

# PV181 Laboratory of security and applied cryptography



## Random values and Random Number Generators

Marek Sýs

[sysox@mail.muni.cz](mailto:sysox@mail.muni.cz), A405

**CRCS**


Centre for Research on  
Cryptography and Security

## You will learn

- What types of RNG you can find in libraries.
- What RNGs are (in)appropriate for crypto.
- bitwise operations (heavily used in crypto).
- How to improve randomness of RNG output.
  - using hash function and bitwise XOR
- How to generate secure random values:
  - in *python*, C, C++
- Why standard **rand()** and others (e.g. Mersenne Twister) are insecure.

# RNG types

1. True random (TRNG)
  - Source: physical device (noise)  
radio decay, thermal noise, ...
  - non-deterministic, aperiodic, slow
1. Pseudo random (PRNG)
  - Source: software function
  - deterministic, periodic, very fast




# PRNG

defined by 3 functions: Init, Transform, Output

State = Init(Seed)

State = Trans(State)

rnd = Out(State)



Cryptographically secure (CSPRNG) - generated rnd values give no information about **next** or **previous** rnd values  $\Rightarrow$  no info about Seed, State

## Standard library functions

[ANSI C\(rand\), Java\(java.util.random\),...](#) - uses fast but **very insecure** LCG generator

Linear Congruential Generator(LCG)

- $s_{n+1} = a * s_n + b \text{ mod } m$  (fixed constants  $a, b, c$ )

Out is identity (**id**) func. i.e., generated  $rnd = State$   
 $\Rightarrow$  next rnd values easily computed

Trans is linear:  $f(x) = ax + b \text{ mod } m$

$\Rightarrow$  previous rnd values can be computed easily

# Example

## ANSI C portable functions

```
static unsigned long int next = 1;

int rand(void)    // RAND_MAX assumed to be 32767
{
    next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
    return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768;
}

void srand(unsigned int seed)
{
    next = seed;
}
```


## Practice

PRNG values:

- CSPRNG seeded by TRNG

TRNG (entropy source):

- typically combined internally with PRNG
- output stored in “entropy pool”
  - depends on all previous generated rnd values (chaining of values, not replacement)



# TRNG

Linux: two entropy pools (files) *dev/(u)random*

- [keyboard](#) timings, [mouse](#) movements, IDE timings

Windows: similar to Linux

- binary register *HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ RNG\Seed*

Additional entropy sources (if available):

- TPM, RNRAND instruction, hardware system clock (RTC), [Interrupt](#) timings, [havege](#) daemon



## Weak generators

**Python** [random\(\)](#) - “Mersenne Twister(MT) as the core generator. It produces 53-bit precision floats and has a period of  $2^{19937}-1$ ”

**C** `rand()`: [LCG](#) generators (+ some tweaks)

- [glibc](#) (used by [GCC](#)) [rand\(\)](#) - LCG and “linear additive feedback” ( $r[i] = r[i-31] + r[i-3]$ )

**C++**: [LCG or MT or Lagged fibonacci](#)

- `minstd_rand(0 or 1)`, `mt19937(_64)`,

# Unix infrastructure

Special files - reading files provides random data

- `/dev/random`
  - always produces entropy but,
  - blocking - can block the caller until entropy available (entropy estimation)
- `/dev/urandom`
  - amount of entropy not quaranteed
  - always returns quickly (non blocking)

Usage:

- `/dev/urandom` preferred, only shortly after boot use `/dev/random` (see [Myths about dev/urandom](#))

# Linux RNG design

- 3 entropy pools (store random data)
  - can be viewed as PRNG - “Init” func **mixes** (using SHA1) input rnd data to the state  $\Rightarrow$  state depends input data and **all** previous states!!
- input\_pool (state of 4096 bits)
  - accumulate (collects, compress) the entropy from hardware events to the state
  - feeds exclusively (no access to this pool)
    - blocking\_pool (state of 1024 bytes)
    - non-blocking\_pool (ChaCha20 stream cipher)
      - only key (256) is fed by true rnd values
    - state (“seed” for other pools) is saved at shutdown

See [Gauvrit's blog](#) with nice scheme

# Unix infrastructure

## Operations on files:

- to get entropy just open and read from the file
  - use `read(2)` but always check if returned value == requested number of bytes (reading can be interrupted!!!)
- It is also possible to write to **`/dev/random`**
  - privileged (harmless) user can mix random data into the pool - entropy is increased (but not entropy counter)
- information about the pool: **`proc/sys/random/*`**

# Unix: methods and quality

## Good sources(C):

- direct read from initialized random/urandom
- [getrandom\(\)](#) + flags:
  - source: random or urandom
  - blocking or non-blocking (also blocks until initialised)
- `get_random_bytes()` - kernel space
- similar in Python: [os.urandom\(\)](#), [os.getrandom\(\)](#), [secrets.token\\_bytes\(\)](#)

## Weak sources:

- `rand`, `time(rdtsc instruction, clock func,...)`, uninitialized `urandom`

## Practice

1. Go to <https://mybinder.org>
2. Copy link [https://github.com/sysox/PV181\\_RNG/](https://github.com/sysox/PV181_RNG/) to Github field, press launch
3. Start with PV181\_RNG\_python.ipynb
4. Then PV181\_RNG\_C.ipynb
5. Write down the answers to Questions - they will be discussed at the end of seminar.