

Part VI

Public-key cryptosystems, II. Other cryptosystems, security, PRG, hash functions

CHAPTER 6: Other cryptosystems , pseudo-random numbers generators and hash functions

A large number of interesting and important cryptosystems have already been designed. In this chapter we present some of them in order to illustrate principles and techniques that can be used to design cryptosystems.

At first, we present several cryptosystems security of which is based on the fact that computation of discrete logarithms is infeasible in some groups.

Secondly, we discuss pseudo-random number generators and hash functions – other very important concepts of modern cryptography

Finally, we discuss one of the fundamental questions of modern cryptography: when can a cryptosystem be considered as (computationally) perfectly secure?

In order to do that we will:

- discuss the role randomness play in the cryptography;
- introduce the very fundamental definitions of perfect security of cryptosystem
- present some examples of perfectly secure cryptosystems.

Rabin cryptosystem

Primes p, q of the form $4k + 3$ are kept secret, $n = pq$ is the public key.

Encryption: of a plaintext $w < n$

$$c = w^2 \pmod n$$

Decryption: Using a method to compute w given c with [Chinese remainder theorem](#) one can get that w equals to one of the numbers:

$$\begin{aligned} w_1 &= c^{(p+1)/4} \pmod n & w_2 &= p - c^{(p+1)/4} \pmod n \\ w_3 &= c^{(q+1)/4} \pmod n & w_4 &= q - c^{(q+1)/4} \pmod n \end{aligned}$$

Indeed, **it is easy to verify**, using Euler's criterion which says that if c is a quadratic residue modulo p , then $c^{(p-1)/2} \equiv 1 \pmod p$, **that**

$$\pm c^{(p+1)/4} \pmod p \quad \text{and} \quad \pm c^{(q+1)/4} \pmod q$$

are two square roots of c modulo p and q . One can now obtain four square roots of c modulo n using the method shown in Appendix.

In case the plaintext w is a meaningful English text, it should be easy to determine w from w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 .

However, if w is a random string (say, for a key exchange) it is impossible to determine w from w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 .

Rabin did not propose this system as a practical cryptosystem.

Generalized Rabin cryptosystem

Public key: n, B ($0 \leq B \leq n - 1$)

Trapdoor: primes p, q ($n = pq$) of the form $4k + 3$

Encryption: $e(x) = x(x + B) \pmod n$

Decryption: $d(y) = \left(\sqrt{\frac{B^2}{4} + y} - \frac{B}{2} \right) \pmod n$

It is easy to verify that if ω is a nontrivial square root of 1 modulo n , then there are four decryptions of $e(x)$:

$$x, \quad -x, \quad \omega \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right) - \frac{B}{2}, \quad -\omega \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right) - \frac{B}{2}$$

Example

$$e \left(\omega \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right) - \frac{B}{2} \right) = \left(\omega \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right) - \frac{B}{2} \right) \left(\omega \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right) + \frac{B}{2} \right) = \omega^2 \left(x + \frac{B}{2} \right)^2 - \left(\frac{B}{2} \right)^2 = x^2 + Bx = e(x)$$

Decryption of the generalized Rabin cryptosystem can be reduced to the decryption of the original Rabin cryptosystem.

Indeed, the equation $\Rightarrow x^2 + Bx \equiv y \pmod n$

can be transformed by the substitution $x = x_1 - B/2 \Rightarrow$ into

$x_1^2 \equiv B^2/4 + y \pmod n$ and, by defining $c = B^2/4 + y$, \Rightarrow into $x_1^2 \equiv c \pmod n$

Decryption can be done by factoring n and solving congruences

$$x_1^2 \equiv c \pmod p \qquad x_1^2 \equiv c \pmod q$$

Security of Rabin cryptosystem

We show that any hypothetical decryption algorithm A for Rabin cryptosystem, can be used, as an oracle, in the following Las Vegas algorithm, to factor an integer n .

Algorithm:

- 1 Choose a random $r, 1 \leq r \leq n - 1$;
- 2 Compute $y = (r^2 - B^2/4) \bmod n$; $\{y = e_k(r - B/2)\}$.
- 3 Call $A(y)$, to obtain a decryption $x = \left(\sqrt{\frac{B^2}{4} + y} - \frac{B}{2}\right) \bmod n$;
- 4 Compute $x_1 = x + B/2$; $\{x_1^2 \equiv r^2 \bmod n\}$
- 5 **if** $x_1 = \pm r$ **then quit** (failure)
 else $\gcd(x_1 + r, n) = p$ **or** q

Indeed, after Step 4, either $x_1 = \pm r \bmod n$ or $x_1 = \pm \omega r \bmod n$.

In the second case we have

$$n \mid (x_1 - r)(x_1 + r),$$

but n does not divide either factor $x_1 - r$ or $x_1 + r$.

Therefore computation of $\gcd(x_1 + r, n)$ or $\gcd(x_1 - r, n)$ must yield factors of n .

ElGamal cryptosystem

Design: choose a large prime p – (with at least 150 digits).

choose two random integers $1 \leq q, x < p$ – where q is a primitive element of Z_p^*

calculate $y = q^x \bmod p$.

Public key: p, q, y ; trapdoor: x

Encryption of a plaintext w : choose a random r and compute

$$a = q^r \bmod p, \quad b = y^r w \bmod p$$

Cryptotext: $c = (a, b)$

(Cryptotext contains indirectly r and the plaintext is masked by multiplying with y^r (and taking modulo p))

Decryption: $w = \frac{b}{a^x} \bmod p = ba^{-x} \bmod p$.

Proof of correctness: $a^x \equiv q^{rx} \bmod p$

$$\frac{b}{a^x} \equiv \frac{y^r w}{a^x} \equiv \frac{q^{rx} w}{q^{rx}} \equiv w \pmod{p}$$

Note: Security of the ElGamal cryptosystem is based on infeasibility of the discrete logarithm computation.

Shanks' algorithm for discrete logarithm

Let $m = \lceil \sqrt{p-1} \rceil$. The following algorithm computes $\lg_q y$ in Z_p^* .

- Compute $q^{mj} \bmod p, 0 \leq j \leq m-1$.
- Create list L_1 of m pairs $(j, q^{mj} \bmod p)$, sorted by the second item.
- Compute $yq^{-i} \bmod p, 0 \leq i \leq m-1$.
- Create list L_2 of pairs $(i, yq^{-i} \bmod p)$ sorted by the second item.
- Find two pairs, one $(j, z) \in L_1$ and second $(i, z) \in L_2$

If such a search is successful, then

$$q^{mj} \bmod p = z = yq^{-i} \bmod p$$

and as the result

$$\lg_q y \equiv (mj + i) \pmod{p-1}.$$

Therefore

$$q^{mj+i} \equiv y \pmod{p}$$

On the other hand, for any y we can write

$$\lg_q y = mj + i,$$

For some $0 \leq i, j \leq m-1$. Hence the search in the Step 5 of the algorithm has to be successful.

Bit security of discrete logarithm

Let us consider problem to compute $L_i(y) = i$ -th least significant bit of $\lg_q y$ in Z_p^* .

Result 1 $L_1(y)$ can be computed efficiently.

To show that we use the fact that the set $QR(p)$ has $(p-1)/2$ elements.

Let q be a primitive element of Z_p^* . Clearly, $q^a \in QR(p)$ if a is even. Since the elements

$$q^0 \bmod p, q^2 \bmod p, \dots, q^{p-3} \bmod p$$

are all distinct, we have that

$$QR(p) = \{q^{2i} \bmod p \mid 0 \leq i \leq (p-3)/2\}$$

Consequence: y is a quadratic residue iff $\lg_q y$ is even, that is iff $L_1(y) = 0$.

By Euler's criterion y is a quadratic residue if $y^{(p-1)/2} \equiv 1 \pmod p$

$L_1(y)$ can therefore be computed as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} L_1(y) = 0 & \text{if } y^{(p-1)/2} \equiv 1 \pmod p; \\ L_1(y) = 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{array}$$

Result 2 Efficient computability of $L_i(y)$, $i > 1$ in Z_p^* would imply efficient computability of the discrete logarithm in Z_p^* .

Williams cryptosystem – basics

Similar to RSA, but number operations are performed in a quadratic field. Cryptoanalysis of Williams cryptosystem is equivalent to factoring.

Consider numbers of the form

$$\alpha = a + b\sqrt{c}$$

where a, b, c are integers.

If c remains fixed, α can be viewed as a pair (a, b) .

$$\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = (a_1, b_1) + (a_2, b_2) = (a_1 + a_2, b_1 + b_2)$$

$$\alpha_1 \alpha_2 = (a_1, b_1) \cdot (a_2, b_2) = (a_1 a_2 + c b_1 b_2, a_1 b_2 + b_1 a_2)$$

The **conjugate** $\bar{\alpha}$ of α of a is defined by

$$\bar{\alpha} = a - b\sqrt{c}$$

Auxiliary functions:

$$X_i(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha^i + \alpha^{-i}}{2}$$

$$Y_i(\alpha) = \frac{b(\alpha^i - \alpha^{-i})}{(\alpha - \bar{\alpha})} \left(= \frac{\alpha - \bar{\alpha}^i}{2\sqrt{c}} \right)$$

Hence

$$\alpha^i = X_i(\alpha) + Y_i(\alpha)\sqrt{c}$$

$$\bar{\alpha}^i = X_i(\alpha) - Y_i(\alpha)\sqrt{c}$$

Assume now

$$a^2 - cb^2 = 1$$

Then $\alpha\bar{\alpha} = 1$ and consequently

$$X_i^2 - cY_i^2 = 1$$

Moreover, for $j \geq i$

$$X_{i+j} = 2X_iX_j + X_{j-1}$$

$$Y_{i+j} = 2Y_iX_j + Y_{j-1}$$

From these and following equations:

$$X_{i+j} = 2X_iX_j + cY_iY_j$$

$$Y_{i+j} = 2Y_iX_j + X_iY_j$$

we get the recursive formulas:

$$X_{2i} = X_i^2 + cY_i^2 = 2X_i^2 - 1$$

$$Y_{2i} = 2X_iY_i$$

$$X_{2i+1} = 2X_iY_{i+1} - X_1$$

$$Y_{2i+1} = 2X_iY_{i+1} - Y_1$$

Consequences: 1. X_i and Y_i can be, given i , computed fast.

Remark Since $X_0 = 1$, $X_1 = a$, X_i does not depend on b .

WHEN is a CRYPTOSYSTEM (perfectly) SECURE?

First question: Is it enough for perfect security of a cryptosystem that one cannot get a plaintext from a cryptotext?

NO, NO, NO
WHY

For many applications it is crucial that **no information** about the plaintext **could be obtained**.

- Intuitively, a cryptosystem is (perfectly) secure if one cannot get **any** (new) information about the corresponding plaintext from any cryptotext.
- It is very nontrivial to define correctly when a cryptosystem is (computationally) perfectly secure.
- **It has been shown that perfectly secure cryptosystems have to use randomized encryptions.**

Randomness and cryptography are deeply related.

- 1 Prime goal of any good encryption method is to transform even a highly nonrandom plaintext into a highly random cryptotext. (Avalanche effect.)

Example Let e_k be an encryption algorithm, x_0 be a plaintext. And

$$x_i = e_k(x_{i-1}), i \geq 1.$$

It is intuitively clear that if encryption e_k is “cryptographically secure”, then it is very, very likely that the sequence $x_0 x_1 x_2 x_3$ is (quite) random.

Perfect encryption should therefore produce (quite) perfect (pseudo)randomness.

- 2 The other side of the relation is more complex. It is clear that perfect randomness together with ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem produces perfect secrecy. The price to pay: a key as long as plaintext is needed.

The way out seems to be to use an encryption algorithm with a pseudo-random generator to generate a long pseudo-random sequence from a short seed and to use the resulting sequence with ONE-TIME PAD.

Basic question: When is a pseudo-random generator good enough for cryptographical purposes?

We now start to discuss a very nontrivial question: **when is an encryption scheme computationally perfectly SECURE?**

First, some very basic technical concepts:

Definition A function $f: N \rightarrow R$ is a **negligible function** if for any polynomial $p(n)$ it holds, for almost all n :

$$f(n) \leq \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

Definition – computational distinguishability Let $X = \{X_n\}_{n \in N}$ and $Y = \{Y_n\}_{n \in N}$ be **probability ensembles** such that each X_n and Y_n ranges over strings of length n . We say that X and Y are **computationally indistinguishable** if for every feasible algorithm A the difference

$$d_A(n) = | Pr[A(X_n) = 1] - Pr[A(Y_n) = 1] |$$

is a negligible function in n .

Secure encryptions – pseudorandom generators

In cryptography **random sequences** can be usually fully replaced by **pseudorandom sequences** generated by (**cryptographically perfect**) **pseudorandom generators**.

Definition - pseudorandom generator. Let $l(n) : \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{N}$ be such that $l(n) > n$ for all n . A (**computationally indistinguishable**) **pseudorandom generator with stretch function l** , is an efficient deterministic algorithm which on input of a random n -bit **seed** outputs a $l(n)$ -bit sequence which is computationally indistinguishable from a random $l(n)$ -bit sequence.

Theorem Let f be a one-way function which is length preserving and efficiently computable, and b be a **hard core predicate** of f , then

$$G(s) = b(s) \cdot b(f(s)) \cdot \dots \cdot b\left(f^{l(|s|)-1}(s)\right)$$

is a (computationally indistinguishable) pseudorandom generator with stretch function $l(n)$.

Definition A predicate b is a **hard core predicate** of the function f if b is easy to evaluate, but $b(x)$ is hard to predict from $f(x)$. (That is, it is unfeasible, given $f(x)$ where x is uniformly chosen, to predict $b(x)$ substantially better than with the probability $1/2$.)

It is conjectured that the least significant bit of the modular squaring function $x^2 \bmod n$ is a hard-core predicate.

Theorem A (**good**) pseudorandom generator exists if a one-way function exists.

Cryptographically strong pseudo-random generators

Fundamental question: when is a pseudo-random generator good enough for cryptographic purposes?

Basic concept: A pseudo-random generator is called cryptographically strong if the sequence of bits it produces, from a short random seed, is so good for using with ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem, that no polynomial time algorithm allows a cryptanalyst to learn any information about the plaintext from the cryptotext.

A cryptographically strong pseudo-random generator would therefore provide sufficient security in a secret-key cryptosystem if both parties agree on some short seed and never use it twice.

As discussed later: Cryptographically strong pseudo-random generators could provide perfect secrecy also for public-key cryptography.

Problem: Do cryptographically strong pseudo-random generators exist?

Remark: The concept of a cryptographically strong pseudo-random generator is one of the key concepts of the foundations of computing.

Indeed, a cryptographically strong pseudo-random generator exists if and only if a one-way function exists what is equivalent with $P \neq UP$ and what implies $P \neq NP$.

Candidates for cryptographically strong pseudo-random generators

So far there are only candidates for cryptographically strong pseudo-random generators.

For example, cryptographically strong are all pseudo-random generators that are **unpredictable to the left** in the sense that a cryptanalyst that knows the generator and sees the whole generated sequence except its first bit has no better way to find out this first bit than to toss the coin.

It has been shown that if integer factoring is intractable, then the so-called *BBS* pseudo-random generator, discussed below, is unpredictable to the left.

(We make use of the fact that if factoring is unfeasible, then for almost all quadratic residues $x \bmod n$, coin-tossing is the best possible way to estimate the least significant bit of x after seeing $x_2 \bmod n$.)

Let n be a Blum integer. Choose a random quadratic residue x_0 (modulo n).

For $i \geq 0$ let

$$x_{i+1} = x_i^2 \bmod n, b_i = \text{the least significant bit of } x_i$$

For each integer i , let

$$BBS_{n,i}(x_0) = b_0 \dots b_{i-1}$$

be the first i bits of the pseudo-random sequence generated from the seed x_0 by the *BBS* pseudo-random generator.

Choose random x , relatively prime to n , compute $x_0 = x^2 \bmod n$
 $x_{i+1} = x_i^2 \bmod n$, b_i = the least significant bit of x_i
 $BBS_{n,i}(x_0) = b_0 \dots b_{i-1}$

Assume that the pseudo-random generator BBS with a Blum integer is not unpredictable to the left.

Let y be a quadratic residue from Z_n^* .

Compute $BBS_{n,l-1}(y)$ for some $i > 1$.

Let us pretend that last $(i - 1)$ bits of $BBS_{n,i}(x)$ are actually the first $(i - 1)$ bits of $BBS_{n,l-1}(y)$, where x is the principal square root of y .

Hence, if the BBS pseudo-random generator is not unpredictable to the left, then there exists a better method than coin-tossing to determine the least significant bit of x , what is, as mentioned above, impossible.

Randomized encryptions

From security point of view, public-key cryptography with deterministic encryptions has the following serious drawback:

A cryptanalyst who knows the public encryption function e_k and a cryptotext c can try to guess a plaintext w , compute $e_k(w)$ and compare it with c .

The purpose of randomized encryptions is to encrypt messages, using randomized algorithms, in such a way that one can prove that no feasible computation on the cryptotext can provide any information whatsoever about the corresponding plaintext (except with a negligible probability).

Formal setting: Given:

plaintext-space	P
cryptotext	C
key-space	K
random-space	R

encryption: $e_k : P \times R \rightarrow C$

decryption: $d_k : C \rightarrow P$ or $C \rightarrow 2^P$ such that for any p, r :

$$d_k(e_k(p, r)) = p.$$

- d_k, e_k should be easy to compute.
- Given e_k , it should be unfeasible to determine d_k .

Definition – semantic security of encryption A cryptographic system is **semantically secure** if for every feasible algorithm A , there exists a feasible algorithm B so that for every two functions

$$f, h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

and all probability ensembles $\{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, where X_n ranges over $\{0, 1\}^n$

$$\Pr[A(E(X_n), h(X_n)) = f(X_n)] < \Pr[B(h(X_n)) = f(X_n)] + \mu(n),$$

where μ is a negligible function.

It can be shown that any semantically **secure public-key cryptosystem** must use a **randomized encryption algorithm**.

RSA cryptosystem is not secure in the above sense. However, **randomized versions of RSA are semantically secure**.

Secure encryptions – Second definition

Definition A randomized-encryption cryptosystem is **polynomial time secure** if, for any $c \in \mathbb{N}$ and sufficiently large $s \in \mathbb{N}$ (security parameter), any randomized polynomial time algorithms that takes as input s (in unary) and the public key, cannot distinguish between randomized encryptions, by that key, of two given messages of length c , with the probability larger than $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{s^c}$.

Both definitions are equivalent.

Example of a polynomial-time secure randomized (Bloom-Goldwasser) encryption:

p, q - large Blum primes $n = p \times q$ - key

Plaintext-space - all binary strings

Random-space - QR_n

Crypto-space - $QR_n \times \{0, 1\}^*$

Encryption: Let w be a t -bit plaintext and x_0 a random quadratic residue modulo n . Compute x_t and $BBS_{n,t}(x_0)$ using the recurrence

$$x_{i+1} = x_i^2 \pmod{n}$$

Cryptotext: $(x_t, w \oplus BBS_{n,t}(x_0))$

Decryption: Legal user, knowing p, q , can compute x_0 from x_t , then $BBS_{n,t}(x_0)$, and finally w .

Another very simple, fundamental and important cryptographic concept is that of **hash functions**.

Hash functions

$$h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m; \quad h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m, \quad n \gg m$$

map (very) long messages w into short ones, called usually **messages digests** or **hashes** or **fingerprints** of w , in a way that has important cryptographic properties.

Digital signatures are one of important applications of hash functions.

In most of the digital signature schemes, to be discussed in the next chapter, the length of a signature is at least as long as of the message being signed. This is clearly a big disadvantage.

To remedy this situation, signing procedure is applied to a hash of the message, rather than to the message itself. This is OK provided the hash function has good cryptographic properties, discussed next.

We now derive basic properties cryptographically good hash functions should have by analysing several possible attacks on their use.

Attack 1 If Eve gets a valid signature (w, y) , where $y = \text{sig}_k(h(w))$ and she would be able to find w' such that $h(w')=h(w)$, then also (w', y) , a forgery, would be a valid signature.

Cryptographically good hash function should therefore have the following **weak collision-free property**

Definition 1. Let w be a message. A hash function h is weakly collision-free for w , if it is computationally infeasible to find a w' such that $h(w)=h(w')$.

Attack 2 If Eve finds two w and w' such that $h(w')=h(w)$, she can ask Alice to sign $h(w)$ to get signature s and then Eve can create a forgery (w',s) .

Cryptographically good hash function should therefore have the following **strong collision-free property**

Definition 2. A hash function h is strongly collision-free if it is computationally infeasible to find two elements $w \neq w'$ such that $h(w)=h(w')$.

Attack 3 If Eve can compute signature s of a random z , and then she can find w such that $z=h(w)$, then Eve can create forgery (w,s) .

To exclude such an attack, hash functions should have the following **one-wayness property**.

Definition 3. A hash function h is one-way if it is computationally infeasible to find, given z , an w such that $h(w)=z$.

One can show that **if a hash function has strongly collision-free property, then it has one-wayness property.**

An important use of hash functions is to protect integrity of data in the following way:

The problem of protecting data of arbitrary length is reduced, using hash functions, to the problem to protect integrity of the data of fixed (and small) length – of their fingerprints.

In addition, to send reliably a message w through an unreliable (and cheap) channel, one sends also its (small) hash $h(w)$ through a very secure (and therefore expensive) channel.

The receiver, familiar also with the hash function h that is being used, can then verify the integrity of the message w' he receives by computing $h(w')$ and comparing

$$h(w) \text{ and } h(w') .$$

Example 1 For a vector $a = (a_1, \dots, a_k)$ of integers let

$$H(a) = \sum_{i=0}^k a_i \pmod n$$

where n is a product of two large integers.

This hash function does not meet any of the three properties mentioned on the last slide.

Example 2 For a vector $a = (a_1, \dots, a_k)$ of integers let

$$H(a) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^k a_i \right)^2 \pmod n$$

This function is one-way, but it is not weakly collision-free.

Theorem Let $h : X \rightarrow Z$ be a hash function where X and Z are finite and $|X| \geq 2|Z|$. If there is an inversion algorithm \mathbf{A} for h , then there exists randomized algorithm to find collisions.

Sketch of the proof. One can easily show that the following algorithm

- 1 Choose a random $x \in X$ and compute $z=h(x)$; Compute $x_1 = \mathbf{A}(z)$;
- 2 **if** $x_1 \neq x$, then x_1 and x collide (under h – success) **else** failure

has probability of success

$$p(\text{success}) = \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{x \in X} \frac{|[x]| - 1}{|[x]|} \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

where, for $x \in X$, $[x]$ is the set of elements having the same hash as x .

It is well known that if there are 23 (39) [40] people in one room, then the probability that two of them have the same birthday is more than 50% (70%)[89%] — this is called a **Birthday paradox**.

More generally, if we have n objects and r people, each choosing one object (so that several people can choose the same object), then if $r \approx 1.177\sqrt{n}$ ($r \approx \sqrt{2\lambda}$), then probability that two people choose the same object is 50% ($(1 - e^{-\lambda})\%$).

Another version of the birthday paradox: Let us have n objects and two groups of r people. If $r \approx \sqrt{\lambda n}$, then probability that someone from one group chooses the same object as someone from the other group is $(1 - e^{-\lambda})$.

Assume Alice uses a hash function that produces 50 bits.

Fred, who wants Alice to sign a fraudulent contract, find 30 places in a good document, where he can make change in the document (adding a coma, space, ...) such that Alice would not notice that. By choosing at each place whether to make or not a change, he can produce 2^{30} documents essentially identical with the original good document.

Similarly, Fred makes 2^{30} changes of the fraudulent document.

Considering birthday problem with $n = 2^{50}$, $r = 2^{30}$ we get that $r = \sqrt{\lambda n}$, with $\lambda = 2^{10}$ and therefore with probability $1 - e^{-1024} \approx 1$ there is a version of the good document that has the same hash as a version of the fraudulent document.

Finding a match, Fred can ask Alice to sign a good version and then append the signature to the fraudulent contract.

Birthday paradox imposes a lower bound on the sizes of message digests (fingerprints)

For example a 40-bit message would be insecure because a collision could be found with probability 0.5 with just over 20^{20} random hashes.

Minimum acceptable size of message digest seems to be 128 and therefore 160 are used in such important systems as DSS – Digital Signature Schemes (standard).

AN ALMOST GOOD HASH FUNCTION

We show an example of the hash function (so called **Discrete Log Hash Function**) that seems to have as the only drawback that it is too slow to be used in practice:

Let p be a large prime such that $q = \frac{(p-1)}{2}$ is also prime and let α, β be two primitive roots modulo p . Denote $a = \log_{\alpha} \beta$ (that is $\beta = \alpha^a$).

h will map two integers **smaller than q** to an integer smaller than p , for $m = x_0 + x_1 q, 0 \leq x_0, x_1 \leq q - 1$ as follows,

$$h(x_0, x_1) = h(m) = \alpha^{x_0} \beta^{x_1} \pmod{p}.$$

To show that h is one-way and collision-free the following fact can be used:

FACT: If we know different messages m_1 and m_2 such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$, then we can compute $\log_{\alpha} \beta$.

EXTENDING HASH FUNCTIONS

Let $h : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t$ be a strongly collision-free hash function, where $m > t + 1$.

We design now a strongly collision-free hash function

$$h^* : \sum_{i=m}^{\infty} \{0, 1\}^i \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t.$$

Let a bit string x , $|x| = n > m$, have decomposition

$$x = x_1 \| x_2 \dots \| x_k,$$

where $|x_i| = m - t - 1$ if $i < k$ and $|x_k| = m - t - 1 - d$ for some d . (Hence

$$k = \left\lceil \frac{n}{m - t - 1} \right\rceil.)$$

h^* will be computed as follows:

- 1 for $i=1$ to $k-1$ do $y_i := x_i$;
- 2 $y_k := x_k \| 0^d$; $y_{k+1} :=$ binary representation of d ;
- 3 $g_1 := h(0^{t+1} \| y_1)$;
- 4 for $i=1$ to k do $g_{i+1} := h(g_i \| 1 \| y_{i+1})$;
- 5 $h^*(x) := g_{k+1}$.

Let us have computationally secure cryptosystem with plaintexts, keys and cryptotexts being binary strings of a fixed length n and with encryption function e_k .

If

$$x = x_1 \| x_2 \| \dots \| x_k$$

is decomposition of x into substrings of length n , g_0 is a random string, and

$$g_i = f(x_i, g_{i-1})$$

for $i = 1, \dots, k$, where f is a function that “incorporates” encryption function e_k of the cryptosystem, then

$$h(x) = g_k .$$

For example such good properties have these two functions:

$$f(x_i, g_{i-1}) = e_{g_{i-1}}(x_i) \oplus x_i$$

$$f(x_i, g_{i-1}) = e_{g_{i-1}}(x_i) \oplus x_i \oplus g_{i-1}$$

A variety of hash functions has been constructed. Very often used hash functions are MD4, MD5 (created by Rivest in 1990 and 1991 and producing 128 bit message digest).

NIST even published, as a standard, in 1993, SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) – producing 160 bit message digest – based on similar ideas as MD4 and MD5.

A hash function is called secure if it is strongly collision-free.

One of the most important cryptographic results of the last years was due to the Chinese Wang who has shown that MD4 is not cryptographically secure.

Randomized version of RSA-like cryptosystems

The scheme works for **any trapdoor function** (as in case of RSA),

$$f : D \rightarrow D, D \subset \{0, 1\}^n,$$

for any **pseudorandom generator**

$$G : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l, k \ll l$$

and any **hash function**

$$h : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k,$$

where $n = l + k$. Given a random seed $s \in \{0, 1\}^k$ as input, G generates a pseudorandom bit-sequence of length l .

Encryption of a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^l$ is done as follows:

- 1 A random string $r \in \{0, 1\}^k$ is chosen.
- 2 Set $x = (m \oplus G(r)) \parallel (r \oplus h(m \oplus G(r)))$. (If $x \notin D$ go to step 1.)
- 3 Compute encryption $c = f(x)$ – length of x and of c is n .

Decryption of a ciphertext c .

- Compute $f^{-1}(c) = a \parallel b$, $|a| = l$ and $|b| = k$.
- Set $r = h(a) \oplus b$ and get $m = a \oplus G(r)$.

Comment Operation " \parallel " stands for a concatenation of strings.

Bloom-Goldwasser cryptosystem once more

Private key: Blum primes p and q .

Public key: $n = pq$.

Encryption of $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$.

- 1 Randomly choose $s_0 \in \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$.
- 2 For $i = 1, 2, \dots, m + 1$ compute

$$s_i \leftarrow s_{i-1}^2 \pmod n$$

and $\sigma_i = \text{lsb}(s_i)$.

The cryptotext is (s_{m+1}, y) , where $y = x \oplus \sigma_1 \sigma_2 \dots \sigma_m$.

Decryption: of the cryptotext (r, y) :

Let $d = 2^{-m} \pmod{\phi(n)}$.

- Let $s_1 = r^d \pmod n$.
- For $i = 1, \dots, m$, compute $\sigma_i = \text{lsb}(s_i)$ and $s_{i+1} \leftarrow s_i^2 \pmod n$

The plaintext x can then be computed as $y \oplus \sigma_1 \sigma_2 \dots \sigma_m$.

Global goals of cryptography

Cryptosystems and encryption/decryption techniques are only one part of modern cryptography.

General goal of modern cryptography is construction of schemes which are robust against malicious attempts to make these schemes to deviate from their prescribed functionality.

The fact that an adversary can design its attacks after the cryptographic scheme has been specified, makes design of such cryptographic schemes very difficult – schemes should be secure under all possible attacks.

In the next chapters several of such most important basic functionalities and design of secure systems for them will be considered. For example: digital signatures, user and message authentication,...

Moreover, also such basic primitives as zero-knowledge proofs, needed to deal with general cryptography problems will be presented and discussed.

We will also discuss cryptographic protocols for a variety of important applications. For example for voting, digital cash,...