


# PB173 - Tématický vývoj aplikací v C/C++ (podzim 2013)



Skupina: [Aplikovaná kryptografie a bezpečné programování](#)

<https://is.muni.cz/auth/el/1433/podzim2013/PB173/index.qwarp?fakulta=1433;obdobi=5983;predmet=734514;prejit=2957738;>

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Konzultace: G.201, Úterý 13-13:50



Centre for Research on  
Cryptography and Security

## Rozdělení do týmů

- 2-3 osoby
- Společná práce, ale každý prezentuje svůj přínos
  - prezentace na každém dalším cvičení
  - resp. za 14 dní při absenci
- Rozdělení teď!
  - TODO týmy

# Designing good API, authenticated encryption

# Principles of good API

1. Be minimal
  2. Be complete
  3. Have clear and simple semantics
  4. Be intuitive
  5. Be easy to memorize
  6. Lead to readable code
- read more at e.g., <http://doc.trolltech.com/qq/qq13-apis.html>
  - security API even harder:  
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c18.pdf>
  - <http://blog.apigee.com/taglist/security>

## Read more about this topics

- Schneier on Security: <http://www.schneier.com/>
- TaoSecurity <http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/>
- Krebs on Security: <http://krebsonsecurity.com/>
- Freedom to Tinker: <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/>
- Light Blue Touchpaper:  
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/>
- ...

## Copy-free functions

- API style which minimizes array copy operations
- Frequently used in cryptography
  - we take block, process it and put back
  - can take place inside original memory array
- **int** encrypt(byte array[], **int** startOffset, **int** length);
  - encrypt data from *startOffset* to *startOffset + length*;
- Wrong(?) example:
  - **int** encrypt(byte array[], **int** length, byte outArray[], **int\*** pOutLength);
  - note: C/C++ can still use pointers arithmetic
  - note: Java can't (we need to create new array)

# Block cipher modes for Authenticated Encryption

## Modes for authenticated encryption

- Encryption preserves confidentiality but not integrity
- Common integrity functions (like CRC) protect against **random** faults
- Cryptographic message integrity protects **intentional** errors



## Confidentiality, integrity, privacy

- Message confidentiality [encryption]
  - attacker is not able to obtain info about plaintext
- Message integrity [MAC]
  - attacker is not able to modify message without being detected (PTX, CTX)
- Message privacy [encryption]
  - attacker is not able to distinguish between encrypted message and random string
  - same message is encrypted each time differently

## Encryption and MAC composition

- Modes for block ciphers (CBC, CTR, CBC-MAC)
- Compositions (encryption + MAC)
  - encrypt-and-mac [ $E_{K_e, K_m}(M) = E_{K_e}(M) \parallel T_{K_m}(M)$ ]
    - can fail with privacy and authenticity
  - mac-then-encrypt [ $E_{K_e, K_m}(M) = E_{K_e}(M \parallel T_{K_m}(M))$ ]
    - can fail with authenticity
  - encrypt-then-mac [ $E_{K_e, K_m}(M) = E_{K_e}(M) \parallel T_{K_m}(E_{K_e}(M))$ ]
    - always provides privacy and authenticity
- Parallelizability issue
- Authenticated-encryption modes (AE)
  - special block cipher modes for composed process

## Usage scenarios


- Powerful, parallelizable environments
  - hardware accelerators
- Powerful, but almost serial environments
  - personal computer, PDA
- Restricted environments
  - smart card, cellular phone
- Different scenarios have different needs

## Important features for AE modes

- Provable security
- Performance, paralelizability, memory req.
  - important for high-speed encryption, SC
- Patent
  - early AE modes were patented
- Associated data authentication
  - authentication of non-encrypted part
- Online, incremental MAC, number of keys, endian dependency ...
- <http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html>
- [www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE\\_comparison\\_ipics04.pdf](http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf)


## EAX mode

- Encrypt-then-mac composition
- Provable secure, unpatented




# Offset CodeBook mode (OCB)

- Memory efficient, fast mode
- Provable secure, but patented



# Cipher-State mode (CS)


- Memory efficient, fast mode, unpatented
- Not provable secure (inner state of cipher)



# Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)

- Need pre-computed table (4kB-64kB)
- fast mode, provable secure, unpatented, NIST standard
- <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf>

## GCM





# Implementation: AES-GCM from PolarSSL

- gcm.h, gcm.c

```
int gcm_init( gcm_context *ctx,  
             const unsigned char *key,  
             unsigned int keysize );
```

```
int gcm_crypt_and_tag( gcm_context *ctx,  
                      int mode, // GCM_ENCRYPT (alternatively GCM_DECRYPT)  
                      size_t length,  
                      const unsigned char *iv,  
                      size_t iv_len,  
                      const unsigned char *add, // authenticated, but not encrypted  
                      size_t add_len,  
                      const unsigned char *input, // authenticated and encrypted  
                      unsigned char *output, // encrypted data  
                      size_t tag_len,  
                      unsigned char *tag );
```


```
int gcm_auth_decrypt( gcm_context *ctx,  
                    size_t length, // length of input data  
                    const unsigned char *iv,  
                    size_t iv_len,  
                    const unsigned char *add, // authenticated, but not encrypted  
                    size_t add_len,  
                    const unsigned char *tag, // authenticator (MAC value)  
                    size_t tag_len,  
                    const unsigned char *input, // encrypted data  
                    unsigned char *output ); // decrypted data
```

## Conclusions

- Composition of ENC and MAC can fail
  - encrypt-then-mac provable secure
  - specially designed composed modes
- Most promising mode is patented (OCB)
  - fast alternative GCM, CS
- Suitable mode depends on usage
  - parallelizability, memory
  - specific needs (online, incremental MAC)

## "Theme" project

- Secure videoconferencing architecture



## "Theme" project – some details

- Users obtains certificate of identity from Certification authority
- Users register with Videoconferencing server
- Videoconferencing server provides list of connected users, help to establish video connection and charge fee based on call length
- Client maintains user identity, related keys and provides high speed encryption of audio/video stream

# Practical assignment

- Design and document API to:
  1. **new user registration**
  2. **user authentication to server**
  3. **obtain list of other users**
  4. **establish secure channel to other (online) users (ENC, MAC)**
  5. **exchange stream data with other user (audio only)**
  6. **close secure channel**
  7. **disconnect user from server**
  8. **...?**
- Document functions in JavaDoc-style (Doxygen)
- CA/Client/Server are separate processes
  - design communication over sockets or http requests

## Practical assignment – cont.

- Prepare document and presentation with design decisions
  - 2xA4 document (overview, functions...)
  - 4-5 slides (presentation)
- Your design will be presented and discussed next week