Part IX

Identification, authentication, secretsharing and e-commerce

User identification and message authentication, Secret sharing and E-commerce

Most of today's applications of cryptography ask for authentic data rather than secret data. A practically very important problem is therefore how to protect data and communication against an active attacker (and noise).

Main related problems to deal with are:

1. User identification (authentication): How can a person prove his (her) identity?
2. Message authentication: Can tools be provided to decide, for the recipient, that the message is from the person who is supposed to send it?
3. Message integrity (authentication): Can tools be provided to decide for the recipient whether or not the message was changed on the fly?

Important practical objectives are to find identification schemes that are so simple that it can be implemented on smart cards – they are essentially credit cards equipped with a chip that can perform arithmetical operations and communications.

E-commerce: One of the main new applications of the cryptographic techniques is to establish secure and convenient manipulation with digital money (e-money), especially for e-commerce.

USER IDENTIFICATION (AUTHENTICATION)

User identification (authentication) is a process at which one party (often referred to as a Prover or Alice) convinces a second party often referred to as a Verifier or Bob) of Prover's identity.

(Namely, that the Prover has actually participated in the identication process. In other words that the Prover has been active in the time the confirmative evidence of identity has been recquired).

The purpose of any identification (authentication) process is to preclude (vylucit) some impersonation (zosobnenie) of one person (the Prover) by someone else.

Identication usually serves to control access to a resource (often a resource should be accessed only by privileged users).

OBJECTIVES of IDENTICATIONS

User identification process has to satisfy the following objectives:

- The Verifier has to accept Prover's identity if both parties are honest;
- The Verifier cannot later, after a successful identication, pose as the Prover and identicate himself (as the Prover) to another Verifier;
- A dishonest party that would claim to be the other party has only negligible chance to identicate itself successfully;
- Each of the above conditions remains true even if an attacker has observed or has participated in several identification protocols.

USER IDENTIFICATION PROTOCOLS

Identification protocols have to satisfy two security conditions:

1. If one party, say Bob (a Verifier), gets a message from the other party, say Alice (a Prover), then Bob is able to verify that the sender was indeed Alice.
2. There is no way to pretend, for a third party, say Charles, when communicating with Bob, that he is Alice without Bob having a large chance to find out that.

Identification system based on a PKC

- Alice chooses a random r and sends $e_B(r)$ to Bob.
- Alice identifies a communicating person as Bob if he can send her back r.
- Bob identifies a communicating person as Alice if she can send him r.

A misuse of the above system

We show that (any non-honest) Alice could misuse the above identification scheme.

Indeed, Alice could intercept a communication of a Jane (a new "player") with Bob, and get a cryptotext $e_B(w)$, the one Jana has been sending to Bob, and then Alice could send $e_B(w)$ to Bob.

Honest Bob, who follows fully the protocol, would then return w to Alice and she would get this way the plaintext w.

USER IDENTIFICATION

Static means of identification: People can be identified by their attributes (fingerprints), possessions (passports), or knowledge.

Dynamic means of identification: Challenge and respond protocols.

Both Alice and Bob share a key k and a one-way function f_k.

1. Bob sends Alice a random number or string RAND.
2. Alice sends Bob $PI = f_k(RAND)$.
3. If Bob gets PI, then he verifies whether $PI = f_k(RAND)$.

If yes, he starts to believe that the person he has communicated with is Alice.

The process can be repeated to increase probability of a correct identification.

Message authentication – to be discussed later

MAC -method (Message Authentication Code) Alice and Bob share a key k and a encoding algorithm A_k

1. With a message m, Alice sends (m, A_k (m)) – MAC is here $A_k(m)$
2. If Bob gets (m', MAC), then he computes A_k (m') and compares it with MAC.

Three-way authentication and also key agreement

A PKC will be used with encryption/decryption algorithms (e, d) and DSS with pairs (s, v). Alice and Bob will have their identity strings I_A and I_B.

1. Alice chooses a random r_A, sets t = (I_B, r_A), signs $sig_{s_A}(t)$ and sends $m_1 = (t, sig_{s_A}(t))$ to Bob.
2. Bob verifies Alice's signature, chooses random r_B and a random session key k. He encrypts k with Alice's public key, $E_{e_A}(k) = c$, sets

$$t_1 = (I_A, r_A, r_B, c),$$

signs it with $sig_{s_B}(t_1)$. Then he sends $m_2 = (t_1, sig_{s_B}(t_1))$ to Alice.

Three-way authentication and key agreement

3. Alice verifies Bob's signature, and checks that the r_A she just got matches the one she generated in Step 1. Once verified, she is convinced that she is communicating with Bob. She gets k via

$$D_{d_A}(c) = D_{d_A}(E_{e_A}(k)) = k,$$

sets $t_2 = (I_B, r_B)$ and signs it with $sig_{s_A}(t_2)$. Then she sends $m_3 = (t_2, sig_{s_A}(t_2))$ to Bob.

4. Bob verifies Alice's signature and checks that r_B he just got matches his choice in Step 2. If both verifications pass, Alice and Bob have mutually authenticated each other's identity and have agreed upon a session key k.

DATA AUTHENTICATION

The goal of data authentication schemes (protocols) is to handle the case that data are sent through insecure channels.

By creating so-called Message Authentication Code (MAC) a sending this MAC, together with a message through an insecure channel, one can create possibility to verify whether data were not changed in the channel.

The price to pay is that communicating parties need to share a secret random key that need to be transmitted through a very secure channel.

Schemes for Data Authentication

Basic difference between MACs and digital signatures is that MACs are symmetric in the following sense: Anyone who is able to verify MAC of a message is also able to generate the same MAC, and vice versa.

A scheme (M, T, K) for data authentication is given by:

- M is a set of possible messages (data)
- T is a set of possible MACs
- K is a set of possible keys

Moreover, it is required that

- to each k from K there is a single and easy to compute authentication mapping

$$auth_k : \{0,1\}^* \times M \rightarrow T$$

- and a single easy to compute verification mapping

$$ver_k : M \times T \rightarrow \{true, false\}$$

Two conditions should be satisfied for such a scheme:

Correctness: For each m from M and k from K it holds $ver_k(m, c) = true$, if there exists an r from $\{0,1\}^*$ such that $c = aut_k(r, m)$

Security: For any m from M and k from K it is computationally unfeasible, without a knowledge of k, to find c from T such that $ver_k(m, c) = true$

FROM BLOCK CIPHERS to MAC – CBC-MAC

Let C be an encryption algorithm that maps k-bit strings into k-bit strings.

If a message

$$m = m_1 m_2 \ldots m_l$$

is divided into blocks of length k, then so-called CBC-mode of encryption assumes a choice (random) of a special block y_0 of length k, and performs the following computations for i = 1, . . . ,l

$$y_i = C(y_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$$

and then

$$y_1 \| y_2 \| \ldots \| y_l$$

is the encryption of m and

y_l is MAC for m.

A modification of this method is to use another crypto-algoritm to encrypt the last block m_l.

WEAKNESS of the CBS-MAC METHOD

Let us have three pairs and in each: a message and its MAC

$$(m_1, c_1), (m_2, c_2), (m_3, c_3)$$

Where m_1 and m_3 have the same length k and

$$m_2 = m_1 \| B \| m_2'$$

and let the length of B be also k. The encryption of the block B within m_2 is $C(B \oplus c_1)$.

If we now define

$$B' = B \oplus c_1 \oplus c_3,\ m_4 = m_3 \| B' \| m_2' \ ,$$

then, during the encryption of m_4, we get

$$C(B' \oplus c_3) = C(B \oplus c_1),$$

This implies that MAC's for m_4 and m_2 are the same. One can therefore forge a new valid pair

$$(m_4, c_2).$$

ANALYSIS of CBC-MAC – a view

Theorem Given are two independent random permutations C_1 and C_2 on the set of message blocks M of cardinality n. Let us define

$$MAC(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l) = C_2(C_1(\ldots C_1(C_1(m_1) \oplus m_2) \oplus \ldots \oplus m_{l-1} \oplus m_l).$$

Let us assume that the MAC function be implemented by an oracle, and consider an adversary who can send queries to the oracle with a limited total length of q. Let $m_1, \ldots, m_d$ denote the finite block sequences on **M** which are sent by the adversary to the oracle and let the total number of blocks be less than q. Let the purpose of the adversary be to output a message m which is different from all m_i together with its MAC value c. Then the probability of success of the adversary (i.e. the probability that his MAC value is correct) is smaller than

$$\frac{q(q+1)}{2} \times \frac{1}{n-q} + \frac{1}{n-d}.$$

When $q = \theta n^{\frac{1}{2}}$, this is approximately a$= \frac{\theta^2}{2}$ (which is greater than $1 - e^{-a}$)

Implication: if the total length of all authenticated messages is negligible against # n, then there is no better way than the brute force attack to get collisions on the CBC-MAC.

FROM HASH FUNCTIONS TO MAC

So called HMAC was published as the internet standard RFC2104.

Let a hash function h process messages by blocks of b bytes and produce a digest of l bytes and let t be the size of MAC, in bytes. HMAC of a message m with a key k is computed as follows:

- If k has more than b bytes replace k with h(k).
- Append zero bytes to k to have exactly b bytes.
- Compute (using strings opad and ipad defined later)

$$h(k \oplus opad \| h(k \oplus ipad \| m)).$$

  and truncate the results to its t leftmost bytes to get $HMAX_k(m)$.

In HMAX ipad (opad) consists of b bytes equal to 0×36 ($0 \times 5c$) hexadecimal.

SECURITY of HMAC

It can be shown that if

- $h(k \oplus ipad \| m)$ defines a secure MAC on fixed length messages, and
- h is collision free,

then HMAC is a secure MAC on variable length messages with two independent keys. More precisely:

Theorem Let h be a hash function which hashes into l bits. Given k_1, k_2 from $\{0,1\}^l$ consider the following MAC algorithm

$$MAC_{k_1,k_2}(m) = h(k_2 \| h(k_1 \| m))$$

If h is collision free and $m \longrightarrow h(k_2 \| m)$ is a secure MAC algorithm for messages m of the fixed length l, then the MAC is a secure MAC algorithm for messages of arbitrary length.

Disadvantage of static user identification schemes

Everybody who knows your password or PIN can impersonate you.

Using so called zero-knowledge identification schemes, discussed in the next chapter, you can identify yourself without giving to the identificator the ability to impersonate you.

Simplified Fiat-Shamir identification scheme

A trusted authority (TA) chooses: large random primes p,q, computes n = pq; and chooses a quadratic residue $v \in QR_n$, and s such that $s^2 = v \pmod{n}$.

public-key: v

private-key: s (that Alice knows, but not Bob)

Challenge-reponse Identification protocol

1. Alice chooses a random $r < n$, computes $x = r^2 \mod n$ and sends x to Bob.
2. Bob sends to Alice a random bit (a challenge) b.
3. Alice sends Bob (a response) $y = rs^b \mod n$
4. Bob identifies the sender as Alice if and only if $y^2 = xv^b \mod n$, what is taken as a proof that the sender knows square roots of x and of v.

This protocol is a so-called single accreditation protocol

Alice proves her identity by convincing Bob that she knows square root s of v (without revealing s to Bob).

If protocol is repeated t times, Alice has a chance 2^{-t} to fool Bob if she does not known s.

Analysis of Fiat-Shamir identification I

public-key: v
private-key: s (of Alice) such that $s^2 = v \pmod{n}$.

Protocol

1. Alice chooses a random $r < n$, computes $x = r^2 \mod n$ and sends x (her commitment) to Bob.
2. Bob sends to Alice a random bit b (a challenge).
3. Alice sends to Bob (a response) $y = rs^b$.
4. Bob verifies if and only if $y^2 = xv^b \mod n$, proving that Alice knows a square root of x.

Analysis

1. The first message is a commitment by Alice that she knows square root of x.
2. The second message is a challenge by Bob.
   - If Bob sends b = 0, then Alice has to open her commitment and reveal r.
   - If Bob sends b = 1, the Alice has to show her secret s in an "encrypted form".
3. The third message is Alice's response to the challenge of Bob.

Completeness If Alice knows s, and both Alice and Bob follow the protocol, then the response rs^b is the square root of xv^b.

It can be shown that Eve can cheat with probability of success $\frac{1}{2}$ as follows:

- Eve chooses random $r \in Z_n^*$, random $b_1 \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends $x = r^2 v^{-b_1}$, to Bob.
- Bob chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ at random and sends it to Eve.
- Eve sends r to Bob.

HOW CAN A BAD EVE CHEAT?

Eve can send, to fool Bob, as her commitment, either r^2 for a random r or $r^2 v^{-1}$

In the first case Eve can respond correctly to the Bob's challenge b=0, by sending r; but cannot respond correctly to the challenge $b = 1$.

In the second case Eve can respond correctly to Bob's challenge $b = 1$, by sending r again; but cannot respond correctly to the challenge $b = 0$.

Eve has therefore a 50% chance to cheat.

Fiat-Shamir identification scheme parallel version

In the following parallel version of Fiat-Shamir idenitification scheme the probability of false identification is decreased.

Choose primes p, q, compute $n = pq$.

Choose quadratic residues $v_1, \ldots, v_k \in QR_n$.

Compute $s_1, \ldots, s_k$ such that $s_i = \sqrt{v_i} \mod n$

public-key: $v_1, \ldots, v_k$

secret-key: $s_1, \ldots, s_k$ of Alice

1. Alice chooses a random $r < n$, computes $a = r^2 \mod n$ and sends a to Bob.
2. Bob sends Alice a random k-bit string $b_1 \ldots b_k$.
3. Alice sends to Bob
$$y = r \prod_{i=1}^{k} s_i^{b_i} \mod n$$
4. Bob accepts if and only if
$$y^2 = a \prod_{i=1}^{k} v_{i=1}^{b_i} \mod n$$

Alice and Bob repeat this protocol t times, until Bob is convinced that Alice knows $s_1, \ldots, s_k$.

The chance that Alice fools Bob is 2^{-kt}, a decrease comparing with the chance $\frac{1}{2}$ of the previous version of the identification scheme.

The Schnorr identification scheme – setting

This is a practically attractive and computationally efficient (in time, space + communication) scheme which minimizes storage + computations performed by Alice (to be a smart card).

Scheme requires also a trusted authority (TA) which

1. chooses: a large prime $p < 2^{512}$,
   a large prime q dividing p - 1 and $q \leq 2^{140}$,
   an $\alpha \in Z_p^*$ of order q,
   a security parameter t such that $2^t < q$,
   p, q, α, t are made public.
2. establishes: a secure digital signature scheme with a secret signing algorithm sig_{TA} and a public verification algorithm ver_{TA}.

Protocol for issuing a certificate to Alice

1. TA establishes Alice's identity by conventional means and forms a string ID(Alice) which contains identification information.
2. Alice chooses a secret random $0 \leq a \leq q-1$ and computes
   $$v = \alpha^{-a} \mod p$$
   and sends v to the TA.
3. TA generates signature
   $$s = sig_{TA}(ID(Alice), v)$$
   and sends to Alice the certificate C (Alice) = (ID(Alice), v, s)

Schnorr identification scheme

1. Alice chooses a random $0 \leq k < q$ and computes
$$\gamma = \alpha^k \mod p.$$
2. Alice sends her certificate C (Alice) = (ID(Alice), v, s) and γ to Bob.
3. Bob verifies the signature of the TA by checking that
$$ver_{TA}(ID(Alice), v, s) = true.$$
4. Bob chooses a random $1 \leq r \leq 2^t$, where $t < \lg q$ is a security parameter and sends it to Alice (often $t \leq 40$).
5. Alice computes and sends to Bob
$$y = (k + ar) \mod q.$$
6. Bob verifies that
$$\gamma \equiv \alpha^y v^r \mod p$$
7. This way Alice shows her identity to Bob. Indeed,
$$\begin{aligned} \alpha^y v^r &\equiv \alpha^{k+ar} \alpha^{-ar} \mod p \\ &\equiv \alpha^k \mod p \\ &\equiv \gamma \mod p. \end{aligned}$$

Total storage: 512 bits for ID(Alice), 512 bits for v, 320 bits for s (if DSS is used), total – 1344 bits.

Total communication: Alice $\rightarrow$ Bob 1996 bits,
Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice 40 bits.

Okamoto identification scheme

The disadvantage of the Schnorr identification scheme is that there is no proof of its security. For the modification of the Schnorr identification scheme presented below, for Okamoto identification scheme, a proof of security exists.

Basic setting: To set up the scheme the TA chooses:

- a large prime $p \leq 2^{512}$,
- a large prime $q \geq 2^{140}$ dividing p - 1;
- two elements $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in Z_p^*$ of order q.

TA makes public p, q, α_1, α_2 and keeps secret (also before Alice and Bob)

$$c = lg_{\alpha_1}\alpha_2.$$

Finally, TA chooses a signature scheme and a hash function.

Issuing a certificate to Alice

- TA establishes Alice's identity and issues an identification string ID(Alice).
- Alice secretly and randomly chooses $0 \leq a_1, a_2 \leq q-1$ and sends to TA
$$v = \alpha_1^{-a_1}\alpha_2^{-a_2} \mod p.$$
- TA generates a signature $s = sig_{\mathrm{TA}}(ID(Alice), v)$ and sends to Alice the certificate
$$\mathrm{C\ (Alice)} = (\mathrm{ID(Alice)},\ \mathrm{v},\ \mathrm{s}).$$

Okamoto identification scheme – basics once more

Basic setting

TA chooses: a large prime $p \leq 2^{512}$,large prime $q \geq 2^{140}$ dividing p - 1; two elements $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in Z_p^*$ of order q. TA keep secret (also from Alice and Bob)
$c = \lg_{\alpha_1} \alpha_2$.

Issuing a certificate to Alice

- TA establishes Alice's identity and issues an identification string ID(Alice).
- Alice randomly chooses $0 \leq a_1, a_2 \leq q - 1$ and sends to TA.

$$v = \alpha_1^{-a_1} \alpha_2^{-a_2} \mod p.$$

- TA generates a signature $s = sig_{\mathrm{TA}}(ID(Alice), v)$ and sends to Alice the certificate

$$\mathrm{C\ (Alice)} = (\mathrm{ID(Alice)},\ \mathrm{v},\ \mathrm{s}).$$

Okamoto identification scheme

- Alice chooses random $0 \leq k_1, k_2 \leq q-1$ and computes
$$\gamma = \alpha_1^{k_1}\alpha_2^{k_2} \mod p.$$
- Alice sends to Bob her certificate (ID(Alice), v, s) and γ.
- Bob verifies the signature of TA by checking that
$$ver_{TA}(ID(Alice), v, s) = true.$$
- Bob chooses a random $1 \leq r \leq 2^t$ and sends it to Alice.
- Alice sends to Bob
$$y_1 = (k_1 + a_1 r) \mod q;\ y_2 = (k_2 + a_2 r) \mod q.$$
- Bob verifies
$$\gamma \equiv \alpha_1^{y_1}\alpha_2^{y_2} v^r \pmod{\text{p}}$$

Authentication codes

They provide methods of ensuring integrity of messages – that a message has not been tampered/changed, and that message originated with the presumed sender.

The goal is to achieve authentication even in the presence of Mallot, a man in the middle, who can observe transmitted messages and replace them by messages of his own choice.

Formally, an authentication code consists of:

- A set M of possible messages.
- A set T of possible authentication tags.
- A set K of possible keys.
- A set R of authentication algorithms $a_k : M \rightarrow T$, one for each $k \in K$

Transmission process

- Alice and Bob jointly choose a secret key k.
- If Alice wants to send a message w to Bob, she sends (w, t), where $t = a_k(w)$.
- If Bob receives (w, t) he computes $t' = a_k(w)$ and if t = t' Bob accepts the message as authentic.

Attacks and deception probabilities

There are two basic types of attacks Mallot, the man in the middle, can do.

Impersonation. Mallot introduces a message (w, t) into the channel expecting that message will be received as being sent by Alice.

Substitution. Mallot replaces a message (w, t) in the channel by a new one, (w', t'), expecting that message will be accepted as being sent by Alice.

With any impersonation (substitution) attack a probability $P_i(P_s)$ is associated that Mallot will deceive Bob, if Mallot follows an optimal strategy.

In order to determine such probabilities we need to know probability distributions p_m on messages and p_k on keys.

In the following so called $|K| \times |M|$ authentication matrice will tabulate all authentication tags. The item in a row corresponding to a key k and in a column corresponding to a message w will contain the authentication tag $t_k(w)$.

The goal of authentication codes, to be discussed next, is to decrease probabilities that Mallot performs successfully impersonation or substitution.

Example

Let $M = T = Z_3$, $K = Z_3 \times Z_3$.
For $(i, j) \in K$ and $w \in M$, let $t_{ij}(w) = (iw + j) \mod 3$.
The matrix key $\times$ message of authentication tags has the form

Key	0	1	2
(0,0)	0	0	0
(0,1)	1	1	1
(0,2)	2	2	2
(1,0)	0	1	2
(1,1)	1	2	0
(1,2)	2	0	1
(2,0)	0	2	1
(2,1)	1	0	2
(2,2)	2	1	0

Impersonation attack: Mallot picks a message w and tries to guess the correct authentication tag.
However, for each message w and each tag a there are exactly three keys k such that $t_k(w) = a$. Hence $P_i = \frac{1}{3}$.
Substitution attack: By checking the table one can see that if Mallot observes an authenticated messages (w, t), then there are only three possibilities for the key that was used.
Moreover, for each choice (w', t'), w $\neq$ w', there is exactly one of the three possible keys for (w,t) that can be used. Therefore $P_s = \frac{1}{3}$.

Computation of deception probabilities I

Probability of impersonation: For $w \in M, t \in T$, let us define payoff(w, t) to be the probability that Bob accepts the message (w, t) as authentic. Then

$$payoff(w,t) = Pr(t = a_{k_0}(w)) \quad (4)$$

$$= \sum_{\{k \in K | a_k(w) = t\}} Pr_K(k) \quad (5)$$

In other words, payoff(w, t) is computed by selecting the rows of the authentication matrix that have entry t in column w and summing probabilities of the corresponding keys.

Therefore $P_I = max\{payoff(w,t), | w \in M, t \in A\}$.

Probability of substitution: Define, for $w, w' \in M, w \neq w'$ and $t, t' \in A, payoff(w', t', w, t)$ to be the probability that a substitution of (w, t) with (w', t') will succeed to deceive Bob. Hence

$$payoff(w', t', w, t) = Pr(t' = a_{k_0}(w') | t = a_{k_0}(w)) \quad (6)$$

$$= \frac{Pr(t' = a_{k_0}(w') \cap t = e_{k_0}(w))}{Pr(t = a_{k_0}(w))} \quad (7)$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{\{k \in K | a_k(w) = t, a_k(w') = t'\}} p_k(k)}{payoff(w,t)} \quad (8)$$

Observe that the numerator in the last fraction is found by selecting rows of the authentication matrix with value t in column w and t' in column w'.

Computation of deception probabilities II

Since Mallot wants to maximize his chance of deceiving Bob, he needs to compute

$$p_{w,t} = max\{payoff(w', t', w, t) | w' \in M, w \neq w', t' \in A\}.$$

$p_{w,t}$ therefore denotes the probability that Mallot can deceive Bob with a substitution in the case (w, t) is the message observed.

If $Pr_{\mathrm{Ma}}(w, t)$ is the probability of observing a message (w, t) in the channel, then

$$P_S = \sum_{(w,t) \in Ma} Pr_{Ma}(w, t) p_{w,t}$$

and

$$Pr_{Ma}(w, t) = Pr_M(w) Pr_K(t|w) = Pr_M(w) \times payoff(w, t).$$

The next problem is to show how to construct an authentication code such that the deception probabilities are as low as possible.

The concept of orthogonal arrays, introduced next, serves well such a purpose.

Orthogonal arrays

Definition An orthogonal array OA(n, k, λ) is a $\lambda n^2 \times k$ array of n symbols, such that in any two columns of the array every one of the possible n^2 pairs of symbols occurs in exactly λ rows.

Example OA(3,3,1) obtained from the authentication matrix presented before;

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 2 & 2 \\ 0 & 1 & 2 \\ 1 & 2 & 0 \\ 2 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 2 \\ 2 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Theorem Suppose we have an orthogonal array OA(n, k, λ).Then there is an authentication code with $|M| = k, |A| = n, |K| = \lambda n^2$ and $P_I = P_s = \frac{1}{n}$.

Proof Use each row of the orthogonal array as an authentication rule (key) with equal probability. Therefore we have the following correspondence:

orthogonal array	authentication code
row	authentication rule
column	message
symbol	authentication tag

Construction and bounds for OAs

In an orthogonal array OA(n, k, λ)

- n determines the number of authenticators (security of the code);
- k is the number of messages the code can accommodate;
- λ relates to the number of keys $-\lambda n^2$.

The following holds for orthogonal arrays.

- If p is prime, then OA(p, p, 1) exits.
- Suppose there exists an OA(n, k, λ). Then
$$\lambda \geq \frac{k(n-1)+1}{n^2};$$
- Suppose that p is a prime and $d \leq 2$ an integer. Then there is an orthogonal array $OA(p, \frac{(p^d-1)}{(p-1)}, p^{d-2})$.
- Let us have an authentication code with $|A| = n$ and $P_i = P_s = \frac{1}{n}$.Then $|K| \geq n^2$. Moreover, $|K| = n^2$ if and only if there is an orthogonal array OA(n, k,1), where $|M| = k$ and $P_K(k) = \frac{1}{n^2}$ for every key $k \in K$.

The last claim shows that there are no much better approaches to authentication codes with deception probabilities as small as possible than orthogonal arrays.

Secret sharing between two parties

A moderator distributes a binary-string secret s, between two parties P_1 and P_2 by choosing a random binary string b, of the same length as s, and

- by sending b to P_1 and
- by sending $s \oplus b$ to P_2.

This way, none of the parties P_1 and P_2 alone has a slightest idea about s, but both together easily recover s by computing

$$b \oplus (s \oplus b) = s.$$

Threshold secret sharing schemes

Secret sharing schemes distribute a "secret" among several users in such a way that only predefined sets of users can "assemble" the secret.

For example, a vault in the bank can be opened only if at least two out of three responsible employees use their knowledge and tools to open the vault.

An important special simple case of secret sharing schemes are threshold secret sharing schemes at which a certain threshold of participant is needed and sufficient to assemble the secret.

Definition Let $t \leq n$ be positive integers. A (n, t)-threshold scheme is a method of sharing a secret S among a set P of n participants, $P = \{P_i | 1 \leq i \leq n\}$, in such away that any t, or more, participants can compute the value S , but no group of t - 1, or less, participants can compute S .

Secret S is chosen by a "dealer" $D \notin P$.

It is assumed that the dealer "distributes" the secret to participants secretly and in such a way that no participant knows shares of other participants.

Shamir's (n,t)-threshold scheme

Initial phase:
Dealer D chooses a prime p, n distinct x_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$ and D gives randomly chosen values x_i to the user P_i.
The values x_i are then public.
Share distribution: Suppose D wants to share a secret $S \in Z_p$ among the users. D randomly chooses t - 1 elements of Z_p, $a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1}$.
For $1 \leq i \leq n$, D computes the "shares" $y_i = a(x_i)$,
where

$$a(x) = S + \sum_{j-1}^{t-1} a_j x^j \mod p.$$

For $1 \leq i \leq n$, D sends the share y_i to the participant P_i.
Secret cumulation: Let participants $P_{i_1}, \ldots, P_{i_t}$ want to determine secret S. Since a(x) has degree t-1, a(x) has the form

$$a(x) = a_0 + a_1 x + \ldots + a_{t-1} x^{t-1},$$

and coefficients a_i can be determined from t equations $a(x_{i_j}) = y_{i_j}$, where all arithmetic is done modulo p.
It can be easily shown that equations obtained this way are linearly independent and the system has a unique solution.
In such a case $S = a_0$.

Shamir's scheme – technicalities

Shamir's scheme uses the following result concerning polynomials over fields Z_p, where p is prime.

Theorem Let $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} a_i X^i \in Z_p[X]$ be a polynomial of degree t - 1 and let S be a set $\{(x_i, f(x_i)) | x_i \in Z_p, i = 1, \ldots, t, x_i \neq x_j \text{ if i} \neq j\}$. For any $Q \subseteq S$, let $P_Q = \{g \in Z_p[x] | deg(g) = t - 1, g(x) = y \text{ for all (x,y)} \in Q\}$. Then it holds:

- $P_S = \{f(x)\}$, i.e. f is the only polynomial of degree t - 1, whose graph contains all t points in P.
- If Q is a proper subset of S and $x \neq 0$ for all $(x, y) \in Q$, then each $a \in Z_p$ appears with the same frequency as the constant coefficient of polynomials in P_Q.

Corollary (Lagrange formula) Let $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} a_i X^i \in Z_p[X]$ be a polynomial and let $P = \{(x_I, f(x_i)) | i = 1, \ldots, t, x_i \neq x_j, i \neq j\}$. Then

$$f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} f(x_i) \prod_{1 \leq j \leq t, j \neq i} \frac{x - x_j}{x_i - x_j}$$

Shamir's (n,t)-threshold scheme – summary

To distribute n shares of a secret S among users $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ a trusted authority TA proceeds as follows:

- TA chooses a prime $p > max\{S, n\}$ and sets $a_0 = S$.
- TA selects randomly $a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1} \in Z_p$ and creates polynomial $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} a_i x^i$.
- TA computes $s_i = f(i), i = 1, \ldots, n$ and transfers each (i, s_i) to the user P_i in a secure way.

Any group J of t or more users can compute the secret. Indeed, from the previous corollary we have

$$S = a_0 = f(0) = \sum_{i \in J} f(i) \prod_{j \in J, j \neq i} \frac{j}{j - i}$$

In case $|J| < t$, then each $a_0 \in Z_p$ is equally likely to be the secret.

SECRET SHARING – GENERAL CASE

A serious limitation of the threshold secret sharing schemes is that all groups of users with the same number of users have the same access to secret.

Practical situations usually require that some (sets of) users are more important than others.

Let P be a set of users. To deal with above situation such concepts as **authorized set of user** and **access structure** are used.

An authorized set of users $A \subseteq P$ is a set of users who can together construct the secret.

An unauthorized set of users $U \subseteq P$ is a set of users who alone cannot learn anything about the secret.

Let P be a set of users. The access structure $\Gamma \subseteq 2^P$ is a set such that $A \in \Gamma$ for all authorized sets A and $U \in 2^P - \Gamma$ for all unauthorized sets U.

Theorem: For any access structure there exists a secret sharing scheme realizing this access structure.

Secret Sharing Schemes with Verification

- Secret sharing protocols increase security of a secret information by sharing it between several subjects.
- Some secret sharing scheme are such that they work even in case some participants behave incorrectly.
- A secret sharing scheme with verification is such a secret sharing scheme that:
  - Each P_i is capable to verify correctness of his/her share s_i
  - No participant P_i is able to provide incorrect information and to convince others about its correctness

Feldman's (n,k)-Protocol

Feldman's protocol is an example of the secret sharing scheme with verification. The protocol is a generalization of Shamir's protocol. It is assumed that all n participants can broadcast messages to all others and each of them can determine all senders.

Given are large primes $p, q, q|(p-1), q > n$ and $h < p$ – a generator of Z_p^* . All these numbers, and also the number $g = h^{\frac{p-1}{q}} \mod p$, are public.

As in Shamir's scheme, the dealer assigns to each participant P_i a specific x_i from $\{1, \ldots, q-1\}$ and generates a random polynomial

$$f(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} a_j x^j \mod q \qquad (1)$$

such that f(0) = s and sends to each P_i value $y_i = f(x_i)$. In addition, using a broadcasting scheme, the dealer sends to each P_i all values $v_j = g^{a_j} \mod p$.

Feldman's (n,k)-Protocol (cont.)

Each P_i verifies that

$$g^{y_i} = \prod_{j=0}^{k-1} (v_j)^{x_i^j} \mod p \qquad (1)$$

If (1) does not hold, P_i asks, using the broadcasting scheme, the dealer to broadcast correct value of y_i. If there are at least k such requests, or some of the new values of y_i does not satisfies (1), the dealer is considered as not reliable.

One can easily verify that if the dealer works correctly, then all relations (1) hold

E-COMMERCE

Very important is to ensure security of e-money transactions needed for e-commerce.

In addition to providing security and privacy, the task is also to prevent alterations of purchase orders and forgery of credit card information.

Basic requirements for e-commerce system:

Authenticity: Participants in transactions cannot be impersonated and signatures cannot be forged.

Integrity: Documents (purchase orders, payment instructions,...) cannot be forged.

Privacy: Details of transaction should be kept secret.

Security: Sensitive information (as credit card numbers) must be protected.

Anonymity: Anonymity of money senders should be guaranteed.

Additional requirement: In order to allow an efficient fighting of the organized crime a system for processing e-money has to be such that under well defined conditions it has to be possible to revoke customer's identity and flow of e-money.

(Secure Electronic Transaction) protocol was created to standardize the exchange of credit card information. Development of SET initiated in 1996 the credit card companies MasterCard and Visa.

DUAL SIGNATURE PROTOCOL

We present a protocol to solve the following security and privacy problem in e-commerce: shoppers banks should not know what cardholders are ordering and shops should not learn credit cards numbers.

Participants of our e-commerce protocol: a bank, a cardholder, a shop

The cardholder uses the following information:

- GSO – Goods and Service Order (cardholder's name, shop's name, items being ordered, their quantity,...)
- PI - Payment instructions (shop's name, card number, total price,...)

Protocol uses a public hash function h.

RSA cryptosystem is used and

- e_C, e_S and e_B are public keys of cardholder, shop, bank and
- d_C, d_S and d_B are their secret keys.

CARDHOLDER and SHOP ACTIONS

A cardholder performs the following procedure – GSO-goods and service order

1. Computes $HEGSO = h(e_S(GSO))$ – hash value of the encryption of GSO.
2. Computes $HEPI = h(e_B(PI))$ – hash value of the encryption of the payment instructions.
3. Computes $HPO = h(HEPI||HEGSO)$ – Hash values of the Payment Order.
4. Signs HPO by computing "Dual Signature" $DS = d_C(HPO)$.
5. Sends $e_S(GSO)$, DS, HEPI, and $e_B(PI)$ to shop.

Shop does the following: (payment instructions)

- Calculates $h(e_S(GSO)) =$ HEGSO;
- Calculates $h(HEPI||HEGSO)$ and $e_C(DS)$. If they are equal, shop has verified by that the cardholder signature;
- Computes $d_S(e_S(GSO))$ to get GSO.
- Sends $HEGSO, HEPI, e_B(PI)$, and DS to the bank.

BANK and SHOP ACTIONS

Bank has received HEPI, HEGSO, $e_B(PI)$, and DS and performs the following actions.

1. Computes $h(e_B(PI))$ – what should be equal to HEPI.
2. Computes $h(h(e_B(PI))\|HEGSO)$ what should be equal to $e_C(DS) = HPO$.
3. Computes $d_B(e_B(PI))$ to obtain PI;
4. Returns an encrypted (with e_S) digitally signed authorization to shop, guaranteeing the payment.

Shop completes the procedure by encrypting, with e_C, the receipt to the cardholder, indicating that transaction has been completed.

It is easy to verify that the above protocol fulfils basic requirements concerning security, privacy and integrity.

DIGITAL MONEY

Is it possible to have electronic (digital) money?

It seems that not, because copies of digital information are indistinguishable from their origin and one could therefore hardly prevent double spending,....

T. Okamoto and K. Ohia formulated six properties digital money systems should have.

1. One should be able to send e-money through e-networks.
2. It should not be possible to copy and reuse e-money.
3. Transactions using e-money should be done **off-line** – that is no communication with central bank should be needed during translation.
4. One should be able to sent e-money to anybody.
5. An e-coin could be divided into e-coins of smaller values.

Several systems of e-money have been created that satisfy all or at least some of the above requirements.

BLIND SIGNATURES – applications

Blind digital signatures allow the signer (bank) to sign a message without seeing its content.

Scenario: Customer Bob would like to give e-money to Shop. E-money has to be signed by a Bank. Shop must be able to verify Bank's signature. Later, when Shop sends e-money to Bank, Bank should not be able to recognize that it signed these e-money for Bob. Bank has therefore to sign money blindly.

Bob can obtain a blind signature for a message m from Bank by executing the Schnorr blind signature protocol described on the next slide.

Basic setting

Bank chooses large primes $p, q | (p-1)$ and an $g \in Z_p$ of order q.
Let $h : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow Z_p$ be a collision-free hash function.
Bank's secret will be a randomly chosen $x \in \{0, \ldots, p-1\}$.
Public information: $(p, q, g, y = g^x)$.

BLIND SIGNATURES – protocols

1. Schnorr's simplified identification protocol in which Bank proves its identity by proving that it knows x.
   - Bank chooses a random $r \in \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$ and send $a = g^r$ to Bob. {By that Bank "commits" itself to r}.
   - Bob sends to Bank a random $c \in \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$ {a challenge}.
   - Bank sends to Bob $b = r - cx$ {a response}.
   - Bob accepts the proof that bank knows x if $a = g^b y^c$. {because $y = g^x$}
2. Transfer of the identification scheme to a signature scheme:

   Bob chooses as $c = h(m\|a)$, where m is message to sign.

   Signature: (c, b); Verification rule: $a = g^b y^c$; Transcript: (a, c, b).
3. **Shnorr's blind signature scheme**
   - Bank sends to Bob $a' = g^{r'}$ with random $r' \in \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$.
   - Bob chooses random $u, v, w \in \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$, $u \neq 0$, computes $a = a'^u g^v y^w$, $c = h(m\|a)$, $c' = (c - w)u^{-1}$ and sends c' to Bank.
   - Bank sends to Bob b' = r' - c'x.

   Bob verifies whether $a' = g^{b'} y^{c'}$, computes b = ub' + v and gets blind signature $\sigma(m) = (c, b)$ of m.

   Verification condition for the blind signature: $c = h(m\|g^b y^c)$.

   Both (a,c,b) and (a',c',b') are valid transcripts.