • IV054 Encryption: of a pair of letters x,y •If x and y are in the same row (column), then they are replaced by the pair of symbols to the right (bellow) them. •If x and y are in different rows and columns they are replaced by symbols in the opposite corners of rectangle created by x and y. Example: PLAYFAIR is encrypted as LCMNNFCS Playfair was used in World War I by British army. Playfair square: ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 25 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Polyalphabetic Substitution Cryptosystems •VIGENERE and AUTOCLAVE cryptosystems • •Several of the following polyalphabetic cryptosystems are modification of the CAESAR cryptosystem. • •A 26 ×26 table is first designed with the first row containing a permutation of all symbols of alphabet and all columns represent CAESAR shifts starting with the symbol of the first row. • •Secondly, for a plaintext w a key k is a word of the same length as w. • •Encryption: the i-th letter of the plaintext - wi is replaced by the letter in the wi-row and ki-column of the table. IV054 VIGENERE cryptosystem: a short keyword p is chosen and k = Prefix|w|poo VIGENERE is actually a cyclic version of the CAESAR cryptosystem. AUTOCLAVE cryptosystem: k = Prefix|w|pw. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 26 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Polyalphabetic Substitution Cryptosystems •VIGENERE and AUTOCLAVE cryptosystems • • • Example: • • • • • • • • • •Keyword: H A M B U R G •Plaintext: I N J E D E M M E N S C H E N G E S I C H T E S T E H T S E I N E G •Vigenere-key: H A M B U R G H A M B U R G H A M B U R G H A M B U R G H A M B U R •Autoclave-key: H A M B U R G I N J E D E M M E N S C H E N G E S I C H T E S T E H •Vigerere-cryp.: P N V F X V S T E Z T W Y K U G Q T C T N A E E V Y Y Z Z E U O Y X •Autoclave-cryp.: P N V F X V S U R W W F L Q Z K R K K J L G K W L M J A L I A G I N IV054 09 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 27 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems CRYPTOANALYSIS of cryptotexts produced by VINEGAR cryptosystem 1.Task 1 -- to find the length of the key • •Kasiski method (1852) - invented also by Charles Babbage (1853). •Basic observation If a subword of a plaintext is repeated at a distance that is a multiple of the length of the key, then the corresponding subwords of the cryptotext are the same. IV054 Example, cryptotext: Substring ''CHR'' occurs in positions 1, 21, 41, 66: expected keyword length is therefore 5. CHRGQPWOEIRULYANDOSHCHRIZKEBUSNOFKYWROPDCHRKGAXBNRHROAKERBKSCHRIWK Method. Determine the greatest common divisor of the distances between identical subwords (of length 3 or more) of the cryptotext. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 28 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems CRYPTOANALYSIS of cryptotexts produced by VINEGAR cryptosystem •Friedman method Let ni be the number of occurrences of the i-th letter in the cryptotext. •Let l be the length of the keyword. •Let n be the length of the cryptotext. Then it holds • •Once the length of the keyword is found it is easy to determine the key using the statistical (frequency analysis)method of analyzing monoalphabetic cryptosystems. • IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 29 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Derivation of the Friedman method 1. Let ni be the number of occurrences of i-th alphabet symbol in a text of length n. •The probability that if one selects a pair of symbols from the text, then they are the same is • •and it is called the index of coincides. IV054 2. Let pi be the probability that a randomly chosen symbol is the i -th symbol of the alphabet. The probability that two randomly chosen symbol are the same is For English text one has For randomly chosen text: Approximately ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 30 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Derivation of the Friedman method •Assume that a cryptotext is organized into l columns headed by the letters of the keyword • • • •First observation Each column is obtained using the CAESAR cryptosystem. •Probability that two randomly chosen letters are the same in •- the same column is 0.065. •- different columns is 0.038. • •The number of pairs of letters in the same column: • •The number of pairs of letters in different columns: • •The expect number A of pairs of equals letters is • •Since • •one gets the formula for l from the previous slide. IV054 letters Sl S1 S2 S3 . . . Sl x1 x2 x3 . . . Xl xl+1 xl+2 xl+3 X xl+1 xl+2 xl+3 . . . x3l . . . . ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 31 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem – Vernam’s cipher •Binary case: • plaintext w • key k are binary words of the same length • cryptotext c • •Encryption: c = w Ĺ k •Decryption: w = c Ĺ k IV054 Example: w = 101101011 k = 011011010 c = 110110001 What happens if the same key is used twice or 3 times for encryption? c1 = w1 Ĺ k, c2 = w2 Ĺ k, c3 = w3 Ĺ k c1 Ĺ c2 = w1 Ĺ w2 c1 Ĺ c3 = w1 Ĺ w3 c2 Ĺ c3 = w2 Ĺ w3 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 32 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Perfect secret cryptosystems •By Shanon, a cryptosystem is perfect if the knowledge of the cryptotext provides no information whatsoever about its plaintext (with the exception of its length). •It follows from Shannon's results that perfect secrecy is possible if the key-space is as large as the plaintext-space. In addition, a key has to be as long as plaintext and the same key should not be used twice. IV054 An example of a perfect cryptosystem ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem (Gilbert S. Vernam (1917) - AT&T + Major Joseph Mauborgne). If used with the English alphabet, it is simply a polyalphabetic substitution cryptosystem of VIGENERE with the key being a randomly chosen English word of the same length as the plaintext. Proof of perfect secrecy: by the proper choice of the key any plaintext of the same length could provide the given cryptotext. Did we gain something? The problem of secure communication of the plaintext got transformed to the problem of secure communication of the key of the same length. Yes: 1. ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem is used in critical applications 2. It suggests an idea how to construct practically secure cryptosystems. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 33 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Transposition Cryptosystems •The basic idea is very simple: permutate the plaintext to get the cryptotext. Less clear it is how to specify and perform efficiently permutations. •One idea: choose n, write plaintext into rows, with n symbols in each row and then read it by columns to get cryptotext. •Example • • • •Cryptotexts obtained by transpositions, called anagrams, were popular among scientists of 17th century. They were used also to encrypt scientific findings. • Newton wrote to Leibnitz • a7c2d2e14f2i7l3m1n8o4q3r2s4t8v12x1 •what stands for: ”data aequatione quodcumque fluentes quantitates involvente, fluxiones invenire et vice versa” •Example a2cdef3g2i2jkmn8o5prs2t2u3z • •Solution: IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 34 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems KEYWORD CAESAR cryptosystem1 •Choose an integer 0 < k < 25 and a string, called keyword, of length at most 25 with all letters different. • •The keyword is then written bellow the English alphabet letters, beginning with the k-symbol, and the remaining letters are written in the alphabetic order and cyclicly after the keyword. IV054 Example: keyword: HOW MANY ELKS, k = 8 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 35 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems KEYWORD CAESAR cryptosystem •Exercise Decrypt the following cryptotext encrypted using the KEYWORD CAESAR and determine the keyword and k IV054 11 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 36 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems KEYWORD CAESAR cryptosystem •Step 1. Make the •frequency counts: • • • IV054 Number Number Number U 32 X 8 W 3 C 31 K 7 Y 2 Q 23 N 7 G 1 F 22 E 6 H 1 V 20 M 6 J 0 P 15 R 6 L 0 T 15 B 5 O 0 I 14 Z 5 S 0 A 8 D 4 7=2.90% 180=74.69% 54=22.41% Step 2. Cryptotext contains two one-letter words T and Q. They must be A and I. Since T occurs once and Q three times it is likely that T is I and Q is A. The three letter word UPC occurs 7 times and all other 3-letter words occur only once. Hence UPC is likely to be THE. Let us now decrypt the remaining letters in the high frequency group: F,V,I From the words TU, TF Þ F=S From UV Þ V=O From VI Þ I=N The result after the remaining guesses ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 37 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems UNICITY DISTANCE of CRYPTOSYSTEMS •Redundancy of natural languages is of the key importance for cryptanalysis. •Would all letters of a 26-symbol alphabet have the same probability, a character would carry lg 26 = 4.7 bits of Information. •The estimated average amount of information carried per letter in a meaningful English text is 1.5 bits. • •The unicity distance of a cryptosystem is the minimum number of cryptotext (number of letters) required to a computationally unlimited adversary to recover the unique encryption key. • •Empirical evidence indicates that if any simple cryptosystem is applied to a meaningful English message, then about 25 cryptotext characters is enough for an experienced cryptanalyst to recover the plaintext. • > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 38 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems ANAGRAMS - EXAMPLES •German: • IRI BRÄTER, GENF Briefträgerin • FRANK PEKL, REGEN … • PEER ASSSTIL, MELK … • INGO DILMR, PEINE … • EMIL REST, GERA … • KARL SORDORT, PEINE … IV054 English: algorithms logarithms antagonist stagnation compressed decompress coordinate decoration creativity reactivity deductions discounted descriptor predictors impression permission introduces reductions procedures reproduces ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 39 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems • APPENDIX > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 40 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems STREAM CRYPTOSYSTEMS •Two basic types of cryptosystems are: • •Block cryptosystems (Hill cryptosystem,…) – they are used • to encrypt simultaneously blocks of plaintext. •Stream cryptosystems (CAESAR, ONE-TIME PAD,…) – they • encrypt plaintext letter by letter, or block by block, using an encryption that may vary during the encryption process. • •Stream cryptosystems are more appropriate in some applications (telecommunication), usually are simpler to implement (also in hardware), usually are faster and usually have no error propagation (what is of importance when transmission errors are highly probable). • •Two basic types of stream cryptosystems: secret key cryptosystems •(ONE-TIME PAD) and public-key cryptosystems (Blum-Goldwasser) • > ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 41 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems Block versus stream cryptosystems •In block cryptosystems the same key is used to encrypt arbitrarily long plaintext – block by block - (after dividing each long plaintext w into a sequence of subplaintexts (blocks) w1w2w3 ). • •In stream cryptosystems each block is encryptyd using a different key IV054 •The fixed key k is used to encrypt all blocks. In such a case the resulting cryptotext has the form c = c1c2c3… = ek(w1) ek(w2) ek(w3)… •A stream of keys is used to encrypt subplaintexts. The basic idea is to generate a key-stream K=k1,k2,k3,… and then to compute the cryptotext as follows c = c1c2c3 … = ek1(w1) ek2(w2) ek3(w3). ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 42 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems CRYPTOSYSTEMS WITH STREAMS OF KEYS IV054 Decryption: To decrypt the cryptotext c1c2c3 … the sequence k1, w1, k2, w2, k3, w3, … of keys and subplaintexts is computed. Various techniques are used to compute a sequence of keys. For example, given a key k ki = fi (k, k1, k2, …, ki-1) In such a case encryption and decryption processes generate the following sequences: Encryption: To encrypt the plaintext w1w2w3 … the sequence k1, c1, k2, c2, k3, c3, … of keys and sub-cryptotexts is computed. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 43 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems EXAMPLES •A keystream is called synchronous if it is independent of the plaintext. • • •KEYWORD VIGENERE cryptosystem can be seen as an example of a synchronous keystream cryptosystem. • •Another type of the binary keystream cryptosystem is specified by an initial sequence of keys k1, k2, k3 … km • •and a initial sequence of binary constants b1, b2, b3 … bm-1 • •and the remaining keys are computed using the rule • •A keystrem is called periodic with period p if ki+p = ki for all i. • IV054 Example Let the keystream be generated by the rule ki+4 = ki Ĺ ki+1 If the initial sequence of keys is (1,0,0,0), then we get the following keystream: 1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,0 1,1,1, … of period 15. ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 44 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems PERFECT SECRECY - BASIC CONCEPTS •Let P, K and C be sets of plaintexts, keys andcryptotexts. •Let pK(k) be the probability that the key k is chosen from K and let a priory probability that plaintext w is chosen is pp(w). • •If for a key , then for the probability PC(y) that c is the cryptotext that is transmitted it holds • • • •For the conditional probability pc(c|w) that c is the cryptotext if w is the plaintext it holds • • •Using Bayes' conditional probability formula p(y)p(x|y) = p(x)p(y|x) we get for probability pP(w|c) that w is the plaintext if c is the cryptotext the expression IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 45 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems PERFECT SECRECY - BASIC RESULTS •Definition A cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if • •(That is, the a posteriori probability that the plaintext is w,given that the cryptotext is c is obtained, is the same as a priori probability that the plaintext is w.) •Example CAESAR cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if any of the26 keys is used with the same probability to encode any symbol of the plaintext. •Proof Exercise. •An analysis of perfect secrecy: The condition pP(w|c) = pP(w) is for all wÎP and cÎC equivalent to the condition pC(c|w) = pC(c). • •Let us now assume that pC(c) > 0 for all cÎC. • •Fix wÎP. For each cÎC we have pC(c|w) = pC(c) > 0. Hence, for each c€C there must exists at least one key k such that ek(w) = c. Consequently, |K| >= |C| >= |P|. • •In a special case |K| = |C| = |P|. the following nice characterization of the perfect secrecy can be obtained: •Theorem A cryptosystem in which |P| = |K| = |C| provides perfect secrecy if and only if every key is used with the same probability and for every wÎP and every c€C there is a unique key k such that ek(w) = c. •Proof Exercise. IV054 ‹#› Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems 46 Classical (secret-key) cryptosystems PRODUCT CRYPTOSYSTEMS •A cryptosystem S = (P, K, C, e, d) with the sets of plaintexts P, keys K and cryptotexts C and encryption (decryption) algorithms e (d) is called endomorphic if P = C. •If S1 = (P, K1, P, e(1), d (1)) and S2 = (P, K2, P, e (2), d (2)) are endomorphic cryptosystems, then the product cryptosystem is • •S1 Ä S2 = (P, K1 Ä K2, P, e, d), •where encryption is performed by the procedure •e( k1, k2 )(w) = ek2(ek1(w)) •and decryption by the procedure •d( k1, k2 )(c) = dk1(dk2(c)). IV054 Example (Multiplicative cryptosystem): Encryption: ea(w) = aw mod p; decryption: da(c) = a-1c mod 26. If M denote the multiplicative cryptosystem, then clearly CAESAR × M is actually the AFFINE cryptosystem. Exercise Show that also M Ä CAESAR is actually the AFFINE cryptosystem. Two cryptosystems S1 and S2 are called commutative if S1 Ä S2 = S2 Ä S1. A cryptosystem S is called idempotent if S Ä S = S.