

MUNI
FI

Cyber Threat Management

PA211 Advanced Topics of Cyber Security

October 4, 2022

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Exit tickets from last week – I

- **Q:** What is this “measure” part of vulnerability management lifecycle in example Tenable?
- **A:** *It measures the **success** of lifecycle, e.g., using **risk** computed from*
 - ***threats** caused by vulnerabilities,*
 - *probability of **vulnerability exploit**,*
 - ***asset** criticality,*
 - *possible **impact**.*

*It allows tracking and **comparing risk** (between business units and organizations) and making **strategic decisions**.*

Exit tickets from last week – II

- **Q:** What exactly is QoD ?
- **A:** *It is the **reliability** of the vulnerability detection method. For example, the **exploit** has 100% QoD, and **remote banner** containing the patch level has 80% QoD. See [\[1\]](#).*

- **Q:** As for the generating PDF reports, Is there any way to customize content of the report?
- **A:** *Yes, see [\[2\]](#). You can specify, e.g., that you want only **HIGH severity** vulnerabilities or **QoD** \geq 90%.*

Exit tickets from last week – III

- **Q:** What is the best SW/way how to check vulnerabilities in our computer? SW that we used today seemed not working 100% and too heavy for local computers.
- **A:** *I would perform some **stress tests** on the computer or use utilities that check **system health**. We used a network vulnerability scanner, which reveals a **different type** of vulnerabilities.*

Exit tickets from last week – IV

Greenbone's management daemon was constantly crashing, which prevented me from finishing some tasks.

*A: Environments consisting of docker containers showed to be very **fragile**. It is not possible to **manually** test every computer when shortly after `vagrant up` everything seems OK.*

We ask you to change seats today to test whether the problems are associated with particular machines in this room.

Goals of this lecture

- Become **acquainted** with:
 - **cyber threat intelligence** and related terminology,
 - **cyber threat hunting**,
 - **cyber threat intelligence sharing** and **threat intelligence platforms**,
 - **standards, knowledge bases, and data sources.**

Essential terminology

Cyber threat

- **Circumstance or event with the potential adversarial impact**
- Impacts **operations, assets**, individuals, or organizations
- **Threat actor** – a **source** of malicious activity
- **Examples:**
 - SQL injection
 - Denial of service
 - Elevation of privileges
 - Unauthorized access
 - Disclosure or modification of information

Cyber threat management

- A process that **manages** cyber threats
- It **detects** threats and **prevents** attacks
 - Uses **different data** sources that provide **evidence**
 - **Internal data** – packets, logs, IP flows, scans
 - **External data** – cyber threat intelligence, knowledge bases, databases
- Requires to discover **vulnerabilities** and **vulnerable assets**
 - Coupled with **vulnerability** and **asset** managements

Cyber threat intelligence

Cyber threat intelligence

- **Evidence-based knowledge** about an existing hazard to assets
- **Common content**
 - Context
 - Mechanisms
 - Indicators
 - Implications for the decision regarding the response

Cyber threat intelligence sources

- **Open-source intelligence**
 - **Example:** threat intelligence platforms
- **Device log files**
- **Network traffic**
- **Human intelligence** from incident resolution
 - Alerts
 - Warnings
 - Security advisories

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

- Piece of information that objectively **describes an intrusion**

- **Atomic**

- **Cannot be broken** down into smaller parts
- **Examples:** IP addresses, email addresses, and vulnerability identifiers

- **Computed**

- **Derived** from data involved in an incident
- **Examples:** file hash values and regular expressions

- **Behavioral**

- **Collection of** computed and atomic **indicators**, which is often quantified
- **Examples:** unusual outbound network traffic and user activity anomalies

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

- Describe the **behavior of an actor**
- **Tactic**
 - The **highest-level** description of the behavior
- **Technique**
 - A **more detailed** description of behavior in the context of a **tactic**
- **Procedure**
 - **Highly detailed** description in the context of a **technique**
- **Sources:**
 - MITRE ATT&CK,
 - Possibly CAPEC

Examples of TTPs

– Privilege escalation example


- **Tactic:** privilege escalation
- **Technique:** vulnerability exploitation
- **Procedure:** submit specially crafted input to a vulnerable application

– Network scanning example

- **Tactic:** reconnaissance
- **Technique:** network scanning
- **Procedure:** run command `nmap -sP <ip_address>/<mask>`


Pyramid of Pain

- **Not** all indicators are **equal**
- Attack **complexity** based on **detected** artifacts
- The **lowest** level
 - **Precise** but the **easiest** to change
- The **highest** level
 - **Abstract** but the **hardest** to change
- **Example:**
 - **IP addresses** not valid IOCs after **a day**



Detection Maturity Level model

- **Detection Maturity Level (DML) model**
 - The **lowest** levels are the most **technically specific**
 - The **highest** levels the most **technically abstract**
- **Comparison with Pyramid of Pain:**
 - The **same ordering** of indicators



Threat intelligence platforms

- Platforms that **aggregate and organize** threat intelligence
- **Open-source**
 - Collaborative Research Into Threats (CRITs) by MITRE
 - GOSINT by CISCO
- **Commercial**
 - ThreatConnect
 - ThreatStream
- **Community**
 - Open Threat Exchange ([OTX](#))
 - Malware Information Sharing Platform ([MISP](#))



Challenges of CTI sharing

– Trust

- **Anyone** can produce cyber threat intelligence
- Sharing **participants** do not want **negative publicity** – anonymization

– Quality

- information may **not** be **complete** or may be **wrong**

– Volume of data

- Threat **intelligence platforms** contain a lot of **IOCs**

– Privacy and legal rules

- GDPR

– Changing nature of cyber attacks

- CTI may not be usable for the **next attack**

– Diverse data models and formats

Standards and enumerations

Standards and enumerations

- Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification ([CAPEC](#))
- [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- The Structured Threat Information eXpression (**STIX**)
- Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (**TAXII**)



ATT&CK[®]



Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

- Enumeration of known **attack categories** (attack patterns)
- **Hierarchical** organization
- **Example use cases:**
 - Threat modeling
 - Incident response
- **Example entries:**
 - CAPEC-125 (Flooding) [\[1\]](#)
 - CAPEC-482 (TCP Flood)
 - CAPEC-486 (UDP Flood)

MITRE ATT&CK

- **Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge** [\[1\]](#)
- **A knowledge base** of adversarial tactics and techniques created from **real-world** observations
- **A set of matrices** consisting of
 - Tactics (columns)
 - Techniques (rows)
- **Example:** TA0001 – **Initial Access** tactic
 - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application [\[2\]](#)
 - T1566.001 - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)

- **A format** for expressing and serialization of **CTI**
- Structured as a **graph** with objects and relationships
- **Objects:**
 - Attack pattern
 - Campaign
 - Malware
 - Vulnerability
 - Other

STIX example

- **Threat actor**

- Adversary Bravo

- **Identity**

- Adversary Bravo


- **Attack pattern**

- Phishing

- **Malware**

- Poison Ivy

- **Relationships**



Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII)

- **Protocol** designed to support the exchange of CTI **over HTTPS**
- Any implementation of a server that uses this protocol must **support the STIX format**
- STIX and TAXII should allow **automated processing of CTI**
- Some threat intelligence **platforms provide** data in **STIX**
- MITRE ATT&CK is also **expressed** in STIX

Cyber threat identification and threat management tools

Cyber threat hunting

- **Proactive** security search that
 - Reveals malicious and suspicious **activities that** have **evaded detection** by existing tools
 - Identifies and categorizes potential threats **in advance of an attack**
 - Uses **new threat intelligence** on previously collected data
- Threat actors are often **Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)**
- **Example:**
 - Hunting for **internal reconnaissance**
 - Search **through logs** to find the use of **commands** *whoami, hostname, ipconfig*

Threat hunting and other approaches

– Threat hunting

- Reveals malicious activities that **evaded** detection by **existing tools**

– Bug bounty program

- Uses **existing tools** to discover security vulnerabilities

– Asset discovery

- Uses **existing tools** to discover assets

– Penetration testing

- Uses **existing tools** to test applications

SIEM

- Security **information** and **event** management
- Threat **detection** and security **incident management**
- Collection and analysis of **security events**
 - Near **real-time** and **historical**
- **Core capabilities**
 - **Log event** collection and management
 - Analyze data from **various sources**
 - **Operational capabilities** – dashboards, reporting, and other

SIEM tools

– Commercial:

- **SolarWinds** Security Event Manager (SEM)
- **AT&T Cybersecurity** (AlienVault) Unified Security Management (USM)
- **IBM Security** QRadar SIEM
- **Splunk** Enterprise Security

– Open-source:

- **Elastic Security**
- **AlienVault** OSSIM (leverages OTX platform),
- **Apache** Metron,
- SIEMonster
- Security Onion



Elastic Security

Security  Onion

splunk > enterprise

 Radar

SOAR

- **S**ecurity **O**rchestration, **A**utomation, and **R**esponse
- Related to **playbooks**
- Streamlines security operations in **three key areas**:
 1. **T**hreat and **v**ulnerability management
 2. Incident **r**esponse
 3. Security operations **a**utomation

Questions?

Supplementary materials

- David Bianco. 2013. *The Pyramid of Pain*. <http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html>
- Ryan Stillions. 2014. *The DML model*.
http://ryanstillions.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-dml-model_21.html

Before the seminar

- Those sitting in the 1st row, please switch your seats with other sitting in other rows.
- We would like to test whether problems with VMs are associated with particular machines in this room.

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