

# **IA168 Algorithmic Game Theory**

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
# Organization of This Course

## Sources:

- ▶ Lectures (slides, notes)
  - ▶ based on several sources
  - ▶ slides are prepared for lectures, some stuff on greenboard ( $\Rightarrow$  attend the lectures)
- ▶ Books:
  - ▶ Nisan/Roughgarden/Tardos/Vazirani, **Algorithmic Game Theory**, Cambridge University, 2007.  
Available online for free:  
[http://www.cambridge.org/journals/nisan/downloads/Nisan\\_Non-printable.pdf](http://www.cambridge.org/journals/nisan/downloads/Nisan_Non-printable.pdf)
  - ▶ Tadelis, **Game Theory: An Introduction**, Princeton University Press, 2013

(I use various resources, so please, attend the lectures)

- ▶ Oral exam
- ▶ Homework



- ▶ 3 times homework
- ▶ A computer implementation of a strategy

## Notable features of the course

- ▶ No computer games course!
- ▶ **Very demanding!**
- ▶ Mathematical!

An unusual exam system!

You can repeat the oral exam as many times as needed (only the best grade goes into IS).

An example of an instruction email (from another course with the same system):

It is typically not sufficient to devote a single afternoon to the preparation for the exam.

You have to know everything (which means every single thing) starting with the slide 42 and ending with the slide 245 with notable exceptions of slides: 121 - 123, 137 - 140, 165, 167.

Proofs presented on the whiteboard are also mandatory.

Most importantly,

The previous slide is not  
a joke!

# What is Algorithmic Game Theory?

First, what is the game theory?

*According to the Oxford dictionary* it is "the branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategies for dealing with competitive situations where the outcome of a participant's choice of action depends critically on the actions of other participants"

*According to Myerson* it is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers"







What does the "algorithmic" mean?

- ▶ It means that we are "concerned with the computational questions that arise in game theory, and that enlighten game theory. In particular, questions about finding efficient algorithms to 'solve' games."

Let's have a look at some examples ....

# Prisoner's Dilemma

Prisoners' dilemma

		prisoner B			
		confess		remain silent	
prisoner A	confess	 5 years 5 years	 0 year 20 years		
	remain silent	 20 years 0 year	 1 year 1 year		

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- ▶ Two suspects of a serious crime are arrested and imprisoned.
- ▶ Police has enough evidence of only petty theft, and to nail the suspects for the serious crime they need testimony from at least one of them.
- ▶ The suspects are interrogated separately without any possibility of communication.
- ▶ Each of the suspects is offered a deal: If he confesses (C) to the crime, he is free to go. The alternative is not to confess, that is remain silent (S).

Sentence depends on the behavior of both suspects.

The problem: What would the suspects do?

## Prisoner's Dilemma – Solution(?)

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

Rational "row" suspect (or his adviser) may reason as follows:

- ▶ If my colleague chooses C, then playing C gives me -5 and playing S gives -20.
- ▶ If my colleague chooses S, then playing C gives me 0 and playing S gives -1.


In both cases C is clearly better (it *strictly dominates* the other strategy). If the other suspect's reasoning is the same, both choose C and get 5 years sentence.

Where is the dilemma? There is a solution (S, S) which is better for both players but needs some "central" authority to control the players.

Are there always "dominant" strategies?



# Nash equilibria – Battle of Sexes



- ▶ A couple agreed to meet this evening, but cannot recall if they will be attending the opera or a football match.
- ▶ The husband would like to go to the football game. The wife would like to go to the opera. Both would prefer to go to the same place rather than different ones.

If they cannot communicate, where should they go?

## Nash equilibria – Battle of Sexes

Battle of Sexes can be modeled as a game of two players (Wife, Husband) with the following payoffs:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2,1	0,0
<i>F</i>	0,0	1,2


Apparently, no strategy of any player is dominant. A “solution”?

Note that whenever *both* players play *O*, then neither of them wants to *unilaterally* deviate from his strategy!

$(O, O)$  is an example of a *Nash equilibrium* (as is  $(F, F)$ )

# Mixed Equilibria – Rock-Paper-Scissors

	R	P	S
R	0,0	-1,1	1,-1
P	1,-1	0,0	-1,1
S	-1,1	1,-1	0,0



- ▶ This is an example of *zero-sum* games: whatever one of the players wins, the other one loses.
- ▶ What is an optimal behavior here? Is there a Nash equilibrium?

Use *mixed strategies*: Each player plays each pure strategy with probability  $1/3$ . The expected payoff of each player is 0 (even if one of the players changes his strategy, he still gets 0!).


## Philosophical Issues in Games

I UNDERSTAND THAT SCISSORS CAN BEAT PAPER, AND I GET HOW ROCK CAN BEAT SCISSORS, BUT THERE'S NO WAY PAPER CAN BEAT ROCK. PAPER IS SUPPOSED TO MAGICALLY WRAP AROUND ROCK LEAVING IT IMMOBILE? WHY CAN'T PAPER DO THIS TO SCISSORS? SCREW SCISSORS, WHY CAN'T PAPER DO THIS TO PEOPLE? WHY AREN'T SHEETS OF COLLEGE RULED NOTEBOOK PAPER CONSTANTLY SUFFOCATING STUDENTS AS THEY ATTEMPT TO TAKE NOTES IN CLASS? I'LL TELL YOU WHY, BECAUSE PAPER CAN'T BEAT ANYBODY, A ROCK WOULD TEAR IT UP IN TWO SECONDS. WHEN I PLAY ROCK PAPER SCISSORS, I ALWAYS CHOOSE ROCK. THEN WHEN SOMEBODY CLAIMS TO HAVE BEATEN ME WITH THEIR PAPER I CAN PUNCH THEM IN THE FACE WITH MY ALREADY CLENCHED FIST AND SAY, OH SORRY, I THOUGHT PAPER WOULD PROTECT YOU.

# Dynamic Games

So far we have seen games in *strategic form* that are unable to capture games that unfold over time (such as chess).

For such purpose we need to use *extensive form* games:




How to "solve" such games?

What is their relationship to the strategic form games?

# Chance and Imperfect Information

Some decisions in the game tree may be by chance and controlled by neither player (e.g. Poker, Backgammon, etc.)

Sometimes a player may not be able to distinguish between several “positions” because he does not know all the information in them (Think a card game with opponent’s cards hidden).



Again, how to solve such games?

# Games of Incomplete Information

According to a study by the Institute of incomplete information 9 out of every 10.

In all previous games the players knew all details of the game they played, and this fact was a “common knowledge”. This is not always the case.

## Example: Sealed Bid Auction

- ▶ Two bidders are trying to purchase the same item.
- ▶ The bidders simultaneously submit bids  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  and the item is sold to the highest bidder at his bid price (first price auction)
- ▶ The payoff of the player 1 (and similarly for player 2) is calculated by

$$u_1(b_1, b_2) = \begin{cases} v_1 - b_1 & b_1 > b_2 \\ \frac{1}{2}(v_1 - b_1) & b_1 = b_2 \\ 0 & b_1 < b_2 \end{cases}$$

Here  $v_1$  is the private value that player 1 assigns to the item and so the player 2 **does not know**  $u_1$ .

How to deal with such a game? Assume the “worst” private value?  
What if we have a partial knowledge about the private values?

# Inefficiency of Equilibria

In Prisoner's Dilemma, the selfish behavior of suspects (the Nash equilibrium) results in somewhat worse than ideal situation.

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

Defining a *welfare function*  $W$  which to every pair of strategies assigns the sum of payoffs, we get  $W(C, C) = -10$  but  $W(S, S) = -2$ .

The ratio  $\frac{W(C,C)}{W(S,S)} = 5$  measures the inefficiency of "selfish-behavior"  $(C, C)$  w.r.t. the optimal "centralized" solution.

*Price of Anarchy* is the maximum ratio between values of equilibria and the value of an optimal solution.




# Inefficiency of Equilibria – Selfish Routing

Consider a transportation system where many agents are trying to get from some initial location to a destination. Consider the welfare to be the average time for an agent to reach the destination. There are two versions:

- ▶ “Centralized”: A central authority tells each agent where to go.
- ▶ “Decentralized”: Each agent selfishly minimizes his travel time.

Price of Anarchy measure the ratio between average travel time in these two cases.

Problem: Bound the price of anarchy over all routing games?



# Games in Computer Science

Game theory is a core foundation of mathematical economics. But what does it have to do with CS?

- ▶ Games in AI: modeling of “rational” agents and their interactions.
- ▶ Games in machine learning: Generative adversarial networks, reinforcement learning
- ▶ Games in Algorithms: several game theoretic problems have a very interesting algorithmic status and are solved by interesting algorithms
- ▶ Games in modeling and analysis of reactive systems: program inputs viewed “adversarially”, bisimulation games, etc.
- ▶ Games in computational complexity: Many complexity classes are definable in terms of games: PSPACE, polynomial hierarchy, etc.
- ▶ Games in Logic: modal and temporal logics, Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games, etc.

Games, the Internet and E-commerce: An extremely active research area at the intersection of CS and Economics

Basic idea: “The internet is a HUGE experiment in interaction between agents (both human and automated)”

How do we set up the rules of this game to harness “socially optimal” results?

# Summary and Brief Overview

This is a *theoretical* course aimed at some fundamental results of game theory, often related to computer science

- ▶ We start with strategic form games (such as the Prisoner's dilemma), investigate several solution concepts (dominance, equilibria) and related algorithms.
- ▶ Then we consider repeated games which allow players to learn from history and/or to react to deviations of the other players.
- ▶ Subsequently, we move on to incomplete information games and auctions.
- ▶ Finally, we consider (in)efficiency of equilibria (such as the Price of Anarchy) and its properties on important classes of routing and network formation games.
- ▶ Remaining time will be devoted to selected topics from extensive form games, games on graphs etc.

# Static Games of Complete Information

## Strategic-Form Games

### Solution concepts

# Static Games of Complete Information – Intuition

Proceed in two steps:

1. Each player *simultaneously and independently* chooses a *strategy*. This means that players play without observing strategies chosen by other players.
2. Conditional on the players' strategies, *payoffs* are distributed to all players.

Complete information means that the following is *common knowledge* among players:

- ▶ all possible strategies of all players,
- ▶ what payoff is assigned to each combination of strategies.

## Definition 1

A fact  $E$  is a *common knowledge* among players  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  if for every sequence  $i_1, \dots, i_k \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  we have that  $i_1$  knows that  $i_2$  knows that ...  $i_{k-1}$  knows that  $i_k$  knows  $E$ .

The goal of each player is to maximize his payoff (and this fact is a common knowledge).

# Strategic-Form Games

To formally represent static games of complete information we define *strategic-form games*.

## Definition 2

A game in *strategic-form* (or normal-form) is an ordered triple  $G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$ , in which:

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is a finite set of *players*.
- ▶  $S_i$  is a set of (*pure*) *strategies* of player  $i$ , for every  $i \in N$ .

A *strategy profile* is a vector of strategies of all players  $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S_1 \times \dots \times S_n$ .

We denote the set of all strategy profiles by  $S = S_1 \times \dots \times S_n$ .

- ▶  $u_i : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a function associating each strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  with the *payoff*  $u_i(s)$  to player  $i$ , for every player  $i \in N$ .

## Definition 3

A *zero-sum* game  $G$  is one in which for all  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  we have  $u_1(s) + u_2(s) + \dots + u_n(s) = 0$ .

## Example: Prisoner's Dilemma

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $S_1 = S_2 = \{S, C\}$
- ▶  $u_1, u_2$  are defined as follows:
  - ▶  $u_1(C, C) = -5, u_1(C, S) = 0, u_1(S, C) = -20,$   
 $u_1(S, S) = -1$
  - ▶  $u_2(C, C) = -5, u_2(C, S) = -20, u_2(S, C) = 0,$   
 $u_2(S, S) = -1$

(Is it zero sum?)

We usually write payoffs in the following form:

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

or as two matrices:

	C	S
C	-5	0
S	-20	-1

	C	S
C	-5	-20
S	0	-1



## Example: Cournot Duopoly

- ▶ Two identical firms, players 1 and 2, produce some good. Denote by  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  quantities produced by firms 1 and 2, resp.
- ▶ The total quantity of products in the market is  $q_1 + q_2$ .
- ▶ The price of each item is  $\kappa - q_1 - q_2$  (here  $\kappa$  is a positive constant)
- ▶ Firms 1 and 2 have per item production costs  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ , resp.

Question: How these firms are going to behave?

We may model the situation using a strategic-form game.

Strategic-form game model  $(N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $S_i = [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1$   
 $u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_2 c_2$

# Solution Concepts

A *solution concept* is a method of analyzing games with the objective of restricting the set of *all possible outcomes* to those that are *more reasonable than others*.

We will use term *equilibrium* for any one of the strategy profiles that emerges as one of the solution concepts' predictions.

(I follow the approach of Steven Tadelis here, it is not completely standard)

## Example 4

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept. That is, we “solve” games by finding Nash equilibria and declare them to be reasonable outcomes.

# Assumptions

Throughout the lecture we assume that:

1. Players are **rational**: a *rational* player is one who chooses his strategy to maximize his payoff.
2. Players are **intelligent**: An *intelligent* player knows everything about the game (actions and payoffs) and can make any inferences about the situation that we can make.
3. **Common knowledge**: The fact that players are rational and intelligent is a common knowledge among them.
4. **Self-enforcement**: Any prediction (or equilibrium) of a solution concept must be *self-enforcing*.

Here 4. implies non-cooperative game theory: Each player is in control of his actions, and he will stick to an action only if he finds it to be in his best interest.

# Evaluating Solution Concepts

In order to evaluate our theory as a methodological tool we use the following criteria:

1. Existence (i.e. How often does it apply?): Solution concept should apply to a wide variety of games.  
E.g. We shall see that mixed Nash equilibria exist in all two player finite strategic-form games.
2. Uniqueness (How much does it restrict behavior?): We demand our solution concept to restrict the behavior as much as possible.  
E.g. So called strictly dominant strategy equilibria are always unique as opposed to Nash eq.

# Solution Concepts – Pure Strategies

We will consider the following solution concepts:

- ▶ strict dominant strategy equilibrium
- ▶ iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS)
- ▶ rationalizability
- ▶ Nash equilibria

For now, let us concentrate on

**pure strategies only!**

I.e., no mixed strategies are allowed. We will generalize to mixed setting later.

- ▶ Let  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  be a finite set and for each  $i \in N$  let  $X_i$  be a set. Let  $X := \prod_{i \in N} X_i = \{(x_1, \dots, x_n) \mid x_j \in X_j, j \in N\}$ .
- ▶ For  $i \in N$  we define  $X_{-i} := \prod_{j \neq i} X_j$ , i.e.,

$$X_{-i} = \{(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n) \mid x_j \in X_j, \forall j \neq i\}$$

- ▶ An element of  $X_{-i}$  will be denoted by

$$x_{-i} = (x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

We slightly abuse notation and write  $(x_i, x_{-i})$  to denote  $(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_n) \in X$ .

# Strict Dominance in Pure Strategies

## Definition 5

Let  $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$  be strategies of player  $i$ . Then  $s'_i$  is *strictly dominated* by  $s_i$  (write  $s_i > s'_i$ ) if for any possible combination of the other players' strategies,  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ , we have

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) \quad \text{for all } s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$$

## Claim 1

*An intelligent and rational player will never play a strictly dominated strategy.*

Clearly, intelligence implies that the player should recognize dominated strategies, rationality implies that the player will avoid playing them.

# Strictly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium in Pure Str.

## Definition 6

$s_i \in S_i$  is *strictly dominant* if every other pure strategy of player  $i$  is strictly dominated by  $s_i$ .

Observe that every player has at most one strictly dominant strategy, and that strictly dominant strategies do not have to exist.

## Claim 2

*Any rational player will play the strictly dominant strategy (if it exists).*

## Definition 7

A strategy profile  $s \in S$  is a *strictly dominant strategy equilibrium* if  $s_i \in S_i$  is strictly dominant for all  $i \in N$ .

## Corollary 8

*If the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique and rational players will play it.*



## Examples

In the Prisoner's dilemma:

	<i>C</i>	<i>S</i>
<i>C</i>	-5, -5	0, -20
<i>S</i>	-20, 0	-1, -1

(*C, C*) is the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium.

In the Battle of Sexes:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2, 1	0, 0
<i>F</i>	0, 0	1, 2

no strictly dominant strategies exist.

# Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade

(Taken from Dixit & Nalebuff's "The Art of Strategy" and a lecture of Robert Marks)

Indiana Jones, his father, and the Nazis have all converged at the site of the Holy Grail. The two Joneses refuse to help the Nazis reach the last step. So the Nazis shoot Indiana's dad. Only the healing power of the Holy Grail can save the senior Dr. Jones from his mortal wound. Suitably motivated, Indiana leads the way to the Holy Grail. But there is one final challenge. He must choose between literally scores of chalices, only one of which is the cup of Christ. While the right cup brings eternal life, the wrong choice is fatal. The Nazi leader impatiently chooses a beautiful gold chalice, drinks the holy water, and dies from the sudden death that follows from the wrong choice. Indiana picks a wooden chalice, the cup of a carpenter. Exclaiming "There's only one way to find out" he dips the chalice into the font and drinks what he hopes is the cup of life. Upon discovering that he has chosen wisely, Indiana brings the cup to his father and the water heals the mortal wound.

## Indy Goofed

- ▶ Although this scene adds excitement, it is somewhat embarrassing that such a distinguished professor as Dr. Indiana Jones would overlook his dominant strategy.
- ▶ He should have given the water to his father without testing it first.
  - ▶ If Indiana has chosen the right cup, his father is still saved.
  - ▶ If Indiana has chosen the wrong cup, then his father dies but Indiana is spared.
- ▶ Testing the cup before giving it to his father doesn't help, since if Indiana has made the wrong choice, there is no second chance – Indiana dies from the water and his father dies from the wound.

# Iterated Strict Dominance in Pure Strategies

We know that no rational player ever plays strictly dominated strategies.

As each player knows that each player is rational, each player knows that his opponents will not play strictly dominated strategies and thus all opponents know that *effectively* they are facing a "smaller" game.

As rationality is a common knowledge, everyone knows that everyone knows that the game is effectively smaller.

Thus everyone knows, that nobody will play strictly dominated strategies in the smaller game (and such strategies may indeed exist).

Because it is a common knowledge that all players will perform this kind of reasoning again, the process can continue until no more strictly dominated strategies can be eliminated.

The previous reasoning yields the **Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS)**:

Define a sequence  $D_i^0, D_i^1, D_i^2, \dots$  of strategy sets of player  $i$ .  
 (Denote by  $G_{DS}^k$  the game obtained from  $G$  by restricting to  $D_i^k, i \in N$ .)

1. Initialize  $k = 0$  and  $D_i^0 = S_i$  for each  $i \in N$ .
2. For all players  $i \in N$ : Let  $D_i^{k+1}$  be the set of all pure strategies of  $D_i^k$  that are **not** strictly dominated in  $G_{DS}^k$ .
3. Let  $k := k + 1$  and go to 2.

We say that  $s_i \in S_i$  **survives IESDS** if  $s_i \in D_i^k$  for all  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

## Definition 9

A strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  is an **IESDS equilibrium** if each  $s_i$  survives IESDS.

A game is **IESDS solvable** if it has a unique IESDS equilibrium.

**Remark:** If all  $S_i$  are *finite*, then in 2. we may remove only some of the strictly dominated strategies (not necessarily all). The result is *not* affected by the order of elimination since strictly dominated strategies remain strictly dominated even after removing some other strictly dominated strategies.

# IESDS Examples

In the Prisoner's dilemma:

	<i>C</i>	<i>S</i>
<i>C</i>	-5, -5	0, -20
<i>S</i>	-20, 0	-1, -1

(*C, C*) is the only one surviving the first round of IESDS.

In the Battle of Sexes:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2, 1	0, 0
<i>F</i>	0, 0	1, 2

all strategies survive all rounds (i.e. IESDS  $\equiv$  anything may happen, sorry)

## A Bit More Interesting Example

	<i>L</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>L</i>	4,3	5,1	6,2
<i>C</i>	2,1	8,4	3,6
<i>R</i>	3,0	9,6	2,8

IESDS on greenboard!


# Political Science Example: Median Voter Theorem

Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957)

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $S_i = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$  (political and ideological spectrum)
- ▶ 10 voters belong to each position  
(Here 10 means ten percent in the real-world)
- ▶ Voters vote for the closest candidate. If there is a tie, then  $\frac{1}{2}$  go to each candidate
- ▶ Payoff: The number of voters for the candidate, each candidate (selfishly) strives to maximize this number



# Political Science Example: Median Voter Theorem



Candidate A



Candidates must choose to position themselves at one of the ten ideological locations. Voters are evenly distributed along the ideological spectrum, i.e. 10% at each location.



Candidate B

- ▶ 1 and 10 are the (only) strictly dominated strategies  $\Rightarrow$   
 $D_1^1 = D_2^1 = \{2, \dots, 9\}$
- ▶ in  $G_{DS}^1$ , 2 and 9 are the (only) strictly dominated strategies  $\Rightarrow$   
 $D_1^2 = D_2^2 = \{3, \dots, 8\}$
- ▶ ...
- ▶ only 5, 6 survive IESDS

# Belief & Best Response

IESDS eliminated apparently unreasonable behavior (leaving "reasonable" behavior implicitly untouched).

What if we rather want to actively preserve reasonable behavior?  
What is reasonable? .... what we believe is reasonable :-).

Intuition:

- ▶ Imagine that your colleague did something stupid
- ▶ What would you ask him? Usually something like "What were you thinking?"
- ▶ The colleague may respond with a reasonable description of his *belief* in which his action was (one of) the best he could do  
(You may of course question reasonableness of the belief)

Let us formalize this type of reasoning ....

# Belief & Best Response

## Definition 10

A *belief* of player  $i$  is a pure strategy profile  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  of his opponents.

## Definition 11

A strategy  $s_i \in S_i$  of player  $i$  is a *best response* to a belief  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  if

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) \text{ for all } s'_i \in S_i$$

## Claim 3

*A rational player who believes that his opponents will play  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  always chooses a best response to  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ .*

## Definition 12

A strategy  $s_i \in S_i$  is *never best response* if it is not a best response to any belief  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ .

A rational player never plays any strategy that is never best response.

# Best Response vs Strict Dominance

## Proposition 1

*If  $s_i$  is strictly dominated for player  $i$ , then it is never best response.*

The opposite does not have to be true in pure strategies:

	X	Y
A	1, 1	1, 1
B	2, 1	0, 1
C	0, 1	2, 1

Here A is never best response but is strictly dominated neither by B, nor by C.

# Elimination of Stupid Strategies = Rationalizability

Using similar iterated reasoning as for IESDS, strategies that are never best response can be iteratively eliminated.

Define a sequence  $R_i^0, R_i^1, R_i^2, \dots$  of strategy sets of player  $i$ .  
(Denote by  $G_{Rat}^k$  the game obtained from  $G$  by restricting to  $R_i^k, i \in N$ .)

1. Initialize  $k = 0$  and  $R_i^0 = S_i$  for each  $i \in N$ .
2. For all players  $i \in N$ : Let  $R_i^{k+1}$  be the set of all strategies of  $R_i^k$  that are best responses to some beliefs in  $G_{Rat}^k$ .
3. Let  $k := k + 1$  and go to 2.

We say that  $s_i \in S_i$  is *rationalizable* if  $s_i \in R_i^k$  for all  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

## Definition 13

A strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  is a *rationalizable equilibrium* if each  $s_i$  is rationalizable.

We say that a game is *solvable by rationalizability* if it has a unique rationalizable equilibrium.

(Warning: For some reasons, rationalizable strategies are almost always defined using mixed strategies!)

# Rationalizability Examples

In the Prisoner's dilemma:

	<i>C</i>	<i>S</i>
<i>C</i>	-5, -5	0, -20
<i>S</i>	-20, 0	-1, -1

(*C*, *C*) is the only rationalizable equilibrium.

In the Battle of Sexes:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2, 1	0, 0
<i>F</i>	0, 0	1, 2

all strategies are rationalizable.

# Cournot Duopoly

$$G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$$

▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$

▶  $S_i = [0, \infty)$

▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$

$$u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

What is a best response of player 1 to a given  $q_2$  ?

Solve  $\frac{\delta u_1}{\delta q_1} = \theta - 2q_1 - q_2 = 0$ , which gives that  $q_1 = (\theta - q_2)/2$  is the only best response of player 1 to  $q_2$ .

Similarly,  $q_2 = (\theta - q_1)/2$  is the only best response of player 2 to  $q_1$ .

Since  $q_2 \geq 0$ , we obtain that  $q_1$  is never best response iff  $q_1 > \theta/2$ .

Similarly  $q_2$  is never best response iff  $q_2 > \theta/2$ .

Thus  $R_1^1 = R_2^1 = [0, \theta/2]$ .

# Cournot Duopoly

$$G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$$

▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$

▶  $S_i = [0, \infty)$

▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$

$$u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

---

Now, in  $G_{Rat}^1$ , we still have that  $q_1 = (\theta - q_2)/2$  is the best response to  $q_2$ , and  $q_2 = (\theta - q_1)/2$  the best resp. to  $q_1$

Since  $q_2 \in R_2^1 = [0, \theta/2]$ , we obtain that  $q_1$  is never best response iff  $q_1 \in [0, \theta/4)$

Similarly  $q_2$  is never best response iff  $q_2 \in [0, \theta/4)$

Thus  $R_1^2 = R_2^2 = [\theta/4, \theta/2]$ .

....



## Cournot Duopoly (cont.)

$$G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$$

$$\blacktriangleright N = \{1, 2\}$$

$$\blacktriangleright S_i = [0, \infty)$$

$$\blacktriangleright u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$$

$$u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

In general, after  $2k$  iterations we have  $R_i^{2k} = R_i^{2k} = [\ell_k, r_k]$  where

$$\blacktriangleright r_k = (\theta - \ell_{k-1})/2 \text{ for } k \geq 1$$

$$\blacktriangleright \ell_k = (\theta - r_k)/2 \text{ for } k \geq 1 \text{ and } \ell_0 = 0$$

Solving the recurrence we obtain

$$\blacktriangleright \ell_k = \theta/3 - \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^k \theta/3$$

$$\blacktriangleright r_k = \theta/3 + \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{k-1} \theta/6$$

Hence,  $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \ell_k = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} r_k = \theta/3$  and thus  $(\theta/3, \theta/3)$  is the only rationalizable equilibrium.

## Cournot Duopoly (cont.)

$$G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$$

▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$

▶  $S_i = [0, \infty)$

▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$

$$u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

---

Are  $q_i = \theta/3$  the best outcomes possible? NO!

$$u_1(\theta/3, \theta/3) = u_2(\theta/3, \theta/3) = \theta^2/9$$

but

$$u_1(\theta/4, \theta/4) = u_2(\theta/4, \theta/4) = \theta^2/8$$

# IESDS vs Rationalizability in Pure Strategies

## Theorem 14

Assume that  $S$  is finite. Then for all  $k$  we have that  $R_i^k \subseteq D_i^k$ . That is, in particular, all rationalizable strategies survive IESDS.

The opposite inclusion does not have to be true in pure strategies:

	X	Y
A	1, 1	1, 1
B	2, 1	0, 1
C	0, 1	2, 1

Recall that  $A$  is never best response but is strictly dominated by neither  $B$ , nor  $C$ . That is,  $A$  survives IESDS but is not rationalizable.

# Proof of Theorem 14

## Claim

If  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^k$ , then  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G$ .

**Proof of the Claim.** By induction on  $k$ . For  $k = 0$  we have  $G_{Rat}^k = G_{Rat}^0 = G$  and the claim holds trivially.

Assume that the claim is true for some  $k$  and that  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^{k+1}$ . Let  $s'_i$  be a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^k$ .

Then  $s'_i \in G_{Rat}^{k+1}$  since  $s'_i$  is *not* eliminated from  $G_{Rat}^k$ .

However, since  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^{k+1}$ , we get  $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$ .

Thus  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^k$ .

By induction hypothesis,  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G$  and the claim has been proved.

# Proof of Theorem 14

**Keep in mind:** If  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^k$ , then  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G$ .

Now we prove  $R_i^k \subseteq D_i^k$  for all players  $i$  by induction on  $k$ .

For  $k = 0$  we have that  $R_i^0 = S_i = D_i^0$  by definition.

Assume that  $R_i^k \subseteq D_i^k$  for some  $k \geq 0$  and prove that  $R_i^{k+1} \subseteq D_i^{k+1}$ .

Let  $s_i \in R_i^{k+1}$ . Then there must be  $s_{-i} \in R_{-i}^k$  such that

$s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{Rat}^k$

(This follows from the fact that  $s_i$  has not been eliminated in  $G_{Rat}^k$ .)

By the claim,  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G$  as well!

Also, by induction hypothesis,  $s_i \in R_i^{k+1} \subseteq R_i^k \subseteq D_i^k$  and  $s_{-i} \in D_{-i}^k$ .

However, then  $s_i$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}$  in  $G_{DS}^k$ .

(This follows from the fact that the “best response” relationship of  $s_i$  and  $s_{-i}$  is preserved by removing arbitrarily many other strategies.)

Thus  $s_i$  is not strictly dominated in  $G_{DS}^k$  and  $s_i \in D_i^{k+1}$ . □

# Pinning Down Beliefs – Nash Equilibria

Criticism of previous approaches:

- ▶ Strictly dominant strategy equilibria often do not exist
- ▶ IESDS and rationalizability may not remove any strategies

Typical example is Battle of Sexes:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2,1	0,0
<i>F</i>	0,0	1,2

Here all strategies are equally reasonable according to the above concepts.

But are all strategy profiles really equally reasonable?

## Pinning Down Beliefs – Nash Equilibria

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2, 1	0, 0
<i>F</i>	0, 0	1, 2

Assume that each player has a belief about strategies of other players.

By Claim 3, each player plays a best response to his beliefs.

Is  $(O, F)$  as reasonable as  $(O, O)$  in this respect?

Note that if player 1 believes that player 2 plays  $O$ , then playing  $O$  is reasonable, and if player 2 believes that player 1 plays  $F$ , then playing  $F$  is reasonable. But such **beliefs cannot be correct together!**

$(O, O)$  can be obtained as a profile where each player plays the best response to his belief and the **beliefs are correct.**

# Nash Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium can be defined as a set of beliefs (one for each player) and a strategy profile in which every player plays a best response to his belief and each strategy of each player is consistent with beliefs of his opponents.

A usual definition is following:

## Definition 15

A pure-strategy profile  $s^* = (s_1^*, \dots, s_n^*) \in S$  is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if  $s_i^*$  is a best response to  $s_{-i}^*$  for each  $i \in N$ , that is

$$u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*) \quad \text{for all } s_i \in S_i \text{ and all } i \in N$$

Note that this definition is equivalent to the previous one in the sense that  $s_{-i}^*$  may be considered as the (consistent) belief of player  $i$  to which he plays a best response  $s_i^*$



# Nash Equilibria Examples

In the Prisoner's dilemma:

	<i>C</i>	<i>S</i>
<i>C</i>	-5, -5	0, -20
<i>S</i>	-20, 0	-1, -1

$(C, C)$  is the only Nash equilibrium.

In the Battle of Sexes:

	<i>O</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>O</i>	2, 1	0, 0
<i>F</i>	0, 0	1, 2

only  $(O, O)$  and  $(F, F)$  are Nash equilibria.

In Cournot Duopoly,  $(\theta/3, \theta/3)$  is the only Nash equilibrium.

(Best response relations:  $q_1 = (\theta - q_2)/2$  and  $q_2 = (\theta - q_1)/2$  are both satisfied only by  $q_1 = q_2 = \theta/3$ )

# Example: Stag Hunt

Story:

- ▶ Two (in some versions more than two) hunters, players 1 and 2, can each choose to hunt



- ▶ stag (S) = a large tasty meal
- ▶ hare (H) = also tasty but small



- ▶ Hunting stag is much more demanding and forces of both players need to be joined (hare can be hunted individually)

Strategy-form game model:  $N = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $S_1 = S_2 = \{S, H\}$ , the payoff:

	S	H
S	5,5	0,3
H	3,0	3,3

Two NE: (S, S), and (H, H), where the former is strictly better for each player than the latter! Which one is more reasonable?

## Example: Stag Hunt

Strategy-form game model:  $N = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $S_1 = S_2 = \{S, H\}$ , the payoff:

	S	H
S	5,5	0,3
H	3,0	3,3

Two NE:  $(S, S)$ , and  $(H, H)$ , where the former is strictly better for each player than the latter! Which one is more reasonable?

---

If each player believes that the other one will go for hare, then  $(H, H)$  is a reasonable outcome  $\Rightarrow$  a society of individualists who do not cooperate at all.

If each player believes that the other will cooperate, then this anticipation is self-fulfilling and results in what can be called a cooperative society.

This is supposed to explain that in real world there are societies that have similar endowments, access to technology and physical environment but have very different achievements, all because of self-fulfilling beliefs (or *norms* of behavior).

## Example: Stag Hunt

Strategy-form game model:  $N = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $S_1 = S_2 = \{S, H\}$ , the payoff:

	S	H
S	5,5	0,3
H	3,0	3,3

Two NE:  $(S, S)$ , and  $(H, H)$ , where the former is strictly better for each player than the latter! Which one is more reasonable?

---

Another point of view:  $(H, H)$  is less risky

Minimum secured by playing S is 0 as opposed to 3 by playing H  
(We will get to this *minimax* principle later)

So it seems to be rational to expect  $(H, H)$  (?)

# Nash Equilibria vs Previous Concepts

## Theorem 16

1. *If  $s^*$  is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, then it is the unique Nash equilibrium.*
2. *Each Nash equilibrium is rationalizable and survives IESDS.*
3. *If  $S$  is finite, neither rationalizability, nor IESDS creates new Nash equilibria.*

Proof: Homework!

## Corollary 17

*Assume that  $S$  is finite. If rationalizability or IESDS result in a unique strategy profile, then this profile is a Nash equilibrium.*

## Interpretations of Nash Equilibria

Except the two definitions, usual interpretations are following:

- ▶ When the goal is to give advice to all of the players in a game (i.e., to advise each player what strategy to choose), any advice that was not an equilibrium would have the unsettling property that there would always be some player for whom the advice was bad, in the sense that, if all other players followed the parts of the advice directed to them, it would be better for some player to do differently than he was advised. If the advice is an equilibrium, however, this will not be the case, because the advice to each player is the best response to the advice given to the other players.
- ▶ When the goal is prediction rather than prescription, a Nash equilibrium can also be interpreted as a potential stable point of a dynamic adjustment process in which individuals adjust their behavior to that of the other players in the game, searching for strategy choices that will give them better results.

# Static Games of Complete Information

## Mixed Strategies

## Let's Mix It

As pointed out before, neither of the solution concepts has to exist in pure strategies

**Example:** Rock-Paper-scissors

	<i>R</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>R</i>	0,0	-1,1	1,-1
<i>P</i>	1,-1	0,0	-1,1
<i>C</i>	-1,1	1,-1	0,0

There are no strictly dominant pure strategies

No strategy is strictly dominated (IESDS removes nothing)

Each strategy is a best response to some strategy of the opponent (rationalizability removes nothing)

No pure Nash equilibria: No *pure* strategy profile allows each player to play a best response to the strategy of the other player

How to solve this?

Let the players randomize their choice of pure strategies ....



# Probability Distributions

## Definition 18

Let  $A$  be a finite set. A *probability distribution over  $A$*  is a function  $\sigma : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$  such that  $\sum_{a \in A} \sigma(a) = 1$ .

We denote by  $\Delta(A)$  the set of all probability distributions over  $A$ .

## Example 19

Consider  $A = \{a, b, c\}$  and a function  $\sigma : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$  such that  $\sigma(a) = \frac{1}{4}$ ,  $\sigma(b) = \frac{3}{4}$ , and  $\sigma(c) = 0$ . Then  $\sigma \in \Delta(A)$ .

# Mixed Strategies

Let us fix a strategic-form game  $G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$ .

From now on, **assume two players and both  $S_i$  finite!**

$$G = (\{1, 2\}, (S_1, S_2), (u_1, u_2))$$

## Definition 20

A *mixed strategy* of player  $i$  is a probability distribution  $\sigma \in \Delta(S_i)$  over  $S_i$ . We denote by  $\Sigma_i = \Delta(S_i)$  the set of all mixed strategies of player  $i$ .

We define  $\Sigma := \Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2$ , the set of all *mixed strategy profiles*.

We identify each  $s_i \in S_i$  with a mixed strategy  $\sigma$  that assigns probability one to  $s_i$  (and zero to other pure strategies).

For example, in rock-paper-scissors, the pure strategy  $R$  corresponds

$$\text{to } \sigma_i \text{ which satisfies } \sigma_i(X) = \begin{cases} 1 & X = R \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

# Mixed Strategy Profiles

Let  $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  be a mixed strategy profile.

Intuitively, we assume that each player  $i$  *randomly* selects his pure strategy according to  $\sigma_i$  and *independently* of his opponents.

Thus for  $s = (s_1, s_2) \in S = S_1 \times S_2$  we have that

$$\sigma(s) := \sigma_1(s_1) \cdot \sigma_2(s_2)$$

is the probability that the players randomly select the pure strategy profile  $s$  according to the mixed strategy profile  $\sigma$ .

(We abuse notation a bit here:  $\sigma$  denotes two things, a vector of mixed strategies as well as a probability distribution on  $S$ )

## Mixed Strategies – Example

	<i>R</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>R</i>	0,0	-1,1	1,-1
<i>P</i>	1,-1	0,0	-1,1
<i>C</i>	-1,1	1,-1	0,0

An example of a mixed strategy  $\sigma_1$ :  $\sigma_1(R) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\sigma_1(P) = \frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\sigma_1(C) = \frac{1}{6}$ .

Sometimes we write  $\sigma_1$  as  $(\frac{1}{2}(R), \frac{1}{3}(P), \frac{1}{6}(C))$ , or only  $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{6})$  if the order of pure strategies is fixed.

Consider a mixed strategy profile  $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  where  $\sigma_1 = (\frac{1}{2}(R), \frac{1}{3}(P), \frac{1}{6}(C))$  and  $\sigma_2 = (\frac{1}{3}(R), \frac{2}{3}(P), 0(C))$ .

Then the probability  $\sigma(R, P)$  that the pure strategy profile  $(R, P)$  will be played by players playing the mixed profile  $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  is

$$\sigma_1(R) \cdot \sigma_2(P) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$$

# Expected Payoff

... but now what is the suitable notion of payoff?

## Definition 21

The *expected payoff* of player  $i$  under a mixed strategy profile  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  is

$$u_i(\sigma) := \sum_{s \in S} \sigma(s) u_i(s) \quad \left( = \sum_{s_1 \in S_1} \sum_{s_2 \in S_2} \sigma_1(s_1) \cdot \sigma_2(s_2) \cdot u_i(s_1, s_2) \right)$$

I.e., it is the "weighted average" of what player  $i$  wins under each pure strategy profile  $s$ , weighted by the probability of that profile.

**Assumption:** Every rational player strives to maximize his own expected payoff.

(This assumption is not always completely convincing ...)

## Expected Payoff – Example

Matching Pennies:

	H	T
H	1, -1	-1, 1
T	-1, 1	1, -1

Each player secretly turns a penny to heads or tails, and then they reveal their choices simultaneously. If the pennies match, player 1 (row) wins, if they do not match, player 2 (column) wins.

Consider  $\sigma_1 = (\frac{1}{3}(H), \frac{2}{3}(T))$  and  $\sigma_2 = (\frac{1}{4}(H), \frac{3}{4}(T))$

$$\begin{aligned}u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) &= \sum_{(X,Y) \in \{H,T\}^2} \sigma_1(X)\sigma_2(Y)u_1(X, Y) \\ &= \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{4} 1 + \frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{4} (-1) + \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{4} (-1) + \frac{2}{3} \frac{3}{4} 1 = \frac{1}{6}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}u_2(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) &= \sum_{(X,Y) \in \{H,T\}^2} \sigma_1(X)\sigma_2(Y)u_2(X, Y) \\ &= \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{4} (-1) + \frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{4} 1 + \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{4} 1 + \frac{2}{3} \frac{3}{4} (-1) = -\frac{1}{6}\end{aligned}$$

# Solution Concepts

We revisit the following solution concepts in mixed strategies:

- ▶ strict dominant strategy equilibrium
- ▶ IESDS equilibrium
- ▶ rationalizable equilibria
- ▶ Nash equilibria

From now on, when I say a *strategy* I implicitly mean a  
**mixed strategy.**

In order to deal with efficiency issues we assume that the size of the game  $G$  is defined by  $|G| := |N| + \sum_{i \in N} |S_i| + \sum_{i \in N} |u_i|$  where  $|u_i| = \sum_{s \in S} |u_i(s)|$  and  $|u_i(s)|$  is the length of a binary encoding of  $u_i(s)$  (we assume that rational numbers are encoded as quotients of two binary integers)

Note that, in particular,  $|G| > |S|$ .

# Strict Dominance in Mixed Strategies

## Definition 22

Let  $\sigma_1, \sigma'_1 \in \Sigma_1$  be (mixed) strategies of player 1. Then  $\sigma'_1$  is *strictly dominated* by  $\sigma_1$  (write  $\sigma'_1 < \sigma_1$ ) if

$$u_1(\sigma_1, s_2) > u_1(\sigma'_1, s_2) \quad \text{for all } s_2 \in S_2$$

(Symmetrically for player 2.)

**Comment:** The above condition is equivalent to

$$u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) > u_1(\sigma'_1, \sigma_2) \quad \text{for all strategies } \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2$$



# Strict Dominance in Mixed Strategies

## Example 23

	X	Y
A	3	0
B	0	3
C	1	1

Is there a strictly dominated strategy?

**Question:** Is there a game with at least one strictly dominated strategy but without strictly dominated *pure* strategies?

# Strictly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

## Definition 24

$\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i$  is *strictly dominant* if every other mixed strategy of player  $i$  is strictly dominated by  $\sigma_i$ .

## Definition 25

A strategy profile  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  is a *strictly dominant strategy equilibrium* if  $\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i$  is strictly dominant for all  $i \in N$ .

## Proposition 2

*If the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique, all its strategies are pure, and rational players will play it.*

To compute the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, it is sufficient to consider only pure strategies (greenboard).

# IESDS in Mixed Strategies

Define a sequence  $D_i^0, D_i^1, D_i^2, \dots$  of strategy sets of player  $i$ .  
(Denote by  $G_{DS}^k$  the game obtained from  $G$  by restricting the pure strategy sets to  $D_i^k, i \in N$ .)

1. Initialize  $k = 0$  and  $D_i^0 = S_i$  for each  $i \in N$ .
2. For all players  $i \in N$ : Let  $D_i^{k+1}$  be the set of all pure strategies of  $D_i^k$  that are *not* strictly dominated in  $G_{DS}^k$  by *mixed strategies*.
3. Let  $k := k + 1$  and go to 2.

We say that  $s_i \in S_i$  *survives IESDS* if  $s_i \in D_i^k$  for all  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

## Definition 26

A strategy profile  $s = (s_1, s_2) \in S$  is an *IESDS equilibrium* if both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  survive IESDS.

Each  $D_i^{k+1}$  can be computed in polynomial time using *linear programming*.

## IESDS in Mixed Strategie – Example

	X	Y
A	3	0
B	0	3
C	1	1

Let us have a look at the first iteration of IESDS.

Observe that  $A, B$  are not strictly dominated by any mixed strategy.

Let us construct a set of constraints on mixed strategies (possibly) strictly dominating  $C$ :

$$3x_A + 0x_B + x_C > 1$$

Row's payoff against  $X$

$$0x_A + 3x_B + x_C > 1$$

Row's payoff against  $Y$

$$x_A, x_B, x_C \geq 0$$

$$x_A + x_B + x_C = 1$$

$x$ 's must make a distribution

How to solve this?

# Intermezzo: Linear Programming

Linear programming is a technique for optimization of a linear objective function, subject to linear (non-strict) inequality constraints.

Formally, a linear program in so called *canonical form* looks like this:

$$\text{maximize } \sum_{j=1}^m c_j x_j \quad (\text{objective function})$$

$$\text{subject to } \sum_{j=1}^m a_{ij} x_j \leq b_i \quad 1 \leq i \leq n \quad (\text{constraints})$$

$$x_j \geq 0 \quad 1 \leq j \leq m$$

Here  $a_{ij}$ ,  $b_k$  and  $c_j$  are real numbers and  $x_j$ 's are real variables.

A *feasible solution* is an assignment of real numbers to the variables  $x_j$ ,  $1 \leq j \leq m$ , so that the *constraints* are satisfied.

An *optimal solution* is a feasible solution which maximizes the *objective function*  $\sum_{j=1}^m c_j x_j$ .

# Intermezzo: Complexity of Linear Programming

We assume that coefficients  $a_{ij}$ ,  $b_k$  and  $c_j$  are encoded in binary (more precisely, as fractions of two integers encoded in binary).

## Theorem 27 (Khachiyan, Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1979)

*There is an algorithm which for any linear program computes an optimal solution in polynomial time.*

The algorithm uses so called ellipsoid method.

In practice, the Khachiyan's is not used. Usually **simplex algorithm** is used even though its theoretical complexity is exponential.

There is also a polynomial time algorithm (by Karmarkar) which has better complexity upper bounds than the Khachiyan's and sometimes works even better than the simplex.

There exist several advanced linear programming solvers (usually parts of larger optimization packages) implementing various heuristics for solving large scale problems, sensitivity analysis, etc.

For more info see

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear\\_programming#Solvers\\_and\\_scripting\\_.28programming.29\\_languages](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_programming#Solvers_and_scripting_.28programming.29_languages)

## IESDS in Mixed Strategie – Example

	X	Y
A	3	0
B	0	3
C	1	1

The linear program for deciding whether C is strictly dominated: The program maximizes  $y$  under the following constraints:

$$3x_A + 0x_B + x_C \geq 1 + y$$

Row's payoff against X

$$0x_A + 3x_B + x_C \geq 1 + y$$

Row's payoff against Y

$$x_A, x_B, x_C \geq 0$$

$$x_A + x_B + x_C = 1$$

$x$ 's must make a distribution

$$y \geq 0$$

Here  $y$  just implements the strict inequality using  $\geq$ , we look for a solution with  $y > 0$ .

The maximum  $y = \frac{1}{2}$  is attained at  $x_A = \frac{1}{2}$  and  $x_B = \frac{1}{2}$ .

Note that in step 2 it is not sufficient to consider pure strategies.  
Consider the following zero sum game:

	X	Y
A	3	0
B	0	3
C	1	1

C is strictly dominated by  $(\sigma_1(A), \sigma_1(B), \sigma_1(C)) = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0)$  but no strategy is strictly dominated in pure strategies.



# Best Response in Mixed Strategies

## Definition 28

A *(mixed) belief* of player 1 is a mixed strategy  $\sigma_2$  of player 2 (and vice versa).

## Definition 29

$\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$  is a *best response* to a belief  $\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2$  if

$$u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \geq u_1(\mathbf{s}_1, \sigma_2) \quad \text{for all } \mathbf{s}_1 \in \mathbf{S}_1$$

Denote by  $BR_1(\sigma_2)$  the set of all best responses of player 1. (Symmetrically for player 2.)

**Comment:** The above condition is equivalent to

$$u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \geq u_1(\sigma'_1, \sigma_2) \quad \text{for all } \sigma'_1 \in \Sigma_1$$

## Best Response – Example

Consider a game with the following payoffs of player 1:

	X	Y
A	2	0
B	0	2
C	1	1

- ▶ Player 1 (row) plays  $\sigma_1 = (a(A), b(B), c(C))$ .
- ▶ Player 2 (column) plays  $(q(X), (1 - q)(Y))$  (we write just  $q$ ).

Compute  $BR_1(q)$ .

# Rationalizability in Mixed Strategies (Two Players)

**Assumption:** *A rational player 1 with a belief  $\sigma_2$  always plays a best response to  $\sigma_2$  (the same for player 2).*

## Definition 30

A pure strategy  $s_1 \in S_1$  of player 1 is *never best response* if it is not a best response to any belief  $\sigma_2$  (similarly for player 2).

No rational player plays a strategy that is never best response.

# Rationalizability in Mixed Strategies (Two Players)

Define a sequence  $R_i^0, R_i^1, R_i^2, \dots$  of strategy sets of player  $i$ .

(Denote by  $G_{Rat}^k$  the game obtained from  $G$  by restricting the pure strategy sets to  $R_i^k, i \in N$ .)

1. Initialize  $k = 0$  and  $R_i^0 = S_i$  for each  $i \in N$ .
2. For all players  $i \in N$ : Let  $R_i^{k+1}$  be the set of all strategies of  $R_i^k$  that are *best responses to some (mixed) beliefs* in  $G_{Rat}^k$ .
3. Let  $k := k + 1$  and go to 2.

We say that  $s_i \in S_i$  is *rationalizable* if  $s_i \in R_i^k$  for all  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

## Definition 31

A strategy profile  $s = (s_1, s_2) \in S$  is a *rationalizable equilibrium* if both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are rationalizable.

# Rationalizability vs IESDS (Two Players)

	X	Y
A	3	0
B	0	3
C	1	1

What pure strategies of player 1 are strictly dominated?

What pure strategies of player 1 are never best responses?

**Observation:** The set of strictly dominated pure strategies coincides with the set of pure never best responses!

... and this holds in general for two player games:

## Theorem 32

A pure strategy  $s_1$  of player 1 is never best response to any belief  $\sigma_2$  **iff**  $s_1$  is strictly dominated by a strategy  $\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$  (similarly for player 2).

It follows that a strategy of  $S_i$  survives IESDS **iff** it is rationalizable.

# Mixed Nash Equilibrium

## Definition 33

A mixed-strategy profile  $\sigma^* = (\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \in \Sigma$  is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium if  $\sigma_1^*$  is a best response to  $\sigma_2^*$  and  $\sigma_2^*$  is a best response to  $\sigma_1^*$ . That is

$$u_1(\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \geq u_1(\mathbf{s}_1, \sigma_2^*) \quad \text{for all } \mathbf{s}_1 \in \mathbf{S}_1$$

$$u_2(\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \geq u_2(\sigma_1^*, \mathbf{s}_2) \quad \text{for all } \mathbf{s}_2 \in \mathbf{S}_2$$

The above condition is equivalent to

$$u_1(\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \geq u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2^*) \quad \text{for all } \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$$

$$u_2(\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \geq u_2(\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2) \quad \text{for all } \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2$$

## Theorem 34 (Nash 1950)

*Every finite game in strategic form has a Nash equilibrium.*

This is THE fundamental theorem of game theory.

## Example: Matching Pennies

	<i>H</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>H</i>	1, -1	-1, 1
<i>T</i>	-1, 1	1, -1

Player 1 (row) plays  $(p(H), (1 - p)(T))$  (we write just  $p$ ) and player 2 (column) plays  $(q(H), (1 - q)(T))$  (we write  $q$ ).

Compute all Nash equilibria.

---

What are the expected payoffs of playing pure strategies for player 1?

$$u_1(H, q) = 2q - 1 \text{ and } u_1(T, q) = 1 - 2q$$

Then

$$u_1(p, q) = pu_1(H, q) + (1 - p)u_1(T, q) = p(2q - 1) + (1 - p)(1 - 2q).$$

We obtain the best response correspondence  $BR_1$ :

$$BR_1(q) = \begin{cases} T & \text{if } q < \frac{1}{2} \\ p \in [0, 1] & \text{if } q = \frac{1}{2} \\ H & \text{if } q > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

## Example: Matching Pennies

	<i>H</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>H</i>	1, -1	-1, 1
<i>T</i>	-1, 1	1, -1

Player 1 (row) plays  $(p(H), (1 - p)(T))$  (we write just  $p$ ) and player 2 (column) plays  $(q(H), (1 - q)(T))$  (we write  $q$ ).

Compute all Nash equilibria.

Similarly for player 2 :

$$u_2(p, H) = 1 - 2p \text{ and } u_2(p, T) = 2p - 1$$

$$u_2(p, q) = qu_2(p, H) + (1 - q)u_2(p, T) = q(1 - 2p) + (1 - q)(2p - 1)$$

We obtain best-response relation  $BR_2$ :

$$BR_2(p) = \begin{cases} H & \text{if } p < \frac{1}{2} \\ q \in [0, 1] & \text{if } p = \frac{1}{2} \\ T & \text{if } p > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

The only "intersection" of  $BR_1$  and  $BR_2$  is the only Nash equilibrium  $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ .



# Complexity Results – (Two Players)

## Theorem 35

*Given a two-player game in strategic form, a mixed Nash equilibrium can be computed in exponential time.*

## Theorem 36

*All the following problems are NP-complete: Given a two-player game in strategic form, does it have*

- 1. a NE in which player 1 has utility at least a given amount  $v$  ?*
- 2. a NE in which the sum of expected payoffs of the two players is at least a given amount  $v$  ?*
- 3. a NE with a support of size greater than a given number?*
- 4. a NE whose support contains a given strategy  $s$  ?*
- 5. a NE whose support does not contain a given strategy  $s$  ?*
- 6. ....*

NP-hardness can be proved using reduction from SAT.

# The Reduction (It's Short and Sweet)

**Definition 4** Let  $\phi$  be a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form (representing a SAT instance). Let  $V$  be its set of variables (with  $|V| = n$ ),  $L$  the set of corresponding literals (a positive and a negative one for each variable<sup>6</sup>), and  $C$  its set of clauses. The function  $v : L \rightarrow V$  gives the variable corresponding to a literal, e.g.,  $v(x_1) = v(-x_1) = x_1$ . We define  $G_\epsilon(\phi)$  to be the following finite symmetric 2-player game in normal form. Let  $\Sigma = \Sigma_1 = \Sigma_2 = L \cup V \cup C \cup \{f\}$ . Let the utility functions be

- $u_1(l^1, l^2) = u_2(l^2, l^1) = n - 1$  for all  $l^1, l^2 \in L$  with  $l^1 \neq -l^2$ ;
- $u_1(l, -l) = u_2(-l, l) = n - 4$  for all  $l \in L$ ;
- $u_1(l, x) = u_2(x, l) = n - 4$  for all  $l \in L, x \in \Sigma - L - \{f\}$ ;
- $u_1(v, l) = u_2(l, v) = n$  for all  $v \in V, l \in L$  with  $v(l) \neq v$ ;
- $u_1(v, l) = u_2(l, v) = 0$  for all  $v \in V, l \in L$  with  $v(l) = v$ ;
- $u_1(v, x) = u_2(x, v) = n - 4$  for all  $v \in V, x \in \Sigma - L - \{f\}$ ;
- $u_1(c, l) = u_2(l, c) = n$  for all  $c \in C, l \in L$  with  $l \notin c$ ;
- $u_1(c, l) = u_2(l, c) = 0$  for all  $c \in C, l \in L$  with  $l \in c$ ;
- $u_1(c, x) = u_2(x, c) = n - 4$  for all  $c \in C, x \in \Sigma - L - \{f\}$ ;
- $u_1(x, f) = u_2(f, x) = 0$  for all  $x \in \Sigma - \{f\}$ ;
- $u_1(f, f) = u_2(f, f) = \epsilon$ ;
- $u_1(f, x) = u_2(x, f) = n - 1$  for all  $x \in \Sigma - \{f\}$ .

**Theorem 1** If  $(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_n)$  (where  $v(l_i) = x_i$ ) satisfies  $\phi$ , then there is a Nash equilibrium of  $G_\epsilon(\phi)$  where both players play  $l_i$  with probability  $\frac{1}{n}$ , with expected utility  $n - 1$  for each player. The only other Nash equilibrium is the one where both players play  $f$ , and receive expected utility  $\epsilon$  each.

## ... But What is The Exact Complexity of Computing Nash Equilibria in Two Player Games?

Let us concentrate on the problem of computing one Nash equilibrium (sometimes called the *sample equilibrium problem*).

As the class NP consists of decision problems, it cannot be directly used to characterize complexity of the sample equilibrium problem.

We use complexity classes of *function problems* such as FP, FNP, etc. The sample equilibrium problem belongs to the complexity class PPAD (which is a subclass of FNP) for two-player games.

Can we do better than FNP (i.e. exponential time)?

In what follows we show that the sample equilibrium problem can be solved in polynomial time for zero-sum two-player games.

(Using a beautiful characterization of all Nash equilibria)

## Definition 37

$\sigma_1^* \in \Sigma_1$  is a *maxmin* strategy of player 1 if

$$\sigma_1^* \in \underset{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1}{\operatorname{argmax}} \min_{s_2 \in S_2} u_1(\sigma_1, s_2) \quad (= \underset{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1}{\operatorname{argmax}} \min_{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2} u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2))$$

(Intuitively, a *maxmin* strategy  $\sigma_1^*$  maximizes player 1's worst-case payoff in the situation where player 2 strives to cause the greatest harm to player 1.)

Similarly,  $\sigma_2^* \in \Sigma_2$  is a *maxmin* strategy of player 2 if

$$\sigma_2^* \in \underset{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2}{\operatorname{argmax}} \min_{s_1 \in S_1} u_2(s_1, \sigma_2)$$

Which assuming zero-sum games, i.e.  $u_1 = -u_2$ , becomes

$$\sigma_2^* \in \underset{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2}{\operatorname{argmin}} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} u_1(s_1, \sigma_2) \quad (= \underset{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2}{\operatorname{argmin}} \max_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2))$$

Note the same payoff function for both players!!

## Theorem 38 (von Neumann)

Assume a two-player **zero-sum** game. Then

$$\max_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \min_{s_2 \in S_2} u_1(\sigma_1, s_2) = \min_{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2} \max_{s \in S_1} u_1(s_1, \sigma_2)$$

Moreover,  $\sigma^* = (\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*) \in \Sigma$  is a Nash equilibrium **iff** both  $\sigma_1^*$  and  $\sigma_2^*$  are *maxmin*.

So to compute a Nash equilibrium it suffices to compute (arbitrary) maxmin strategies for both players.

# Zero-Sum Two-Player Games – Computing NE

Assume  $S_1 = \{1, \dots, m_1\}$  and  $S_2 = \{1, \dots, m_2\}$ .

We want to compute

$$\sigma_1^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \min_{\ell \in S_2} u_1(\sigma_1, \ell)$$

Consider a linear program with variables  $\sigma_1(1), \dots, \sigma_1(m_1), v$ :

**maximize:**  $v$

**subject to:** 
$$\sum_{k=1}^{m_1} \sigma_1(k) \cdot u_1(k, \ell) \geq v \quad \ell = 1, \dots, m_2$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^{m_1} \sigma_1(k) = 1$$

$$\sigma_1(k) \geq 0 \quad k = 1, \dots, m_1$$

## Lemma 39

$\sigma_1^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \min_{\ell \in S_2} u_1(\sigma_1, \ell)$  **iff** assigning  $\sigma_1(k) := \sigma_1^*(k)$  and  $v := \min_{\ell \in S_2} u_1(\sigma_1^*, \ell)$  gives an optimal solution.

# Zero-Sum Two-Player Games – Computing NE

## Summary:

- ▶ We have reduced computation of NE to computation of maxmin strategies for both players.
- ▶ Maxmin strategies can be computed using linear programming in polynomial time.
- ▶ That is, Nash equilibria in zero-sum two-player games can be computed in polynomial time.

# Strategic-Form Games – Conclusion

We have considered *static games of complete information*, i.e., "one-shot" games where the players know exactly what game they are playing.

We modeled such games using *strategic-form games*.

We have considered both pure strategy setting and mixed strategy setting.

In both cases, we considered four solution concepts:

- ▶ Strictly dominant strategies
- ▶ Iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies
- ▶ Rationalizability (i.e., iterative elimination of strategies that are never best responses)
- ▶ Nash equilibria



# Strategic-Form Games – Conclusion

In pure strategy setting:

1. Strictly dominant strategy equilibrium survives IESDS, rationalizability and is the unique Nash equilibrium (if it exists)
2. In finite games, rationalizable equilibria survive IESDS, IESDS preserves the set of Nash equilibria
3. In finite games, rationalizability preserves Nash equilibria

In mixed setting:

1. In finite two player games, IESDS and rationalizability coincide.
2. Strictly dominant strategy equilibrium survives IESDS (rationalizability) and is the unique Nash equilibrium (if it exists)
3. In finite games, IESDS (rationalizability) preserves Nash equilibria

The proofs for 2. and 3. in the mixed setting are similar to corresponding proofs in the pure setting.

# Algorithms

- ▶ Strictly dominant strategy equilibria coincide in pure and mixed settings, and can be computed in polynomial time.
- ▶ IESDS and rationalizability can be implemented in polynomial time in the pure setting as well as in the mixed setting  
In the mixed setting, linear programming is needed to implement one step of IESDS (rationalizability).
- ▶ Nash equilibria can be computed for two-player games
  - ▶ in polynomial time for zero-sum games  
(using von Neumann's theorem and linear programming)
  - ▶ in exponential time using support enumeration (omitted)
  - ▶ in PPAD using Lemke-Howson (omitted)

## Loose Ends – Modes of Dominance

To simplify, let us consider only **pure strategies**.

Let  $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$ . Then  $s'_i$  is *strictly dominated* by  $s_i$  if  $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$  for all  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ .

Let  $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$ . Then  $s'_i$  is *weakly dominated* by  $s_i$  if  $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$  for all  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  and there is  $s'_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  such that  $u_i(s_i, s'_{-i}) > u_i(s'_i, s'_{-i})$ .

Let  $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$ . Then  $s'_i$  is *very weakly dominated* by  $s_i$  if  $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$  for all  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ .

A strategy is (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominant if it (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominates any other strategy.

### Claim 4

*Any pure strategy profile  $s \in S$  such that each  $s_i$  is very weakly dominant is a Nash equilibrium.*

The same claim can be proved in the mixed strategy setting.

Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
Extensive-Form Games  
Definition  
Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria

# Dynamic Games of Perfect Information

## (Motivation)

Static games (modeled using strategic-form games) cannot capture games that unfold over time.

In particular, as all players move simultaneously, there is no way how to model situations in which order of moves is important.

Imagine e.g. chess where players take turns, in every round a player knows all turns of the opponent before making his own turn.


There are many examples of dynamic games: markets that change over time, political negotiations, models of computer systems, etc.

We model dynamic games using *extensive-form games*, a tree like model that allows to express sequential nature of games.

We start with perfect information games, where each player always knows results of all previous moves.

Then generalize to imperfect information, where players may have only partial knowledge of these results (e.g. most card games).

# Perfect-Info. Extensive-Form Games (Example)



Here  $h_0, h_1, h_2$  are non-terminal nodes, leaves are terminal nodes.  
Each non-terminal node is owned by a player who chooses an action.

E.g.  $h_1$  is owned by player 2 who chooses either  $K$  or  $U$

Every action results in a transition to a new node.

Choosing  $L$  in  $h_0$  results in a move to  $h_1$

When a play reaches a terminal node, players collect payoffs.

E.g. the left most terminal node gives 3 to player 1 and 1 to player 2.

# Perfect-Information Extensive-Form Games

A *perfect-information extensive-form game* is a tuple

$G = (N, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$  where

- ▶  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  is a set of  $n$  *players*,  $A$  is a (single) set of *actions*,
- ▶  $H$  is a set of *non-terminal* (choice) nodes,  $Z$  is a set of *terminal* nodes (assume  $Z \cap H = \emptyset$ ), denote  $\mathcal{H} = H \cup Z$ ,
- ▶  $\chi : H \rightarrow (2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\})$  is the *action function*, which assigns to each choice node a *non-empty* set of *enabled* actions,
- ▶  $\rho : H \rightarrow N$  is the *player function*, which assigns to each non-terminal node a player  $i \in N$  who chooses an action there, we define  $H_i := \{h \in H \mid \rho(h) = i\}$ ,
- ▶  $\pi : H \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{H}$  is the *successor function*, which maps a non-terminal node and an action to a new node, such that
  - ▶  $h_0$  is the only node that is not in the image of  $\pi$  (the root)
  - ▶ for all  $h_1, h_2 \in H$  and for all  $a_1 \in \chi(h_1)$  and all  $a_2 \in \chi(h_2)$ , if  $\pi(h_1, a_1) = \pi(h_2, a_2)$ , then  $h_1 = h_2$  and  $a_1 = a_2$ ,
- ▶  $u = (u_1, \dots, u_n)$ , where each  $u_i : Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a *payoff function* for player  $i$  in the terminal nodes of  $Z$ .

# Some Notation

A *path* from  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  to  $h' \in \mathcal{H}$  is a sequence  $h_1 a_2 h_2 a_3 h_3 \cdots h_{k-1} a_k h_k$  where  $h_1 = h$ ,  $h_k = h'$  and  $\pi(h_{j-1}, a_j) = h_j$  for every  $1 < j \leq k$ .

Note that, in particular,  $h$  is a path from  $h$  to  $h$ .

**Assumption:** For every  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  there is a unique path from  $h_0$  to  $h$  and there is no infinite path (i.e., a sequence  $h_1 a_2 h_2 a_3 h_3 \cdots$  such that  $\pi(h_{j-1}, a_j) = h_j$  for every  $j > 1$ ).

Note that the assumption is satisfied when  $\mathcal{H}$  is finite.

Indeed, uniqueness follows immediately from the definition of  $\pi$ . Now let  $X$  be the set of all  $h'$  from which there is a path to  $h$ . If  $h_0 \in X$  we are done.

Otherwise, let  $h'$  be a node of  $X$  with the longest path to  $h$ . As  $h' \neq h_0$ , there is  $h''$  and  $a \in \chi(h'')$  such that  $h' = \pi(h'', a)$ . But then there is a path from  $h''$  to  $h$  that is longer than the path from  $h'$ , a contradiction.

The above claim implies that every perfect-information extensive-form game can be seen as a game on a *rooted tree*  $(\mathcal{H}, E, h_0)$  where

- ▶  $H \cup Z$  is a set of nodes,
- ▶  $E \subseteq \mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{H}$  is a set of edges defined by  $(h, h') \in E$  iff  $h \in H$  and there is  $a \in \chi(h)$  such that  $\pi(h, a) = h'$ ,
- ▶  $h_0$  is the root.




## Some More Notation

$h'$  is a *child* of  $h$ , and  $h$  is a *parent* of  $h'$  if there is  $a \in \chi(h)$  such that  $h' = \pi(h, a)$ .

$h' \in \mathcal{H}$  is *reachable* from  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  if there is a path from  $h$  to  $h'$ .


If  $h'$  is reachable from  $h$  we say that  $h'$  is a descendant of  $h$  and  $h$  is an ancestor of  $h'$  (note that, by definition,  $h$  is both a descendant and an ancestor of itself).

## Example: Trust Game



- ▶ Two players, both start with 5\$
- ▶ Player 1 either distrusts (D) player 2 and keeps the money (payoffs (5, 5)), or trusts (T) player 2 and passes 5\$ to player 2
- ▶ If player 1 chooses to trust player 2, the money is tripled by the experimenter and sent to player 2.
- ▶ Player 2 may either keep (K) the additional 15\$ (resulting in (0, 20)), or share (S) it with player 1 (resulting in (7.5, 12.5))

## Example: Trust Game (Cont.)



- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $A = \{D, T, K, S\}$
- ▶  $H = \{h_0, h_1\}$ ,  $Z = \{z_1, z_2, z_3\}$
- ▶  $\chi(h_0) = \{D, T\}$ ,  $\chi(h_1) = \{K, S\}$
- ▶  $\rho(h_0) = 1$ ,  $\rho(h_1) = 2$
- ▶  $\pi(h_0, D) = z_1$ ,  $\pi(h_0, T) = h_1$ ,  $\pi(h_1, K) = z_2$ ,  $\pi(h_1, S) = z_3$
- ▶  $u_1(z_1) = 5$ ,  $u_1(z_2) = 0$ ,  $u_1(z_3) = 7.5$ ,  $u_2(z_1) = 5$ ,  $u_2(z_2) = 20$ ,  $u_2(z_3) = 12.5$

# Stackelberg Competition

Very similar to Cournot duopoly ...

- ▶ Two identical firms, players 1 and 2, produce some good. Denote by  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  quantities produced by firms 1 and 2, resp.
- ▶ The total quantity of products in the market is  $q_1 + q_2$ .
- ▶ The price of each item is  $\kappa - q_1 - q_2$  where  $\kappa > 0$  is fixed.
- ▶ Firms have a common per item production cost  $c$ .

Except that ...

- ▶ As opposed to Cournot duopoly, the firm 1 moves first, and chooses the quantity  $q_1 \in [0, \infty)$ .
- ▶ Afterwards, the firm 2 chooses  $q_2 \in [0, \infty)$  (knowing  $q_1$ ) and then the firms get their payoffs.

# Stackelberg Competition – Extensive-Form Model

An extensive-form game model:

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $A = [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $H = \{h_0, h_1^{q_1} \mid q_1 \in [0, \infty)\}$
- ▶  $Z = \{z^{q_1, q_2} \mid q_1, q_2 \in [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $\chi(h_0) = [0, \infty), \quad \chi(h_1^{q_1}) = [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $\rho(h_0) = 1, \quad \rho(h_1^{q_1}) = 2$
- ▶  $\pi(h_0, q_1) = h_1^{q_1}, \quad \pi(h_1^{q_1}, q_2) = z^{q_1, q_2}$
- ▶ The payoffs are
  - ▶  $u_1(z^{q_1, q_2}) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1c$
  - ▶  $u_2(z^{q_1, q_2}) = q_2(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_2c$

## Example: Chess (a bit simplified)

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶ Denoting *Boards* the set of all (appropriately encoded) board positions, we define  $\mathcal{H} = B \times \{1, 2\}$  where
$$B = \{w \in \text{Boards}^+ \mid \text{no board repeats } \geq 3 \text{ times in } w\}$$
(Here  $\text{Boards}^+$  is the set of all non-empty sequences of boards)
- ▶  $Z$  consists of all nodes  $(wb, i)$  (here  $b \in \text{Boards}$ ) where either  $b$  is checkmate for player  $i$ , or  $i$  does not have a move in  $b$ , or every move of  $i$  in  $b$  leads to a board with three occurrences in  $w$
- ▶  $\chi(wb, i)$  is the set of all legal moves of player  $i$  in  $b$
- ▶  $\rho(wb, i) = i$
- ▶  $\pi$  is defined by  $\pi((wb, i), a) = (wbb', 2 - i + 1)$  where  $b'$  is obtained from  $b$  according to the move  $a$
- ▶  $h_0 = (b_0, 1)$  where  $b_0$  is the initial board
- ▶  $u_j(wb, i) \in \{1, 0, -1\}$ , here 1 means "win", 0 means "draw", and -1 means "loss" for player  $j$

# Pure Strategies

Let  $G = (N, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$  be a perfect-information extensive-form game.

## Definition 40

A *pure strategy* of player  $i$  in  $G$  is a function  $s_i : H_i \rightarrow A$  such that for every  $h \in H_i$  we have that  $s_i(h) \in \chi(h)$ .

We denote by  $S_i$  the set of all pure strategies of player  $i$  in  $G$ .

Denote by  $S = S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n$  the set of all pure strategy profiles.


Note that each pure strategy profile  $s \in S$  determines a unique path  $w_s = h_0 a_1 h_1 \cdots h_{k-1} a_k h_k$  from  $h_0$  to a terminal node  $h_k$  by

$$a_j = s_{\rho(h_{j-1})}(h_{j-1}) \quad \forall 0 < j \leq k$$

Denote by  $O(s)$  the terminal node reached by  $w_s$ .

Abusing notation a bit, we denote by  $u_i(s)$  the value  $u_i(O(s))$  of the payoff for player  $i$  when the terminal node  $O(s)$  is reached using strategies of  $s$ .

## Example: Trust Game



A pure strategy profile  $(s_1, s_2)$  where

$$s_1(h_0) = T \quad \text{and} \quad s_2(h_1) = K$$

is usually written as  $TK$  (BFS & left to right traversal) determines the path  $h_0 T h_1 K z_2$

The resulting payoffs:  $u_1(s_1, s_2) = 0$  and  $u_2(s_1, s_2) = 20$ .



# Extensive-Form vs Strategic-Form

The extensive-form game  $G$  determines the *corresponding strategic-form game*  $\bar{G} = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$

Here note that the set of players  $N$  and the sets of pure strategies  $S_i$  are the same in  $G$  and in the corresponding game.

The payoff functions  $u_i$  in  $\bar{G}$  are understood as functions on the pure strategy profiles of  $S = S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n$ .


With this definition, we may apply all solution concepts and algorithms developed for strategic-form games to the extensive form games.

We often consider the extensive-form to be only a different way of representing the corresponding strategic-form game and do not distinguish between them.

There are some issues, namely whether all notions from strategic-form area make sense in the extensive-form. Also, naive application of algorithms may result in unnecessarily high complexity.

For now, let us consider pure strategies only!

# Example: Trust Game




Is any strategy strictly (weakly, very weakly) dominant?

Is any strategy never best response?

Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies ?

# Example



Find all pure strategies of both players.


Is any strategy (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominant?

Is any strategy (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominated?

Is any strategy never best response?

Are there Nash equilibria in pure strategies ?

# Example



	$KK'$	$KU'$	$UK'$	$UU'$
$L$	3,1	3,1	1,3	1,3
$R$	2,1	0,0	2,1	0,0

Find all pure strategies of both players.


Is any strategy (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominant?

Is any strategy (strictly, weakly, very weakly) dominated?

Is any strategy never best response?

Are there Nash equilibria in pure strategies ?

# Criticism of Nash Equilibria



	$KK'$	$KU'$	$UK'$	$UU'$
$L$	3, 1	3, 1	1, 3	1, 3
$R$	2, 1	0, 0	2, 1	0, 0


Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies:  $(L, UU')$  and  $(R, UK')$

Examine  $(L, UU')$ :

- ▶ Player 2 **threats** to play  $U'$  in  $h_2$ ,
- ▶ as a result, player 1 plays  $L$ ,
- ▶ player 2 reacts to  $L$  by playing the best response, i.e.,  $U$ .

However, the threat is not *credible*, once a play reaches  $h_2$ , a rational player 2 chooses  $K'$ .

# Criticism of Nash Equilibria



	$KK'$	$KU'$	$UK'$	$UU'$
$L$	3,1	3,1	1,3	1,3
$R$	2,1	0,0	2,1	0,0

Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies:  $(L, UU')$  and  $(R, UK')$

Examine  $(R, UK')$ : This equilibrium is sensible in the following sense:

- ▶ Player 2 plays the best response in both  $h_1$  and  $h_2$
- ▶ Player 1 plays the "best response" in  $h_0$  assuming that player 2 will play his best responses in the future.

This equilibrium is called *subgame perfect*.

# Subgame Perfect Equilibria

Given  $h \in \mathcal{H}$ , we denote by  $\mathcal{H}^h$  the set of all nodes reachable from  $h$ .

## Definition 41 (Subgame)

A *subgame*  $G^h$  of  $G$  rooted in  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  is the restriction of  $G$  to nodes reachable from  $h$  in the game tree. More precisely,

$G^h = (N, A, H^h, Z^h, \chi^h, \rho^h, \pi^h, h, u^h)$  where  $H^h = H \cap \mathcal{H}^h$ ,  $Z^h = Z \cap \mathcal{H}^h$ ,  $\chi^h$  and  $\rho^h$  are restrictions of  $\chi$  and  $\rho$  to  $H^h$ , resp.,  
(Given a function  $f : A \rightarrow B$  and  $C \subseteq A$ , a restriction of  $f$  to  $C$  is a function  $g : C \rightarrow B$  such that  $g(x) = f(x)$  for all  $x \in C$ .)

- ▶  $\pi^h$  is defined for  $h' \in H^h$  and  $a \in \chi^h(h')$  by  $\pi^h(h', a) = \pi(h', a)$
- ▶ each  $u_i^h$  is a restriction of  $u_i$  to  $Z^h$

## Definition 42

A *subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)* in pure strategies is a pure strategy profile  $s \in S$  such that for any subgame  $G^h$  of  $G$ , the restriction of  $s$  to  $H^h$  is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in  $G^h$ .

A restriction of  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  to  $H^h$  is a strategy profile  $s^h = (s_1^h, \dots, s_n^h)$  where  $s_i^h(h') = s_i(h')$  for all  $i \in N$  and all  $h' \in H_i \cap H^h$ .

# Stackelberg Competition – SPE

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $A = [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $H = \{h_0, h_1^{q_1} \mid q_1 \in [0, \infty)\}$ ,  $Z = \{z^{q_1, q_2} \mid q_1, q_2 \in [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $\chi(h_0) = [0, \infty)$ ,  $\chi(h_1^{q_1}) = [0, \infty)$ ,  $\rho(h_0) = 1$ ,  $\rho(h_1^{q_1}) = 2$
- ▶  $\pi(h_0, q_1) = h_1^{q_1}$ ,  $\pi(h_1^{q_1}, q_2) = z^{q_1, q_2}$
- ▶ The payoffs are  $u_1(z^{q_1, q_2}) = q_1(\kappa - c - q_1 - q_2)$ ,  
 $u_2(z^{q_1, q_2}) = q_2(\kappa - c - q_1 - q_2)$

Denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$

Player 1 chooses  $q_1$ , we know that the best response of player 2 is  $q_2 = (\theta - q_1)/2$  where  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

Then  $u_1(z^{q_1, q_2}) = q_1(\theta - q_1 - \theta/2 - q_1/2) = (\theta/2)q_1 - q_1^2/2$  which is maximized by  $q_1 = \theta/2$ , giving  $q_2 = \theta/4$ .

Then  $u_1(z^{q_1, q_2}) = \theta^2/8$  and  $u_2(z^{q_1, q_2}) = \theta^2/16$ .

Note that firm 1 has an advantage as a leader.



# Backward Induction

An algorithm for computing SPE for finite perfect-information extensive-form games.

**Backward Induction:** We inductively "attach" to every node  $h$  a pure strategy profile  $s^h = (s_1^h, \dots, s_n^h)$  in  $G^h$ , together with a vector of expected payoffs  $u(h) = (u_1(h), \dots, u_n(h))$ .

- ▶ **Initially:** Attach to each terminal node  $z \in Z$  the empty profile  $s^z = (\emptyset, \dots, \emptyset)$  and the payoff vector  $u(z) = (u_1(z), \dots, u_n(z))$ .
- ▶ **While**(there is an unattached node  $h$  with all children attached):
  1. Let  $K$  be the set of all children of  $h$
  2. Let

$$h_{\max} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{h' \in K} u_{\rho(h)}(h')$$

3. Attach to  $h$  a strategy profile  $s^h$  where
  - ▶  $s_{\rho(h)}^h(h) = h_{\max}$
  - ▶ for all  $i \in N$  and all  $h' \in H_i$  define  $s_i^h(h') = s_i^{\bar{h}}(h')$  where  $\bar{h} \in K$  and  $h' \in H^{\bar{h}} \cap H_i$
4. Attach to  $h$  the vector of expected payoffs  $u(h) := u(h_{\max})$ .

# Correctness of Backward Induction

## Theorem 43

For every finite perfect-information extensive-form game and for each node  $h$  the attached  $s^h$  is a SPE and the attached vector  $u(h)$  satisfies  $u(h) = u(s^h) = (u_1(s^h), \dots, u_n(s^h))$ .

**Proof:** By induction. In any terminal node  $z$  no player has any choice, thus empty strategies make a SPE with payoffs  $u(z)$ .

Assume that  $h$  is processed in the while cycle. Denote by  $\bar{s}^h$  a profile obtained from  $s^h$  by changing the strategy of player  $i$ .

First, assume  $i \neq \rho(h)$ . Let  $\bar{s}^{h_{\max}}$  be the restriction of  $\bar{s}^h$  to the subgame rooted in  $h_{\max}$ .

$$u_i(\bar{s}^h) = u_i^{h_{\max}}(\bar{s}^{h_{\max}}) \leq u_i^{h_{\max}}(s^{h_{\max}}) = u_i(s^h)$$

Second, assume  $i = \rho(h)$  and denote by  $\bar{h} = \bar{s}^h_{\rho(h)}(h)$ . Let  $\bar{s}^{\bar{h}}$  be the restriction of  $\bar{s}^h$  to the subgame rooted in  $\bar{h}$ .

$$u_i(\bar{s}^h) = u_i^{\bar{h}}(\bar{s}^{\bar{h}}) \leq u_i^{\bar{h}}(s^{\bar{h}}) \leq u_i^{h_{\max}}(s^{h_{\max}}) = u_i(s^h)$$

In both cases the deviation of player  $i$  leads to smaller or equal payoff. Apparently,  $u(s^h) = u^{h_{\max}}(s^{h_{\max}}) = u(h_{\max}) = u(h)$ .

Recall that in the model of chess, the payoffs were from  $\{1, 0, -1\}$  and  $u_1 = -u_2$  (i.e. it is zero-sum).

By Theorem 43, there is a SPE in pure strategies  $(s_1^*, s_2^*)$ .

However, then one of the following holds:

1. White has a winning strategy

If  $u_1(s_1^*, s_2^*) = 1$  and thus  $u_2(s_1^*, s_2^*) = -1$

2. Black has a winning strategy

If  $u_1(s_1^*, s_2^*) = -1$  and thus  $u_2(s_1^*, s_2^*) = 1$

3. Both players have strategies to force a draw

If  $u_1(s_1^*, s_2^*) = 0$  and thus  $u_2(s_1^*, s_2^*) = 0$

**Question:** Which one is the right answer?

**Answer:** Nobody knows yet ... the tree is too big!

Even with  $\sim 200$  depth &  $\sim 5$  moves per node:  $5^{200}$  nodes!

# Efficient Algorithms for Pure Nash Equilibria

In the step 2. of the backward induction, the algorithm may choose *an arbitrary*  $h_{\max} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{h' \in K} u_{\rho(h)}(h')$  and always obtain a SPE.

In order to compute all SPE, the algorithm may systematically search through all possible choices of  $h_{\max}$  throughout the induction.

Backward induction is too inefficient (unnecessarily searches through the whole tree).


There are better algorithms, such as  $\alpha$ - $\beta$ -pruning.

For details, extensions etc. see e.g.

- ▶ PB016 Artificial Intelligence I
- ▶ Multi-player alpha-beta pruning, R. Korf, *Artificial Intelligence* 48, pages 99-111, 1991
- ▶ Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd edition), S. Russell and P. Norvig, *Prentice Hall*, 2009

## Example

Centipede game:



SPE in pure strategies:  $(DDD, DD)$  ... Isn't it weird?

There are serious issues here ...

- ▶ In laboratory setting, people usually play  $A$  for several steps.
- ▶ There is a theoretical problem: Imagine, that you are player 2. What would you do when player 1 chooses  $A$  in the first step? The SPE analysis says that you should go down, but the same analysis also says that the situation you are in cannot appear :-)

Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
Extensive-Form Games  
**Mixed and Behavioral Strategies**

# Mixed and Behavioral Strategies

Assume two players and a **finite** extensive-form game  $G$ .

## Definition 44

A *mixed strategy*  $\sigma_i$  of player  $i$  in  $G$  is a mixed strategy of player  $i$  in the corresponding strategic-form game.

i.e., a mixed strategy  $\sigma_i$  of player  $i$  in  $G$  is a probability distribution on  $S_i$  (recall that  $S_i$  is the set of all pure strategies, i.e., functions of the form  $s_i : H_i \rightarrow A$ ).

As before, we denote by  $\Sigma_i$  the set of all mixed strategies of player  $i$ .

## Definition 45

A *behavioral strategy* of player  $i$  in  $G$  is a function  $\beta_i : H_i \rightarrow \Delta(A)$  such that for every  $h \in H_i$  and every  $a \in A$ :  $\beta_i(h)(a) > 0$  iff  $a \in \chi(h)$ .


Given a profile  $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2)$  of behavioral strategies, we denote by  $P_\beta(z)$  the probability of reaching  $z \in Z$  when  $\beta$  is used, i.e.,

$$P_\beta(z) = \prod_{\ell=1}^k \beta_{\rho(h_{\ell-1})}(h_\ell)(a_\ell)$$

where  $h_0 a_1 h_1 a_2 h_2 \cdots a_k h_k$  is the unique path from  $h_0$  to  $h_k = z$ .

We define  $u_i(\beta) := \sum_{z \in Z} P_\beta(z) \cdot u_i(z)$ .

# Behavioral Strategies: Example




Pure strategies of player 1:  $AC, A\bar{C}, \bar{A}C, \bar{A}\bar{C}$

An example of a mixed strategy  $\sigma_1$  of player 1:

$$\sigma_1(AC) = \frac{1}{3}, \sigma_1(A\bar{C}) = \frac{1}{9}, \sigma_1(\bar{A}C) = \frac{1}{6} \text{ and } \sigma_1(\bar{A}\bar{C}) = \frac{11}{18}$$



# Behavioral Strategies: Example




An example of behavioral strategies of both players:

- ▶ player 1:  $\beta_1(h_0)(A) = \frac{1}{3}$  and  $\beta_1(h_3)(C) = \frac{1}{2}$
- ▶ player 2:  $\beta_2(h_1)(B) = \frac{1}{4}$  and  $\beta_2(h_2)(D) = \frac{1}{5}$

$$P_{(\beta_1, \beta_2)}(z_2) = \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{4}\right) \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{8}$$

# Behavioral Strategies: Example




$$\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2)$$

- ▶ player 1:  $\beta_1(h_0)(A) = \frac{1}{3}$   
and  $\beta_1(h_3)(C) = \frac{1}{2}$
- ▶ player 2:  $\beta_2(h_1)(B) = \frac{1}{4}$   
and  $\beta_2(h_2)(D) = \frac{1}{5}$

$$\begin{aligned}u_1(\beta) &= P_\beta(z_1) \cdot 1 + P_\beta(z_2) \cdot 2 + P_\beta(z_3) \cdot 3 + P_\beta(z_4) \cdot 1 + P_\beta(z_5) \cdot 5 \\ &= \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{4} 1 + \frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{4} \frac{1}{2} 2 + \frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{4} \frac{1}{2} 3 + \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{5} 1 + \frac{2}{3} \frac{4}{5} 5 \approx 3.508\end{aligned}$$

# Pure Strategies as Behavioral



Each pure strategy can be seen as a behavioral strategy.

Consider e.g.  $s_1 : H_1 \rightarrow A$  defined by  $s_1(h_0) = A$  and  $s_1(h_3) = C$ .

The corresponding behavioral strategy  $\beta_1$  would satisfy

$\beta_1(h_0)(A) = \beta_1(h_3)(C) = 1$   
(i.e. select actions chosen by  $s_1$  with prob. 1).

Now given a behavioral strategy  $\beta_2$  of player 2 defined by  $\beta_2(h_1)(B) = \frac{1}{4}$  and  $\beta_2(h_2)(D) = \frac{1}{5}$  we obtain

$$P_{(s_1, \beta_2)}(z_2) = P_{(\beta_1, \beta_2)}(z_2) = 1 \left(1 - \frac{1}{4}\right) 1 = \frac{3}{4}$$

# Mixed/Behavioral Profiles

Let  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$  be a strategy profile where each  $\alpha_i$  is either mixed or behavioral.

The game is played as follows:

- ▶ If  $\alpha_1$  mixed, select randomly a pure strategy  $\beta_1$  according to  $\alpha_1$ , else  $\beta_1 := \alpha_1$ .
- ▶ If  $\alpha_2$  mixed, select randomly a pure strategy  $\beta_2$  according to  $\alpha_2$ , else  $\beta_2 := \alpha_2$ .
- ▶ Play  $(\beta_1, \beta_2)$  and collect payoffs.

Denote the resulting payoffs by  $u_1(\alpha)$  and  $u_2(\alpha)$ .

## Lemma 46


*For every mixed/behavioral strategy  $\alpha_1$  of player 1 there is a mixed/behavioral strategy  $\alpha'_1$  such that for every mixed/behavioral strategy  $\alpha_2$  we have that  $u_i(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = u_i(\alpha'_1, \alpha_2)$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .*

Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
Extensive-Form Games  
**Imperfect-Information Games**

# Extensive-form of Matching Pennies

Is it possible to model Matching pennies using extensive-form games?

	<i>H</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>H</i>	1, -1	-1, 1
<i>T</i>	-1, 1	1, -1




The problem is that player 2 is "perfectly" informed about the choice of player 1. In particular, there are pure Nash equilibria  $(H, TH)$  and  $(T, TH)$  in the extensive-form game as opposed to the strategic-form.

Reversing the order of players does not help.

We need to extend the formalism to be able to hide some information about previous moves.

# Extensive-form of Matching Pennies

Matching pennies can be modeled using an *imperfect-information* extensive-form game:



Here  $h_1$  and  $h_2$  belong to the same *information set* of player 2.

As a result, player 2 is not able to distinguish between  $h_1$  and  $h_2$ .

So even though players do not move simultaneously, the information player 2 has about the current situation is the same as in the simultaneous case.

# Imperfect Information Games

An *imperfect-information extensive-form game* is a tuple

$G_{imp} = (G_{perf}, I)$  where

- ▶  $G_{perf} = (N, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$  is a perfect-information extensive-form game (called *the underlying game*),
- ▶  $I = (I_1, \dots, I_n)$  where for each  $i \in N = \{1, \dots, n\}$

$$I_i = \{I_{i,1}, \dots, I_{i,k_i}\}$$

is a collection of *information sets* for player  $i$  that satisfies

- ▶  $\bigcup_{j=1}^{k_i} I_{i,j} = H_i$  and  $I_{i,j} \cap I_{i,k} = \emptyset$  for  $j \neq k$   
(i.e.,  $I_i$  is a partition of  $H_i$ )
- ▶ for all  $h, h' \in I_{i,j}$ , we have  $\rho(h) = \rho(h')$  and  $\chi(h) = \chi(h')$   
(i.e., nodes from the same information set are owned by the same player and have the same sets of enabled actions)

Given  $h \in H$ , we denote by  $I(h)$  the information set  $I_{i,j}$  containing  $h$ .

Given an information set  $I_{i,j}$ , we denote by  $\chi(I_{i,j})$  the set of all actions enabled in some (and hence all) nodes of  $I_{i,j}$ .



# Imperfect Information Games – Strategies

Now we define the set of pure, mixed, and behavioral strategies in  $G_{imp}$  as subsets of pure, mixed, and behavioral strategies, resp., in  $G_{perf}$  that respect the information sets.

Let  $G_{imp} = (G_{perf}, I)$  be an imperfect-information extensive-form game where  $G_{perf} = (N, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$ .

## Definition 47


A *pure strategy* of player  $i$  in  $G_{imp}$  is a pure strategy  $s_i$  in  $G_{perf}$  such that for all  $j = 1, \dots, k_i$  and all  $h, h' \in I_{i,j}$  holds  $s_i(h) = s_i(h')$ .

Note that each  $s_i$  can also be seen as a function  $s_i : I_i \rightarrow A$  such that for every  $I_{i,j} \in I_i$  we have that  $s_i(I_{i,j}) \in \chi(I_{i,j})$ .

As before, we denote by  $S_i$  the set of all pure strategies of player  $i$  in  $G_{imp}$ , and by  $S = S_1 \times \dots \times S_n$  the set of all pure strategy profiles.

As in the perfect-information case we have a corresponding strategic-form game  $\bar{G}_{imp} = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$ .

# Matching Pennies



$I_1 = \{I_{1,1}\}$  where  $I_{1,1} = \{h_0\}$


$I_2 = \{I_{2,1}\}$  where  $I_{2,1} = \{h_1, h_2\}$

Example of pure strategies:

- ▶  $s_1(I_{1,1}) = H$  which describes the strategy  $s_1(h_0) = H$
- ▶  $s_2(I_{2,1}) = T$  which describes the strategy  $s_2(h_1) = s_2(h_2) = T$   
(it is also sufficient to specify  $s_2(h_1) = T$  since then  $s_2(h_2) = T$ )

So we really have strategies  $H, T$  for player 1 and  $H, T$  for player 2.

# Weird Example




Note that  $I_1 = \{I_{1,1}\}$  where  $I_{1,1} = \{h_0, h_3\}$

and that  $I_2 = \{I_{2,1}\}$  where  $I_{2,1} = \{h_1, h_2\}$

What pure strategies are in this example?

# SPE with Imperfect Information



What we designate as subgames to allow the backward induction?

Only subtrees rooted in  $h_1$ ,  $h_2$ , and  $h_0$  (together with all subtrees rooted in terminal nodes)

Note that subtrees rooted in  $h_3$  and  $h_4$  cannot be considered as "independent" subgames because their individual solutions cannot be combined to a single best response in the information set  $\{h_3, h_4\}$ .

# SPE with Imperfect Information

Let  $G_{imp} = (G_{perf}, I)$  be an imperfect-information extensive-form game where  $G_{perf} = (N, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$  is the underlying perfect-information extensive-form game.

Let us denote by  $H_{proper}$  the set of all  $h \in H$  that satisfy the following: For every  $h'$  reachable from  $h$ , we have that either all nodes of  $I(h')$  are reachable from  $h$ , or no node of  $I(h')$  is reachable from  $h$ .

Intuitively,  $h \in H_{proper}$  iff every information set  $I_{i,j}$  is either completely contained in the subtree rooted in  $h$ , or no node of  $I_{i,j}$  is contained in the subtree.

## Definition 48

For every  $h \in H_{proper}$  we define a subgame  $G_{imp}^h$  to be the imperfect information game  $(G_{perf}^h, I^h)$  where  $I^h$  is the restriction of  $I$  to  $H^h$ .

Note that as subgames of  $G_{imp}$  we consider only subgames of  $G_{perf}$  that respect the information sets, i.e., are rooted in nodes of  $H_{proper}$ .

## Definition 49

A strategy profile  $s \in S$  is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if  $s^h$  is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame  $G_{imp}^h$  of  $G_{imp}$  (here  $h \in H_{proper}$ ).

# Backward Induction with Imperfect Info

The backward induction generalizes to imperfect-information extensive-form games along the following lines:

1. As in the perfect-information case, the goal is to label each node  $h \in H_{proper} \cup Z$  with a SPE  $s^h$  and a vector of payoffs  $u(h) = (u_1(h), \dots, u_n(h))$  for individual players according to  $s^h$ .
2. Starting with terminal nodes, the labeling proceeds bottom up. Terminal nodes are labeled similarly as in the perfect-inf. case.
3. Consider  $h \in H_{proper}$ , let  $K$  be the set of all  $h' \in (H_{proper} \cup Z) \setminus \{h\}$  that are  $h$ 's **closest descendants out of  $H_{proper} \cup Z$** .

I.e.,  $h' \in K$  iff  $h' \neq h$  is reachable from  $h$  and the unique path from  $h$  to  $h'$  visits only nodes of  $\mathcal{H} \setminus H_{proper}$  (except the first and the last node).

For every  $h' \in K$  we have already computed a SPE  $s^{h'}$  in  $G_{imp}^{h'}$  and the vector of corresponding payoffs  $u(h')$ .

4. Now consider all nodes of  $K$  as terminal nodes where each  $h' \in K$  has payoffs  $u(h')$ . This gives a new game in which we compute an equilibrium  $\bar{s}^h$  together with the vector  $u(h)$ .

The equilibrium  $s^h$  is then obtained by "concatenating"  $\bar{s}^h$  with all  $s^{h'}$ , here  $h' \in K$ , in the subgames  $G_{imp}^{h'}$  of  $G_{imp}^h$ .

# Mutually Assured Destruction

Analysis of Cuban missile crisis of 1962  
(as described in *Games for Business and Economics* by R. Gardner)

- ▶ The crisis started with United States' discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.
- ▶ The USSR then backed down, agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba, which suggests that US had a credible threat "if you don't back off we both pay dearly".

**Question:** Could this indeed be a credible threat?

## Mutually Assured Destruction (Cont.)


Model as an extensive-form game:

- ▶ First, player 1 (US) chooses to either ignore the incident ( $I$ ), resulting in maintenance of status quo (payoffs  $(0, 0)$ ), or escalate the situation ( $E$ ).
- ▶ Following escalation by player 1, player 2 can back down ( $B$ ), causing it to lose face (payoffs  $(10, -10)$ ), or it can choose to proceed to a nuclear confrontation ( $N$ ).
- ▶ Upon this choice, the players play a simultaneous-move game in which they can either retreat ( $R$ ), or choose doomsday ( $D$ ).
  - ▶ If both retreat, the payoffs are  $(-5, -5)$ , a small loss due to a mobilization process.
  - ▶ If either of them chooses doomsday, then the world destructs and payoffs are  $(-100, -100)$ .

Find SPE in pure strategies.



# Mutually Assured Destruction (Cont.)



Solve  $G_{imp}^{h_2}$  (a strategic-form game). Then  $G_{imp}^{h_1}$  by solving a game rooted in  $h_1$  with terminal nodes  $h_2, z_5$  (payoffs in  $h_2$  correspond to an equilibrium in  $G_{imp}^{h_2}$ ). Finally solve  $G_{imp}$  by solving a game rooted in  $h_0$  with terminal nodes  $h_1, z_6$  (payoffs in  $h_1$  have been computed in the previous step).

# Mixed and Behavioral Strategies

## Definition 50

A *mixed strategy*  $\sigma_i$  of player  $i$  in  $G_{imp}$  is a mixed strategy of player  $i$  in the corresponding strategic-form game  $\bar{G}_{imp} = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, u_i)$ .

Do not forget that now  $s_i \in S_i$  iff  $s_i$  is a pure strategy that assigns the same action to all nodes of every information set. Hence each  $s_i \in S_i$  can be seen as a function  $s_i : I_i \rightarrow A$ .

As before, we denote by  $\Sigma_i$  the set of all mixed strategies of player  $i$ .


## Definition 51

A *behavioral strategy* of player  $i$  in  $G_{imp}$  is a behavioral strategy  $\beta_i$  in  $G_{perf}$  such that for all  $j = 1, \dots, k_i$  and all  $h, h' \in I_{i,j}$  :  $\beta_i(h) = \beta_i(h')$ .

Each  $\beta_i$  can be seen as a function  $\beta_i : I_i \rightarrow \Delta(A)$  such that for all  $I_{i,j} \in I_i$  we have  $\text{supp}(\beta_i(I_{i,j})) \subseteq \chi(I_{i,j})$ .

Are they equivalent as in the perfect-information case?

## Example: Absent Minded Driver



Only one player: A driver who has to take a turn at a particular junction. There are two identical junctions, the first one leads to a wrong neighborhood where the driver gets completely lost (payoff 0), the second one leads home (payoff 5). If the driver misses both, there is a longer way home (payoff 1). The problem is that after missing the first turn, the driver forgets that he missed the turn.

Behavioral strategy:  $\beta_1(I_{1,1})(L) = \frac{1}{2}$  has the expected payoff  $\frac{3}{2}$ .

No mixed strategy gives a larger payoff than 1 since no pure strategy ever reaches the terminal node with payoff 5.

# Kuhn's Theorem

Player  $i$  has *perfect recall* in  $G_{imp}$  if the following holds:

- ▶ Every information set of player  $i$  (i.e. *his own*) intersects every path from the root  $h_0$  to a terminal node at most once.
- ▶ Every two paths from the root that end in the same information set of player  $i$ 
  - ▶ pass through the same information sets of player  $i$ ,
  - ▶ and in the same order,
  - ▶ and in every such information set the two paths choose the same action.

May, however, pass through *different* information sets of other players and other players may choose different actions along each of the paths!

I.e. each information set  $J$  of player  $i$  determines the sequence of information sets of player  $i$  and actions taken by player  $i$  along any path reaching  $J$ .

## Theorem 52 (Kuhn, 1953)

*Assuming perfect recall, every mixed strategy can be translated to a behavioral strategy (and vice versa) so that the payoff for the resulting strategy is the same in any mixed profile.*

Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
**Repeated Games**  
Finitely Repeated Games

## Example – repeated prisoner's dilemma

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

Imagine that the criminals are being arrested repeatedly.

Can they somewhat reflect upon their experience in order to play "better"?

In what follows we consider strategic-form games played repeatedly

- ▶ for finitely many rounds, the final payoff of each player will be the average of payoffs from all rounds
- ▶ infinitely many rounds, here we consider a discounted sum of payoffs and the long-run average payoff

We analyze Nash equilibria and sub-game perfect equilibria.

**We stick to pure strategies only!**

# Finitely Repeated Games

Let  $G = (\{1, 2\}, (S_1, S_2), (u_1, u_2))$  be a finite strategic-form game of two players.

A  *$T$ -stage game  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  based on  $G$*  proceeds in  $T$  stages so that in a stage  $t \geq 1$ , players choose a strategy profile  $s^t = (s_1^t, s_2^t)$ .

After  $T$  stages, both players collect the average payoff  $\sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t) / T$ .

A *history of length  $0 \leq t \leq T$*  is a sequence  $h = s^1 \cdots s^t \in S^t$  of  $t$  strategy profiles. Denote by  $H(t)$  the set of all histories of length  $t$ .

A *pure strategy* for player  $i$  in a  $T$ -stage game  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  is a function

$$\tau_i : \bigcup_{t=0}^{T-1} H(t) \rightarrow S_i$$

which for every possible history chooses a next step for player  $i$ .

Every strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  induces a sequence of pure strategy profiles  $w_\tau = s^1 \cdots s^T$  in  $G$  so that  $s_i^t = \tau_i(s^1 \cdots s^{t-1})$ .

Given a pure strategy profile  $\tau$  in  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  such that  $w_\tau = s^1 \cdots s^T$ , define the payoffs  $u_i(\tau) = \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t) / T$ .

## Example

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

Consider a 3-stage game.

Examples of histories:  $\epsilon$ ,  $(C, S)$ ,  $(C, S)(S, S)$ ,  $(C, S)(S, S)(C, C)$

Here the last one is terminal, obtained using  $\tau_1, \tau_2$  s.t.:

$$\tau_1(\epsilon) = C, \tau_1((C, S)) = S, \tau_1((C, S)(S, S)) = C$$

$$\tau_2(\epsilon) = S, \tau_2((C, S)) = S, \tau_2((C, S)(S, S)) = C$$

Thus  $w_{(\tau_1, \tau_2)} = (C, S)(S, S)(C, C)$

$$u_1(\tau_1, \tau_2) = (0 + (-1) + (-5))/3 = -2$$

$$u_2(\tau_1, \tau_2) = (-20 + (-1) + (-5))/3 = -26/3$$



# Finitely Repeated Games in Extensive-Form

Every  $T$ -stage game  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  can be defined as an imperfect information extensive-form game.

Define an imperfect-information extensive-form game  $G_{\text{imp}}^{\text{rep}} = (G_{\text{perf}}^{\text{rep}}, I)$  such that  $G_{\text{perf}}^{\text{rep}} = (\{1, 2\}, A, H, Z, \chi, \rho, \pi, h_0, u)$  where

- ▶  $A = S_1 \cup S_2$
- ▶  $H = (S_1 \times S_2)^{\leq T} \cup (S_1 \times S_2)^{< T} \cdot S_1$   
Intuitively, elements of  $(S_1 \times S_2)^{\leq k}$  are possible histories;  
 $(S_1 \times S_2)^{< k} \cdot S_1$  is used to simulate a simultaneous play of  $G$  by letting player 1 choose first and player 2 second.
- ▶  $Z = (S_1 \times S_2)^T$
- ▶  $\chi(\epsilon) = S_1$  and  $\chi(h \cdot s_1) = S_2$  for  $s_1 \in S_1$ , and  $\chi(h \cdot (s_1, s_2)) = S_1$  for  $(s_1, s_2) \in S$
- ▶  $\rho(\epsilon) = 1$  and  $\rho(h \cdot s_1) = 2$  and  $\rho(h \cdot (s_1, s_2)) = 1$
- ▶  $\pi(\epsilon, s_1) = s_1$  and  $\pi(h \cdot s_1, s_2) = h \cdot (s_1, s_2)$  and  $\pi(h \cdot (s_1, s_2), s'_1) = h \cdot (s_1, s_2) \cdot s'_1$
- ▶  $h_0 = \epsilon$  and  $u_i((s_1^1, s_2^1)(s_1^2, s_2^2) \cdots (s_1^T, s_2^T)) = \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s_1^t, s_2^t) / T$

# Finitely Repeated Games in Extensive-Form

The set of information sets is defined as follows: Let  $h \in H_1$  be a node of player 1, then

- ▶ there is exactly one information set of player 1 containing  $h$  as the only element,
- ▶ there is exactly one information set of player 2 containing all nodes of the form  $h \cdot s_1$  where  $s_1 \in S_1$ .

Intuitively, in every round, player 1 has a complete information about results of past plays,

player 1 chooses a pure strategy  $s_1 \in S_1$ ,

player 2 is *not* informed about  $s_1$  but still has a complete information about results of all previous rounds,

player 2 chooses a pure strategy  $s_2 \in S_2$  and both players are informed about the result.

# Finitely Repeated Games – Equilibria

## Definition 53

A strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in a  $T$ -stage game  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  is a Nash equilibrium if for every  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  and every  $\tau'_i$  we have

$$u_i(\tau_1, \tau_2) \geq u_i(\tau'_i, \tau_{-i})$$

To define SPE we use the following notation. Given a history  $h = s^1 \cdots s^t$  and a strategy  $\tau_i$  of player  $i$ , we define a strategy  $\tau_i^h$  in  $(T - t)$ -stage game based on  $G$  by

$$\tau_i^h(\bar{s}^1 \cdots \bar{s}^t) = \tau_i(s^1 \cdots s^t \bar{s}^1 \cdots \bar{s}^t) \quad \text{for every sequence } \bar{s}^1 \cdots \bar{s}^t$$

(i.e.  $\tau_i^h$  behaves as  $\tau_i$  after  $h$ )

## Definition 54

A strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in a  $T$ -stage game  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) if for every history  $h$  the profile  $(\tau_1^h, \tau_2^h)$  is a Nash equilibrium in the  $(T - |h|)$ -stage game based on  $G$ .

## SPE with Single NE in $G$

	$C$	$S$
$C$	$-5, -5$	$0, -20$
$S$	$-20, 0$	$-1, -1$

Consider a  $T$ -stage game based on Prisoner's dilemma.

For every  $T$ , find a SPE.

... there is one, play  $(C, C)$  all the time. Is it all?

### Theorem 55

*Let  $G$  be an arbitrary finite strategic-form game. If  $G$  has a unique Nash equilibrium, then playing this equilibrium all the time is the unique SPE in the  $T$ -stage game based on  $G$ .*

### Proof.

By backward induction, players have to play the NE in the last stage. As the behavior in the last stage does not depend on the behavior in the  $(T - 1)$ -th stage, they have to play the NE also in the  $(T - 1)$ -th stage. Then the same holds in the  $(T - 2)$ -th stage, etc.  $\square$

## Further Discussion of Prisoner's Dilemma

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

Are there other NE (that are not SPE) in the repeated Prisoner's dilemma?

To simplify our discussion, we use the following notation:  $X$ - $YZ$ , where  $X, Y, Z \in \{C, S\}$  denotes the following strategy:

- ▶ In the first phase, play  $X$
- ▶ In the second phase, play  $Y$  if the opponent plays  $C$  in the first phase, otherwise play  $Z$

There are 4 NE: They are the four profiles that lead to  $(C, C)(C, C)$ , i.e., each player plays either  $C$ - $CC$ , or  $C$ - $CS$ .

## Further Discussion of Prisoner's Dilemma

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

The strategy  $C$  strictly dominates  $S$  in the Prisoner's dilemma.

Is there a strictly dominant strategy in the 2-stage game based on the Prisoner's dilemma?

If player 2 plays  $S-CC$ , then the best responses of player 1 are  $S-CC$  and  $S-SC$ .

(The strategy  $S-CS$  is usually called "tit-for-tat".)

If player 2 plays  $S-SC$ , then the best responses are  $C-SC$  and  $C-CC$ .

So there is no strictly dominant strategy for player 1.

(Which would be among the best responses for all strategies of player 2.)

# SPE with Multiple NE in $G$

Let  $s = (s_1, s_2)$  be a Nash equilibrium in  $G$ .

Define a strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  where

- ▶  $\tau_1$  chooses  $s_1$  in every stage
- ▶  $\tau_2$  chooses  $s_2$  in every stage

## Proposition 3

$\tau$  is a SPE in  $G_{T\text{-rep}}$  for every  $T \geq 1$ .

### Proof.

Apparently, changing  $\tau_i$  in some stage(s) may only result in the same or worse payoff for player  $i$ , since the other player always plays  $s_2$  independent of the choices of player 1. □

The proposition may be generalized by allowing players to play different equilibria in particular stages

I.e., consider a sequence of NE  $s^1, s^2, \dots, s^T$  in  $G$  and assume that in stage  $\ell$  player  $i$  plays  $s_i^\ell$

Does this cover all possible SPE in finitely repeated games?

## SPE with Multiple NE in $G$

	$m$	$f$	$r$
$M$	4,4	-1,5	0,0
$F$	5,-1	1,1	0,0
$R$	0,0	0,0	3,3

NE in the above game  $G$  :  $(F, f)$  and  $(R, r)$

Consider 2-stage game  $G_{2\text{-rep}}$  and strategies  $\tau_1, \tau_2$  where

- ▶  $\tau_1$  : Chooses  $M$  in stage 1. In stage 2 plays  $R$  if  $(M, m)$  was played in the first stage, and plays  $F$  otherwise.
- ▶  $\tau_2$  : Chooses  $m$  in stage 1. In stage 2 plays  $r$  if  $(M, m)$  was played in the first stage, and plays  $f$  otherwise.

Is this SPE?

Note that here the players **do not** play a NE in the first step.

The idea is that both players agree to play a Pareto optimal profile. If both comply, then a favorable NE is played in the second stage. If one of them betrays then a "punishing" NE is played.



Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
**Repeated Games**  
Infinitely Repeated Games

# Infinitely Repeated Games

Let  $G = (\{1, 2\}, (S_1, S_2), (u_1, u_2))$  be a strategic-form game of two players.

An *infinitely repeated game*  $G_{irep}$  based on  $G$  proceeds in *stages* so that in each stage, say  $t$ , players choose a strategy profile  $s^t = (s_1^t, s_2^t)$ .

Recall that a *history of length*  $t \geq 0$  is a sequence  $h = s^1 \cdots s^t \in S^t$  of  $t$  strategy profiles. Denote by  $H(t)$  the set of all histories of length  $t$ .

A *pure strategy* for player  $i$  in the infinitely repeated game  $G_{irep}$  is a function

$$\tau_i : \bigcup_{t=0}^{\infty} H(t) \rightarrow S_i$$

which for every possible history chooses a next step for player  $i$ .

Every pure strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  induces a sequence of pure strategy profiles  $w_\tau = s^1 s^2 \cdots$  in  $G$  so that  $s_i^t = \tau_i(s^1 \cdots s^{t-1})$ .

(Here for  $t = 0$  we have that  $s^1 \cdots s^{t-1} = \epsilon$ .)

# Infinitely Repeated Games & Discounted Payoff

Let  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  be a pure strategy profile in  $G_{irep}$  such that  $w_\tau = s^1 s^2 \dots$

Given  $0 < \delta < 1$ , we define a  *$\delta$ -discounted payoff* by

$$u_i^\delta(\tau) = (1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \cdot u_i(s^{t+1})$$

Given a strategic-form game  $G$  and  $0 < \delta < 1$ , we denote by  $G_{irep}^\delta$  the infinitely repeated game based on  $G$  together with the  $\delta$ -discounted payoffs.

# Infinitely Repeated Games & Discounted Payoff

## Definition 56

A strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a Nash equilibrium in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  if for both  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  and for every  $\tau'_i$  we have that

$$u_i^\delta(\tau_i, \tau_{-i}) \geq u_i^\delta(\tau'_i, \tau_{-i})$$

Given a history  $h = s^1 \dots s^t$  and a strategy  $\tau_i$  of player  $i$ , we define a strategy  $\tau_i^h$  in the infinitely repeated game  $G_{irep}$  by

$$\tau_i^h(\bar{s}^1 \dots \bar{s}^t) = \tau_i(s^1 \dots s^t \bar{s}^1 \dots \bar{s}^t) \quad \text{for every sequence } \bar{s}^1 \dots \bar{s}^t$$

(i.e.  $\tau_i^h$  behaves as  $\tau_i$  after  $h$ )

Now  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  if for every history  $h$  we have that  $(\tau_1^h, \tau_2^h)$  is a Nash equilibrium.

Note that  $(\tau_1^h, \tau_2^h)$  must be a NE also for all histories  $h$  that are *not* visited when the profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is used.

## Example

Consider the infinitely repeated game  $G_{irep}$  based on Prisoner's dilemma:

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

What are the Nash equilibria and SPE in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  for a given  $\delta$  ?

Consider a pure strategy profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  where  $\tau_i(s^1 \dots s^T) = C$  for all  $T \geq 1$  and  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ . Is it a NE? A SPE?

Consider a "grim trigger" profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  where

$$\tau_i(s^1 \dots s^T) = \begin{cases} S & T = 0 \\ S & s^\ell = (S, S) \text{ for all } 1 \leq \ell \leq T \\ C & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Is it a NE? Is it a SPE?

# A Simple Version of Folk Theorem

Let  $G = (\{1, 2\}, (S_1, S_2), (u_1, u_2))$  be a two-player strategic-form game where  $u_1, u_2$  are bounded on  $S = S_1 \times S_2$  (but  $S$  may be infinite) and let  $s^*$  be a Nash equilibrium in  $G$ .

Let  $s$  be a strategy profile in  $G$  satisfying  $u_i(s) > u_i(s^*)$  for all  $i \in N$ .

Consider the following *grim trigger for  $s$  using  $s^*$*  strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  where

$$\tau_i(s^1 \cdots s^T) = \begin{cases} s_i & T = 0 \\ s_i & s^\ell = s \text{ for all } 1 \leq \ell \leq T \\ s_i^* & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then for

$$\delta \geq \max_{i \in \{1, 2\}} \frac{\max_{s'_i \in S_i} u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) - u_i(s)}{\max_{s'_i \in S_i} u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) - u_i(s^*)}$$

we have that  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  and  $u_i^\delta(\tau) = u_i(s)$ .

## Simple Folk Theorem – Example

Consider the infinitely repeated game  $G_{irep}$  based on the following game  $G$ :

	$m$	$f$	$r$
$M$	4, 4	-1, 5	3, 0
$F$	5, -1	1, 1	0, 0
$R$	0, 3	0, 0	2, 2

NE in  $G$  :  $(F, f)$

Consider the grim trigger for  $(M, m)$  using  $(F, f)$ , i.e., the profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  where

- ▶  $\tau_1$  : Plays  $M$  in a given stage if  $(M, m)$  was played in all previous stages, and plays  $F$  otherwise.
- ▶  $\tau_2$  : Plays  $m$  in a given stage if  $(M, m)$  was played in all previous stages, and plays  $f$  otherwise.

This is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  for all  $\delta \geq \frac{1}{4}$ . Also,  $u_i(\tau_1, \tau_2) = 4$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .

Are there other SPE? Yes, a grim trigger for  $(R, r)$  using  $(F, f)$ . This is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^\delta$  for  $\delta \geq \frac{1}{2}$ .

# Tacit Collusion

Consider the Cournot duopoly game model  $G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $S_i = [0, \kappa]$
- ▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$   
 $u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

If the firms sign a *binding contract* to produce only  $\theta/4$ , their profit would be  $\theta^2/8$  which is higher than the profit  $\theta^2/9$  for playing the NE  $(\theta/3, \theta/3)$ .

However, such contracts are forbidden in many countries (including US).

Is it still possible that the firms will behave selfishly (i.e. only maximizing their profits) and still obtain such payoffs?

In other words, is there a SPE in the infinitely repeated game based on  $G$  (with a discount factor  $\delta$ ) which gives the payoffs  $\theta^2/8$  ?



# Tacit Collusion

Consider the Cournot duopoly game model  $G = (N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $S_i = [0, \infty)$
- ▶  $u_1(q_1, q_2) = q_1(\kappa - q_1 - q_2) - q_1 c_1 = (\kappa - c_1)q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1 q_2$   
 $u_2(q_1, q_2) = q_2(\kappa - q_2 - q_1) - q_2 c_2 = (\kappa - c_2)q_2 - q_2^2 - q_2 q_1$

Assume for simplicity that  $c_1 = c_2 = c$  and denote  $\theta = \kappa - c$ .

---

Consider the grim trigger profile for  $(\theta/4, \theta/4)$  using  $(\theta/3, \theta/3)$  :  
Player  $i$  will

- ▶ produce  $q_i = \theta/4$  whenever all profiles in the history are  $(\theta/4, \theta/4)$ ,
- ▶ whenever one of the players deviates, produce  $\theta/3$  from that moment on.

Assuming that  $\kappa = 100$  and  $c = 10$  (which gives  $\theta = 90$ ), this is a SPE  $G_{irep}^\delta$  for  $\delta \geq 0.5294 \dots$ . It results in  $(\theta/4, \theta/4)(\theta/4, \theta/4) \dots$  with the discounted payoffs  $\theta^2/8$ .

Dynamic Games of Complete Information  
**Repeated Games**  
Infinitely Repeated Games  
Long-Run Average Payoff and Folk Theorems

# Infinitely Repeated Games & Average Payoff

In what follows we assume that all payoffs in the game  $G$  are positive and that  $S$  is finite!

Let  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  be a strategy profile in the infinitely repeated game  $G_{irep}$  such that  $w_\tau = s^1 s^2 \dots$ .

## Definition 57

We define a *long-run average payoff* for player  $i$  by

$$u_i^{avg}(\tau) = \limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t)$$

(Here  $\limsup$  is necessary because  $\tau_i$  may cause non-existence of the limit.)

The long-run average payoff  $u_i^{avg}(\tau)$  is *well-defined* if the limit

$$u_i^{avg}(\tau) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t)$$
 exists.

Given a strategic-form game  $G$ , we denote by  $G_{irep}^{avg}$  the infinitely repeated game based on  $G$  together with the long-run average payoff.

# Infinitely Repeated Games & Average Payoff

## Definition 58

A strategy profile  $\tau$  is a Nash equilibrium if  $u_i^{avg}(\tau)$  is well-defined for all  $i \in N$ , and for every  $i$  and every  $\tau'_i$  we have that

$$u_i^{avg}(\tau_i, \tau_{-i}) \geq u_i^{avg}(\tau'_i, \tau_{-i})$$

(Note that we demand existence of the defining limit of  $u_i^{avg}(\tau_i, \tau_{-i})$  but the limit does not have to exist for  $u_i^{avg}(\tau'_i, \tau_{-i})$ .)

Moreover,  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$  if for every history  $h$  we have that  $(\tau_1^h, \tau_2^h)$  is a Nash equilibrium.

## Example

Consider the infinitely repeated game based on Prisoner's dilemma:

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

The grim trigger profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  where

$$\tau_i(s^1 \cdots s^T) = \begin{cases} S & T = 0 \\ S & s^\ell = (S, S) \text{ for all } 1 \leq \ell \leq T \\ C & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

is a SPE which gives the long-run average payoff  $-1$  to each player.

The intuition behind the grim trigger works as for the discounted payoff:

Whenever a player  $i$  deviates, the player  $-i$  starts playing  $C$  for which the best response of player  $i$  is also  $C$ . So we obtain

$(S, S) \cdots (S, S)(X, Y)(C, C)(C, C) \cdots$  (here  $(X, Y)$  is either  $(C, S)$  or  $(S, C)$  depending on who deviates). Apparently, the long-run average payoff is  $-5$  for both players, which is worse than  $-1$ .

## Example

Consider the infinitely repeated game based on Prisoner's dilemma:

	C	S
C	-5, -5	0, -20
S	-20, 0	-1, -1

However, other payoffs can be supported by NE. Consider e.g. a strategy profile  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  such that

- ▶ Both players **cyclically** play as follows:
  - ▶ 9 times  $(S, S)$
  - ▶ once  $(S, C)$
- ▶ If one of the players deviates, then, from that moment on, both play  $(C, C)$  forever.

Then  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is also SPE.

Apparently,  $u_1^{avg}(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \frac{9}{10} \cdot (-1) + (-20)/10 = -29/10$  and  $u_1^{avg}(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \frac{9}{10}(-1) = -9/10$ .

Player 2 gets better payoff than from the "best" profile  $(S, S)$ !

# Outline of the Folk Theorems

The previous examples suggest that other (possibly all?) convex combinations of payoffs may be obtained by means of Nash equilibria.

This observation forms a basis for a bunch of theorems, collectively called Folk Theorems.

No author is listed since these theorems had been known in games community long before they were formalized.

In what follows we prove several versions of Folk Theorem concerning achievable payoffs for repeated games.

We consider the following variants:

- ▶ Long-run average payoffs & SPE
- ▶ Long-run average payoffs & Nash equilibria

Note that similar theorems can be proved also for the discounted payoff.

# Folk Theorems – Feasible Payoffs

## Definition 59

We say that a vector of payoffs  $v = (v_1, v_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$  is *feasible* if it is a convex combination of payoffs for pure strategy profiles in  $G$  with rational coefficients, i.e., if there are rational numbers  $\beta_s$ , here  $s \in S$ , satisfying  $\beta_s \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{s \in S} \beta_s = 1$  such that for both  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  holds

$$v_i = \sum_{s \in S} \beta_s \cdot u_i(s)$$

We assume that there is  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  such that each  $\beta_s$  can be written in the form  $\beta_s = \gamma_s/m$ .

The following theorems can be extended to a notion of feasible payoffs using *arbitrary, possibly irrational*, coefficients  $\beta_s$  in the convex combination.

Roughly speaking, this follows from the fact that each real number can be approximated with rational numbers up to an arbitrary error. However, the proofs are technically more involved.



# Folk Theorems – Long-Run Average & SPE

## Theorem 60

Let  $s^*$  be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in  $G$  and let  $v = (v_1, v_2)$  be a **feasible** vector of payoffs satisfying  $v_i \geq u_i(s^*)$  for both  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .

Then there is a strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  such that

- ▶  $\tau$  is a SPE in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$
- ▶  $u_i^{avg}(\tau) = v_i$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$

**Proof:** Consider a strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  which gives the following behavior:

1. Unless one of the players deviates, the players play **cyclically** all profiles  $s \in S$  so that each  $s$  is always played for  $\gamma_s$  rounds.
2. Whenever one of the players deviates, then, from that moment on, each player  $i$  plays  $s_i^*$ .

It is easy to see that  $u_i^{avg}(\tau) = v_i$ .

We verify that  $\tau$  is SPE.

# Folk Theorems – Long-Run Average & SPE

Fix a history  $h$ , we show that  $\tau^h = (\tau_1^h, \tau_2^h)$  is a NE in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$ .

- ▶ If  $h$  does not contain any deviation from the cyclic behavior 1., then  $\tau^h$  continues according to 1., thus  $u_i^{avg}(\tau^h) = v_i$ .
- ▶ If  $h$  contains a deviation from 1., then

$$w_{\tau^h} = s^* s^* \dots$$

and thus  $u_i^{avg}(\tau^h) = u_i(s^*)$ .

- ▶ Now if a player  $i$  deviates from  $\tau_i^h$  to  $\bar{\tau}_i^h$  in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$ , then

$$w_{(\bar{\tau}_i^h, \tau_{-i}^h)} = \alpha(s_i^1, s'_{-i})(s_i^2, s^*_{-i})(s_i^3, s^*_{-i}) \dots$$

where  $\alpha$  is a sequence of profiles following the cyclic behavior 1.,  $s_i^1, s_i^2, \dots$  are strategies of  $S_i$  and  $s'_{-i}$  is a strat. of  $S_{-i}$ .

However, then  $u_i^{avg}(\bar{\tau}_i^h, \tau_{-i}^h) \leq u_i(s^*) \leq v_i$  since  $s^*$  is a Nash equilibrium and thus  $u_i(s_i^k, s^*_{-i}) \leq u_i(s^*)$  for all  $k \geq 1$ .

Intuitively, player  $-i$  punishes player  $i$  by playing  $s^*_{-i}$ .



# Folk Theorems – Individually Rational Payoffs

## Definition 61

$v = (v_1, v_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$  is *individually rational* if for both  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  holds

$$v_i \geq \min_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \max_{s_i \in S_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

That is,  $v_i$  is at least as large as the value that player  $i$  may secure by playing best responses to the most hostile behavior of player  $-i$ .

## Example:

	L	R
U	-2, 2	1, -2
M	1, -2	-2, 2
D	0, 1	2, 3

Here any  $(v_1, v_2)$  such that  $v_1 \geq 1$  and  $v_2 \geq 2$  is individually rational.

# Folk Theorems – Long-Run Average & NE

## Theorem 62

Let  $v = (v_1, v_2)$  be a feasible and individually rational vector of payoffs. Then there is a strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  such that

- ▶  $\tau$  is a Nash equilibrium in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$
- ▶  $u_i^{avg}(\tau) = v_i$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$

**Proof:** It suffices to use a slightly modified strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  in  $G_{irep}$  from Theorem 60:

- ▶ Unless one of the players deviates, the players play **cyclically** all profiles  $s \in S$  so that each  $s$  is always played for  $\gamma_s$  rounds.
- ▶ Whenever a player  $i$  deviates, the opponent  $-i$  plays a strategy  $s_{-i}^{min} \in \operatorname{argmin}_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \max_{s_i \in S_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$ .

It is easy to see that  $u_i^{avg}(\tau) = v_i$ .

If a player  $i$  deviates, then his long-run average payoff cannot be higher than  $\min_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \max_{s_i \in S_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \leq v_i$ , so  $\tau$  is a NE. □

# Folk Theorems – Long-Run Average & NE

## Theorem 63

If a strategy profile  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a NE in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$ , then  $(u_1^{avg}(\tau), u_2^{avg}(\tau))$  is individually rational.

**Proof:** Suppose that  $(u_1^{avg}(\tau), u_2^{avg}(\tau))$  is not individually rational.

W.l.o.g. assume that  $u_1^{avg}(\tau) < \min_{s_2 \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} u_1(s_1, s_2)$ .

Now let us consider a new strategy  $\bar{\tau}_1$  such that for every history  $h$  the pure strategy  $\bar{\tau}_1(h)$  is a best response to  $\tau_2(h)$ .

But then, for every history  $h$ , we have

$$u_1(\bar{\tau}_1(h), \tau_2(h)) \geq \min_{s_2 \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} u_1(s_1, s_2) > u_1^{avg}(\tau)$$

So clearly  $u_1^{avg}(\bar{\tau}_1, \tau_2) > u_1^{avg}(\tau)$  which contradicts the fact that  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  is a NE.  $\square$

Note that if irrational convex combinations are allowed in the definition of feasibility, then vectors of payoffs for Nash equilibria in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$  are exactly feasible and individually rational vectors of payoffs. Indeed, the coefficients  $\beta_s$  in the definition of feasibility are exactly frequencies with which the individual profiles of  $S$  are played in the NE.

# Folk Theorems – Summary

- ▶ We have proved that "any reasonable" (i.e. feasible and individually rational) vector of payoffs can be justified as payoffs for a Nash equilibrium in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$  (where the future has "an infinite weight").
- ▶ Concerning SPE, we have proved that any feasible vector of payoffs dominating a Nash equilibrium in  $G$  can be justified as payoffs for SPE in  $G_{irep}^{avg}$ .

This result can be generalized to arbitrary feasible and *strictly* individually rational payoffs by means of a more demanding construction.

- ▶ For discounted payoffs, one can prove that an arbitrary feasible vector of payoffs strictly dominating a Nash equilibrium in  $G$  can be approximated using payoffs for SPE in  $G_{irep}^{\delta}$  as  $\delta$  goes to 1. Even this result can be extended to feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs.

For a very detailed discussion of Folk Theorems see "A Course in Game Theory" by M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein.

# Summary of Extensive-Form Games

We have considered extensive-form games (i.e., games on trees)

- ▶ with perfect information
- ▶ with imperfect information

We have considered pure strategies, mixed strategies and behavioral strategies (Kuhn's theorem).

We have considered Nash equilibria (NE) and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in pure strategies.

## Summary of Extensive-Form Games (Cont.)

For perfect information we have shown that

- ▶ there always exists a pure strategy SPE
- ▶ SPE can be computed using backward induction in polynomial time

For imperfect information the following holds:

- ▶ The backward induction can be used to propagate values through "perfect information nodes", but "imperfect information parts" have to be solved by different means
- ▶ Solving imperfect information games is at least as hard as solving games in strategic-form; however, even in the zero-sum case, most decision problems are NP-hard.



## Summary of Extensive-Form Games (Cont.)

Finally, we discussed repeated games. We considered both, finitely as well as infinitely repeated games.

For finitely repeated games we considered the average payoff and discussed existence of pure strategy NE and SPE with respect to existence of NE in the original strategic-form game.

For infinitely repeated games we considered both

- ▶ **discounted payoff**: We have formulated and applied a simple folk theorem: "grim trigger" strategy profiles can be used to implement any vector of payoffs strictly dominating payoffs for a Nash equilibrium in the original strategic-form game.
- ▶ **long-run average payoff**: We have proved that all feasible and individually rational vectors of payoffs can be achieved by Nash equilibria (a variant of grim trigger).

Games of INcomplete Information  
**Bayesian Games**  
Auctions

**The (General) problem:** How to allocate (discrete) resources among selfish agents in a multi-agent system?

*Auctions* provide a general solution to this problem.

As such, auctions have been heavily used in real life, in consumer, corporate, as well as government settings:

- ▶ eBay, art auctions, wine auctions, etc.
- ▶ advertising (Google adWords)
- ▶ governments selling public resources: electromagnetic spectrum, oil leases, etc.
- ▶ ...

Auctions also provide a theoretical framework for understanding resource allocation problems among self-interested agents: Formally, an auction is any protocol that allows agents to indicate their interest in one or more resources and that uses these indications to determine both the resource allocation and payments of the agents.

## Auctions: Taxonomy

Auctions may be used in various settings depending on the complexity of the resource allocation problem:

- ▶ *Single-item auctions*: Here  $n$  bidders (players) compete for a single indivisible item that can be allocated to just one of them. Each bidder has his own private value of the item in case he wins (gets zero if he loses). Typically (but not always) the highest bid wins. How much should he pay?
- ▶ *Multiunit auctions*: Here a fixed number of identical units of a homogeneous commodity are sold. Each bidder submits both a number of units he demands and a unit price he is willing to pay. Here also the highest bidders typically win, but it is unclear how much they should pay (pay-as-bid vs uniform pricing)
- ▶ *Combinatorial auctions*: Here bidders compete for a set of distinct goods. Each player has a valuation function which assigns values to *subsets* of the set (some goods are useful only in groups etc.) Who wins and what he pays?

(We mostly concentrate on the single-item auctions.)

# Single Unit Auctions

There are many single-item auctions, we consider the following well-known versions:

- ▶ *open auctions:*

- ▶ *The English Auction:* Often occurs in movies, bidders are sitting in a room (by computer or a phone) and the price of the item goes up as long as someone is willing to bid it higher. Once the last increase is no longer challenged, the last bidder to increase the price wins the auction and pays the price for the item.
- ▶ *The Dutch Auction:* Opposite of the English auction, the price starts at a prohibitively high value and the auctioneer gradually drops the price. Once a bidder shouts "buy", the auction ends and the bidder gets the item at the price.

- ▶ *sealed-bid-auction:*

- ▶ *k-th price Sealed-Bid Auction:* Each bidder writes down his bid and places it in an envelope; the envelopes are opened simultaneously. The highest bidder wins and then pays the *k-th maximum bid*. (In a reverse auction it is the *k-th minimum*.) The most prominent special cases are *The First-Price Auction* and *The Second-Price Auction*.

# Single Unit Auctions (Cont.)



Observe that

- ▶ the English auction is essentially equivalent to the second price auction if the increments in every round are very small.  
There exists a "continuous" version, called Japanese auction, where the price continuously increases. Each bidder may drop out at any time. The last one who stays gets the item for the current price (which is the dropping price of the "second highest bid").
- ▶ similarly, the Dutch auction is equivalent to the first price auction. Note that the bidder with the highest bid stops the decrement of the price and buys at the current price which corresponds to his bid.

Now the question is, which type of auction is better?

# Objectives

The goal of the bidders is clear: To get the item at as low price as possible (i.e., they maximize the difference between their private value and the price they pay)

We consider self-interested non-communicating bidders that are rational and intelligent.

There are at least two goals that may be pursued by the auctioneer (in various settings):

- ▶ Revenue maximization
- ▶ Incentive compatibility: We want the bidders to spontaneously bid their true value of the item  
This means, that such an auction cannot be strategically manipulated by lying.

# Auctions vs Games

Consider *single-item sealed-bid auctions* as strategic form games:

$G = (N, (B_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$  where

- ▶ The set of players  $N$  is the set of bidders
- ▶  $B_i = [0, \infty)$  where each  $b_i \in B_i$  corresponds to the bid  $b_i$   
(We follow the standard notation and use  $b_i$  to denote pure strategies (bids))
- ▶ To define  $u_i$ , we assume that each bidder has his own private value  $v_i$  of the item, then given bids  $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$  :

$$\text{First Price: } u_i(b) = \begin{cases} v_i - b_i & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Second Price: } u_i(b) = \begin{cases} v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Is this model realistic? Not really, usually, the bidders are not perfectly informed about the private values of the other bidders.

Can we use (possibly imperfect information) extensive-form games?



# Incomplete Information Games

A *(strict) incomplete information game* is a tuple

$G = (N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (T_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$  where

- ▶  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  is a set of players,
- ▶ Each  $A_i$  is a set of *actions* available to player  $i$ ,  
We denote by  $A = \prod_{i=1}^n A_i$  the set of all *action profiles*  
 $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$ .
- ▶ Each  $T_i$  is a set of *possible types* of player  $i$ ,  
Denote by  $T = \prod_{i=1}^n T_i$  the set of all *type profiles*  $t = (t_1, \dots, t_n)$ .
- ▶  $u_i$  is a type-dependent payoff function

$$u_i : A_1 \times \dots \times A_n \times T_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

Given a profile of actions  $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in A$  and a type  $t_i \in T_i$ , we write  $u_i(a_1, \dots, a_n; t_i)$  to denote the corresponding payoff.

A *pure strategy* of player  $i$  is a function  $s_i : T_i \rightarrow A_i$ . As before, we denote by  $S_i$  the set of all pure strategies of player  $i$ , and by  $S$  the set of all pure strategy profiles  $\prod_{i=1}^n S_i$ .

# Dominant Strategies

- ▶ A pure strategy  $s_i$  **very weakly dominates**  $s'_i$  if for every  $t_i \in T_i$  the following holds: For all  $a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$  we have

$$u_i(s_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i) \geq u_i(s'_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i)$$

A pure strategy  $s_i$  **weakly dominates**  $s'_i \neq s_i$  if for every  $t_i \in T_i$  satisfying  $s_i(t_i) \neq s'_i(t_i)$  the following holds: For all  $a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$  we have

$$u_i(s_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i) \geq u_i(s'_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i)$$

and the inequality is strict for at least one  $a_{-i}$

(Such  $a_{-i}$  may be different for different  $t_i$ .)

- ▶ A pure strategy  $s_i$  **strictly dominates**  $s'_i \neq s_i$  if for every  $t_i \in T_i$  satisfying  $s_i(t_i) \neq s'_i(t_i)$  the following holds: For all  $a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$  we have

$$u_i(s_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i) > u_i(s'_i(t_i), a_{-i}; t_i)$$

## Definition 64

$s_i$  is (**very weakly, weakly, strictly**) **dominant** if it (very weakly, weakly, strictly, resp.) dominates all other pure strategies.

# Nash Equilibrium

In order to generalize Nash equilibria to incomplete information games, we use the following notation: Given a pure strategy profile  $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  and a type profile  $(t_1, \dots, t_n) \in T$ , for every player  $i$  write

$$s_{-i}(t_{-i}) = (s_1(t_1), \dots, s_{i-1}(t_{i-1}), s_{i+1}(t_{i+1}), \dots, s_n(t_n))$$

## Definition 65

A strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  is an *ex-post-Nash equilibrium* if for *every*  $t_1, \dots, t_n$  we have that  $(s_1(t_1), \dots, s_n(t_n))$  is a Nash equilibrium in the strategic-form game defined by the  $t_i$ 's.

Formally,  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  is an *ex-post-Nash equilibrium* if for all  $i \in N$  and all  $t_1, \dots, t_n$  and all  $a_i \in A_i$  :

$$u_i(s_1(t_1), \dots, s_n(t_n); t_i) \geq u_i(a_i, s_{-i}(t_{-i}); t_i)$$

## Example: Single-Item Sealed-Bid Auctions

Consider *single-item sealed-bid auctions* as strict incomplete information games:  $G = (N, (B_i)_{i \in N}, (V_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$  where

- ▶ The set of players  $N$  is the set of bidders
- ▶  $B_i = [0, \infty)$  where each action  $b_i \in B_i$  corresponds to the bid  $b_i$
- ▶  $V_i = [0, \infty)$  where each type  $v_i \in V_i$  corresponds to the private value  $v_i$
- ▶ Let  $v_i \in V_i$  be the type of player  $i$  (i.e. his private value), then given an action profile  $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$  (i.e. bids) we define

$$\text{First Price:} \quad u_i(b; v_i) = \begin{cases} v_i - b_i & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Second Price:} \quad u_i(b; v_i) = \begin{cases} v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that if there is a tie (i.e., there are  $k \neq \ell$  such that  $b_k = b_\ell = \max_j b_j$ ), then all players get 0.

Are there dominant strategies? Are there ex-post-Nash equilibria?

# Second-Price Auction

For every  $i$ , we denote by  $v_i$  the pure strategy  $s_i$  for player  $i$  defined by  $s_i(v_i) = v_i$ .

Intuitively, such a strategy is *truth telling*, which means that the player bids his own private value truthfully.

## Theorem 66

*Assume the Second-Price Auction. Then for every player  $i$  we have that  $v_i$  is a weakly dominant strategy. So  $v$  is also an ex-post-Nash equilibrium.*

**Proof.** Let us fix a private value  $v_i$  and a bid  $b_i \in B_i$  such that  $b_i \neq v_i$ . We show that for all bids of opponents  $b_{-i} \in B_{-i}$  :

$$u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i) \geq u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

with the strict inequality for at least one  $b_{-i}$ .

Intuitively, assume that player  $i$  bids  $b_i$  against  $b_{-i}$  and compare his payoff with the payoff he obtains by playing  $v_i$  against  $b_{-i}$ .

There are two cases to consider:  $b_i < v_i$  and  $b_i > v_i$ .

## Second-Price Auction (Cont.)

**Case**  $b_i < v_i$  : We distinguish three sub-cases depending on  $b_{-i}$ .

**A.** If  $b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Intuitively, player  $i$  wins and pays the price  $\max_{j \neq i} b_j < b_i$ . However, then bidding  $v_i$ , player  $i$  wins and pays  $\max_{j \neq i} b_j$  as well.

**B.** If there is  $k \neq i$  such that  $b_k > \max_{j \neq k} b_j$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 \leq u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Moreover, if  $b_i < b_k < v_i$ , then we get the strict inequality

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 < v_i - b_k = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Intuitively, if another player  $k$  wins, then player  $i$  gets 0 and increasing  $b_i$  to  $v_i$  does not hurt. Moreover, if  $b_i < b_k < v_i$ , then increasing  $b_i$  to  $v_i$  strictly increases the payoff of player  $i$ .

**C.** If there are  $k \neq \ell$  such that  $b_k = b_\ell = \max_j b_j$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 \leq u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Intuitively, there is a tie in  $(b_i, b_{-i})$  and hence all players get 0.

## Second-Price Auction (Cont.)

**Case  $b_i > v_i$  :** We distinguish four sub-cases depending on  $b_{-i}$ .

**A.** If  $b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j > v_i$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j < 0 = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

So in this case the inequality is strict.

**B.** If  $b_i > v_i \geq \max_{j \neq i} b_j$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Note that this case also covers  $v_i = \max_{j \neq i} b_j$  where decreasing  $b_i$  to  $v_i$  causes a tie with zero payoff for player  $i$ .

**C.** If there is  $k \neq i$  such that  $b_k > \max_{j \neq k} b_j > v_i$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

**D.** If there are  $k \neq k'$  such that  $b_k = b_{k'} = \max_j b_j > v_i$ , then

$$u_i(b_i, b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 = u_i(v_i, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

# First-Price Auction

Consider the First-Price Auction.

Here the highest bidder wins and pays his bid.

Let us impose a (reasonable) assumption that no player bids more than his private value.

**Question:** Are there any dominant strategies?

**Answer:** No, to obtain a contradiction, assume that  $s_i$  is a very weakly dominant strategy.

Intuitively, if player  $i$  wins against some bids of his opponents, then his bid is strictly higher than bids of all his opponents. Thus he may slightly decrement his bid and still win with a better payoff.

Formally, assume that all opponents bid 0, i.e.,  $b_j = 0$  for all  $j \neq i$ , and consider  $v_i > 0$ .

If  $s_i(v_i) > 0$ , then

$$u_i(s_i(v_i), b_{-i}; v_i) = v_i - s_i(v_i) < v_i - s_i(v_i)/2 = u_i(s_i(v_i)/2, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

If  $s_i(v_i) = 0$ , then

$$u_i(s_i(v_i), b_{-i}; v_i) = 0 < v_i/2 = u_i(v_i/2, b_{-i}; v_i)$$

Hence,  $s_i$  cannot be weakly dominant.



# First-Price Auction (Cont.)

**Question:** Is there a pure strategy Nash equilibrium?

**Answer:** No, assume that  $(s_1, \dots, s_n)$  is a Nash equilibrium.

If there are  $v_1, \dots, v_n$  such that some player  $i$  wins, i.e., his bid  $s_i(v_i)$  satisfies  $s_i(v_i) > \max_{j \neq i} s_j(v_j)$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(s_i(v_i), s_{-i}(v_{-i}); v_i) &= v_i - s_i(v_i) \\ &< v_i - (s_i(v_i) - \varepsilon) = u_i(s_i(v_i) - \varepsilon, s_{-i}(v_{-i}); v_i) \end{aligned}$$

for  $\varepsilon > 0$  small enough to satisfy  $s_i(v_i) - \varepsilon > \max_{j \neq i} s_j(v_j)$   
(i.e., player  $i$  may help himself by decreasing the bid a bit)

Assume that for no  $v_1, \dots, v_n$  there is a winner (this itself is a bit weird). Consider  $0 < v_1 < \dots < v_n$ . Since there is no winner, there are two players  $i, j$  such that  $i < j$  satisfying

$$s_j(v_j) = s_i(v_i) \geq \max_{\ell} s_{\ell}(v_{\ell})$$

But then, due to our assumption,  $s_j(v_j) = s_i(v_i) \leq v_i < v_j$  and thus

$$u_j(s_j(v_j), s_{-j}(v_{-j}); v_j) = 0 < v_j - (s_j(v_j) + \varepsilon) = u_j(s_j(v_j) + \varepsilon, s_{-j}(v_{-j}); v_j)$$

for  $\varepsilon > 0$  small enough to satisfy  $s_j(v_j) + \varepsilon < v_j$ .

(i.e., player  $j$  can help himself by increasing his bid a bit)

## Second Price Auction:

- ▶ There is an ex-post Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
- ▶ It is incentive compatible (players are self-motivated to bid their private values)

## First Price Auction:

- ▶ There are neither dominant strategies, nor ex-post Nash equilibria

**Question:** Can we modify the model in such a way that First Price Auction has a solution?

**Answer:** Yes, give the players at least some information about private values of other players.

# Bayesian Games

A *Bayesian Game*  $G = (N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (T_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N}, P)$  where  $(N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (T_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$  is a strict incomplete information game and  $P$  is a distribution on types, i.e.,

- ▶  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  is a set of players,
- ▶  $A_i$  is a set of *actions* available to player  $i$ ,
- ▶  $T_i$  is a set of *possible types* of player  $i$ ,

Recall that  $T = \prod_{i=1}^n T_i$  is the set of type profiles, and that  $A = \prod_{i=1}^n A_i$  is the set of action profiles.

- ▶  $u_i$  is a type-dependent payoff function

$$u_i : A_1 \times \dots \times A_n \times T_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

- ▶  $P$  is a *(joint) probability distribution over  $T$*  called *common prior*.

Formally,  $P$  is a probability measure over an appropriate measurable space on  $T$ . However, I will not go into measure theory and consider only two special cases: finite  $T$  (in which case  $P : T \rightarrow [0, 1]$  so that  $\sum_{t \in T} P(t) = 1$ ) and  $T_i = \mathbb{R}$  for all  $i$  (in which case I assume that  $P$  is determined by a (joint) density function  $p$  on  $\mathbb{R}^n$ ).

# Bayesian Games: Strategies & Payoffs

A play proceeds as follows:

- ▶ First, a type profile  $(t_1, \dots, t_n) \in T$  is randomly chosen according to  $P$ .
- ▶ Then each player  $i$  learns his type  $t_i$ .  
(It is a common knowledge that every player knows his own type but not the types of other players.)
- ▶ Each player  $i$  chooses his action based on  $t_i$ .
- ▶ Each player receives his payoff  $u_i(a_1, \dots, a_n; t_i)$ .

A *pure strategy* for player  $i$  is a function  $s_i : T_i \rightarrow A_i$ .

As before, we use  $S$  to denote the set of pure strategy profiles.

# Properties

- ▶ We assume that  $u_i$  depends only on  $t_i$  and not on  $t_{-i}$ . This is called **private values** model and can be used to model auctions. This model can be extended to **common values** by using  $u_i(a_1, \dots, a_n; t_1, \dots, t_n)$ .
- ▶ We assume the *common prior*  $P$ . This means that all players have *the same* beliefs about the type profile. This assumption is rather strong. More general models allow each player to have
  - ▶ his own individual beliefs about types
  - ▶ ... his own beliefs about beliefs about types
  - ▶ .... beliefs about beliefs about beliefs about types
  - ▶ .....
  - ▶ (we get an infinite hierarchy)

There is a generic result of Harsanyi saying that the hierarchy is not necessary: It is possible to extend the type space in such a way that each player's "extended type" describes his original type as well as all his beliefs.

## Example: Battle of Sexes

Assume that player 1 may suspect that player 2 is angry with him/her (the choice is yours) but cannot be sure.

In other words, there are two types of player 2 giving two different games.

Formally we have a Bayesian Game

$G = (N, (A_i)_{i \in N}, (T_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N}, P)$  where

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $A_1 = A_2 = \{F, O\}$
- ▶  $T_1 = \{t_1\}$  and  $T_2 = \{t_2^1, t_2^2\}$
- ▶ The payoffs are given by

		$t_2^1$		$t_2^2$	
		F	O	F	O
$t_1$	F	2, 1	0, 0	2, 0	0, 2
	O	0, 0	1, 2	0, 1	1, 0

- ▶  $P(t_2^1) = P(t_2^2) = \frac{1}{2}$

## Example: Single-Item Sealed-Bid Auctions

Consider *single-item sealed-bid auctions* as Bayesian games:

$G = (N, (B_i)_{i \in N}, (V_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N}, P)$  where

- ▶ The set of players  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  is the set of bidders
- ▶  $B_i = [0, \infty)$  where each action  $b_i \in B_i$  corresponds to the bid
- ▶  $V_i = \mathbb{R}$  where each type  $v_i$  corresponds to the private value
- ▶ Let  $v_i \in V_i$  be the type of player  $i$  (i.e. his private value), then given an action profile  $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$  (i.e. bids) we define

$$\text{First Price:} \quad u_i(b; v_i) = \begin{cases} v_i - b_i & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Second Price:} \quad u_i(b; v_i) = \begin{cases} v_i - \max_{j \neq i} b_j & \text{if } b_i > \max_{j \neq i} b_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- ▶  $P$  is a probability distribution of the private values such that  $P(v \in [0, \infty)^n) = 1$ . For example, we may (and will) assume that each  $v_i$  is chosen independently and uniformly from  $[0, v_{\max}]$  where  $v_{\max}$  is a given number. Then  $P$  is uniform on  $[0, v_{\max}]^n$ .

## Finite-Type Bayesian Games: Payoffs

For now, let us assume that each player has only finitely many types, i.e.,  $T$  is finite.

Given a type profile  $t = (t_1, \dots, t_n)$ , we denote by  $P(t_{-i} | t_i)$  the *conditional probability* that the opponents of player  $i$  have the type profile  $t_{-i}$  conditioned on player  $i$  having  $t_i$ , i.e.,

$$P(t_{-i} | t_i) := \frac{P(t_i, t_{-i})}{\sum_{t'_{-i}} P(t_i, t'_{-i})}$$

Intuitively,  $P(t_{-i} | t_i)$  is the maximum information player  $i$  may squeeze out of  $P$  about possible types of other players once he learns his own type  $t_i$ .

Given a pure strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$  and a type  $t_i \in T_i$  of player  $i$  the *expected payoff* for player  $i$  is

$$u_i(s; t_i) = \sum_{t_{-i} \in T_{-i}} P(t_{-i} | t_i) \cdot u_i(s_1(t_1), \dots, s_n(t_n); t_i)$$

(this is the conditional expectation of  $u_i$  assuming the type  $t_i$  of player  $i$ ; the continuous case is treated similarly, just substitute a density  $f$  for  $P$ .)



## Example: Battle of Sexes

		$t_2^1$			$t_2^2$	
		$F$	$O$		$F$	$O$
$t_1 :$	$F$	2,1	0,0	$F$	2,0	0,2
	$O$	0,0	1,2		$O$	0,1

$$P(t_2^1) = P(t_2^2) = \frac{1}{2}$$

Consider strategies  $s_1$  of player 1 and  $s_2$  of player 2 defined by

- ▶  $s_1(t_1) = F$
- ▶  $s_2(t_2^1) = F$  and  $s_2(t_2^2) = O$

Then

- ▶  $u_1(s_1, s_2; t_1) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 = 1$
- ▶  $u_2(s_1, s_2; t_2^1) = 1$  and  $u_2(s_1, s_2; t_2^2) = 2$

# Infinite-Type Bayesian Games: Payoffs

## Example: First-Price Auction

Consider the first-price auction as a Bayesian game where the types of players are chosen uniformly and independently from  $[0, v_{\max}]$ .

Consider a pure strategy profile  $v = (v_1/2, \dots, v_n/2)$  (i.e., each player  $i$  plays  $v_i/2$ ). What is  $u_i(v; v_i)$  ?

$$\begin{aligned}u_i(v; v_i) &= P(\text{player } i \text{ wins}) \cdot v_i/2 + P(\text{player } i \text{ loses}) \cdot 0 \\&= P(\text{all players except } i \text{ bid less than } v_i/2) \cdot v_i/2 \\&= \left(\frac{v_i}{2v_{\max}}\right)^{n-1} \cdot v_i/2 \\&= \frac{v_i^n}{2^n v_{\max}^{n-1}}\end{aligned}$$

# Risk Aversion

We assume that players *maximize* their expected payoff. Such players are called **risk neutral**.

In general, there are three kinds of players that can be described using the following experiment. A player can choose between two possibilities: Either get \$50 surely, or get \$100 with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  and 0 with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

- ▶ risk neutral person has no preference
- ▶ risk averse person prefers the first alternative
- ▶ risk seeking person prefers the second one

# Dominance and Nash Equilibria

A pure strategy  $s_i$  *weakly dominates*  $s'_i \neq s_i$  if for every  $t_i \in T_i$  satisfying  $s_i(t_i) \neq s'_i(t_i)$  the following holds: For all  $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$  we have

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}; t_i) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}; t_i)$$

and the inequality is strict for at least one  $s_{-i}$ .

The other modes of dominance are defined analogously. Dominant strategies are defined as usual.

## Definition 67

A pure strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  in the Bayesian game is a *pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium* if for each player  $i$  and each type  $t_i \in T_i$  of player  $i$  and every strategy  $s'_i \in S_i$  we have that

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}; t_i) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}; t_i)$$

## Example: Battle of Sexes

		$t_2^1$			$t_2^2$	
		$F$	$O$		$F$	$O$
$t_1 :$	$F$	2,1	0,0	$F$	2,0	0,2
	$O$	0,0	1,2	$O$	0,1	1,0

$$P(t_2^1) = P(t_2^2) = \frac{1}{2}$$

Use the following notation:  $(X, (Y, Z))$  means that player 1 plays  $X \in \{F, O\}$ , and player 2 plays  $Y \in \{F, O\}$  if his/her type is  $t_2^1$  and  $Z \in \{F, O\}$  otherwise.

Are there pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria?

$(F, (F, O))$  is a Bayesian NE.

Even though  $O$  is preferred by player 2, the outcome  $(O, O)$  cannot occur with a positive probability in any BNE.

- ▶ To ever meet at the opera, player 1 needs to play  $O$ .
- ▶ The unique best response of player 2 to  $O$  is  $(O, F)$
- ▶ But  $(O, (O, F))$  is not a BNE:
  - ▶ The expected payoff of player 1 at  $(O, (O, F))$  is  $\frac{1}{2}$
  - ▶ The expected payoff of player 1 at  $(F, (O, F))$  is 1

## Second Price Auction

Consider the second-price sealed-bid auction as a Bayesian game where the types of players are chosen according to an arbitrary distribution.

### Proposition 4

*In a second-price sealed-bid auction, with any probability distribution  $P$ , the truth revealing profile of bids, i.e.,  $v = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ , is a weakly dominant strategy profile.*

### Proof.

The exact same proof as for the strict incomplete information games. Indeed, we do not need to assume that the players have a common prior for this! □

# First Price Auction

Consider the first-price sealed-bid auction as a Bayesian game with some prior distribution  $P$ .

Note that bidding truthfully does *not* have to be a dominant strategy. For example, if player  $i$  knows that (with high probability) his value  $v_i$  is much larger than  $\max_{j \neq i} v_j$ , he will not *waste money* and bid less than  $v_i$ .

So is there a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium?

## Proposition 5

*Assume that for all players  $i$  the type of player  $i$  is chosen independently and uniformly from  $[0, v_{\max}]$ . Consider a pure strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$  where  $s_i(v_i) = \frac{n-1}{n} v_i$  for every player  $i$  and every value  $v_i$ . Then  $s$  is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.*

# Expected Revenue

Consider the first and second price sealed-bid auctions. For simplicity, assume that the type of each player is chosen independently and uniformly from  $[0, 1]$ .

What is the expected revenue of the auctioneer from these two auctions when the players play the corresponding Bayesian NE?

- ▶ In the first-price auction, players bid  $\frac{n-1}{n} v_i$ . Thus the probability distribution of the revenue is

$$F(x) = P(\max_j \frac{n-1}{n} v_j \leq x) = P(\max_j v_j \leq \frac{nx}{n-1}) = \left(\frac{nx}{n-1}\right)^n$$

It is straightforward to show that then the expected maximum bid in the first-price auction (i.e., the revenue) is  $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$ .

- ▶ In the second-price auction, players bid  $v_i$ . However, the revenue is the expected second largest value. Thus the distribution of the revenue is

$$F(x) = P(\max_j v_j \leq x) + \sum_{i=1}^n P(v_i > x \text{ and for all } j \neq i, v_j \leq x)$$

Amazingly, this also gives the expectation  $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$ .



## Revenue Equivalence (Cont.)

The result from the previous slide is a special case of a rather general **revenue equivalence theorem**, first proved by Vickrey (1961) and then generalized by Myerson (1981).

Both Vickrey and Myerson were awarded Nobel Prize in economics for their contribution to the auction theory.

### Theorem 68 (Revenue Equivalence)

*Assume that each of  $n$  risk-neutral players has independent private values drawn from a common cumulative distribution function  $F(x)$  which is continuous and strictly increasing on an interval  $[v_{\min}, v_{\max}]$  (the probability of  $v_i \notin [v_{\min}, v_{\max}]$  is zero). Then any **efficient** auction mechanism in which any player with value  $v_{\min}$  has an expected payoff zero yields the same expected revenue.*

Here efficient means that the auction has a symmetric and increasing Bayesian Nash equilibrium and always allocates the item to the player with the highest bid.

# Bayesian Games – Nature & Common Values

A *Bayesian Game (with nature and common values)* consists of

- ▶ a set of players  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ ,
- ▶ a set of *states of nature*  $\Omega$ ,
- ▶ a set of *actions*  $A_i$  available to player  $i$ ,
- ▶ a set of *possible types*  $T_i$  of player  $i$ ,
- ▶ a *type function*  $\tau_i : \Omega \rightarrow T_i$  assigning a type of player  $i$  to every state of nature,
- ▶ a payoff function  $u_i$  for every player  $i$

$$u_i : A_1 \times \dots \times A_n \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

- ▶  $P$  is a *probability distribution over  $\Omega$*  called *common prior*.

As before, a *pure strategy* for player  $i$  is a function  $s_i : T_i \rightarrow A_i$ .

# Bayesian Games – Nature & Common Values

Given a pure strategy  $s_i$  of player  $i$  and a state of nature  $\omega \in \Omega$ , we denote by  $s_i(\omega)$  the action  $s_i(\tau_i(\omega))$  chosen by player  $i$  when the state is  $\omega$ .

We denote by  $s(\omega)$  the action profile  $(s_1(\tau_1(\omega)), \dots, s_n(\tau_n(\omega)))$ .

Given a set  $A \subseteq \Omega$  of states of nature and a type  $t_i \in T_i$  of player  $i$ , we denote by  $P(A | t_i)$  the conditional probability of  $A$  conditioned on the type  $t_i$  of player  $i$ .

We define the **expected payoff** for player  $i$  by

$$u_i(s_1, \dots, s_n; t_i) = \mathbb{E}_{\omega \sim P} [u_i(s(\omega); \omega) | \tau_i(\omega) = t_i]$$

Here the right hand side is the expected payoff of player  $i$  with respect to the probability distribution  $P$  conditioned on his type  $t_i$ .

## Definition 69

A pure strategy profile  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in S$  in the Bayesian game is a **pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium** if for each player  $i$  and each type  $t_i \in T_i$  of player  $i$  and every action  $a_i \in A_i$  we have that

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}; t_i) \geq u_i(a_i, s_{-i}; t_i)$$

# Adverse Selection

- ▶ A firm  $C$  is taking over a firm  $D$ .
- ▶ The true value  $d$  of  $D$  is not known to  $C$ , assume that it is uniformly distributed on  $[0, 1]$ .  
This is of course a bit artificial, more precise analysis can be done with a different distribution.
- ▶ It is known that  $D$ 's value will flourish under  $C$ 's ownership: it will rise to  $\lambda d$  where  $\lambda > 1$ .
- ▶ All of the above is a common knowledge.

Let us model the situation as a Bayesian game (with common values).

## Adverse Selection (Cont.)

- ▶  $N = \{C, D\}$
- ▶  $\Omega = [0, 1]$  where  $d \in \Omega$  expresses the true value of  $D$ .
- ▶  $A_C = [0, 1]$  where  $c \in A_C$  expresses how much is the firm  $C$  willing to pay for the firm  $D$   
 $A_D = \{\text{yes}, \text{no}\}$  (sell or not to sell).
- ▶  $T_C = \{t_1\}$  (a trivial type) and  $T_D = \Omega = [0, 1]$ .
- ▶  $u_C(c, \text{yes}; d) = \lambda d - c$  and  $u_C(c, \text{no}; d) = 0$   
 $u_D(c, \text{yes}; d) = c$  and  $u_D(c, \text{no}; d) = d$
- ▶  $P$  is the uniform distribution on  $[0, 1]$ .

Is there a BNE?

## Adverse Selection (Cont.)

What is the best response of firm  $D$  to an action  $c \in [0, 1]$  of firm  $C$ ?

Such a best response must satisfy:

- ▶ say *yes* if  $d < c$
- ▶ say *no* if  $d > c$

So the expected *value* of the firm  $D$  (in the eyes of  $C$ ) *assuming that*  $D$  says *yes* is  $c/2$ .

Therefore, the expected payoff of  $A$  is

$$\lambda(c/2) - c = c\left(\frac{\lambda}{2} - 1\right)$$

which is negative for  $\lambda \leq 2$ . So it is not profitable (on average) for the firm  $C$  to buy unless the target  $D$  more than doubles in value after the takeover!

# Committee Voting

Consider a very simple model of a jury made up of two players (jurors) who must collectively decide whether to acquit (A), or to convict (C) a defendant who can be either guilty (G) or innocent (I).

Each player casts a sealed vote (A or C), and the defendant is convicted if and only if both vote C.

A prior probability that the defendant is guilty is  $q > \frac{1}{2}$  and is common knowledge (i.e.,  $P(G) = q$ ).

Assume that each player gets payoff 1 for a right decision and 0 for incorrect decision. We consider risk neutral players who maximize their expected payoff.

We may model this situation using a strategic-form game:

	A	C
A	$1 - q, 1 - q$	$1 - q, 1 - q$
C	$1 - q, 1 - q$	$q, q$

Is there a dominant strategy?

## Committee Voting (Cont.)

Let's make things a bit more complicated.

Assume that each juror, when observing the evidence, gets a private signal  $t_i \in \{\theta_G, \theta_I\}$  that contains a valuable piece of information. That is if the defendant is guilty,  $\theta_G$  is more probable, if innocent,  $\theta_I$  is more probable. For  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  :

$$P(t_i = \theta_G | G) = P(t_i = \theta_I | I) = p > \frac{1}{2}$$

$$P(t_i = \theta_G | I) = P(t_i = \theta_I | G) = 1 - p < \frac{1}{2}$$

We also assume that the players get their signals independently conditional on the defendants condition:

$$P(t_1 = \theta_X \wedge t_2 = \theta_Y | Z) = P(t_1 = \theta_X | Z) \cdot P(t_2 = \theta_Y | Z)$$

for all  $X, Y, Z \in \{G, I\}$ .



## Committee Voting (Cont.)

We obtain a Bayesian game:

- ▶  $N = \{1, 2\}$
- ▶  $A_1 = A_2 = \{A, C\}$
- ▶  $\Omega = \{(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y) \mid Z, X, Y \in \{G, I\}\}$
- ▶  $T_1 = T_2 = \{\theta_G, \theta_I\}$
- ▶  $\tau_1(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y) = \theta_X$  and  $\tau_2(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y) = \theta_Y$
- ▶ For arbitrary  $U, V, X, Y \in \{G, I\}$  we have that

$$u_i(U, V; (G, \theta_X, \theta_Y)) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } U = V = C, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$u_i(U, V; (I, \theta_X, \theta_Y)) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } U = V = C, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- ▶  $P(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y) = P(Z)P(t_1 = \theta_X \mid Z)P(t_2 = \theta_Y \mid Z)$

I.e.,  $P(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y)$  is the probability of choosing  $(Z, \theta_X, \theta_Y)$  as follows:  
First,  $Z \in \{G, I\}$  is randomly chosen ( $Z = G$  has probability  $q$ ). Then, conditioned on  $Z$ ,  $\theta_X$  and  $\theta_Y$  are independently chosen.

## Committee Voting (Cont.)

Now consider just one player  $i$ . If the player  $i$  would be able to decide by himself, how does his decision depend on his type  $t_i \in \{\theta_G, \theta_I\}$ ?

If  $t_i = \theta_G$ , then how probable is that the defendant is guilty?

$$P(G | t_i = \theta_G) = \frac{P(t_i = \theta_G | G)P(G)}{P(t_i = \theta_G)} = \frac{pq}{qp + (1 - q)(1 - p)} > q$$

so that the posterior probability of  $G$  is even higher.

If  $\theta_I$  is received, then how probable is that the defendant is guilty?

$$P(G | t_i = \theta_I) = \frac{P(t_i = \theta_I | G)P(G)}{P(t_i = \theta_I)} = \frac{(1 - p)q}{q(1 - p) + (1 - q)p} < q$$

which means, clearly, that the player is less sure about  $G$ .

In particular, player  $i$  chooses  $I$  instead of  $G$  if

$$P(G | t_i = \theta_I) = \frac{q(1 - p)}{q(1 - p) + (1 - q)p} < \frac{1}{2}$$

which holds iff  $p > q$ .

## Committee Voting (Cont.)

So if  $p > q$  each player would choose to vote according to his signal.

Denote by  $XY$  the strategy of player  $i$  in which he chooses  $X$  if  $t_i = \theta_G$  and  $Y$  if  $t_i = \theta_I$ .

**Question:** Is  $(CA, CA)$  BNE assuming that  $p > q$  ?

$$\begin{aligned}u_1(CA, CA; \theta_I) &= P(I | t_1 = \theta_I) \\ &= P(I | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G)P(t_2 = \theta_G | t_1 = \theta_I) \\ &\quad + P(I | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_I)P(t_2 = \theta_I | t_1 = \theta_I)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}u_1(CC, CA; \theta_I) &= P(G \wedge t_2 = \theta_G | t_1 = \theta_I) + P(I \wedge t_2 = \theta_I | t_1 = \theta_I) \\ &= P(G | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G)P(t_2 = \theta_G | t_1 = \theta_I) \\ &\quad + P(I | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_I)P(t_2 = \theta_I | t_1 = \theta_I)\end{aligned}$$

Intuitively, if player 2 chooses  $A$ , then the decision of player 1 does not have any impact. On the other hand, if player 2 chooses  $C$ , then the decision is, in fact, up to player 1 (we say that he is *pivotal*).

## Committee Voting (Cont.)

So what is the probability that the defendant is guilty assuming that the vote of player 1 counts? That is, assuming  $t_2 = \theta_G$  and  $t_1 = \theta_I$ ?

$$\begin{aligned}P(G | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G) &= \frac{P(t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G | G)P(G)}{P(t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G)} \\&= \frac{(1-p)pq}{p(1-p)} \\&= q > \frac{1}{2} > (1-q) \\&= P(I | t_1 = \theta_I \wedge t_2 = \theta_G)\end{aligned}$$

which means that player 1 is more convinced that the defendant is guilty contrary to the signal! This means that even though individual decision would be "innocent", taking into account that the vote should have some value gives "guilty".

Hence  $u_1(CA, CA; \theta_I) < u_1(CC, CA; \theta_I)$  and thus playing  $CC$  is a better response to  $CA$ .

By the way, is  $(CC, CA)$  a BNE?

# Winner's Curse

An auction for a new oil field (of unknown size), assume only two firms competing (two players).

The field is either small (worth \$10 million), medium (worth \$20 million), large (worth \$30 million).

That is, the real value  $v$  of the field satisfies  $v \in \{10, 20, 30\}$ .

Assume a prior information about the size of the field:

$$P(v = 10) = P(v = 30) = \frac{1}{4} \qquad P(v = 20) = \frac{1}{2}$$

The government is selling the field in the second-price sealed-bid auction, so that in the case of a tie, the winner is chosen randomly (and pays his bid). That is, in effect, in case of a tie, the payoff of each player is  $(v_i - b_i)/2$  where  $v_i$  is the private value,  $b_i$  the bid.

Using the same argument as for the "ordinary" second-price auction with private values one may show that playing the true private value weakly dominates all other bids.

## Winner's Curse (Cont.)

Each of the firms performs a (free) exploration that will provide the type  $t_i \in \{L, H\}$  (low or high), correlated with the size as follows:

- ▶ If  $v = 10$  then  $t_1 = t_2 = L$
- ▶ If  $v = 30$  then  $t_1 = t_2 = H$
- ▶ If  $v = 20$  then for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ , conditioned on  $v = 20$ , the exploration results are uniformly distributed:

There are four possible results,  $(L, L)$ ,  $(L, H)$ ,  $(H, L)$ ,  $(H, H)$ , each with probability  $\frac{1}{4}$ .

Given the signal  $t_i$ , player  $i$  may estimate the true value of the field:

$$P(v_i = 10 \mid t_i = L) = \frac{1}{2} \qquad P(v_i = 10 \mid t_i = H) = 0$$

$$P(v_i = 20 \mid t_i = L) = \frac{1}{2} \qquad P(v_i = 20 \mid t_i = H) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$P(v_i = 30 \mid t_i = L) = 0 \qquad P(v_i = 30 \mid t_i = H) = \frac{1}{2}$$

Thus  $E(v_i \mid t_i = L) = \frac{1}{2}10 + \frac{1}{2}20 = 15$ .

and  $E(v_i \mid t_i = H) = \frac{1}{2}20 + \frac{1}{2}30 = 25$

## Winner's Curse (Cont.)

Is it a good idea to bid the expected value?

Define a strategy for player  $i$  by  $s_i(L) = E(v_i | t_i = L)$  and  $s_i(H) = E(v_i | t_i = H)$ .

Is  $(s_1, s_2)$  a Nash equilibrium?

Consider  $t_1 = L$ . Then player 1 bids 15. What is his expected payoff?

With probability  $\frac{3}{4}$ , player 2 also bids 15, there is a tie and player 1 wins with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . With probability  $\frac{1}{4}$  player 2 bids 25 and player 1 loses. We obtain

$$u_1(s_1, s_2; L) = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{2} (10 - 15) \right) + \frac{1}{4} 0 = \frac{-15}{8}$$

Thus player 1 would be better off by bidding 0 and always losing.

Intuition: Player 1 wins only if the signal of player 2 is  $L$ , which in effect means, that assuming win, the *effective* expected value of the field is *lower* than the predicted expected value.

**Homework:** Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.