1 '■;                          ;
The Three Political Economies of the Welfare 'State *
The Legacy of Classical Political Economy
Most debates on the welfare state have been guided by two questions. First, will the salience of class diminish with the extension of social •citizenship? In other words, can the welfare state fundamentally transform capitalist society? Second, what are the causal forces behind . welfare-state development?
Tiiese rue dons a.c »iOi r cen«. Indeed, they weie foi mal? ted b/ he u-i^ee^rb-ceníriy political eccacnists '03 ye?.s before any w-]f~ie Suľie "--u D^hdy be t~ ci to h ve come !«io cjcr^rcj. Tie classical political economists - vhether of liberal, conservative, ci i Marxist p^iCiirion - "/pie |cececppj3d \/idi Hie lebtcncHo between c?t>iial-i^ni end welfare, 1 (!ey ceiialni/ ?a >e d^fc e*H (a il ugjc ly ..: ;?«.'* re) r 3, ci3, i* u t c. r p iírly:e3f^ o er „d _<_■ : i uie eiciio^ip r ^e;<» ±_j.rls.et (ard ^iO£enYl? ^ d the ctate (d- gggggy)-
ľo^c^i^?! ^ .iCO-^L"!-!^ aT cT/*"- ľc«i~""*Ve'h uf '-c/e-1 f ceiuJ puisne i r/7)lTc a/. 7f. /-'dani innh, hz v~b\i *> * as «h^ 3t«penor „nenn ior í'e abo'iMC» o« el~c , ín^uall y} ~^d pa/ilege. /-sígo fro a a iicxscr/ trr iiruiiß, b»eto I«"» ov> jh on wotdi only sühe the eunaiL"^ p~0'^ -3 of í o^'p^ut» 'e ó^v-r^e -"nci ci^at3 ,o^ if ohec, i f    ~^tK iicf », aid u'^^u^ cy: the sTie *\Au!Js r'-so; «.he rva '"«•í en*
IzJ- y 2L^.»?> ^d .^i^,>"> i'L „3/ ^±^iilZ_ *- ~^'        J'    ^^    u.;
1
1 í « cl^p.er lo rJaOi^d 1 o a r i[ i í- e    3 c 1 __ A -\ jug /   ťt \iai 1 1 iuc  ľ     r/14
10      TfäETHilKß VVĽI.FAI'.E-ST.-ViĽ REOIMES
TUE THREE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF TT IE WELFARE-STATE
Jl
ß
<U^
frfiVtf*
t.Q—policy  advocacy.   Nassau   Senior   and   later  Manchester liberals emphasized the Iaissez::xair^~'~eieTT^^
^sndalľpSt^^                                                          and thg_^cformě3Z
liberals^ in.j^^jwcrpj^rgso^^ts_of a modicum of political regulation^
Yet they all were agreed tjiatthe road to Gawí^a^Qigs^Qň^jiaul<L. ■
be paved with a maximum ofJge^m^ke_t^^
interference.
^Ih3Feii!riusiastic embrace of market capitalism may now appear unjustified. But we must not forget that the reality they spoke of v/as a state upholding absolutist privileges, mercantilist protectionism, and ■pervasive corruption. What they attacked was a system of government' that repressed their ideals of both freedom and enterprise. Hence, theirs was revolutionary theory, and from this vantage point, we can • understand why Adam Smith sometimes reads like Karl Marx.2
Democracy became an Achilles' heel to many liberals. As long as capitalism remained a world of small property owners, property itself would have little to fear from democracy, Bui with industrialization, ■ the proletarian masses emerged, for whom democracy was'a means to. curtail the privileges of property. The liberals rightly feared universal suffrage, for it would be likely to politicize the distributional struggle, 'pervert the market, and fuel inefficiencies. Many liberals discovered that democracy would usurp or destroy the market.
Both conservative and MarxisU^Q^^                     understood this_
^ contradictory bu£proposed, of mmml^O]yr)od^sgMuoim. The most .-^coherent fc^^
liistoricaLschaolr^                                            List, Adolph Wagner,
zu£ĹibMMjM}moU&£. They refused to belieyj[that Ihelraw casj^i^xus""......
oi_t^^gmk^ wasche^ only or the best guaranteee of jjconomjc_ effíciencj. Thejrjdedjvas the perpetuation of patrlirgliy„andjihsoliit- '
iSj2L.aäJ±JÜ2i^^
withoutclass jsfruggie^
One prominent conservative school promoted the '|nonar£liical_w^^ mre^state5, whjch would guarantee social welfare, class harmony, loyalty, and productivity. In this moHelTan eli
y
^.
gnjLorpduction system com£a_iioLímii^^^                                                     An authoritarian
state would be far superior jo the Élgos^ofmarkets in harmonizing the good^ofilie-siate. community, and individual/^
Conservative political economy^emerged m_ľeaction to _the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. It was avowedly nationalistic and"" anii-:rew5iircIoiiary, and sought to. arrest the democratic impulse. • It feared social leveling, and favored a society that retained both hierar-
chy and class. Status,, rank, and class wgre_natural and given; class conflicts, however, were not. ÍIf_we_permit democratic massj^arádpa-jon1_and_allow authority andjstatus boundaries to dissolve, the resuithL /'jjojlapse of the social order. jL
P   Marxist political economy not only abhorred the market's atomizing
^^^^^^Td^oT^XB^^SI^SI^^^ claim that markets guarantee
equality. Since, as Dobb (194,6) puts it, capital accumulation disowns
people of property, the end result will be ever-deeper class divisions.
And as these generaie sharpened conflicts, the liberal state will be
l^^^^^^^S^S^^I^^X^^^^.....afl^Jjgl1J?iGtV? and, .come to the
defence „of the propertied, classes. For Marxism this is the foundation
The central question, not only for Marxism but for the entire contemporary debate on the welfare state, is whether, and under what conditions, the class divisions ..wand social. in^equalitigs__produced by..
ca^itali^
.Fearing that democracy might produce socialism, the liberals were hardly eager to extend it. The socialists, in contrast, suspected that parliamentarism would be little more than an empty' shell or, as Lenin suggested, a mere 'talking shop' (Jessop, 1982). This line of analysis, echoed in much of contemporary Marxism, produced the belief that social reforms were little more than a dike in a steadily leaking capitalist order. By definition, they could not be a response to the desire of the working classes for emancipation.4 ." • It took major extensions of political rights before the socialists could wholeheartedly embrace a more optimistic analysis of parliamentarism. The theoretically most sophisticated contributions came from the Au-stro-German Marxists such as Adler, Bauer, and Eduard Heimann. According to Heimann (1929), it may have been the case that con-■ servative reforms were motivated by luňe else than a desire to repress labor .mobilization, But once introduced, they become contradictory: the balance _of jslass,. power is fundamentally jitered^^when workers 5Zi     :       •eüjoxspcial rights, for the social wage lessens the workers dependence^
_ qnJte-4nari££i^                      jand thus .turns into a potential power
'resource. To Heimann, "social policy introduces an alien element into the capitalist political economy. It is a Trojan horse thai can penetrate the frontier between capitalism and socialism. This intellectual position h?s enjoyed quite a renaissance in recent Marxism (Offe, 1985; Bowles and Gihtis, 1986),                    i
. The social democratic model, as outlined above, did not necessarily abKdorH^                                           fundamental equality requires
12      THE THREE WELFARE-STATE REGIMES
economic socialization. Yet historical experience soon demonstrated that socialization was a goal that could not be pursued realistically througli^ärí
Spphdji^e^ Q&nĹl$2M$g^^                                        wasj5remised on i:w(l3J§l}~-
meats. The first was that workers require social resources, health, an J education to participate j^etivěTy as socialist citi^ns/TTh^šecônľ a?gůměmn^^^                        is not only eriiancip^iX^_buLis_.alsoj,^
precondition forěčonomic efficiency4r^/í^rinrll4yrdal, 1936). Fol-lowíňg Marx, inTEis^řgumeniEThe strategie value of welfare policies is that they help promote the onward march of the productive forces in capitalism. Bui the beauty of the social democratic strategy was that social policy woujd^alsojgsiilt ži^^owerjmobuizatíon. Bx.eradicating^ poverty^nemplopiient^nd compktejTageJ^ state increaseFpoBpcaT capacities. and dimmishe^the_social divisions thaTare^                                            workers.                      ———
The social democratic model, then, is jfather to one of the leading hypothesěT^                                             debate: pa^m^niarjidass£_
mobižiiatiQn is ajineai^^                                 the socialisj^idgals^of
equality, justice, frggdogi^and solidarity, ^
Our forebears in political economy defined the analytic basis of much recent scholarship. They isolated the key variables of class, state, market, and democracy, and they formulated tlie basic propositions about citizenship and class, efficiency and equality, capitalism and socialism. Contemporary social science distinguishes itself from classical political economy on two scientifically vital fronts. First5 it defines itself as a positive science and shies away from normative prescription . (Rcbbins, 1976). Second, classical political economists had little interest in historical variability: they saw their efforts as leading towards a system of universal laws. Although contemporary political economy sometimes still clings to the belief in absolute truths, the comparative and historical method that today underpins almost all good political economy is one that reveals variation and permeability.
Despite these differences, most recent scholarship has as its meal point the staie-economy relationship deilned by nhmteeník-ceníary political economists. And, given the enormous growth of uio welfare state, li h understandable that it has become a major test esse fcr-eor-cemh'm- theories of poHücai economy.
THE. TTiREE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF 11IE WELFARE-STATE       13
We shall review below the contributions of comparative research on the development of welfare $tates in advanced capitalist countries. It will be. argued that most scholarship has been misdirected, mainly because it became detached from its theoretical foundations. We must therefore recast both the methodology and the concepts of political economy'in order to adequately study the welfare state. This will constitute the focus of the final section of this chapter.
Two types of approach have dominated in explanations of welfare states; one stresses structures and whole systems, the other, institutions and actors.
The systems/structuralist approach
Systems or structuj^sUlificiLy^eeks to capture jheJogic.of development hölistically. It is the system that 'wills', and what happens is~ therefore easily interpreted as a functional requisite for the reproduction of society and economy. Because its attention is concentrateďpn the laws, of motion of systems, this approach is inclined to emphasize ciX^nzEooiLdinilariiJes rather thiiTdlfSrences; beingJnmisíríalized_ Qr,x.afiitaEgt-o¥@^deí£iiiiines culturalvariatioiis_or differences in power_ ísJeIiohs^
Qua vai^£LMgins_jíZÍth>b. theory cf industrial society, and argues áiazi^äu^&ldizäÚQi jiškcsjotitů policx^tQie^es^arymid possible^ UPceGgaijLbecause p4.3znidusjnjai_inodes of social reproduction, such as the family, f^e chmrh, aopj^j,^ oblige, and guh\\solidarity are des-lL°Yšf"i by the forces attached to modernization, sujsb_as_social mobility, uniij^iiigr^                      and market dependence. The crux of The
ma tie; is dial 'he rnariiei is no adequste~šuD^íiiuTe because k caters only ?o íiio"e who ?ie able í o perform ii it. M^nce. the 'welfare HB*2íi*±5±LÍ!^^by die iiajjom^iaie.^
|
14      THE THREE WELFARE-STATE R   Ol   íí S
level of economic development, and t>us surplus, is need^ť m ordei to permit the diversion of scarce Tesouiceb itoih prodlila* e use (lave^f-ment) to welfare (Wilensky and LebeauA, 1958)   In this sense, this perspective follows in the footstep* of the old liueiř\>   Social j£QiS-_ tribirtlorLffifi^^                                                                              will
a negative-sum trade-off be avoidao^e (Gkun, 1975)
The new structuralist Marxism »s sled mgly parage!   \ba cJasšpäH^                                                              its "-m-d^ral siart-
ing-poinDOMEI^lIwelföre~siD"te~"is an tik/í-o*., p cdicc on ihp
capitalist-4iiade.....of production. Capval acr?n^ulahop_Cí ^ates coniiaď"-
tiojaajjiat compel social reform (Qy€o~moi, 19/J)  In tu- Líia. ?on o Marxism, as in its 'lôgíčTJiTridus "^'n' com/~*pa- ,   ^'te«- _r33l-s ^hardly__need^o_be_jp^                                 pcloii^i n*iV    fVy &=»
unions socialist parties, humam^» acs, o~ rn igíiK ne^ efouG/^ ^tie point is thai the state, as such 's ncriu^n^d m üimi n y ^L tpr collective needs of capital arf* seiv^d, >e~aidl*ss (c- *■] ^o>/ ^ )v -premised on two crucial assr \ ^«^ ^o , u*" j o* „i : a— iu_jr and^fiOQjid^jiiatJhe state, js_.° "hft < t juo» o :iT s ^.ol.i r^ot <-JivesiPoulantzas, 1973; Block ln/7, . _ ~,-m ^ 'J-, ^c.i —. -this literature, see Therbora, 19tľ/\   i" r^^ os ipJ a mw    \ _ ° ^
Tlie ÉIogie of capitalism5 pe~3p~'it* c i?a^ e& d^rc d* nno^ií, ^ Przeworsíd (1980) has argued,    ^ 3 ng-c^ss    ^c° i *- r^n -*d en  he bads of material hegemony, di°i     ,   ^'r \/^V   ^     <  n^ ^ i ŕ o system, it is difficult to see   Ay    o   o  /r) < ^   .t\ of i   •*          *-H
product must be allocated to fh-" T g   -»^lo^ «.'     * * 3       -        ^ ^
siate. A second problem is to r]c j e m~ ^ '< ' k~ » " ^"-w io 1a c production' analysis. Eastern^ J§LJľfiľ _ {!2i 2^'i1^ ^ro ' v 'fy " £ueMist?Jbpi£neiíí^^                    mu r.c   c " n    >  ^ z c ~   -
too. Perhaps accumulation ha^ r-   e o rrq'   ^   ^g 'o  "^*t  «^ / It proceeds? (Skocpol and Am  u<\, irC3? ř   \ i0 Mx
Ira INSTITUTION 'X AcPKOACti
(J9'!4), Lul alco b/ a numb«     ■        '     *       r ^                 nt
'ICíOPf^í Tfeco1,  the hirťliUiÍL                       '      V u.       i
rtiT th^e- ionncM £.covorn»-s o~ nic vlf^^l stat        1j>
^sola^e íhe ekonomy from social ard -aohucal irstiíuťions \/jJ1 d^suoy fum°n sjjjjgV ^e e£02_ojr2y_jriUoiJ}^~e^              m so^nl communuies
iri_orjlfL—fot- n lo survive Jlhus, pohayi ^ees so n? ooh^y as one ue^saryjiLerordítíoa íoi J e reinig» "í«o i of me socípI economy
An íiiíeies^g rec^iu /e^am oi ]» S'ltnaoaal alignment ťheoiy is ire arg^me-1* tb]^^_2Ľ3ie s"a|es ^^w j^ ^o^e r ^iily ?n so ail open ccouorniesjji^a» e particularly vi^oe al le co interna m la] niarL^ts ^ is ^sizenníeia (ícSb) ?>iá Camion (13/8) *-bj ^ i'e«3 is a greaiei "' ?i r non »o egiua^e r/?ss-J u nb t ^ OJ ^crľ c " , f c gS Oo e« m'^-n and íiííc^Gř co^certat^oii hei b^d" 7 ^ ^h^s ^ d i ^rŕio^tJ,n 0 fo-ce«. be^crl domes iC con o í
~- ' ^L •■ "x miic-   / ue j-"*^"
° ? í    r Lie      r {C   f>3 }/v,    *       s           *"      iCr r            *     *rt     ^    j ~^->
16     THE THREE WELFARE-STATE REGIMES
to reduce, not raise, taxes (Dich, 1973). In con tras t,jralirig classes in áuthorítarian"politTes~^veren5etter positioned to. impose high^laxesjon
ÔOCIS
.ass as a Political Agent
We have noted that the case for a_cIáss-mobilizaticm-ihgsiaJJQWS from • sTjciaijlgiriocš^                                 R .differs-from símctoralist and_
institutionajhmalyses in its emphasisj>üJ±Lejio^
agcnísjDí^
determines   distributional   outcomes.   To__emghasize   active   class-
irabilizaliQiuI^
hegeniOBk„pmsí£i....(KorpiJ 1983). Bui itJs held that p.arliam.eBta..am^ia principle, effective institutions for the translationjof mobilized power iiitanJEsiŕerl^ônaeš^Sd reforms. Accordingly, rjarliamentar^politics
incapable ofoyerriding hegemorry^jy^^
that ^xe^^taggrns^Jo^c^jtal. Further, the class-mobiiizatioiiJheory_
assumes thai welfare states_do more thj^jnrn^
ifisjältK^                                                                          in its own •
right, establish^ criticaLppwer resources for wage-earners,......and__thus
strengthen íabo£_jnovements. As Heirnann  (1929). originally, held,. scciaTnghtspush back the frontiers of capitalist power.
The question of why the v/elírieTiaĹs~nse!f is a power resource is vital for the theory's applicability. The answer is iliac v/age-eaineisjn die .iiaricci: aie jgherendy atomized aii^síratjiied ^S^IĽ^Ú&l^ i2_ compete, insecure, and dependeiUjori^d^cisioiis, and__fpj^C£Ä__heyond_ liicir control. TIiis_Jin]hs_ tlieh; capacity for collective solidarity agd_ mobilization. The social rights, iiiccmc security2_ equalization, and eradication or"c5"^iFty_ihac a min/ersaJish'c welfare siol^jjuisueů are 2§cesBZ£^jj£§cona\uouS ior_Jhe sdengdi and unity ...uia^gclíecíis^ pov/er mobühcrio i demands (Cep mg-Arn dot-sen, 1935a).
shigTe~lrcGi diifľcuii problem icr í his diesis is to specify the conditions foť pov/ei mobilization. Power depends on the resources rliat How ii'ji.i rdtctoial iimnuem arid from collective bargaining.
LjiLúlmL^izy^hiydxü) oVc^ods enterals of tw
v\:ca oi>:a
left or !dbo^ p..
itiuu.vi.eci uy ks
>Xi nCilC; % i C C
Oil CI t. r/-lS Ol ,3 C
ll. ^Q^čR^iiú^hj^i^xi^ii'jj.y and eelmeí Sc-Js ne'e* by dri, But f no ľo,/cr oí one age »u camicr cLnyly b =5 c^'ii resources: h //hl depend on d^e teiOĽťccs c ŕ
u, lj the lU^v/wi J„crlaíhy »-f :jj    clil'zaíkn, ';nd
' ver ni^íio-j.
v „a^ "olio oLjicaOi/c ín íh? j-f\ ^A-eLibzaidon ijiesjc.
o u j «.e
ľ-udiJ.
TJ-m TSÍRtíH  PO^rnCAL ĽCONOMI&5 OPTHH  WÉLTARE-STATE        17
decisioji-ma^                                            from  parliaments   to   neo^
Jmporatist^ mstitutions^of interest interm^^or^Shoriň&ld, 1965; Sclimitter anclXehT6řiich7T?79). Ä .sečondmticism íFthat the capacity of labor parties to influence welfare-state developrnent is circmnšcribecí
By the"Wrictuďe^o^ight-wlnff party po^r^ailes^ll9787l982) has.....
argued thaftlie degree of nifty among the conservative parties is more important than is the activated power of the left. Other authors have emphasized the fact that denominational (usually social Catholic) parties in countries such as Holland, Italy, and Germany mobilize large sections of the working classes and pursue welfare-state programs not drastically at variance with their socialist competitors (Schmidt, 1982; Wilensky, 1981). The class-mobilization-thesis has, rightly, been criticized for its Swedocentrism, i.e. its inclination to define the process of power mobilization too niuch on the basis of the rather extraordinary Swedish experience (Shajev, 1984).
These objections hint at a basic fallacy in the theory's assumptions about the class formation r we cannot assume that socialism is the
■pt55™^^                                                                      the conditions"
under which workers become socialists are still not adequately^ uocüjBgnted. Historically, the natural organizational "bases oTworker mobilization were pre-capitalist communities, especially the guilds, but also the Church, ethnicity, or language. A ready-made reference to •false consciousness will not do to explain why Duích, Italian, or American workers continue to mobilize around non-socialist princi-ples. The dominance of socialism among the Swedish working class is as much a puzzle as is the dominance of confessionalisin among the Dutch. The third and perhaps most fundamental objection he s to do with'
the model's lin numerical

r view of power/ it is problematic ?o hold thai a
___      rease jjijvotes,^nmoíiizačiQn2 orjjeats will translate into
more_3a^^^^uds-^r enst, for scciah'sí as leť od:er parties, dr. e magical '50 percent' threshold for parliamentary majorizes seems practically insiumouiiiaole (Poeworshi, i985). Second, if soeiaHst par* í''es íepresení working classes in the traditional s-nse, it is dear ihr.c Ihcy wiil never succeed in d-^Jr limine   r:-,
-adidonal wcrLmg class be i acidly becomiii^ margiri?!.6
:ieu project" íl  jimeric
«y
very lew esí majorit;
oaoiy die most pAcmi3>n
.o rcsclv
.a us rôl
tI !ii
;,id worl"íjg-da:3 mh^orily 'problem h-s Dsi/íjgicn í o rorm^íion of ih
rnoc^ii

the comcin^u iinert^-y re cení fppKcciicriG of
"           "to the íráuc-
F3fe (V;eir s^d Chocpcl, i935; Courcviic»:,
d»
e«*
i^^h
»JjUHľ
id   F
Mai
X!
--n,-,
18      THE TT TREE WELFARE-STATE REGIMES
1982). Thus, the origins of the Keynesian full-employment commitment and the social democratic welfare-state edifice have been traced to the capacity of (variably) strong working-class movements'to forge a political alliance with farmer organizations; additionally, it is arguable that sustained social democracy has come to depend on. the formation ■ of a new-working-class-white-collar coalition.
The class-coaiitional approach has additional virtues. Two nations, such as Austria and Sweden, may score similarly on working-class mobilization variables, and yet produce highly unequal policy results. This can be explained by differences in the history of coalition formation, in two countries: the breakthrough of Swedish social democratic hegemony stems from its capacity to forge the famous sred~green\ alliance with the farmers; the comparative disadvantage of the Austrian socialists rests in the 'ghetto' status assigned to them by virtue of the rural classes being captured by a conservative coalition (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984).
In summary, we have to think in terms of social relations« not just social categories. Whereas structural functionalist explanations Identify convergent welfare-state outcomes, and class-mobilization paradigms see large, but linearly distributed, differences, an interactive model such. as the coalition approach directs attention to distinct welfare-state regimes.
L>cr/ mecreried prjTcigm musí somehow deime me welfare S'-ne, How do :. s kr* o v vJicm and if a welfare sfade responds functionally ro ike needs of mdusiricHsmu 01 iO capitalist r^pioduclion arJ ^hdrr^ey? P dá h 3v do -.ve Identify a v/oKsie siare iliac corresponds *o the remands dir: a mobúized voirdmg o'ass might h we? V/e cannot tesi contend'*~ • ^grnmms urdess we h^ve a eouwnonl/ sbaierl co;;cenrior of hie pr'LVo~icn-»i to bo erplained,
P. emanucblo rU^hvte of (he eiiiire iL'Oiatoe is itj írck of nwm gamd e merest hi the wehere sia:e as srsPi. 'Veifrre sia^e ^ud^es k?v, ü3» n mo*:" med by dfeorerieaj ecrite:ns wtii Cfhc~ uhc* om>p, such "3 p: u »-, índ > íria!wirio\ o^ eaphalLí cc drrd'clJ ^s; die ^e> «ro s>m^ •^ if l> ^ g:,n-isily received cci n. comvpiual arternjorn T**1 v/rííA * sí iipn »«."0?";, how rfoihcy ólÍLf : \ndvrr *, mď cd, fa ast^m a . elf1 5?^^? Viis turns aaemion straight hack to die crigín?! question: wm t is d*1 -—if- o r r>-?
THE THREE FOLIT3CAL ECONOMIES OF THE V/ELFARE-STATE       39                                         i         I
L
for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens. Such a                         [     I
definition skirts the issue of whether social policies are emancipator}7 or                         s     j
not; whether they help system legitimation or not; whether they                         i     j
contradict or aid the market process; and what, indeed, is meant by                        í     |
"basic5? Would it not be mo're appropriate to require of a welfare state                         í      1
that it satisfies more than oqjř basic or minimal welfare needs?                                      I      I
The first generation of comparative studies started with this type of                        f     j
conceptualization. They assumed, without much reflection, that the                         \     j
level of social expenditure adequately reflects a state's commitment to                         í      í
welfare. The theoretical intent was not really to arrive at an understand-                         [     ?
ing of the welfare state, but rather to test the validity of contending                         j     j
theoretical models in political economy. By scoring nations with respect                         í     j
to urbanization3 level of economic growth, and the proportion of aged in-                        r     j
the demographic structure, it was believed that the essential features of                         i     |
industrial modernization were properly considered. Alternatively, pow-                         e     ;
er-oriented theories compared nations on left-party strength or work-                         /•     1
ing-class power mobilization.                                                                                       J-     í
Tlie findings of the first-generation comparativists are difficult to                         I
^evaluate, since there is no convincing case for any particular theory. The                         í     !
. shortage of nations tor comparisons statistically restricts the number of                        I     j
variables that can be tested simultaneously. Thus, when Cutright (1965)                         •    " •
or Wilensky (1975) find that economic level, with its demographic and                         -:     I
bureaucratic correlates, explains most welfare-state variations in 'rich                         ;-
countries5, relevant measures of working-class mobilization or economic                         [     j
openness are not included. Their conclusions in favor of a 'logic of                         :     |
industrialism' view are therefore in doubt. And, when Hewitt (1977),                         '      j
Stephens (1979), Korpi (1983), Myles (1984a), and Esping-Andersen                         :     :
(1985b) find strong evidence in favor of a working-class mobilization                         i     I
.thesis, or when Schmidt (1982; 1983) rinds support for a neo-corporatist,                         -     ;
and Cameron (1978) for an economic openness argument, it is without                         f  . :
fully testing against plausible alternative explanations.7                                                 :     J
Most of these studies claim to explain the welfare state. Yet their                         ;
focus on spending may be misleading. Expenditures are epiphenomenal                         <      ]
' to the theoretical substance of welfare states. Moreover, the linear                         í     ]
scoring approach (more or less power, democracy, or spending) contra«                         t     I
diets-.the sociological notion that power, democracy, or welfare are                         '■     i
•-relational • and structured phenomena. By scoring welfare states on                         i     I
spending, we assume that all spending counts equally. But some welfare                               i
states, the Austrian one, for example, spend a large share on benefits to                         _;     ;
; privileged civil servants. Thisris normally not what we would consider a                         ^     I
. xommkimni to social citizenship and solidarity. Others spend disprop-                         l     l
analysts would agree that a reformed poor-relief tradition quaiifies as a welfare-state commitment. Some nations spend enormous sums on fiscal welfare in the form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that mainly benefit the middle classes. But these tax expenditures do not show up on expenditure accounts. In Britain, total social expenditure has grown during the Thatcher period, yet this is almost exclusively a function of very high unemployment. Low expenditure on some programs may signifiy a welfare state more seriously committed to full employment.
Therborn (1983) is right when he holds that we must begin with a conception of state structure What ere the .cp'ten3_jy/ith_jwhiphi '^e should judge whether, and when, a sta»e is a velTare^ state7 Taere_aie chreelípproáSéslo thi£qi^
die historical iran3iaaaa\ion oi state acu\ iocs p u iimaily, ia a. UĚ£1]1££_ \ siiaie state iiie majonty ofjts_daily routine rcnvMiesjiirc< be ä^vo^öd .o berv2cing_tlic^weliaie_jiaeds o^households Thio /utejKn Iis^Ibi-ieacmrigii2iiseqiieacß3. ií we simph/ ineasuľe roníce accivny mjenns 01 32-ejiclnig andjpeispjiiiiel^ >e u^^ *3 1'18l u^tLl5JZ_1_Mi^^íc3-ľs-5 ^al -/clraie aje ürnil theJ.97Cb7ah«3 :olSÄ thai VG "r ilc^y ^ e- ac «■ elfa^3 s\^^~7WTör^?\&j bereise ih^i^joiny oř «^u 10 «tire
^ a 'iues concern d:i>nce, lav/ apd.....orderLad^ m^ o i^j-fv ^^Itú
(Hie Lom, 1983) !boc*aI scismiois Ir^e b?ei too qn^h ^ ic^oi/t is icas3 sclf-^icc?a_mcd welfare ota^c ctxhK liioy ' a\e sl£o l^eu .oo n i r1    to cop ď ~e thai «f tin sladmi so i"l p co arns J a e os^n
í i ^ci c^, tli'*   'eJ?>e siare í io been Lo*n
The second Co c^jiual aiípíO rl^ rtcjn\\u u^m jyiťj>id T t m ssb f x bSuc'assical d^UiiCtjoi Inuvern lesidual g id 2I±§MiMÍ^uT /£í~ľ e cate^ia ihc fomei, the riate rssunns jeupot ^ bi'ity c    ' \ hrt"1 Jif
a jĺÚj oi *1 č__jp    -i ^ilsa ^ ^c1 u .3 i   m "ífb {oinJ.iKtiii.jii«o Q_p*j^ ^a1
^i        o   h^u'uí'o      ^n^"_f   -1 řJpoLjf
TŕlE TT1RBB POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF THE WELFARE-STATE      21
welfare-state rankings difficult to sustain. Conceptually, we are comparing categorically different tj^gsjgfstaFés,          .....~.......——    ......:
• The third approach is to theoretically select the criteria on which to in^E^jY£^^°^J^^^ ^t^s^^is can De ^Qne by measuring actual welf^LJätaißS-agaiaj^^
qrentirgjäčdfä^^                          (Day 1978; Myles, 1984a). But this
is ahistorical, and does not-.necessarily capture the ideals or designs that historical actors sought to realizejin the struggles over the welfare state. if our aim is to test causal theories that involve actors, we should begin ■ with-the demands that were actually promoted by those actors that we deem- critical in the history of welfare-state development. It is difficult to imagine .that anyone straggled for spending per se.
PlJlJľ
A Me-Spccficatícffl of the Welfare State
■ Fgwjan disagree with/TjjLMarshalľs (1950) ^roso^^njůiatjo^dl
■citizensliipc^^                                    welfare state. But the concept
must be neshed out. Above all, it must involve the granting of social rights. If social rights are given the legal and practical status.of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a de-commodißcation of the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market. But the concept of social citizenship also involves social stratification: one's status as a citizen will compete with-, or even replace, one's class position/
. The 'welfare state cannot be understood just in terms of the rights it ' grants, We most also take into account how state activities are interlocked-with the market's and the family's role in social provision. These are the three main principles thai need to he fleshed out prior to any theoretical specification of the welfare state,
F. 2GH j S AND ľiU'CQMŕlGBIFZC? TlOiJ
In pre capitalist societies, few workers were properly comniodhies in
ihe Goiise chat their survival was contingent noon iha sob of their labor por/er. íl is as fnarktó become universal and Hegemonic that ili3 v/aifers of kidividurlu conns f o depc-ud čí. d^ely on the cash ne:;us. Ju'ppiiig cociety of ťv, :a£;üiJ:-:cnal laycrc ůvii ^naraúřeed Ľucíal re^co'lvc'do i ohír:rh the lalicr cb d trace m^rnt that f/r,co!o v/ere con-íuJi»íicf?. in lam, í he h^ťoíiUcdca of modern jcc'al ii^hřd hmJtez a icoceíiíaj; of ;h« emo rorívaiodily ctatus.  0?->-c?nd!ud:fícaíiop acc?: r»
n-lRHH WELFARE-STATE REGIMES
when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can-maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.
The mere presence of social assistance or insurance may not necessarily bring about significant de-commodification if they do not substantially emancipate individuals from market dependence. Means-tested poor relief will possibly offer a safety net of last resort. But if benefits are low and associated with social stigma, the relief system will compel-all but the most desperate to participate in the market. This was precisely the intent of the nineteenth-century poor laws in most countries. Similarly, most of the early social-insurance programs were deliberately designed to maximize labor-market performance (Ogus, 1979).
Theie is no doubt that de-commodification has been a hugely contested issue in welfare state development. For labor, it has always be3.! ? oriority. vmen workers are completely market-dependent, they are difficult to mobilize for solidaristic action. Since their resources rrJixor market hieoualiues, divisions emerge between the 'ins' and the *o ivo\ making tobor-movement formation difficult. De-ccrrmodiíbaiicn strengthens the worker and weakens the absolute > -«ho iiy of ihe employer. It is for exactly this reason that employers ?-^ z always opposed de-commodification,
iľ?-coirunodiíied rights are differentiaííy developed in contemporary ^ehara .tales. Iri^sDX^Lässistance dominated welfare states, rights are nci co much pi.ached io work performance as to demonstrable need. I^cds-icsís sna typically meager benefits, however, service to curtail A e t z cornmorJifying effect. Thu.s, in nations where this model is derm umri (mainly In ihe Anglo-Saxon countries), the result is actually to si, engAei ihe marker since all but those who fail in the market will be c r con i c ge a to co m it ci p i i vate-sector welfare.
_*-«. second dernmant model espouses compulsory stafg^ocla^^ < 'im Ahly strong^íithJetueaís^But again, this may not automatically c-^W3~7ub^25jdaI de-:cmmodirlcation, since this hinges very much on"-A e iabiic of eligibility and benefit roles. Germany was the pioneer of „is trance, bat over most of the century can hardly be said to have
^ c:
n4  -1
KovmA abouL mj^h in the way of de-commodification through its social' r>G ,i?ms. Poner^ľ h* /e depended almost entirely on contributions, and 1ms on woA and employment. In other words, it is not the mere rrescnee c f a ^c^al «/gin, but ihe corresponding rules and precondi-tiO is, /irVh d c\a»e tue extent to which welfare programs offer genuine ^?„-'_ "íncs^Oí niK-i dependence,
Ym -> f *»JijJjicniiii^o model of welfare, namely the Beverldge-type rv^Mľ b*'1 -"£, mry^ijiil^^
IT-IE TIIRBH POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF XHH WELFARE-STATE       23
It offers a basic, equal benefit to all, irrespective of prior earnings, contributions, or performance, it may indeed be a more solidaristic system, but not necessarily de-cornmodirying, since only rarely have such schemes been able to offer benefits of such a standard that they provide'recipients with a genuine option to working.
De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of very recent date. A. minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without .potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary. With this definition in mind, we would, for example, require of a sickness insurance that individuals be guaranteed benefits equal to normal earnings, and the right to absence with minimal proof of medical impairment and for the duration that the individual deems necessary. These conditions, it is worth noting, are those usually enjoyed by academics, civil servants, and higher-echelon white-collar employees. Similar requirements would be made of pensions,- maternity leave, parental leave, educational leave, and unemployment insurance.
Some nations have moved towards this level of de-commodification, but only .'recently, and, in many cases, with significant exemptions, In almost all nations, benefits were upgraded to nearly equal normal wages in'-the late 1960s and early 1970s. Bui in some countries, for example, prompt medical certification in case of illness is still required; in others, entitlements depend on long waiting periods of up to two weeks; and in still'others, the duration of entitlements is very short. As we shall see in chapter 2, the Scandinavian welfare states tend to be the most de» comniodiiying; the Anglo-Saxon the least.
T " í \ ALAre (ztzte fj n Syr p c w cmAA^A'ciAj i
D:s~Aí ihe enipnac^s given to it m both classical nomiVal economy and A AAA IV irAaAs pioneering wo.k, in.; OAonshin terpen cj\id;enship and social class hrs h^za noglecred both íhcoieíicnuy ana 1 r-pincaJty. GmeToi»y speaking, the íssae his either been assumed _V7^ / (ji has been trken for grained Aar die wdnnc strne creates a more fgA^ilan sceeiy), ^r it bas Leci «».o^oachen uucovdy m Anns of nm: t>o Ashdbuiion o; in learns of whether education •■«cnoics "pv^rd sc'":a! „robihiy. A more biziz ques^on, it r^ms, is Ac- Ard of cit'-i J*, 'Aon u.yu'rn is momcte J by cc<Ai poAj. ^ A welfare Stfic is no ysz* * ^ecAmc n »'h°i :A^-m*"1:; m, "'d nrzn^h y cnireO \ >hc ^-C-v^ jímoquamy; > is,: fAc c ".i^h.^^r"^ *' 'írfmr^A >ŕ 's «2,1 '-r.iV? force in d~e ordf-pj'g of sc^H mlr^c-us,
24       TUB THREE WELfARL-äTATE  RHGiMf.iS
Comparatively and historically, we can easily identify alternative systems of stratification embedded in welfare states. The poor-relief tradition, and its contemporary means-tested social-assistance_o^|iQOt? was conspicuously designed fgrjrjurrjoses of stratification. By „punishing and stigmatizing recipients, it promotes social dualisms and has th.ere-foreJbeeiLfiLgfaisfJ^igfít of Iabor=roQyement attacks.—
Thesociakinsurance model promoted by conservative xeformers such_ as Bismarck and von Taffe,3yas also explicitly a form of class politics. It ' S   sought, in fact, to achiey^imi^imiilMQgQiis results in terms of stratifica-■v     tÍ2jíi^ The ^lľ^_^lJ2^£QMQäá^ divisions^rripjig^wage
legisJMing_distinct_pro^                                                     groupsTeäčH
wit^hits^^^cr^pkuously unique set of rights and privileges which was
designed io.....ac£.eiií3iaíeJí^^                                                        ./Tne _
secondLobjective was to tie the loyaitiesoftlie individu a]jmrectly to the mcmjrrrj^r^^                                                    was Bismarck's motive
when he promoted a direct state supplement to the pension benefit This state-corporatist model was pursued mainly in nations such as Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, and often resulted in a labyrinth of status-specific insurance funds.
Of special importance in this corporatist tradition was the establish^ nmat ofjDarticjxlar^^                                            for Jh&jrimLsonzicQ.-
(Beamten). In part, this was a means of rewarding loyalty to the-state, and in part it was a way of demarcating this group's .uniquely exalted social status. The corporatist status-differentiated model springs mainly from the old guild tradition. The neo-abcolutist autocrats, such as Bismarck, saw in this traoirion a means to combat the rising labor movements.
Tlif^har^fôVfe^^                                 the corporatist model as tliey..
were to p^r__reIJeI^rJjL^C^ cases fo^.P^yiouG^reasonG. Yet the alternatives first espoused by labor were no less problematic from the point of view of uniting the workers as one solidaristic class. Almost invariably, the model that labor fire t pursued was that of self-organized friendly societies or equivalent union- or party-sponsored fraternal welfare plans. This is not surprising. Workers were obyjausly-sugpicioiis öf reforms sponsored by a hostile state, and say/Jhetr own organizations rioF^rmly^as^Bases of class mobilisation, but a?20__as_erAbryqs of an alternative world of solidarity and justice; as a microcosm oi'.üie socialist^ Tlnve^^                        el ess f íbes^ mieroraaojaflct _socjej;ies^^tSriJbo^__
eama pioolejxmiiiiiias^                                       i>mn united workers.
THE THRKE rOUHCAL ECONOMIES  OFTÍIH  V/ELFARB-ST^.TE       Z5
most'likely excludedjnjprief,. the.imternaLsocietxmodeljnigtrated the
goal of working-class mobili jmjom                                           ~~
The socialist cghettC3_aparoacjť was an additional obstacle when socialist parties foundthemt^^               ^governments and having to
pass the social reforms they had so long demanded..For political reasons^ of coalition-building and broader solidarity, their welfare model had to be recast as welfare for^trje people'TTlenc^TTEe^^aliste came to espouse the princijjlejoliHy^                             from the liberals, their_
p^gim^JJsTItypically, designed along the lines of the democratic __, fia^mij^^                                                           el.                  ~~"
As an alteiTiative^Jximae^ris^esied^ssistmic^ and corporatism social 'i^uränce2_^äi&::^híM§^^0 system promotes equalřty "of status. AH_. citizens' aré^en^ov^čTwiíh similar rights, irrespective of classes niarkei^ goiSJö^^                                                             cultivate cross-class
solidarity, a solidarity^jsfjfie^^
umyersalism presumes a historically peculiar class structure, one in which the vast majority of the population are the 'little people7 for whom a modest, albeit egalitarian, benefit may be considered adequate. ./Where this no longer obtains, as occurs with growing working;^^, prpspentjTaž^^
inadvertently promotes dualism because the better-off.....torn tojgrivate
insurance and to fringe^ben^                                                    equaP"
ity wiilijvyjiatjth^
Where this process unfolds (as in Canada or Great Britain), the result is that the wonderfully egalitarian spirit of universalism turns into a dualism similar to that of the social-assistance state: the poor rely on the _ staig^ndJli^emidride£on the market^__
íí is not only the universalist but, in fact, all historical welfare-state models which have faced the dilemma of changes in class structure, But the response to prosperity and middle-class growth has been varied, and s'o, therefore, has been the; outcome in terms of stratification. The corporatist insurance tradition was, in a sense, best equipped to manage new and loftier welfare-state expectations since the existing system could technically be upgraded quite easily to distribute more adequate • benefits. Adenauer's 1957 pension-reform in Germany was a pioneer in this respect Its avowed purpose was to restore status differences that had been eroded because of the old insurance system's incapacity to provide benefits tailored to expectations. This it did simply by moving from'contribution- to earnings-graduated benefits without altering the framework of staíus-disíinctiVjôness. ■ • • In nations with either a socipl-assistance or a universaíistic Beveridge-
J^'^'^CU^^
HtSÜ
m
26     THK TMRÍ-.E WHL.FAfííä-3TATH RHGíMSÍ»
type system, the option was whether to allow the market or the state to       ^
furnish adequacy and satisfy middle-class aspirations. Two-alíernatme.___|
models emerged_f^rom^his_£olitical choice^JThe_one .typical of_Great^ . § Britain  and  most  of J:h^Anglo-Saxon., world  w,as_tOL_preserve  an      |
essentially modest uniyersalism in^ihe state, and allow the niarkeFld'......    |
reign fqrjbejgrowiiig- social strata demandinjjfiuf^^                                 |.
the political power of such groupi7~tEe°"dualism that emerges is not § merely one' b^iEm^šidle^nS^mdúíH^^ii aEo^5eTw¥ěir~fon5F"oí § welfare-state tjgnjfen^                                                                          I
components of public expenditure is tax subsidiesjbr^so-čäiled 'private1 ' § ž/elfareolaris. Aid...lhe.._t¥pícal pj3UtičaT^ffigctjsjhe_erosion"oflffiSčffŕ"    I
^ss_SüprjortJo£ whatjsjiess.....and.....Iess_ajmiversalistic publič:sector..........§
transfer system^                                                '   ~~™   ———     -- •$
Vet another alternative has been to seefe a synthesis of umveisalism \ and adequacy ou,tside_gi jhe jnaiket. TliisTord^liTs feeji"fc]Jowed ifi "-cFünTHes j/here, by mandating or legislation, ihejicate incorpoiaIěš"the 1 n ew uiidclej^sse^                                    čf-iľer, u mvci sally indiisi / e,     í
eamhi^s-íelated lnsu°a^c£ rcheme jonj-cj^ of í'ie_í!ai»r^e^^^aiian_ i _one. I Jo~ŕje"T ii^nujes aie r»v .^en_ and Norway. By_gdauLCt^ľin^-- _ bereits w3iÍQ?vd to_e: ü~cyn>rätis^ this s^hjjĹQíi reintroduce^ bene n t l ''peq^htics, fciU effectiycix.bio.cks off the market. It thus succeeds in ~ iet-hiin^ v iveisah;u3Lrí d__rho, >he,irfbie, -lie degree of political í ronscnsns icquiied to otescive broad and soüdaristic support for the r nigh i^-3 thai cTioh a   /pj^te-StPie model demands.
7ci r^^ľírt'2 ^egL^
3s * e " »ivoy in ei ird„n?I veriacom in social rights and wal %e-state
|p,sjy,veiy .„.^^                                                                                         -  by
subsidizing priva.te^we^ie^.^hjÉíílgs^...........
Tfi.e consequence is that j this type of regime minimizes de-commodification-effects, effectively contains the realm of social rights, and erects an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative equality of poverty among state-weifaile recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, arid a class-political dualism between the •two. .TTiejnxte^                                                             United States,
Čanadaand /Uiaícalia.^            :                                  '               ~~~
' A second regime-type_cIusterg_nations such as Ausiriaj^France^ Ggnnajj^^nd.IMy^Here, the historical corporatist-statist legacy was upgraded to cater to the new 'post-industrial5 class structure. In these conservative and strongly 'corporatisť welfare states, the liberal obc^s-ckm with in3»'kgjjgl-'jc^cnoy and eouimcdi^caľ'on ->yas n^eFp'reijT^ir.enľ ai2ikií±ĽoiJ^^^                                  lights v°s harnly e\cr a serious!^
con tec ted issue. V7hal p^edonrinaied ,vas «he oieser/aüon of state diSercjiinls^                                  a^ached to class^and status. This
corpora i'sxT .as sihsmned under a gísie edih>e peue^tl/ ?ecdy o displace í he m^-her as a orovider o- vo*£are; hence^jj«j\aie insurance-aad cc^Tpä"Tr5raFringe b^eo 3 pl~y a ^ulyjaiai^nei lole. On ib° oi>c~ I^u£s ije date s e^ rjhac's {"n i pho!di.">g cipuxs dířcs.ence3 ±l sans 'ha. /s
^ju íh^Lorpcrt-ncí .cg<rnvs^re dso *yp cahy^sr^ped ty *V Orhch 1SI^ lľ^&£±rLĽZijĹ¥ J1 sj:I^ ! 3 fr^unčZ-L 7atnn ^t nad i'onai i^a^h-hoc4__ľo^igI T.3^i? arc »y -i ajye dudes ^ or - * oivi^j / ^es, Tid r tii/ bena^s_riicaii^^c a*oh v^co'l O^y c" a ^rd ^ A-J— fa« , iy"s- - - c __ n e ^2?^1ŕ,"0<lsV ľl gcidt;velopLQ die prn ^iple o? subs d^a" y' 3 ej_ ,1 c ' *nr cc lIi?l ih° si3íe "h1 oní / «ot ^~e ^cn i -* tn íy r cao°at/ to c í p ^ ^ s ít^, íb^'o io of] ausi^o.
T '^ t rid, ^jid£,ŕ^ /"iil£-ľ^? ^e^in >ciiisLí« s cornivsed J_*l c~z cojm^ es    5n       r1 ^L   ^22^ ^utlJi^^0^ ~~~2Í   1U1L -'^hon    and    rV
c^~s      "^3 rra ^ r n ,  t1 2 'social de ucciatiď legine-fype smcp, n »^ar,t5
> ^u^nSj ,cť a\ ^<-^^r__zj^^^& c^a^~ y í*^ den aa,n¥ ^-ee Icrmd s^c^a* - fa tjl«  ""üiL^ .. >Sn.......,._..,_ol í a ° a difJAg~ľ* ueireen s^ie "nd irai1-- \
? *' ^^.iiZ-JlLíl" ní' aM ^/^   [ io ^ cf_eikDV__^____   o <
č!
TlikjprrmiJa translates into a mix of highly ^-commodifying. arid_
nw^Ts^ucj^oßT^m^ that, nonetheless, aretgdíoredjŕo.....djgergrrtijiteď_
expjčťations« Thus, manual workers come to enjoy rights identical to_ those of salaried white-collar employees Qr civil servants; all_strata are incorporated,under one universaMnsurance system, yet benefits are ""graduated according to accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market, and conseguejrtlY_constrüctS-an ..essentially universal^ojidaiity iiLfavor-oilhe welfare state. Ail benefit; ail are dependent; andall wifl _presumably fed^bliged to pay._                                                               .    .
^^3Il£M33Tn^m^c regime's.poliey of emancipation addresses both_ thejnarket andjhe traditional family. In contrast to the corporatist-^ §äí??idia£^                                                waft ^ntiUhe farnilY's capacity ■
to aid is e^Aaiisted^ut to preemptively socialize thg^cgjts^of^fainily---' "hoo^
capacitie^jQzJrjriiyidual independence^ In this sense, t]ie_model is~a\ peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism. Th^result is_a welfare state, Jiai gienis t Q~sí> .du  t]y .o ^Jf*^, cnd i kos r ~ ^L ^cro-"aib K/ of^cRíi^^   Oi ^iPic^   í  a "&?(., <-   n \ iC hes« "eso     s   s^orcqji   Jy5
"ľ3   üo   l dt      !nJ?   ť)      i'u   /        3/^rn      o   t    wOr3       O              '              r
c j o             ui    ill          1i     P   L   t       ~       iT3"Ou    i^       rí"   ai          r   W
^us^ijicii   j    J ^p~   i    ^ 1     iín            e   vxnu     1^j___^J c-
n'o,       *   t ai     —? »-1   o   ucjy L-a ^i    i)l o
i  o e,  d
lC -     on    CiL u "L_0    (i       *£,  l             t        o    O" o c      1°    '   ^   i,
:hc i cli           / £Ui°i1 ,3i i^^^^i____ojjyij^_____i__j\,   tjpi    (ai3

i C
L/
íl       i  L
1
1
And European conservative regimes have incorporated both liberal and social democratic impulses. Over the decades, they have become less corporativist and less authoritarian.
Notwithstanding the lack of jpurity, if our essential criteria for defining welfare states have to do with the quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market, and family, the .world is obviously composted of distinct regime-clusters. Comparing welfare states on scales of mdre or less or, indeed, of better or worse, will yield highly misleading results.

Tbé Causes of Welfare-State Regimes
If-welfare states cluster into three distinct regime-types, we face a • substantially more complex task of identifying the causes' of welfare-state differences. What is the explanatory power of industrialization., r^ore n     orown    n    uriui*',             0*1 Q£ rl?^s   ^^nirsl pc  ei   n
^r i    ü\vr^    r*3           oo^ A           uu  ^inal^s   ei     oulJb*   \Z j
11 a """^       i    p ^"t^0      *    ^ j e o     «\,s      *     * n   ^g2ia j - ? ^   ] o       i ,i             j-      ^ c           ioo li du^n   /i      /e  ri ri    ^
Ü,JN         U ?   ^»0                    e í           o       íl     jl    í    ''lOií   3   Vee cIj^l  iS
^^  l^i          ->                ^    S      o    f           ?     1    I 1SLC o     a a 5 O] P CT I   !<"i-o
i v, i   ne
^gu ,
i                c
v-b'     oo i ve
h-       t D*            ] o
lil i t                     i
-1                         I
i   Ui
<- )řc  -    Ti        cr n r-      e i ^ti'is oi ex r
*    j      i        )      f *    w       Je  1    f"1   ^^^     L  u
U "1 !    ľc   ^                ^é   iP   fl    Uu iO^ "•i/r»LiOi"1
o ^ei 'y l-r         t     c       ^    H- L
?    ^í!y i_
]
K.                      ^                      v~<  l
5      5    í  C"*       0              í
t                      t       ,      i
'      1
expect certain welfare-state outcomes from specific party configurations? There are many factors that conspire to make it virtually impossible to assume that any labor, or left-wing, party will ever be capable, single-handedly, of structuring a welfare state. Denomination-' al or other dmsions aside, it will be only under extraordinary historical circumstances that a labor party alone will command a parliamentary majority long enough to impose its will. We have noted that the .traditional working class has hardly ever constituted an electoral majority, it follows that a theory of class mobilization must look beyond the major leftist parties. It is a historical fact that welfare-state construction has depended on political coalition-building. The structure of class coalitions is much more decisive than are the power resources of any single class.
The emergence of alternative class coalitions is, in part, determined by class formation. In the earlier phases of industrialization, the rural classes usually constituted the largest single group in the electorate, if social democrats wanted political majorities, it was here thai they were forced to look for allies. One of history's many paradoxes is that the rural classes were decisive for the future of socialism, Where the rural economy was dominated by.small, capital-intensive family farmers, the potential for an alliance was greater than where it rested on large pools of cheap labor. And where farmers were politically articulate and well-organized (as in Scandinavia), the capacity to negotiate political deals was vastly superior.
The role of the farmers in coalition fbrmaiion and hence in welfare-state development is clear, in the Nordic countries, the necessary conditions obtained for a broad red-green alliance for a full-employment welfare state in return for farm-price subsidies. This was especially tme in Norway and Sweden, where farming was highly' precarious and dependent on state aid. In the United States, the New Deal was premised on a similar coalition (forged by the Democratic Party), but with the important difference that the labor-intensive South blocked a truly universalistic social security system and opposed further welfare-state developments. In contrast, the rural economy of continent ial Europe was very inhospitable to red-green coalitions. Often, as in Germany and Italy, much of agriculture was labor-intensive; hence the unions and left-wing parties were seen as a threat, In addition, the conservative forces on the continent had succeeded in incorporating farmers into 'reactionary' alliances, helping to consolidate the political isolation of labor.                  ,.
Political dominance was, until after World War II, largely a'question of rural class politics, The construction of welfare states in this period-
was, therefore, dictated by whichever force captured the farmers. The absence of a red-green alliance does not necessarily imply that no
■welfare-state reforms were possible. On the contrary, it implies which political force came to. dominate their design. Great Britain is an exception to this general rule, because the political significance of the rural classes eroded before tjie turn of the century. In this way, Britain's coalition-logic showed at an early date the dilemma that faced most other nations later; namely, that the rising white-collar strata constitute the linchpin for political majorities. The consolidation of welfare states after World War II came to depend fundamentally on the political alliances of the new middle classes. For social democracy, the challenge was to synthesize working-class and white-collar demands without sacrificing the commitment to solidarity,
. Since the new middle classes have, historically, enjoyed a relatively privileged position in the market, they have also been quite successful in meeting their welfare demands outside the state, or, as civil servants, by privileged state welfare. Their employment security has traditionally been such that full employment has been a peripheral concern, Finally,
'•any program for drastic income-equalization is likely to be met with great hostility among a middle-class clientele. On these grounds, it would appear thai the rise of the new middle classes would abort the social democratic project and strengthen a liberal welfare-state formula. .The political leanings of the new middle classes have, indeed, been •decisive for welfare-state consolidation. Their role in shaping the three welfare-state regimes described earlier is clear. The Scandinavian mode! relied almost entirely on social democracy's capacity to incorporate them into a new kind of welfare state: one that provided benefits tailored to the tastes and ;expectations of the middle classes, but
. nonetheless retained universalism of rights. Indeed, by expanding social services and public employment, the welfare state participated directly in manufacturing a middle class mstrumentally devoted to social democracy.,
•In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon nations retained the residual welfare-state model precisely because the new middle classes were not wooed f re m the raaikci to ihe slate, in class terms, the consequence *s duah'sm. Tí*'i3 welfare siate caters essentially to the working class diví íh^ ceot\ Frivaie insurance and occupational fringe benefits cater 10 d*e middle cesses. Given the e'ecícri f ímpcitance of die bitec, it is qune Ic^kn ch:t friíher cyieuskus of wslľare-sía^e scuvries are rested.
TL3 íhird, couíinema! ßtir^pean, welfare-state regime h^s ?ko bte i paUe'ur-d by ibe new middle jelasses, but in a different "'oy. Tne ciuse is hi"<"•_' "^k D^ŕVjp'-d ky conservative poiiíio^í My>"0-s, íh^s-* r <*mies
«n u'iuíP »i/^ i ij.'dc'it 'i iss lokali v 10 tn^ [ 10^ rvatio \ i^ until occepationally segregated social-insurance programs and, ultimately, to the political íorces that brought them into being Adenauer's gieat pension-reform in 1957 was explicidy designed to resuircci middle class loyal cies
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ignited wiicü social expenditure buidens become loo heavy. Paradoxically, the opposite is trae.|Anti-welfare-state sentiments over the past decade have generally beeil weakest where welfare spending has been heaviest, and vice versa. Wliy?
The risks of welfare-state backlash depend not on spending, but on .the class character of welfare'states. Middle-class welfare states, be they social democratic (as in Scjandinavia) or corporarist (as in Germany), forge middle-class loyalties) In contrast, the liberal, residualist welfare states found in the United1 States, Canada and, increasingly, Britain,, •depend on the loyalties of a numerically weak, and often politically residual, social stratum. In this sense, the class coalitions in which the three welfare-state regime-types were founded, explain not only their past evolution but also their future prosoecis.
1  Adam Smith is often cited but rarely read. A closer inspection of his writings •reveals a degree of nuance and a battery of reservations thai substantially
qualify a delirious enthusiasm for the blessings oř capitalism,
2  in -The Wealth of Naäom; (1961, II, p. 236), Smith comments on states thai .   uphold the privilege and security öf the propertied as fellows: rcivil govern-
' merit, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in'reality .•mstituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have -.  some property against those who have none at ail/
3  This tradition is virtually unknown to Auglo-Sazon readers since so little has been translated into English. A key tzxi which greatly inhuenced public
• debate s.nd later social legislation was Adolph Wagneťs Rede lieber die ■ Soziale Frage (1872). For an English language overview of this tradition of
political economy, see Schumpeter (1954), and especially Bower (1947).
From the Catholic tradition, the fundamental texts are the two Pa?3al •Encyclicals, Revum Novarum (1891) and Qucdrogssimo Anno (1931). The . social Caihoüc political economy's main advocacy is a social organization
• where a strong family is integrated in cross-class corporations, aided by the state m terms of the subsidiarity principle. For a recent discussion, see Richter
'   (1987).
Lire ihn hoards, die conseivauvr pc-iucd econorui^ui «I:o hav3 their cQiiVeiVGia\7 errors. ahLoi^h : ihsranuiliy ^ ru hi uuu»b;r, A ^'/r'ri oc-u. cd     „^ Frsr^a's *xu-př o>  dv .sigc _Ae {S^:uscf,e) snt3 cf í"1»«*' -i /o-u- in Gci-u-ury. T?*e t7ibrid"c-"iy c-hc:eie ^ ii] -•Ľdc: <nasu Cor» i:n O * lisnz a Dri icciadc pohdes (see iu'cl >-<\ t%7).
- '-^"'' í ťo::«i »Ho oí Lii'3 a^;'ľb Do \l<s fjuiHĽ. \i^i ^ . ^Mk'rn» r- -z\ (i .nil» i- rno i'cuuks, 19/J); hLz (197/); G'C.ia :• U9/V); Glc^Ii {19/9); run c len f h«    orie of ]> 'baiL^i (157 í). / z f 'e^co! p na - , V^n ^0^^ -n^l