IA169 System Verification and Assurance Symbolic Execution and Concolic Testing Jiří Barnat Section Testing Strategies IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 2/38 Black-box Testing Black-box A product under test is viewed as a black box. It is analysed through the input-output behaviour. Inner details (such as source code) are hidden or not taken into account. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 3/38 White-box, Gray-box Testing White-box Testing (Glass-box) Inner details are taken into account. Tests are selected and executed with respect to the inner details of the product, e.g. code coverage. Error insertion, modification of the product for the purpose of testing. Basically only extends any Black-box approach. Gray-box Testing In between of Black-box and White-box. Sometimes the same as White-box, inconsistent terminology. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 4/38 Testing Techniques Primary Black-box Strategies Domain Testing Combinatory Testing Scenario Testing Risk-based Testing Functional Testing Fuzz Testing (Mutation Testing) Primary White-box Extensions Model-based Testing Unit Testing Support for Developers Regression Testing IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 5/38 Section Symbolic Execution IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 6/38 Motivation Problem To detect errors that systematically exhibit only for specific input values is difficult. Relates to incompleteness of testing. Still we would like to ... test the program on inputs that make program execute differently from what has already been tested. test the program for all inputs. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 7/38 Symbolic Execution Idea Execute a program so that values of input variables are referred to as to symbols instead of concrete values. Demo Program Selected concrete Symbolic values representation read(A) A = 3 A = α A = A * 2 A = 6 A = α ∗ 2 A = A + 1 A = 7 A = (α ∗ 2) + 1 output(A) IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 8/38 Branching and Path Condition Observation Branching in the code put some restrictions on the data depending on the condition of a branching point. Example 1 if (A == 2) A = (α ∗ 2) + 1 2 then ... (α ∗ 2) + 1 = 2 3 else ... (α ∗ 2) + 1 = 2 Path Condition Formula over symbols referring to input values. Encodes history of computation, i.e. cumulative restrictions implied from all the branching points walked-through up to the curent point of execution. Initially set to true. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 9/38 Unfeasible Paths Observation The path condition may become unsatisfiable. If so, there are no input values that would make the program execute that way. Example 1 1 if (A == B) A = α, B = β 2 then α = β 3 if (A == B) 4 then ... α = β ∧ α = β 5 else ... α = β ∧ α = β is UNSAT 6 else ... α = β Example 2 % – operation modulo 1 A=A%2 A = α%2 2 if (A == 3) then ... α%2 = 3 is UNSAT 3 else ... α%2 = 3 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 10/38 Tree of Symbolic Execution Observation All possible executions of program may be represented by a tree structure – Symbolic Execution Tree. The tree is obtained by unfolding/unwinding the control flow graph of the program. Symbolic Execution Tree Node of the tree encodes program location, symbolic representation of variables, and a concrete path condition. location symbolic valuation path condition #12 A = α + 2, B = α + β − 2 α = 2 ∗ β − 1 An edge in the tree corresponds to a symbolic execution of a program instruction on a given location. Branching point is reflected as branching in the tree and causes updates of path conditions in individual branches. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 11/38 Example of Symbolic Execution Tree Program 1 input A,B 2 if (B<0) then 3 return 0 4 else 5 while (B > 0) 6 { B=B-1 7 A=A+B 8 } 9 return A Draw Yourself. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 12/38 Path Explosion Properties of Symbolic Tree Execution No nodes are merged, even if they are the same (the structure is a tree). A single program location may be contained in (infinitely) many nodes of the tree. Tree may contain infinite paths. Path Explosion Problem The number of branches in the symbolic execution tree may be large for non-trivial programs. The number of paths may grow exponentially with the number of branching points visited. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 13/38 Employing Symbolic Execution Tree for Verification Analysis of the Tree Breadth-first strategy, the tree may be infinite. Deduced Program Properties Identification of feasible and unfeasible paths. Proof of reachability of a given program location. Error detection (division by zero, out-of-array access, assertion violation, etc.). Synthesis of Test Input Data If the formula encoded as a path condition is satisfiable for a symbolic run, the model of the formula gives concrete input values that make the program to follow the symbolic run. Excellent for synthesis of tests that increase code coverage. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 14/38 Automated Test Generation Principle 1 Generate random input values (encode some random path). 2 Perform a walk through the Symbolic Execution Tree with the random input values and record the path condition. 3 Generate a new path condition from the recorded one by negating one of the restrictions related to a single branching point. 4 Find input values satisfying the new path condition. 5 Repeat from number 2 until desired coverage is reached. Practical Notes Heuristics for selection of branching point to be negated. Augmentation of the code to enable path condition recording. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 15/38 Limits of Symbolic Execution Undecidability Using complex arithmetic operations on unbounded domains implies general undecidability of the formula satisfaction problem. Symbolic Execution Tree is infinite (due to unwinding of cycles with unbound number of iterations). Computational Complexity Path explosion problem. Efficiency of algorithms for formula satisfiability on finite domains. Known Limits Symbolic operations on non-numerical variables. Not clear how to deal with dynamic data structures. Symbolic evaluation of calls to external functions. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 16/38 Section Tools for SAT Solving IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 17/38 SAT Problem Satisfiability Problem – SAT Is to decide if there exists a valuation of Boolean variables of propositional logic formula that makes the formula hold true (be valid). SAT Problem Properties Famous NP-complete problem. Polynomial algorithm is unlikely to exist. Still there are existing SAT solvers that are very efficient and due to a plethora of heuristics can solve surprisingly large instances of the problem. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 18/38 Tool Z3 ZZZ aka Z3 Developed by Microsoft Research. SAT and SMT Solver. WWW interface — http://www.rise4fun.com/Z3 Standardised binary API for use within other verification tools. Decide using Z3 Is formula (a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (¬a ∨ b) satisfiable? IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 19/38 Usage of Z3 – SAT Reformulate into language of Z3 (a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (¬a ∨ b) (declare-const a Bool) (declare-const b Bool) (assert (and (or a (not b)) (or (not a) b))) (check-sat) (get-model) Answer of Z3 sat (model (define-fun b () Bool false) (define-fun a () Bool false) ) IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 20/38 Satisfiability Modulo Theory – SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theory – SMT Is to decide satisfiability of first order logic with predicates and function symbols that encode one or more selected theories. Typically used theories Arithmetic of integer and floating point numbers. Theories of data structures (lists, arrays, bit-vectors, . . . ). Other view (Wikipedia) SMT can be thought of as a form of the constraint satisfaction problem and thus a certain formalised approach to constraint programming. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 21/38 Examples of SMT in Z3 Solve using Z3 http://rise4fun.com/Z3/tutorial/guide Are there two integer non-zero numbers x and y such that y=x*(x-y)? (declare-const y Int) (declare-const x Int) (assert (= y (* x (- x y)))) (assert (not (= y 0))) (check-sat) (get-model) Are there two integer non-zero numbers x and y such that y=x*(x-(y*y))? (declare-const y Int) (declare-const x Int) (assert (= y (* x (- x (* y y))))) (assert (not (= x 0))) (check-sat) IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 22/38 Satisfiability and Validity Observation A formula is valid if and only if its negation is not satisfiable. Consequence SAT and SMT solvers can be used as theorem provers to show validity of some theorems. Model Synthesis SAT solvers not only decide satisfiability of formulae but in positive case also give concrete valuation of variables for which the formula is valid. Unlike general theorem provers they provide a counterexample in case the theorem to be proved is invalid (negation is satisfiable). IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 23/38 Section Concolic Testing IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 24/38 Motivation Problem Efficient undecidability of path feasibility. In practice, unknown result often means unsatisfiability (no witness found). However, skipping paths that we only think are unfeasible, may result in undetected errors. On the other hand, executing unfeasible path may report unreal errors. Partial Solution Let us use concrete and symbolic values at the same time in order to support decisions that are practically undecidable by a SAT or SMT solver. Heuristics. An interesting case (correct): UNKNOWN =⇒ SAT Concrete and Symbolic Testing = Concolic Testing IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 25/38 Hypothetical demo of concolic testing Program 1 input A,B 2 if (A==(B*B)%30) then 3 ERROR 4 else 5 return A Concolic Testing 1 A=22, B=7 (random values), test executed, no errors found. 2 (22==(7*7)%30) is False, path condition: α = (β ∗ β)%30 3 Synthesis of input data from negation of path condition: α = (β ∗ β)%30 – UNKNOWN 4 Employ concrete values: α = (7 ∗ 7)%30 – SAT, α = 19 5 A=19, B=7 6 Test detected error location on program line 3. IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 26/38 Section SAGE Tool IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 27/38 Story of SAGE Systematic Testing for Security: Whitebox Fuzzing Patrice Godefroid Michael Y. Levin and David Molnar http://research.microsoft.com/projects/atg/ Microsoft Research IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 28/38 Story of SAGE Whitebox Fuzzing (SAGE tool)  Start with a well-formed input (not random)  Combine with a generational search (not DFS)  Negate 1-by-1 each constraint in a path constraint  Generate many children for each parent run  Challenge all the layers of the application sooner  Leverage expensive symbolic execution  Search spaces are huge, the search is partial… yet effective at finding bugs ! Gen 1 parent IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 29/38 Story of SAGE Example: Dynamic Test Generation void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt > 3) crash(); } input = “good” IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 30/38 Story of SAGE Dynamic Test Generation void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt > 3) crash(); } input = “good” I0 != „b‟ I1 != „a‟ I2 != „d‟ I3 != „!‟ Negate a condition in path constraint Solve new constraint  new input Path constraint: IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 31/38 Story of SAGE Depth-First Search void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt > 3) crash(); } I0 != „b‟ I1 != „a‟ I2 != „d‟ I3 != „!‟ good input = “good” IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 32/38 Story of SAGE Depth-First Search goo!good void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt > 3) crash(); } I0 != „b‟ I1 != „a‟ I2 != „d‟ I3 == „!‟ IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 33/38 Story of SAGE Generational Search goo! godd gaod bood Four “Generation 1” test cases ! good void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt > 3) crash(); } I0 == „b‟ I1 == „a‟ I2 == „d‟ I3 == „!‟ IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 34/38 Story of SAGE The Search Space void top(char input[4]) { int cnt = 0; if (input[0] == ‘b’) cnt++; if (input[1] == ‘a’) cnt++; if (input[2] == ‘d’) cnt++; if (input[3] == ‘!’) cnt++; if (cnt >= 3) crash(); } IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 35/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 0 – seed file IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF............ 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 1 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 00 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF....*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 2 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 3 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ....strh........ 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 4 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 5 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ....strf........ 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 6 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 66 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 ; ....strf....(... 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 7 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 66 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 ; ....strf....(... 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 C9 9D E4 4E ; ............É•äN 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 8 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 66 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 ; ....strf....(... 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 9 IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE Zero to Crash in 10 Generations  Starting with 100 zero bytes …  SAGE generates a crashing test for Media1 parser: 00000000h: 52 49 46 46 3D 00 00 00 ** ** ** 20 00 00 00 00 ; RIFF=...*** .... 00000010h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000030h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 68 00 00 00 00 76 69 64 73 ; ....strh....vids 00000040h: 00 00 00 00 73 74 72 66 B2 75 76 3A 28 00 00 00 ; ....strf²uv:(... 00000050h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ; ................ 00000060h: 00 00 00 00 ; .... Generation 10 – crash bucket 1212954973! IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 36/38 Story of SAGE  Since 1st internal release in April’07: tens of new security bugs found  Apps: image processors, media players, file decoders,… Confidential !  Bugs: Write A/Vs, Read A/Vs, Crashes,… Confidential !  Many bugs found triaged as “security critical, severity 1, priority 1” Initial Experiences with SAGE IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 37/38 Homework Homework Follow Klee tutorials 1 and 2 (http://klee.github.io/tutorials) Solve The Wolf, Goat and Cabbage problem with Klee IA169 System Verification and Assurance – 02 str. 38/38