

Architecture of the European Security

Materials of the International Conference
Opolnica, 6-9 May 2001

Edited by
Jan Kolasa and Michał Rynkowski

Łukasz Kulesa
Jagiellonian University

The WEU and its Place in the European Security Architecture. Summary of the Last Decade Developments

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Introduction

If someone ever wanted to write about the question of 'bad luck' in the international security organisations' history, the acronym WEU would surely occur at the very beginning of such a paper. The WEU spent first three decades of its existence in a sort of 'cryogenic' state, overshadowed by its sister security organisation – NATO. In the last decade, we have witnessed the revitalisation of the WEU, the short period of its full activity and, in the end – the loss of its significance, as the frames of the new Common European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union were put in place. It seems that the WEU is bound to fade away and form nothing more than a mere footnote in the public international law textbooks.

The task of writing a comprehensive history of the ill-fated organisation should be left to historians.¹ Nevertheless, I think it is worth concentrating on two aspects of

¹ Many works on this topic and on detailed problems of the relations of the WEU with NATO and the EU or its institutions' evolution over time are available, e.g. in Polish: R. Zięba, *Europejska tożsamość bezpieczeństwa i obrony*, Scholar, Warszawa 2000; J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998; in English: *In the midst*

the WEU's function in the European security system – as a collective defence organisation and as a regional security organisation. That will be useful in trying to answer the question of why the WEU did not become a lasting part of the European security architecture – which is the topic of the last part of this paper.

1. The WEU as a collective defence organisation

The right of states to defend themselves against an armed attack, individually or collectively, is provided for in Article 51 of The Charter of the United Nations. This provision was the legal basis of the collective defence clause included in Article IV of the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (the Brussels Treaty) signed on the 17th of March, 1948. When the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954 and the Western European Union was created as a new international organisation,² the collective defence clause was transferred to Article V. It states that, “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”.³

A similar clause was included in the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of this Treaty reads as follows, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.⁴

The Modified Brussels Treaty availed the WEU to NATO, stating that the Member States should work in “close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” and that the WEU Council would “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters” in recognition of “the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO” (Art. IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty).

of change. On the development of west European security and defence cooperation, Peter Schmidt (ed.) Baden-Baden 1992; G. Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration, Wyn. 1998; A. Deighton, Western European Union, 1954-1999 Defence, Security, Integration, Oxford 1997.

² *Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence. Signed in Brussels on the 17th of March, 1948, as Amended by the “Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty”, signed in Paris on October 23, 1954; the text [in:] R. Zięba, Europejska tożsamość bezpieczeństwa..., pp. 214-219.*

³ *Ibidem*, Art. V.

⁴ *The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C. on the 4th of April 1949; from the NATO Internet site: /basicxt/treaty.htm.*

In practice, given the cold war reality, only NATO, backed by the military might of the United States, could defend Europe against the possible Soviet aggression. The predominant role of NATO led to the diminishing of the WEU's significance⁵ and the organisation, quickly nicknamed ‘the sleeping beauty of London’ (after the organisation's headquarters location), in practice suspended its activities. According to the interpretation of Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty, realisation of the collective defence obligations (Art. V) rested with NATO.

A closer scrutiny of the two above mentioned clauses reveals a serious difference between them. Whereas the obligation to provide military help (*casus foederis*) in the Brussels Treaty is a categorical one (the Contracting Parties will “afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”), in the North Atlantic Treaty there exists an obligation to assist the country under attack “by taking [...] such action as [a given country] deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. According to a Polish author, “It means that at the very moment of signing the North Atlantic Treaty the United States rejected automatic use of armed forces in case of the necessity of helping the European allies, in spite of the position taken by France and other countries”.⁶ The difference may seem to be of no practical meaning as long as there is no threat of an armed attack against states – parties to the both treaties.⁷ But in order to assess the role of the WEU in the European security system the question of the importance of the obligation arising from Article V and the responsibilities of the WEU as a collective defence organisation must be examined.

The stressing of Article V's importance became a kind of useful and reassuring mantra in the official documents of the WEU. From “The Hague Platform”⁸ of 1987 to the Marseille Declaration⁹ of November 2000 – the collective defence clause has been presented as one of the most important tasks of the WEU. Yet, Art. V obligations are binding for 10 full members of the WEU that are also members of NATO. The WEU

⁵ Until the 1980's, WEU supervised the production of weapon by the Federal Republic of Germany through the Armament Control Agency.

⁶ S. Parzymies, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, Scholar, Warszawa 1997, p. 499.

⁷ It is worth pointing out, though, that the argument of different standards of commitment was raised in 1983 when President Reagan launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (a.k.a. ‘the Star Wars Initiative’). The Europeans feared that their continent would become the main arena of a future nuclear war and that the United States, protected by an anti-missile shield, may abandon the European allies. The same arguments are used now as the US pursue a concept of an anti-missile system: the National Missile Defence.

⁸ WEU Ministerial Council, *Platform on European Security interests*, The Hague, 27 October 1987, part III.a.1: “We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve” (all WEU documents cited according to the texts provided on the WEU Internet site: <http://www/weu.int>).

⁹ WEU Ministerial Council, *Marseille Declaration*, Marseille, 13 November 2000: “WEU residual functions and structures which will be in place by July 2001 at the latest and will enable the Member States to fulfil the commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly those arising from Articles V and IX, to which the Member States reaffirm their attachment”.

has no separate mechanisms and assets for common defence. In the case of an armed attack against their territory, WEU Member States could only act within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

A good summary of the present situation is given in a speech from the 16th of October, 2000 by Mr Pierre Richard, who represented the French Presidency of the EU. „First of all, and this is the most important political [sic!] point, the collective defence commitment under Article V must continue. None of the signatories, and certainly not my country, has any intention of calling that commitment into question. [...] Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will continue to embody the solidarity commitment of the Ten European member countries, which we shall implement through the Atlantic Alliance”.¹⁰ It seems clear that the Member States consider Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty as having no practical meaning. They see their collective defence realised through NATO and ignore the danger that during a crisis non-WEU members of NATO may use different standards of engagement that reflect their ‘weaker’ obligation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In reality – the WEU does not function as a collective defence organisation and is not regarded as one, even by its members.

2. The WEU as a regional security organisation

The term ‘regional security organisation’ needs to be clarified.¹¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 52-54) deals with regional arrangements. According to Article 52, regional arrangements or agencies can be set “for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”, they must be “appropriate for regional action” and their activities must be “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. The Modified Brussels Treaty in Article VIII.3 states that, “At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.” This provision gives the WEU competence and discretion to conduct missions ‘out-of-area’ (this term was originally used with reference to NATO and the operational area referred to in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the WEU introduced successfully its own term: “Petersberg tasks”). Unlike NATO, where the legal basis for those kinds of missions was discussed for some time,¹² the WEU could immediately engage in the maintenance of international peace and security.

¹⁰ Assembly of WEU, *The implementation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and WEU's future role – reply to the annual report of the Council*, Document C/1720, 15 November 2000, p. 18.

¹¹ On this subject: L. Vierucci, *WEU – a regional partner of the United Nations*, Chaillot Paper No 12, Institute for Security Studies, Paris 1993.

¹² It was a part of a difficult process of NATO's internal reform and the adjustment to a new situation, finalised by the adoption of the Alliance's strategic concept in 1999.

The first WEU operations were conducted in fact by some of its members using only the organisation's framework (Council meetings, ‘WEU correspondents’), without the operational command of the WEU. These were the mine clearance operation in the Persian Gulf (1987-88) and the coordination of naval operations for the enforcement of the embargo on Iraq during the 1990 crisis.

Building operational capabilities to conduct ‘out-of-area’ missions became the most important aim of the WEU when the organisation became a component of the European Union. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty situated the WEU as the institution which, “as an integral part of the development” of EU, could be requested “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. In the Declaration of the 9 WEU States on the Role of the Western European Union – attached to the Treaty on European Union – Member States decided that “WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means”.¹³

On the 19th of June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Petersberg near Bonn and issued the Petersberg Declaration. The essential fragment stated that “military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for;

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”.¹⁴

The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, included the Petersberg missions catalogue into the EU Treaty (Art. 17.2). The Treaty still acknowledged that the Western European Union is “an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability” (Art. 17.1). The EU was to “avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications” (Art. 17.3).

In the years 1992-2000, the WEU conducted a number of operations in the context of the Balkan conflict, acting on its own initiative or upon a formal request of the EU in a whole range of Petersberg tasks:

- operation Sharp Guard (1993-1996); the WEU Member States' naval forces participated in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic;
- Danube Operation (1993-1996); the WEU Member States provided assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions;
- Police contingent in Mostar (1994-1996); the WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

¹³ Declaration of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union on *The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance*, Maastricht, 10 December 1991, part C.5.

¹⁴ WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, part II.4.

- General Security Surveillance Mission of Kosovo (1998-2000); the WEU Satellite Centre has carried out a satellite surveillance of the Kosovo region;
- WEU Demining Mission in Croatia (WEUDAM; 1999-May 2001); the WEU provided advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre;
- the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) for Albania (started in 1997, will be taken over directly by the EU); WEU provides help to rebuild the Albanian police by a process of modernisation and training.

At first sight the record of WEU activities looks impressive. But, as Antonio Missiroli observed, “the missions that WEU has carried out to date – have been particularly low-key, low-risk and low-cost”.¹⁵ Compared with the NATO engagement during the Balkan conflict, particularly the Kosovo ‘Allied Force’ operation, they turn out to be ‘second – category’ operations. Although no official document would admit that, the WEU did not live up to the expectations it generated in the beginning of the last decade. Two main reasons for the failure of the WEU as a regional security organisation can be given:

Firstly, the capabilities shortages. Apart from naval operations, the other missions of the WEU concerned only police forces. The WEU was technically unable to conduct large-scale operations. The forces at WEU’s disposal (Forces Answerable to WEU – FAWEU) lacked important assets, like strategic transport or a unified command system, that could only be obtained from NATO. Negotiations on agreements to use NATO assets and planning resources dragged for a long time and mutually satisfying solutions could not be reached.¹⁶

Secondly, the lack of political will to make a better use of the WEU. It was just a reflection of the general inability of Western Europe in the 1990’s to cope with security crises, for example in the Balkans. There was no consensus among the Member States about their foreign policy priorities and about the role of the WEU. In these circumstances, without a clear mandate for the organisation and without setting strategic aims, it is not surprising that the WEU so rarely and with limited means engaged in field missions.

3. The WEU – a missed opportunity?

With the future of the WEU decided by the WEU Council in Marseille, it is easy to explain the last decade as a necessary transition period for the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Accordingly, WEU cannot

¹⁵ A. Missiroli, *CFSP, defence and flexibility*, Chaillot Paper No 38, Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris 2000, p. 18.

¹⁶ The issue of WEU – NATO relations, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), cannot be discussed in this paper. Let me only observe that a large number of official documents and an enormous amount of concept work within the two organisations resulted in very little practical advantage for the security system – mainly because of the lack of political will of the Member States.

treated as a kind of testing ground, a “laboratory for the development of a specifically European approach to the conduct of crisis management operations”,¹⁷ with CSDP as a final product. The mistakes made by the Member States in the last decade with regard to the WEU in the implementation of two tasks laid down in the Brussels Treaty (as examined above) would be then justified by the successful start of CSDP.

Such an approach can, however, lead to the repeating of the WEU errors. At the beginning of the 1990’s, there also was a genuine determination in Europe to develop WEU as an important factor of the continent’s security architecture. The same determination can be observed now around the CSDP concept.

In the report “The future of European security and defence cooperation. Security Architecture in the 1990’s” presented at a meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on the 22nd of February 1991, the WEU’s role was described as a “bridge between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance”.¹⁸ The report pointed out several organisational and legal advantages that favoured WEU as a leader in providing security in the region.¹⁹

Placing the WEU in the European security system, Member States adopted the concept of the ‘dual nature’ of the WEU. The Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union attached to the Maastricht Treaty stated that “the WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”.²⁰ This solution, with the WEU as an ‘interface’ between two organisations of a different nature – a military alliance and an European integration project²¹ – was a contribution to the new co-operative security system²² – proposed as an antithesis of the cold war reality of antagonistic military alliances. The supporters of the co-operative security argued that after the fall of communism international relations should be based on commonly shared values of democ-

¹⁷ WEU Internet site, *European Security and Defence: The WEU’s role*, <http://www.weu.int/eng/about.html>.

¹⁸ Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, *WEU’s role and place in the new European security architecture*, Paris, 22 February 1991.

¹⁹ WEU’s institutional advantages listed in the report: a. It is an organisation based on a Treaty which affirms the member countries’ intention progressively to achieve European integration; b. It is the only European organisation based on a mutual defence commitment (Article V); c. It brings together both Foreign and Defence Ministers; d. Its Treaty (Article VIII.3) places no geographical restrictions on its competencies; e. Its Treaty contains a clause which commits the member countries to work in close cooperation with NATO; f. It is backed by a permanent, international Secretariat; g. It is an organisation with a parliamentary dimension in the form of the WEU Assembly whose competence is Treaty-based.

²⁰ Declaration of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union on *The Role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance*, Maastricht, 10 December 1991, p. 1.

²¹ From the international point of view, the WEU is generally not considered an inter-governmental organisation with an international legal capacity, so a term ‘project’ seems suitable.

²² About the cooperative security model, e.g. in Polish: A. Rotfeld, *Rozszerzenie NATO a umacnianie euroatlantyckich struktur bezpieczeństwa*, *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 1/1999 n. 65 ff.

closely together in maintaining peace and security and should be open for all states interested in joining (*inclusiveness of security*).

In the case of the WEU – the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU's Maastricht Declarations and the Petersberg Declaration seemed to set new standards in security matters. In the spirit of co-operative security, the WEU developed also the unique, flexible and multiple concept of membership. During the last decade the organisation expanded from 9 to 28 members to form the "WEU family of nations".²³ Apart from the group of 10 full members, the organisation's categories of participants include Associate Members,²⁴ Observers²⁵ and Associate Partners.²⁶ The flexible member statuses of the WEU present different degrees of involvement in the WEU affairs, but the level of engagement in the organisation's day-to-day work, particularly in case of the Associate Members and Observers – is deeper²⁷ than, for example, NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. In practice – most decisions and activities within the WEU are carried out at the level of 21 (full members, Associate Members and Observers) and, as it was pointed out, the WEU "long ago blurred legalistic distinctions between different categories of membership".²⁸

Unfortunately, the WEU prospects for success quickly fell prey to political controversies. The WEU found itself in the middle of numerous quarrels on different issues – on the role of the United States, on the reform of NATO, on the future of European integration, on the strategy for the Balkan conflict (to name just the most important).

Suddenly the biggest advantage of the organisation – its dual identity – became its biggest weakness. The idea that the WEU would take orders from the EU and co-operate on the operational level with NATO was put into question. On the one side, the WEU was accused of being a European instrument of weakening NATO and undermining the position of the United States. On the other side – the charge was that it gives the United States a voice in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.²⁹

²³ On this subject: M. Cebeci, *A Delicate Process of Participation: The question of participation of WEU Associate Members in decision-making for EU-led Petersberg operations, with special reference to Turkey*, "Occasional Paper" No 10, Institute for Security Studies, Paris 1999.

²⁴ European NATO members: Iceland, Norway and Turkey (from 1995); Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (from 1999).

²⁵ EU-only members: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden plus Denmark (EU and NATO member state).

²⁶ 7 Central Europe candidates for accession to EU that are not NATO members.

²⁷ E.g. participation in WEU Council meetings, committing forces to WEU operations. More details in: WEU Assembly, *The WEU associate members and the new European security architecture*, Document A/1690, 10 May 2000.

²⁸ R.G. Whitman, *Amsterdam's unfinished business? The Blair government's initiative and the future of the WEU*, "Occasional Paper" No 7, Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris 1999, p. 23.

²⁹ P. Quiles, *Défense européenne et l'OTAN: la dérive*, "Le Monde", 11.06.1996: 'When WEU conducts an operation using NATO assets, "the important decisions on military matters would still require NATO consent and NATO would all the time enjoy political control. That would make the United States, the 16th member of the EU when security and defence issues are concerned"', cited in: D. Milczarek, *Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa w stosunkach Unia Europejska – Stany Zjednoczone*, "Studia Europejskie", 1/1999.

The dual membership concept was criticised because it was giving the countries that were not members of the EU and/or NATO too much influence on these organisations through their engagement in the WEU. Some EU and NATO member states argued that close cooperation with the third countries inside the WEU could be an obstacle for the efficiency of the internal decision-making process.

The WEU was faulted for not developing its own military capabilities and at the same time warned not to 'duplicate' NATO assets. As a result, the organisation's operational abilities were not considered useful both by NATO and by the EU. NATO did not want to accept a situation in which the WEU would "play a 'good cop' [using NATO assets in low risk missions], leaving all the dirty job of handling difficult missions for the Alliance".³⁰ The EU found it difficult to coordinate and finance operations that combined both EU and WEU elements – or even reach an agreement on the decision to launch a mission in the EU Council forum.

From the very beginning, various propositions on modifying the role of the WEU were discussed. The highest point (at least when relations with the EU are discussed) came during the Intergovernmental Conference that prepared the amendment of the Treaty of European Union (1996-1997). The official proposals³¹ ranged from the merger of both organisations to their complete separation – which reveals the level of confusion on the subject.

Among these difficulties, WEU Member States never seriously considered the "fixing" of the WEU and the change of its role, for example by amending the Brussels Treaty.³² Instead, the European Union started the process of taking over the crisis management tasks from the competencies of the WEU. The Cologne Declaration³³ of the EU European Council from the 4th of June 1999 laid the foundations for the Common European Security and Defence Policy. EU members decided that the EU should have "the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks". To achieve that, the Union "must have the capacity for autonomous actions, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so". Regarding the future of the WEU as a regional security organisation, EU stressed that "the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose" by the end of the year 2000, when the necessary functions of the WEU would be

³⁰ A. Bailes, *Europe's Defence Challenge. Reinventing the Atlantic Alliance*, "Foreign Affairs", 1/1997, p. 17.

³¹ Full review of proposals: Briefing No 11 from the Intergovernmental Conference: *WEU, Security and Defence*; <http://.dg7/fiches/en/fiche11.htm>.

³² Modification of Article IV (co-operation with NATO), Article V (common defence) and addition of the Petersberg tasks into the Brussels Treaty, propositions included e.g. in: WEU Assembly, *WEU's role in the organisation of European security after the decisions taken by the European Union in Amsterdam and by NATO in Madrid*, Document 1581, 16 October 1997, point 18.

³³ Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999; *European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, [in:] J. Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?*, Chaillot Paper No 43, Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2000.

included into the EU. The WEU prepared the transfer of its assets³⁴ and the takeover of certain responsibilities to the EU and the termination of all operational activities. According to the decisions of the WEU Council taken in Marseille in November 2000 – when the EU becomes fully operational, the WEU will perform only “residual functions”.³⁵

What a difference will CSDP make? The European Union’s representatives state that the advantage of CSDP is its comprehensive approach to crisis management. As it was stated by Javier Solana, Secretary General of the EU Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, “Our aim is to equip the Union to respond effectively to international crises using all the tools at its disposal: diplomacy, economic measures, humanitarian assistance and, ultimately, the use of military forces. The ability to integrate these measures will set the EU apart and allow it to play an international role consistent with its responsibilities and the expectations of its citizens”.³⁶

On the technical level, the main difference of CSDP is that it is supposed to concentrate on the Petersberg tasks, leaving the controversial issue of common defence to NATO. This is however nothing new – the WEU also in practice availed itself to NATO in the field of the Article V commitments. When maintaining regional security is concerned, the problems that CSDP face are almost identical to those that toppled the WEU – the lack of the command system, inadequate operational capabilities or establishing working relations with NATO, not mentioning the willingness of the EU to use the tool it created.

The European Union must still find a way to overcome old WEU weaknesses. A simple act of replacing one organisation by another will not solve the problems that eventually caused WEU’s downfall.

³⁴ The Toreijon Satellite Center and the Institute for Security Studies.

³⁵ WEU Ministerial Council, *Marseille Declaration*, Marseille, 13 November 2000.

³⁶ Remarks by Dr Javier Solana, High Representative of the European Union for CFSP on the occasion of the official launching of the Political and Security Committee, <http://www.weu.int/eng/speeches/s000301a.htm>.

NATO