HOW WE THINK ttve distinct steps in reflection i. The occur rence of a difficulty (a) in the lack of adaptation of means to end shall deal, in a later chapter, with the evolution of abstract thinking out of that which is relatively practical and direct ; here we are concerned only with the com mon elements found in all the types. Upon examination, each instance reveals, more or less clearly, five logically distinct steps : (z) a felt difficulty ; (zY) its location and definition ; (iii) suggestion of pos sible solution ; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion ; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief. i. The first and second steps frequently fuse into one. The difficulty may be felt with sufficient definiteness as to set the mind at once speculating upon its probable solution, or an undefined uneasiness and shock may come first, leading only later to definite attempt to find out what is the matter. Whether the two steps are distinct or blended, there is the factor emphasized in our original account of reflection viz. the perplexity W QJ- problem. In the first of the three cases cited, the difficulty resides in the conflict between conditions at hand and a desired and intended result, between an end and the means for reaching it. The purpose of keep ing an engagement at a certain time, and the existing hour taken in connection with the location, are not con gruous. The object of thinking is to introduce congruity between the two. The given conditions cannot themselves be altered ; time will not go backward nor will the distance between i6th Street and I24th Street shorten itself. The problem is the discovery of inter vening terms which when inserted between the remoter end and the given means will harmonize them with each other. Dewey, J. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910. Tento materiál je určen pouze pro studijní účely. ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT 73 In the second case, the difficulty experienced is the () incompatibility of a suggested and (temporarily) accepted belief that the pole is a flagpole, with certain an object other facts. Suppose we symbolize the qualities that suggest flagpole by the letters a, b, c\ those that op pose this suggestion by the letters /, q, r. There is, of course, nothing inconsistent in the qualities themselves ; but in pulling the mind to different and incongruous conclusions they conflict hence the problem. Here the object is the discovery of some object ((7), of which a, b, c, and/, q, r, may all be appropriate traits just as, in our first case, it is to discover a course of action which will combine existing conditions and a remoter re sult in a single whole. The method of solution is also the same : discovery of intermediate qualities (the posi tion of the pilot house, of the pole, the need of an index to the boat's direction) symbolized by d, g, /, conjecture^ guess, hypothesis, and (in elaborate cases) theory. Since suspended belief, or the postpone ment of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable explana tion to favor, cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking. 4. The process of developing the bearings or, as 4. they are more technically termed, the implications of any idea with respect to any problem, is termed reason- of an idea ing. 1 As an idea is inferred from given facts, so reasoning 1 This term is sometimes extended to denote the entire reflective pro cess just as inference (which in the sense of test is best reserved for Dewey, J. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910. Tento materiál je určen pouze pro studijní účely. ?6 HOW WJE THINK sets out from an Idea. The idea of elevated road Is de veloped into the idea of difficulty of locating station, length of time occupied on the journey, distance of station at the other end from place to be reached. In the second case, the implication of a flagpole is seen to be a verti cal position ; of a wireless apparatus, location on a high part of the ship and, moreover, absence from every casual tugboat ; while the idea of index to direction in which the boat moves, when developed, is found to cover all the details of the case. Reasoning has the same effect upon a suggested solution as more intimate and extensive observation has upon the original problem. Acceptance of the sugges tion in its first form is prevented by looking into it more thoroughly. Conjectures that seem plausible at first sight are often found unfit or even absurd when their full consequences are traced out. Even when reason ing out the bearings of a supposition does not lead to re jection, it develops the idea into a form in which it is more apposite to the problem. Only when, for example, the conjecture that a pole was an index-pole had been thought out into its bearings could its particular appli cability to the case in hand be judged. Suggestions at first seemingly remote and wild are frequently so transformed by being elaborated into what follows from them as to become apt and fruitful. The development of an idea through reasoning helps at least to supply the intervening or intermediate terms that link together into a consistent whole apparently discrepant extremes (ante, p. 72). the third step) is sometimes used in the same broad sense. But reasoning (or ratiocination) seems to be peculiarly adapted to express what the older writers called the ** notional ** or ** dialectic " process of developing the meaning of a given idea. Dewey, J. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910. Tento materiál je určen pouze pro studijní účely. ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT 77 5. The concluding and conclusive step is some kind 5. Corrobof experimental corroboration, or verification, of the ^ a ^^d conjectural idea. Reasoning shows that if the idea be formation of adopted, certain consequences follow. So far the conelusion is hypothetical or conditional. If we look and find present all the conditions demanded by the theory, and if we find the characteristic traits called for by rival alternatives to be lacking, the tendency to believe, to accept, is almost irresistible. Sometimes direct observation furnishes corroboration, as in the case of the pole on the boat. In other cases, as in that of the bubbles, experiment is required ; that is, conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see if the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur. If it is found that the experimental results agree with the theoretical, or rationally deduced, results, and if there is reason to believe that only the conditions in question would yield such results, the confirmation is so strong as to induce a conclusion at least until contrary facts shall indicate the advisability of its revision. Observation exists at the beginning and again at the Thinking 1 end of the process : at the beginning, to determine more definitely and precisely the nature of the difficulty to be observations dealt with ; at the end, to test the value of some hypo- ginning and thetically entertained conclusion. Between those two at the end termini of observation, we find the more distinctively mental aspects of the entire thought-cycle : (f) inference, the suggestion of an explanation or solution; and (if) reasoning, the development of the bearings and im plications of the suggestion. Reasoning requires some experimental observation to confirm it, while experi ment can be economically and fruitfully conducted only Dewey, J. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910. Tento materiál je určen pouze pro studijní účely. HOW WK THINK The trained mind one that judges the extent of each step advisable in a given situation on the basis of an idea that has been tentatively devel oped by reasoning. The disciplined, or logically trained, mind the aim of the educative process is the mind able to judge how far each of these steps needs to be carried in any par ticular situation. No cast-iron rules can be laid down. Each case has to be dealt with as it arises, on the basis of its importance and of the context in which it occurs. To take too much pains in one case is as foolish as illogical as to take too little in another. At one extreme, almost any conclusion that insures prompt and unified action may be better than any long delayed conclusion ; while at the other, decision may have to be postponed for a long period perhaps for a life time. The trained mind is the one that best grasps the degree of observation, forming of ideas, reasoning, and experimental testing required in any special case, and that profits the most, in future thinking, by mistakes made in the past. What is important is that the mind should be sensitive to problems and skilled in methods of attack and solution. Dewey, J. How We Think. Boston: Heath, 1910. Tento materiál je určen pouze pro studijní účely.