

## QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY - Quantum key distribution

- Shared keys are important
  - Encryption (OTP)
  - authentication (Orthogonal arrays)
- Complexity solutions:
  - Diffie-Hellman protocol
  - EC-DH protocol
  - Post-quantum cryptography
- QKD - possible solution

Vulnerable to quantum computers

## Quantum mechanics - the very basics

Mathematical description of a (pure) qubit


Qubit - basic information unit

Qubits are normalized vectors in  $\mathbb{C}^2$  ( $\mathbb{C}$  are complex numbers)

$$\begin{aligned} |0\rangle &= \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \\ |1\rangle &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{These form orthonormal basis} \\ \text{if } |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1 \end{array} \right\}$$

$$|\psi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix}, \quad \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{C}, \quad |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$$

$\alpha + bi$



$$|a+bi| = \sqrt{a^2 + b^2}$$

$\{|\alpha\rangle, |\beta\rangle\} = \text{canonical (computational)}$

There are infinitely many orthonormal bases of  $\mathbb{C}^2$

$$\begin{aligned} |+\rangle &= \frac{|0\rangle + |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \\ |-\rangle &= \frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \end{aligned} \quad \begin{aligned} |+\rangle &= \begin{pmatrix} 1/\sqrt{2} \\ 1/\sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} \\ |-\rangle &= \begin{pmatrix} 1/\sqrt{2} \\ -1/\sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

$$(a,b) \cdot (c,d) = a \cdot c + b \cdot d = 0 \quad (\Leftrightarrow) \quad (c,d) \text{ and } (a,b) \text{ are orthogonal}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix}^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} c \\ d \end{pmatrix} = (a,b) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} c \\ d \end{pmatrix} = ac + bd = \text{scalar product}$$

$$\langle a | b \rangle = (d^*, \beta^*) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \gamma \\ \delta \end{pmatrix} = d^* \cdot \gamma + \beta^* \cdot \delta \quad d = a+bi$$

$$\langle a | = (d^*, \beta^*)$$

$$|b\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma \\ \delta \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\langle a | a \rangle = (d^*, \beta^*) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} d \\ \beta \end{pmatrix} = d^* \cdot d + \beta^* \cdot \beta = |d|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$$

$$\langle a | a \rangle = 1 \quad (a-i\beta) \cdot (a+i\beta) = a^2 - (i\beta)^2 = a^2 + \beta^2 = |a|^2$$

$|+\rangle$  and  $|-\rangle$  are an orthonormal basis

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle +|+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\langle 0| + \langle 1|) \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\langle 0\rangle + \langle 1\rangle) \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} (\langle 0|0\rangle + \langle 1|0\rangle + \langle 0|1\rangle + \langle 1|1\rangle) \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} (1 + 0 + 0 + 1) \\
 &= 1
 \end{aligned}$$


$\langle 0|0\rangle = (0|0) \cdot \binom{1}{0} = 1$   
 $\langle 1|0\rangle = (0|1) \cdot \binom{1}{0} = 0$   
↗ normalization

$$\langle -|- \rangle = 1 \quad \rightarrow \text{both are normalized}$$

$$|+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |1\rangle \quad \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2 = 1$$

$$\langle -|+\rangle = \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1/\sqrt{2} \\ 1/\sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} = 0 \quad \boxed{\rightarrow \text{orthogonality}}$$

$$\langle +|- \rangle = 0$$



Any state  $|Y\rangle$  can be written in any basis

$$|Y\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle \quad \sim \quad |Y\rangle \text{ is a superposition of } |0\rangle \text{ and } |1\rangle$$

$$|0\rangle = \frac{|+\rangle + |- \rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1/\sqrt{2} \\ 1/\sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1/\sqrt{2} \\ -1/\sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are called amplitudes

$$|0\rangle = \frac{|+\rangle + |-\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1/2 \\ 1/2 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1/2 \\ -1/2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$|1\rangle = \frac{|+\rangle - |-\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1/2 \\ 1/2 \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} 1/2 \\ -1/2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi\rangle &= \alpha \left( \frac{|+\rangle + |-\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right) + \beta \left( \frac{|+\rangle - |-\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right) \\ &= \frac{\alpha + \beta}{\sqrt{2}} |+\rangle + \frac{\alpha - \beta}{\sqrt{2}} |-\rangle \quad \text{is a superposition of } |+\rangle \text{ and } |-\rangle \\ &\quad \text{with amplitudes } \frac{\alpha + \beta}{\sqrt{2}} \text{ and } \frac{\alpha - \beta}{\sqrt{2}} \end{aligned}$$


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## Measurements of qubits

To each (projective) measurement we associate a basis

If you measure  $|\psi\rangle$  in basis  $\{|a\rangle, |b\rangle\}$

you get an answer to the following question:

is qubit  $|\psi\rangle$  in state  $|a\rangle$  or  $|b\rangle$ ?

$|\psi\rangle = \alpha|a\rangle + \beta|b\rangle \rightsquigarrow |\psi\rangle$  is in a superposition of  $|a\rangle$  and  $|b\rangle$   
with amplitudes  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$

answer  $|a\rangle$  w.p.  $|\alpha|^2$        $|\psi\rangle \rightarrow |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$   
 $|b\rangle$  w.p.  $|\beta|^2$

after measuring  $|\psi\rangle$  in  $\{|a\rangle, |b\rangle\}$  and getting an answer  
 $|a\rangle$ , state  $|\psi\rangle$  collapses into state  $|a\rangle$ . E.g. if you measure

it again in state  $\{|\alpha\rangle, |\beta\rangle\}$  you will get an answer  $|\alpha\rangle$  w.p. 1

$|\Psi\rangle$  and measure it in  $\{|\alpha\rangle, |\beta\rangle\}$

$$|\langle \alpha | \Psi \rangle|^2 \sim \text{probability of answer } |\alpha\rangle$$

$$|\langle \beta | \Psi \rangle|^2 \sim \text{probability of answer } |\beta\rangle$$

$$|\Psi\rangle = 2|0\rangle + 3|1\rangle$$

$$|\Psi\rangle = \langle +|\Psi\rangle |+\rangle + \langle -|\Psi\rangle |- \rangle$$

## Quantum Key Distribution (BB84 protocol)

1.) Repeat  $2N$  times (rounds)

a.) Alice prepares one of 4 possible states  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$   
at random and sends it to Bob

b.) Bob measures the received qubit in a randomly chosen basis  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$  or  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$


2.) Sifting Alice publishes her  $2N$  preparation bases  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$  or  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$   
Bob publishes his  $2N$  measurement choices  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$  or  $\{|\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\}$

They keep only rounds where their basis matches.

$$\Rightarrow \begin{array}{ll} 0 | 0\rangle & \{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\} \circ \\ 1 | 1\rangle & \{|\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\} \downarrow 1 \\ 0 | +\rangle & \{|\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle, |\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}\rangle\} \circ \\ \dots & \dots \end{array} \quad \left| \langle 0 | 0 \rangle \right|^2 = 1 \quad \left| \langle 1 | 0 \rangle \right|^2 = 0$$

$$0 \xrightarrow{+} \{ |+\rangle, |-\rangle \} 0$$

$$1 \xrightarrow{-} \{ |+\rangle, |-\rangle \} 1$$



Adversary Eve is causing errors in Bob's string!

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### Classical post-processing

1.) Parameter estimation - How many errors are there in Bob's string?

They reveal a small (representative) portion of their strings to estimate error rate

if too many errors - ABORT

11% error is critical

### 2.) Error correction

→ Assume Bob has { errors and Eve has } → { }

→ Alice creates an error correcting code, which can correct { errors (but not more), s.t. her string is a codeword }

$\ell$  errors (but not more), s.t. her string is a codeword.

She publishes the code

→ Bob corrects his string

→ Eve cannot do this since secret left

### 3.) Privacy amplification

→ Alice chooses a random hash function ( $2$ -universal set)

She and Bob hash their corrected string.

Now they share a shorter, but fully secret key