

PV181 Laboratory of security and applied cryptography



Symmetric cryptography

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Goals of Cryptography

- Confidentiality (privacy) - preventing open access
 - **ciphers**
- Authentication:
 1. Entity – identity verification – various (password, MAC, ...)
 2. Data origin – identity of message originator – **MAC**
- Integrity - preventing unauthorized modification
 - **hash functions**
- Non-repudiation - preventing denial of actions
 - **digital signature**

Crypto primitives

- **Ciphers** – encryption/decryption of data using **key**
 - Symmetric ciphers – **same** key for enc/dec
 - Asymmetric ciphers – **different** key for enc/dec
- **Random number generators (RNGs)**
 - generation of Keys, IVs, Nonces, ...
- **Hash functions** – “unique” fingerprint of data
- Based on previous: MAC, PBKDF, Digital signature

Standards

Primitives are defined in various types of standards:

- FIPS PUB 197 – AES block cipher
- RFC1321 – md5 hash function
- NIST SP,...


Test vectors: defined output to test implementation

- MD5 ("") = **d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e**

Ciphers: Kerckhoffs' principle


- A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the **key**, is public knowledge.
- I.e. only the **key** should be kept secret, not the algorithm.

Symmetric cryptosystem



Adapted *Network and
Internetwork Security* (Stallings)


Asymmetric cryptosystem



Adapted Source: *Network and Internet Security* (Stallings)

Block cipher

- Input divided into blocks of fixed size (e.g 256 bits)
 - Padding - message is padded to complete last block
- Different modes of operation:
 - Insecure basic ECB mode – leaks info
 - Secure modes: CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR, ...
- CBC, OFB, CFB need initialization
 - Initialization vector (IV) – must be known



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation

Block ciphers - padding

Standard

ANSI X.923

ISO 10126

PKCS7

ISO/IEC 7816-4

Zero padding

method

... | DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD | DD DD DD DD **00 00 00 04** |


... | DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD | DD DD DD DD **81 A6 23 04** |

... | DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD | DD DD DD DD **04 04 04 04** |


... | DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD | DD DD DD DD **80 00 00 00** |

... | DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD | DD DD DD DD **00 00 00 00** |

Block ciphers: ECB vs CBC mode



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation

Random number generators

- Used to generate: keys, IV, ...
 1. Truly RNG - physical process
 - aperiodic, slow
 2. Pseudo RNG (PRNG) – software function
 - deterministic, periodic, fast
 - initialized by **seed** – fully determines random data
- Combination often used:
 - truly RNG used to generate **seed** for PRNG
 - dev/urandom, dev/random in Linux, **Fortuna** scheme

Hash function

- **Cryptographic** hash function
- Input of arbitrary size
- Output of fixed size: n bits (e.g. 256 bits).
- Function is not injective (there are “**collisions**”).
- Hash is a compact representative of input (also called imprint, (digital) fingerprint or message digest).
- Hash functions often used to protect integrity. First the hash is computed and then only the hash is protected (e.g. digitally signed).

Hash function properties

- One-way property
 - It is easy to calculate $h(\mathbf{x})$ for arbitrary \mathbf{x} .
 - In a reasonable time it is not possible for the fixed \mathbf{y} to find \mathbf{x} , such that $h(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$.
- Collision resistance
 - (**weak**): In a reasonable time it is not possible for a given \mathbf{x} to find \mathbf{x}' ($\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}'$) such that $h(\mathbf{x}) = h(\mathbf{x}')$.
 - (**strong**): In a reasonable time it is not possible to find any \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}' such that $h(\mathbf{x}) = h(\mathbf{x}')$.

Cryptographic hash functions

- MD5: output 128 bits
 - Still used although not considered secure at all
 - Broken: efficient algorithm for finding collisions available
 - 128-bit output not considered secure enough
- RIPEMD
 - Output : 128, 160, 256 or 320 bits
 - Less frequently used
- Whirlpool
 - Output: 512 bits
 - Based on AES
 - Recommended by NESSIE project
 - Standardized by ISO

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)

- **SHA-1**
 - NIST standard, collision found in 2016, 160 bits hash
- **SHA-2**
 - function family: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-224
 - defined in FIPS 180-2
 - Recommended
- **SHA-3**
 - New standard 2015
 - Keccak sponge function family: SHAKE-128, SHA3-224, ...
 - defined in FIPS 202, used in FIPS-202, SP 800-185
 - Recommended

Hash functions - examples

- MD5
 - Input: „Autentizace“.
 - Output: 2445b187f4224583037888511d5411c7 .
 - Output 128 bits, written in hexadecimal notation.
 - Input: „Cutentizace“.
 - Output: cd99abbba3306584e90270bf015b36a7.
 - A single bit changed in input → big change in output, so called “Avalanche effect”
- SHA-1
 - Input: „Autentizace“.
 - Output: 647315cd2a6c953cf5c29d36e0ad14e395ed1776
- SHA-256
 - Input: „Autentizace“.
 - Output: a2eb4bc98a5f71a4db02ed4aed7f12c4ead1e7c98323fda8ecbb69282e4df584

Password protection


password hashing & salting

1. Clear password could be stolen:
 - store hash of password
 $\text{hash} = H(\text{password})$
 - Checking: password is correct if **hash** matches
2. Attack (brute force or dictionary)
 - trying possible passwords “aaa”, “aab” ... “zzz” – N tests
 - N test for single but also for 2,3,... passwords !!!
3. Salt - random string (salt) added to password
 $\text{hash} = H(\text{salt} | \text{password})$
 - protects many passwords not one (salt also stored)


Password protection

password hashing & salting

Password Creation



Password Verification




Source: <http://blog.conviso.com.br/worst-and-best-practices-for-secure-password-storage/>

Key protection

- Encrypt **key** (using cipher and other key **k**)
 - Key **k** typically derived from password
- 4. Password based key derivation function (PBKDF):
 - 2 types - PBKDF and newer PBKDF2 (PKCS#5)
 - slow down hashing of passwords – hash of hash of hash...
$$\mathbf{k} = H^c(\mathit{salt} \mid \mathit{pwd})$$
 - Attacker is c times slower / need c times more resources

PBKDF2



MAC

- based on block cipher or hash func. (HMAC)
- MAC = **authenticity** + integrity
 - message authenticity – came from stated sender
 - message integrity - was not altered
 - Key + message → algorithm → MAC

