

Other public key encryption systems

Rabin encryption

- Chinese remainder theorem
- Quadratic residues
- Euler's criterion
- Legendre and Jacobi symbols

ElGamal encryption

Security definition for PKC

Chinese remainder theorem

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv a_1 \pmod{n_1} & \forall i, j \quad \gcd(n_i, n_j) = 1 \\ x &\equiv a_2 \pmod{n_2} \\ &\vdots \\ x &\equiv a_k \pmod{n_k} \end{aligned}$$

$N = n_1 \cdot n_2 \cdot n_3 \cdots n_k$

$$x = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i \cdot N_i \cdot M_i \pmod{N}$$

$$\begin{aligned} N_i &= N / n_i \\ M_i &= N_i^{-1} \pmod{n_i} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &x \pmod{n_j} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^k a_i \cdot N_i \cdot M_i \pmod{n_j} \\ &= a_j \underbrace{N_j \cdot M_j}_{\sim 1} \pmod{n_j} \quad (\text{because } \forall i \neq j \quad N_i \text{ is a multiple of } n_j) \\ &= a_j \pmod{n_j} \end{aligned}$$

Example

$$N = 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 5 = 60$$

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$$\begin{array}{lll} x \equiv 0 \pmod{3} & N_1 = 4 \cdot 5 = 20 & M_1 \equiv 20^{-1} \equiv 2^2 \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \\ x \equiv 3 \pmod{4} & N_2 = 3 \cdot 5 = 15 & M_2 \equiv 15^{-1} \equiv (-1)^{-1} \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \\ x \equiv 4 \pmod{5} & N_3 = 3 \cdot 4 = 12 & M_3 \equiv 12^{-1} \equiv (2)^{-1} \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x &= 0 \cdot 20 \cdot 2 + 3 \cdot 15 \cdot 3 + 4 \cdot 12 \cdot 3 \\ &= 0 + 135 + 144 \pmod{60} \\ &\quad 279 \pmod{60} \\ &\quad 39 \pmod{60} \end{aligned}$$

Quadratic residues in $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{1, \dots, n-1\}$

$a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a QR if $\exists x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ s.t. $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{n}$

$$x = \sqrt{a} \pmod{n}$$

$$x \equiv a^{\frac{1}{2}} \pmod{n}$$

(1) \rightarrow notation for square root

$$\mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \quad QR_5 = \{1, 4\}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{5} \\ 2^2 \equiv 4 \pmod{5} \\ 3^2 \equiv 4 \pmod{5} \\ 4^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{5} \end{array}$$

There are $\frac{p-1}{2}$ QRs in \mathbb{Z}_p^* prime

$$\begin{array}{l} x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p} \\ (-x)^2 \equiv a \pmod{p} \end{array}$$

Euler's criterion

For odd prime p

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \quad (\Leftrightarrow a \text{ is a QR mod } p) \\ a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \quad (\Leftrightarrow a \text{ is a QNR mod } p) \end{array} \right.$$

Legendre symbol

$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = 1$	$(a \text{ is QR})$
$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = 0$	$(a \equiv 0 \pmod{p})$
$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = -1$	$(a \text{ is QNR})$

$\left(\frac{a}{p} \right) = -1 \pmod{p} \Leftrightarrow a \text{ is a QNR mod } p \quad \left(\frac{a}{p} \right) = -1 \quad (a \text{ is QNR})$

Jacobi symbol

$$\left(\frac{a}{n} \right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_1} \right)^{d_1} \left(\frac{a}{p_2} \right)^{d_2} \cdots \left(\frac{a}{p_e} \right)^{d_e}$$

$$n = p_1^{d_1} p_2^{d_2} \cdots p_e^{d_e}$$

Legendre symbols

How to calculate square roots mod p ?

C is a QR, find x s.t. $x^2 \equiv C \pmod{p}$
 $x \equiv \sqrt{C} \pmod{p}$

1.) $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \rightarrow$ easy

$p \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \rightarrow$ a bit more involved but efficient

$\frac{p+1}{4} \rightarrow$ integer division

$$\sqrt{C} = \pm C \quad (1 \text{ by Euler's criterion})$$

$$\left(C^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \right)^2 \equiv C^{\frac{p+1}{2}} \equiv C \cdot C^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv C \pmod{p}$$

Rabin cryptosystem

Elements: $n = p_1 q$, p_1, q are large primes ($p_1 q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$)

Public: n

Private: p_1, q

Encrypt $1 < w \leq p-1$ $C = w^2 \pmod{n}$ easy

$$\text{Encrypt} \quad 1 < w \leq p-1 \quad C = w^2 \mod n$$

$$\text{Decrypt of } c \quad w = \sqrt[n]{C} \mod n$$

↑
Hard if you
do not know p, q
easy when you do

1.) how to decrypt with the knowledge of p and q

You can find

$$x^2 \equiv C \mod n$$


From

$$x^2 \equiv C \mod p \Rightarrow k \cdot p + C \equiv x^2$$

$$x^2 \equiv C \mod q \Rightarrow l \cdot q + C \equiv x^2$$

$$\Rightarrow m \cdot p \cdot q + C \equiv x^2$$

$$\begin{cases} k = m \cdot q \\ l = m \cdot p \end{cases}$$



$$x \equiv \sqrt[n]{C} \mod p$$

$$x \equiv \sqrt[n]{C} \mod q$$

$$m_p \equiv \sqrt[p]{C} \equiv \pm C^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \mod p$$

$$m_q \equiv \sqrt[q]{C} \equiv \pm C^{\frac{q+1}{4}} \mod q$$

These are easy to calculate
(different integers)

$$x_1 \equiv m_p \mod p \quad | \quad x_3 \equiv -m_p \mod p$$

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 X_1 \equiv m_p \pmod{p} & X_3 \equiv -m_p \pmod{p} \\
 X_1 \equiv m_q \pmod{q} & X_3 \equiv m_q \pmod{q} \\
 \hline
 X_2 \equiv m_p \pmod{p} & X_4 \equiv -m_p \pmod{p} \\
 X_2 \equiv -m_q \pmod{q} & X_4 \equiv -m_q \pmod{q}
 \end{array}$$

Four different solutions!

$$y_q = q^{-1} \pmod{p} \quad y_p = p^{-1} \pmod{q}$$

$$\text{as } N_1 M_1 \quad \text{as } N_2 M_2$$

$$X_1 \equiv (m_p \cdot q \cdot y_q + m_q \cdot p \cdot y_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$X_2 \equiv (m_p \cdot q \cdot y_q - m_q \cdot p \cdot y_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$X_3 \equiv (-m_p \cdot q \cdot y_q + m_q \cdot p \cdot y_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$X_4 \equiv (-m_p \cdot q \cdot y_q - m_q \cdot p \cdot y_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$X_1 + X_2 = 2m_p q y_q$$

$$\gcd(X_1 + X_2, n) = q$$

Exercise 6.1

decrypt $c=56$

with $n=143 = 11 \cdot 13 = p \cdot q$

$$\begin{aligned}
 m_p &\equiv \sqrt{c} \equiv \sqrt{56} \pmod{11} \\
 &\equiv \sqrt{56}^{\frac{12}{4}} \pmod{11} \\
 &\equiv 56^3 \pmod{11}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\equiv 1^3 \pmod{11}$$

$$\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{11}$$

$$m_1 \equiv \sqrt{c} \pmod{\equiv \sqrt{56} \pmod{13}}$$

$$\equiv \sqrt{4} \pmod{13}$$

$$\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{13}$$

↓

$$\begin{array}{c|c|c|c} x_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{11} & x_2 \equiv 1 \pmod{11} & x_3 \equiv -1 \pmod{11} & x_4 \equiv -1 \pmod{11} \\ x_1 \equiv 2 \pmod{13} & x_2 \equiv -2 \pmod{13} & x_3 \equiv 2 \pmod{11} & x_4 \equiv -2 \pmod{13} \end{array}$$

$$y_p \equiv 11^3 \pmod{13}$$

$$\equiv 6 \pmod{13}$$

$$b_1 \equiv 13^3 \pmod{11}$$

$$\equiv 6 \pmod{11}$$

$$x_1 = \frac{m_p}{1.13.6} + \frac{m_a}{2.11.6} \equiv 13.6 + 22.6 \pmod{143}$$

$$x_1 = 78 + 132 \pmod{143}$$

$$x_2 = 78 - 132 \pmod{143}$$

$$x_3 = -78 + 132 \pmod{143}$$

$$x_4 = -78 - 132 \pmod{143}$$

How to attack the cryptosystem?

1.) Factor n

2.) Can you calculate \sqrt{c} (all four of them) without factoring n efficiently?

2.) Can you calculate R^c (all four of them) without factoring efficiently?

$$\text{gcd}(x_1 + x_2, n) = q$$

Unique decryption?

→ pattern in correct plaintext e.g. binary representation ends in 5 ones

$$m \text{ (n-bit)} \mapsto m \cdot 2^5 + 2^5 - 1$$

$$\underbrace{\dots 1 \dots 1}_{J} \underbrace{\dots 1}_{P} \mapsto \underbrace{\dots m_{n-5} \dots m_5}_{C} \underbrace{n}_{J} \underbrace{\dots 1 \dots 1}_{P}$$

$$\rightarrow \begin{array}{l} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 \\ \hline 1 & 1 \\ \hline -1 & 1 \\ \hline 1 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array} \leftarrow \begin{array}{c} \downarrow \\ (C, J, P) \end{array}$$

El Gamal

1.) based on discrete logarithms

2.) has randomized encryption

Elements: p - a large prime

g - primitive element in \mathbb{Z}_p^* $\{g, g^2, \dots, g^{p-1}\} = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

x - secret exponent $\{1, \dots, p-1\}$

$$y \equiv g^x \pmod{p}$$

Public

$$P, a, y$$

Private

X

ENCRYPTION: $w \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

1.) Choose random $r \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$

$$2.) a \equiv g^r \pmod{p}$$

$$3.) b \equiv w \cdot a^r \pmod{p}$$

$$w \rightarrow (a, b)$$

DECRYPTION

$$(a, b) \rightarrow w$$

With
knowledge
of a

With
knowledge of $r \rightarrow$ keep r secret

$$w \equiv b \cdot (a^x)^{-1} \equiv b \cdot a^{-x} \pmod{p}$$

$$\equiv w \cdot b^r \cdot a^{-x} \pmod{p}$$

$$\equiv w \cdot (a^x)^r \cdot (b^r)^{-1} \pmod{p}$$

$$\equiv w \cdot a^{xr} \cdot b^{-r} \pmod{p}$$

$$\equiv w \pmod{p}$$

$$w = b \cdot g^{-r} \pmod{p}$$

Security of PKC

$$\nexists_{m, c} \quad \underline{P(C=c)} = \underline{P(C=c | M=m)}$$

$$\Pr \left[\underbrace{A[e(M), h(M)] = f(M)}_{\dagger} \right] \leq \Pr \left[\underbrace{B[e(M)] = f(M)}_{\dagger} \right] + \gamma(n)$$

A, B are efficient algorithms

e - encryption function

M - plaintext distribution

$e[M] \rightarrow$ ciphertext distribution

$\boxed{y(n) \text{ is a negligible function}}$

h, f functions $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$

$A \left\{ \underbrace{e(M), h(M)}_{\dagger} \right\} \rightarrow$ Something that can be efficiently calculated
from distribution of plaintexts and ciphertexts

$B[e(M)] \rightarrow$ Something that can be efficiently calculated from
distribution of ciphertexts only