

# Introduction to SMV

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based on material by Prof. Clarke and others



# Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV)

Ken McMillan, *Symbolic Model Checking: An Approach to the State Explosion Problem*, 1993.

Finite-state Systems described in a specialized language


Specifications given as CTL formulas

Internal representation using ROBDDs

Automatically verifies specification or produces a counterexample




# Overview of SMV



# SMV Variants




- Oldest Version
- No GUI



Two versions


- 2.x: Open Source, many new features, BDD and SAT based backends
- 1.x: Original version, had a GUI



- Strong abstraction functions
- GUI
- New language



# NuSMV2 Architecture



# SMV Language

Allows description of completely **synchronous** to **asynchronous** systems, detailed to abstract systems

Modularized and hierarchical descriptions

Finite data types: Boolean and enumerated

Parallel-assignment syntax

Non-determinism




# A Sample SMV Program (short.smv)

```
MODULE main
VAR
    request: boolean;
    state: {ready, busy};
ASSIGN
    init(state) := ready;
    next(state) :=
        case
            state=ready & request: busy;
            TRUE           : {ready, busy};
        esac;
SPEC AG(request -> AF (state = busy))
```




## Kripke structure




$AG(\text{request} \rightarrow AF(\text{state} = \text{busy}))$

## Computation tree



holds after one step



holds in the initial state





# A Sample SMV Program (short.smv)


```
MODULE main
VAR
    request: boolean;
    state: {ready, busy};
ASSIGN
    init(state) := ready;
    next(state) :=
        case
            state=ready & request: busy;
            TRUE                  : {ready, busy};
        esac;

SPEC AG(request -> AX (state = busy))
```

what if AF is  
changed to **AX** ?



$AG(\text{request} \rightarrow AX(\text{state} = \text{busy}))$  is false



# SMV Syntax: Expressions

Expr ::

```
    atom                -- symbolic constant
  | number              -- numeric constant
  | id                  -- variable identifier
  | “!” Expr            -- logical not
  | Expr & Expr         -- logical and
  | Expr | Expr        -- logical or
  | Expr -> Expr        -- logical implication
  | Expr <-> Expr       -- logical equivalence
  | “next” “(“ id “)”  -- next value
  | Case_expr
  | Set_expr
```



# The Case Expression

```
Case_expr :: "case"  
           expr_a1 ":" expr_b2 ";"  
           ...  
           expr_an ":" expr_bn ";"  
           "esac"
```

Guards are evaluated sequentially

The first one that is true determines the resulting value

Cases must be exhaustive

It is an error if all expressions on the left hand side evaluate to FALSE



# Variables and Assignments

Decl :: “VAR”

atom1 “:” type1 “;”

atom2 “:” type2 “;”

...

Decl :: “ASSIGN”

dest1 “:=“ Expr1 “;”

dest2 “:=“ Expr2 “;”

...

Dest ::

atom

-- current

| “init” “(“ atom “)”

-- initial

| “next” “(“ atom “)”

-- next-state



# Variables and Assignments (cont'd)

State is an assignment of values to a set of state variables

Type of a variable – boolean, scalar, user defined module, or array.

Assignment to initial state:

- `init(value) := FALSE;`

Assignment to next state (transition relation)

- `next(value) := value xor carry_in;`

Assignment to current state (invariant)

- `carry_out := value & carry_in;`


Either init-next or invar should be used, but not both

SMV is a parallel assignment language




# Circular Definitions

... are not allowed



```
init(a) := !next(b);  
next(a) := c;  
c := a;
```



```
init(a) := 0;  
next(a) := !b;  
  
init(b) := 1;  
next(b) := !a;
```



# Nondeterminism

Completely unassigned variable model unconstrained input

$\{val\_1, \dots, val\_n\}$  is an expression taking on any of the given values nondeterministically

- `next(b) := {TRUE, FALSE};`

Nondeterministic choice can be used to:

- Model an environment that is outside of the control of the system
- Model an implementation that has not been refined yet
- Abstract behavior





# ASSIGN and DEFINE

```
VAR a: boolean;  
ASSIGN a := b | c;
```

- declares a new state variable a
- becomes part of invariant relation

```
DEFINE d := b | c;
```

- a macro definition, each occurrence of d is replaced by (b | c)
- no extra BDD variable is generated for d
- the BDD for (b | c) becomes part of each expression using d



# SPEC Declaration

Decl :: “SPEC” ctlform

Ctlform ::    expr                    -- bool expression  
          | “!” ctlform  
          | Ctlform <op> Ctlform  
          | “E” Pathform  
          | “A” Pathform

Pathform :: “X” Ctlform  
          | “F” Ctlform  
          | “G” Ctlform  
          | Ctlform “U” Ctlform



# Modules

Modules can be instantiated many times, each instantiation creates a copy of the local variables

Each program must have a module **main**

## Scoping


- Variables declared outside a module can be passed as parameters

Parameters are passed by reference.



# Pass by reference

```
DEFINE
  a := 0;
VAR
  b : bar(a);
...
MODULE bar(x)
  DEFINE
    a := 1;
    y := x;
```




```
DEFINE
  a := 0;
  b.y := 0;
  b.a := 1;
```



# Pass by reference

```
VAR
  a : boolean;
  b : foo(a);
...
MODULE foo(x)
  VAR
    y : boolean;
  ASSIGN
    x := TRUE;
    y := FALSE;
```



```
VAR
  a      : boolean;
  b.y    : boolean;
ASSIGN
  a      := TRUE;
  b.y    := FALSE;
```



# A Three-Bit Counter

```
MODULE main
VAR
  bit0 : counter_cell(TRUE);
  bit1 : counter_cell(bit0.carry_out);
  bit2 : counter_cell(bit1.carry_out);

SPEC  AG AF bit2.carry_out

MODULE counter_cell(carry_in)
VAR
  value : boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(value) := FALSE;
  next(value) := value xor carry_in;
DEFINE
  carry_out := value & carry_in;
```





$value + carry\_in \bmod 2$




## module instantiations

### module declaration



AG AF bit2.carry\_out is true



bit2.carry\_out is true





# A Three-Bit Counter


```
MODULE main
VAR
  bit0 : counter_cell(TRUE);
  bit1 : counter_cell(bit0.carry_out);
  bit2 : counter_cell(bit1.carry_out);

SPEC AG (!bit2.carry_out)

MODULE counter_cell(carry_in)
VAR
  value : boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(value) := FALSE;
  next(value) := value xor carry_in;
DEFINE
  carry_out := value & carry_in;
```



AG (!bit2.carry\_out) is false



bit2.carry\_out is true



# Module Composition

## Synchronous composition

- All assignments are executed in parallel and synchronously.
- A single step of the resulting model corresponds to a step in each of the components.

## Asynchronous composition

- A step of the composition is a step by exactly one process.
- Variables, not assigned in that process, are left unchanged.




# Inverter Ring

```
MODULE main
VAR
  gate1 : process inverter(gate3.output);
  gate2 : process inverter(gate1.output);
  gate3 : process inverter(gate2.output);


SPEC (AG AF gate1.output) & (AG AF !gate1.output)

MODULE inverter(input)
VAR
  output : boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(output) := FALSE;
  next(output) := !input;

FAIRNESS
  running
```



In asynchronous composition, a step of the computation is a step by exactly one component. The process to execute is assumed to choose gate0, gate1, and gate2 repeatedly.



$(AG AF \text{ gate1.output}) \ \& \ (AG AF \ !\text{gate1.output})$  is true



# Fairness

**FAIRNESS** Ctlform

- Assumed to be true infinitely often
- Model checker only explores paths satisfying fairness constraint
- Each fairness constraint must be true infinitely often

If there are no fair paths

- All existential formulas are false
- All universal formulas are true

**FAIRNESS** running



# Synchronous vs Asynchronous

In Asynchronous process, need not combine transition relation of each process

Complexity of representing set of states reachable in  $n$  steps higher in asynchronous processes occasionally due to higher number of interleaving

SMV models asynchronous composition by a synchronous one



# Implicit Modeling

INIT Expr

Boolean valued expression giving initial states

INVAR Expr

Boolean valued expression restricting set of all states of model

TRANS Expr

Boolean valued expression restricting transition relation of system





# Implicit Modeling Example

```
MODULE main
VAR
  gate1 : inverter(gate3.output);
  gate2 : inverter(gate1.output);
  gate3 : inverter(gate2.output);

SPEC
  (AG AF gate1.out) & (AG AF !gate1.out)

MODULE inverter(input)
VAR
  output : boolean;
INIT
  output = FALSE;
TRANS
  next(output) = !input | next(output) = output
```



# TRANS

## Advantages

- Group assignments to different variables
- Good for modeling guarded commands
  - IF guard THEN new state

## Disadvantages

- Logical absurdities can lead to unimplementable descriptions



# Shared Data Example

Two users assign PID to Data in turn

```
MODULE main
VAR
  data : boolean;
  turn : {0,1};
  user0 : user(0, data, turn);
  user1 : user(1, data, turn);
ASSIGN
  next(turn) := !turn;
SPEC
  AG (AF data & AF (!data))
```

```
MODULE user(pid, data, turn)
ASSIGN
  next(data) :=
  case
    turn=pid : pid;
    TRUE     : data;
  esac;
```

Error: multiple assignment: next(data)



# Shared Data Example with TRANS

```
MODULE main
VAR
  data : boolean;
  turn : {0,1};
  user0 : user(0, data, turn);
  user1 : user(1, data, turn);
ASSIGN
  next(turn) := !turn;
SPEC
  AG (AF data & AF (!data))
```

```
MODULE user(pid, data, turn)
TRANS
  turn=pid -> next(data) = pid;
```



# TRANS Pitfalls

## TRANS

TRUE  $\rightarrow$  next(b) = 0 &

TRUE  $\rightarrow$  next(b) = 1 & ...

Inconsistencies in TRANS result in an empty transition relation

All universal properties are satisfied

All existential properties are refuted



# TRANS Guidelines

Use ASSIGN if you can!

Validate your model with simulation and sanity checks

Check that transition relation is total (-ctt option)

Write in a disjunction of conjunction format

Cover all cases

Make guards disjoint



```
MODULE main
```

```
VAR
```

```
  send : {s0,s1,s2};  
  recv  : {r0,r1,r2};
```

```
  ack : boolean;  
  req : boolean;
```

```
ASSIGN
```

```
  init(ack):=FALSE;  
  init(req):=FALSE;  
  
  init(send):= s0;  
  init(recv):= r0;
```

```
  next (send) :=  
    case  
      send=s0:{s0,s1};  
      send=s1:s2;  
      send=s2&ack:s0;  
      TRUE:send;
```

```
  esac;
```

```
  next (recv) :=
```

```
    case  
      recv=r0&req:r1;  
      recv=r1:r2;  
      recv=r2:r0;  
      TRUE: recv;
```

```
    esac;
```

```
  next (ack) :=
```

```
    case
```

```
      recv=r2:TRUE;  
      TRUE: ack;  
    esac;
```

```
  next (req) :=
```

```
    case
```

```
      send=s1:FALSE;  
      TRUE: req;  
    esac;
```

SPEC AG (req -> AF ack)



# Can A TRUE Result of Model Checker be Trusted

## Antecedent Failure [Beatty & Bryant 1994]

- A temporal formula  $AG (p \Rightarrow q)$  suffers an *antecedent failure* in model  $M$  iff  $M \models AG (p \Rightarrow q)$  AND  $M \models AG (\neg p)$

## Vacuity [Beer et al. 1997]

- A temporal formula  $\varphi$  is satisfied *vacuously* by  $M$  iff there exists a sub-formula  $p$  of  $\varphi$  such that  $M \models \varphi[p \leftarrow q]$  for every other formula  $q$
- e.g.,  $M \models AG (r \Rightarrow AF a)$  and  $M \models AG (r \Rightarrow AF \neg a)$  and  $AG (r \Rightarrow AF \neg r)$  and  $AG (r \Rightarrow AF FALSE)$ , ...





## Vacuity Detection: Single Occurrence

$\varphi$  is vacuous in  $M$  iff there exists an occurrence of a subformula  $p$  such that

- $M \models \varphi[p \leftarrow \text{TRUE}]$  and  $M \models \varphi[p \leftarrow \text{FALSE}]$

$$\frac{M \models \text{AG} (\text{req} \Rightarrow \text{AF TRUE})}{M \models \text{AG TRUE}}$$

$$\frac{M \models \text{AG} (\text{req} \Rightarrow \text{AF FALSE})}{M \models \text{AG} \neg \text{req}}$$

$$\frac{M \models \text{AG} (\text{TRUE} \Rightarrow \text{AF ack})}{M \models \text{AG AF ack}}$$

$$\frac{M \models \text{AG} (\text{FALSE} \Rightarrow \text{AF ack})}{M \models \text{AG TRUE}}$$



# Detecting Vacuity in Multiple Occurrences

Is  $AG (req \Rightarrow AF req)$  vacuous? Should it be?


$$\frac{M \models AG (TRUE \Rightarrow AF TRUE)}{M \models AG TRUE}$$

$$\frac{M \models AG (FALSE \Rightarrow AF FALSE)}{M \models AG TRUE}$$

Is  $AG (req \Rightarrow AX req)$  vacuous? Should it be?

$$\frac{M \models AG (TRUE \Rightarrow AX TRUE)}{M \models AG TRUE}$$

$$\frac{M \models AG (FALSE \Rightarrow AX FALSE)}{M \models AG TRUE}$$



## Detecting Vacuity in Multiple Occurrences: ACTL

An *ACTL*  $\varphi$  is vacuous in  $M$  iff there exists an a subformula  $p$  such that

- $M \models \varphi[p \leftarrow x]$  , where  $x$  is a non-deterministic variable

Is  $AG (req \Rightarrow AF req)$  vacuous? Should it be?

$$\frac{M \models AG (x \Rightarrow AF x)}{M \models AG TRUE}$$

**Always vacuous!!!**

Is  $AG (req \Rightarrow AX req)$  vacuous? Should it be?

$$\frac{M \models AG (x \Rightarrow AX x)}{\text{can't reduce}}$$

**Can be vacuous!!!**



# Run NuSMV

NuSMV [options] inputfile

- `-int` interactive mode
- `-lp` list all properties
- `-n X` check property number X
- `-ctt` check totality of transition relation
- `-old` compatibility mode
- `-ofm file` output flattened model



# Using NuSMV in Interactive Mode

## Basic Usage

- `go`
  - prepare model for verification
- `check_ctlspec`
  - verify properties

## Simulation

- `pick_state [-i] [-r]`
  - pick initial state for simulation [interactively] or [randomly]
- `simulate [-i] [r] s`
  - simulate the model for 's' steps [interactively] or [randomly]
- `show_traces`
  - show active traces



# Useful Links

NuSMV home page

- <http://nusmv.fbk.eu/>

NuSMV tutorial

- <http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/tutorial/v25/tutorial.pdf>

NuSMV user manual

- <http://nusmv.fbk.eu/NuSMV/userman/v25/nusmv.pdf>

NuSMV FAQ

- <http://nusmv.fbk.eu/faq.html>

NuSMV on Andrew

- [/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr6/soonhok/public/NuSMV-zchaff-2.5.3-x86\\_64-redhat-linux-gnu/](/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr6/soonhok/public/NuSMV-zchaff-2.5.3-x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu/)

NuSMV examples

- `<NuSMV>/share/nusmv/examples`

Ken McMillan, *Symbolic Model Checking: An Approach to the State Explosion Problem*, 1993

- <http://www.kenmcmil.com/pubs/thesis.pdf>

