IV054 Coding, Cryptography and Cryptographic Protocols
2012 - Exercises IX.

1. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and let g be its generator. Alice's private is some $x < p$ and her public key is $X = g^x$. Consider the following user identification scheme:

   - Alice randomly chooses $r < p$ and sends $R = g^r$ and $S = g^{x-r}$ to Bob.
   - Bob responds by sending a randomly chosen bit b.
   - If $b = 0$, Alice sends $z = r$ to Bob, otherwise she sends $z = x - r$.

   (a) Find and explain the acceptance condition.
   (b) Show that the adversary Eve is able to impersonate Alice with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.
   (c) Propose a change which makes the protocol more secure.

2. Consider the Shamir's $(5, 3)$-threshold secret sharing scheme with $p = 211$. Participants P_1, P_2 and P_3 with shares $(1, 171), (2, 46)$ and $(3, 170)$ want to reconstruct the secret. Show in detail their computation.

3. Let h_1, h_2 be hash functions with the same length of outputs such that one of them is strongly collision-free. Use them to find a strongly collision-free hash function h. Show that your function has the desired property.

4. Suppose you are an army cryptographer. Your mission is to design a secret sharing scheme allowing one General and one Lieutenant General or five Lieutenant Generals to fire a missile. Accomplish your mission.

5. There are four persons in a room, and one of them is a foreign spy. Other three persons share a secret using the Shamir's threshold scheme with $p = 11$. Any two of them can recover the secret. The foreign spy chooses his share randomly. Together with the secret sharing participants, the four shares are as follows:

   $$P_A : (1, 7), \quad P_B : (3, 0), \quad P_C : (5, 10), \quad P_D : (7, 9)$$

   Find out who is the foreign spy and calculate the secret.

6. Consider the following authentication protocol:

	A		B		S
(i)		$\xrightarrow{\quad A \quad}$			
(ii)		$\xleftarrow{\quad N_B \quad}$			
(iii)		$\xrightarrow{\{N_B\}_{K_{AS}}}$			
(iv)				$\xrightarrow{B, \{A, \{N_B\}_{K_{AS}}\}_{K_{BS}}}$	
(v)				$\xleftarrow{\{N_B\}_{K_{BS}}}$	
(vi)			check N_B		

   In the protocol, an entity A authenticates herself to another entity B with the help of an authentication server S. We denote a secret key shared by entities X and Y by K_{XY}, and let N_X denote a random value generated by X freshly for each instance of the protocol. The encryption of a message m by a key K is denoted $\{m\}_K$.

   (a) Show that a malicious user M can impersonate A to B without any contribution from A.
   (b) Propose a corrected version of the protocol.

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7. Suppose Alice and Bob share a random secret key and they want to use it to authenticate their messages $0 \leq m < 32$. To authenticate a message m with a 2-bit tag t, Alice chooses two numbers $0 < q < 37$ and $0 \leq r < 37$ *according to the shared key*, computes a hash of m:

$$t = ((qm + r) \pmod{37}) \pmod{4}$$

and sends (m, t) to Bob.
Bob receives a possibly modified pair (m', t') and computes $t_b = ((qm' + r) \pmod{37}) \pmod{4}$. If $t_b = t'$, he accepts.

(a) What is the probability of successful mounting an impersonation attack?

(b) What is the probability of successful mounting a substitution attack?