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Integrating Post-Quantum Algorithms In Practice



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[This presentation includes clickable [links](#)]

Presentation outline

- **Introduction**
- **Our experience with PQC implementation**
- **Current state of PQC**
 - Libraries, ASN.1, JSON Web Algorithms, Hybrid modes
- **General remarks**
 - Preparations, technological constraints, implementation
- **Conclusions**

Introduction

- **Quantum PC** → ~~RSA, ECDSA, ...~~ → **PQC** → **new algorithms**
- **Standardization of PQC** (e.g. NIST)
- **Next step:**
 - PQ support in all system and architecture layers
 - Ensure functionality, compatibility, interoperability
- **My activities:**
 - Exploring current options and state-of-the-art
 - Focus on engineering aspects of PQ protocol implementations
 - Gather experience, remarks, and tips

Post-Quantum Algorithms

- NIST standardization efforts (2016-now)
 - Round 4:
 - **Digital signatures:**
 - Dilithium, Falcon (lattice-based)
 - Sphincs+ (hash-based)
 - **Key Encapsulation Mechanisms:**
 - Kyber (lattice-based)
 - More algs.: TBA ("On ramp")
 - other evaluation efforts (BSI, ENISA, ...) → possibly other algorithms

Our experience with PQC implementation

PQ versions of Web-eID, CDOC2, ASICE, IVXV, TOPCOAT

Project with direct implementation

- **PQ-Web-eID**
 - authentication framework for web applications
 - Estonian electronic ID cards + state web services
 - dig. signatures, ~~smart cards~~ → ESP32 programmable microcontroller
- **PQ-CDOC2**
 - Estonian standard for securing and exchanging data
 - KEMs, problems with TLS
- **PQ-ASiC-E**
 - (almost Estonian) standard for digitally signed container of data

Project with problematic implementations

- **PQ-IVXV**

- electronic voting system
- preparation of infrastructure, PQ-OCSP, PQ-TSA
- dig. signatures are OK, but vote encryption is problem
 - eGama! → completely new PQ protocol (lattice-based)

- **TOPCOAT**

- threshold digital signature scheme
- almost no existing implementations → completely new PQ protocol (lattice-based)

Go-to libraries

- [PQClean](#) (C)
 - *Cleaned* aggregation of NIST-submitted algorithms
 - Source of source-code (i.e. not a library)
- [libOQS](#) (C)
 - + wrappers for C++, Python, Java, Go, .NET, and Rust
 - + applications built with libOQS (OpenSSL, OpenSSH, OpenVPN forks)
- [BouncyCastle](#) (Java), [rustpq/pqcrypto](#) (Rust), [pqm4](#) (C, Cortex-M4), [botan-pq](#) (C++)
- custom wrappers

PQ ASN.1 structures

- **No standards exist yet** → NIST requires raw bytes
- RFC drafts
 - private and public keys with alg. specific parameters
 - e.g. `DilithiumPrivateKey` (contains `nonce`, `tr`, `s1`, `s2`, `t0`, etc.)
- **PQ Object Identifiers (OIDs):**
 - OQS defined their own (most commonly used so far)
 - BouncyCastle expanded with KEMs

JSON Web Algorithms (RFC 7518)

- Usage: *JW Signature*
- Format: *(DIGSIG + HASH identification)*
- Example: *ES384 = ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384*
- **No RFC drafts for PQ JWAs**
- RFC draft for **PQ JW Encodings**
 - e.g. *CRYDI5 = CRYSTALS-Dilithium parameter set 5*
 - *HASH? → SHA-512*
- RFC drafts for PQ JW Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
 - alg. specific parameters encoding

Hybrid mode (PQ + classic crypto)

- Longevity of data confidentiality + protection against emerging threats in PQC
- **Concatenation, sequential** modes
 - *Ghinea et al.*
 - both have security issues
 - novel method to improve unforgeability of ECDSA+PQ signatures
- RFC Draft for hybrid **KEM in TLS1.3** follows **concatenation**
- **Cloudflare and Google Chrome** follow RFC draft using **concatenation** (X25519 + Kyber)


General remarks

Preparations, technological constraints, implementation

Identifying relevant locations

- **Identify all PKI objects through their lifetime**
- **Beware of MTUs**
 - bigger objects, variable sizes (Falcon)
- **Beware of changing data formats**
 - ASN1, Base64, PEM, JOSE, other...

BPMN example



Technological constraints


- Assess current boundaries of the system
 - Increased **performance, memory, and storage overhead**
 - Limited devices and slow networks
- **Protocol adjustments:**
 - streaming public keys and signatures into memory
 - key encapsulation instead of digital signatures (credit cards)
 - allocate all objects in heap instead of limited stack memory (our case)

Implementation

- Start at the **beginning of the data lifecycle**
- Implement PQC **one step at a time**
- Implementation is still **not straight-forward**
- **Extensions, adjustments, adaptations** of crypto libraries
- **Create your own wrappers** using SWIG
- Expect future changes - standardization is not over!

Embedded devices

- Smart cards are not suitable → LilyGO T-Display-S3
- Problematic memory management:
 - Limited to 8 KB of stack RAM
 - *PQClean* allocates to a stack a lot
- Solved by adjusting *PQClean* code by using:
 - `malloc` and `free` functions
 - `std::unique_ptr` (C++ v11)



libOQS extensions

- Available wrappers for C++, Python, Java, Go, .NET, and Rust
 - PHP? → SWIG wrapper generator!
- C/C++ interface definition required
 - → *liboqs-php, liboqs-python, liboqs-go*
- Some remapping was required:
 - PHP `string` ↔ C++ `uint8_t*`
 - Python `bytes` ↔ C++ `uint8_t*`

PQ in PHP

- **OpenSSL usage → OQS-OpenSSL**
 - (v1 forks discontinued)
 - v3 extension provider:
 - extends regular OpenSSL@3
 - PHP algorithms IDs hardcoded for DSA, DH, RSA, and EC
 - some built-in functions do not require algID (e.g. `openssl_verify()`)
 - [my notes on OQS-OpenSSL in PHP](#)
- **PHPSecLib → new PQC-PHPSecLib fork**
 - *OQS-OpenSSL* or *liboqs-php* (based on availability)

PQ in BouncyCastle (v1.74+)

- Not well documented
 - [bc-java / core / src / main / java / org / bouncycastle / asn1 / bc / BCObjectIdentifiers.java](#)
 - `org.bouncycastle.pqc.*` packages
- Works with actual algorithm parameters from ASN1 drafts
 - vs raw bytes in libOQS
 - e.g. `KyberPublicKeyParameters` has `t` and `rho`

PQ Java Keytool

- keytool = command for managing a keystore of cryptographic objects
- PQ BouncyCastle → PQ Java Keytool
- e.g. to generate .p12 with Dilithium keypair and self-signed certificate:

```
keytool \  
  -providerpath bcprov-jdk18on-175.jar \  
  -provider org.bouncycastle.pqc.jcajce.provider.BouncyCastlePQCProvider \  
  -genkeypair \  
  -keyalg Dilithium5 \  
  -alias cdoc20-client-pqc-CA \  
  -keystore cdoc20clientpqcCA.p12 \  
  -storepass passwd \  
  -sigalg Dilithium5 \  
  -dname "CN=cdoc20-client-pqc-CA,OU=ISRI,O=CyberneticaAS,L=Brno,S=Czechia,C=CZ"
```

This week's news

- **Post-Quantum Cryptography conference 2023** by PKI Consortium
 - Recording on YT
 - PQC Migration Handbook
 - Experiments on embedded devices are unrealistic
 - FIDO2 tokens are highly limited
 - PQC on mobile phones might require new HW co-processors
 - banking is XY years behind



Conclusions







- **Implementing PQC today is...**
 - **...complicated:**
 - different libraries → different approaches and documentation level
 - computational constraints, adaptation and tweaking
 - standardization is not finished (and complete - MPC, ZKP, etc..)
 - **...doable:**
 - authentication framework, crypto systems for encryption, signing containers, etc.
 - **...worth it:**
 - long-term data protection, experience
 - **...helpful:**
 - big space for open-source PQ contributions, reduce confusion

Thank you for listening!

References:

- links in presentation
- [PQ authentication framework](#)
- [Notes on PQC in PHP](#)
- write me an email!

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