

**Sébastien Saint-Arnaud and
Paul Bernard**

Convergence or Resilience? A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of the Welfare Regimes in Advanced Countries

Introduction

Global economy, competitiveness, new economy: growth in advanced societies is increasingly tied to the rapid internationalization of economic exchanges and to the circulation of information and knowledge, an outcome of the development of new information and communication technologies (Thurow, 1997). Globalization and its many facets have helped bring about structural changes in the economy and, to a certain extent, in the way governments operate. In this economic globalization context, what has become of the social fabric? How have citizens and governments adjusted to the new economy?

The imperatives of economic performance and efficiency and the globalization of exchanges are often cited by governments seeking to justify reductions in their social programme expenditures, thereby eliminating budget deficits and encouraging foreign investment. These cuts have consequences such as declines in the efficiency of the health care system (Maioni, 1996) and the polarization of employment income,¹ which in turn swell the ranks of both the wealthiest and the most disadvantaged members of society, at the expense of the middle classes (O'Connor, 1997; Jesuit and Smeeding, 2002).

One might well ask whether we are witnessing the generalization of what Betcherman and Lowe (1997: 39) call the individualization of risk, at a time when our most pivotal institutions, which once assumed the management of a number of social risks (via health insurance, social security, collective bargaining, etc.), are weakening. Even the OECD (2001: 26), known for

championing economic flexibility, is concerned with the consequences of this new economic context, and particularly about a possible disintegration of social consensus and declines in social capital.

In order to characterize these transformations, one has to start off from the fact that individuals use three distinct systems of exchange for procuring resources to meet their needs (see Bernard, 2001): the market, the state and civil society (especially the family), which all contribute to the production and distribution of goods and services. In the market, individuals contribute work and receive income in return. To the state they make civic and fiscal contributions, and they are entitled to political, civic and social rights (public services, transfer payments, etc.). Lastly individuals operate, in both families and civil society, through voluntary exchanges, each contribution creating obligations on the part of others, but obligations that are less well defined than is the case with the market or in dealings with the state (Godbout, 1992).

Depending on ideological orientations, that differ from society to society, the structuring of these three systems of exchange will give rise to welfare regimes, i.e. models of social organization. Indeed several studies, and particularly those of a qualitative nature, inspired by the innovative work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999a), have confirmed the presence and persistence of important distinguishing characteristics in the organization of social policies in advanced societies. We undertake parallel analyses here, but, in our case, using quantitative indicators and methods. This approach allows us to put to the test several welfare regime typologies, and to examine more systematically the forms these regimes assume, their recent development and especially the reasons for their resilience.

A Typological Analysis of Welfare Regimes

Societies belonging to different welfare regimes each express in their own way the basic principles of social citizenship. According to Bernard (1999), these principles are the ones that the French Revolution identified: liberty, equality and solidarity, and they combine in a complex *dialectical* relationship. As shown in Figure 1, any vision of development held by advanced societies that neglects one of these principles is lacking. For instance, in societies where liberty predominates, economic freedoms rapidly become dominant under neoliberalism, with its resultant polarization of living standards (leading to a deficit in equality) as well as community disintegration (a deficit in solidarity). Societies that mostly emphasize equality may move towards totalitarianism, as was the case for Communist societies (a deficit in freedom), whereas in less extreme cases, the uniform bureaucratic treatment of social problems leads, on the one hand, to the failure of social programmes for want of community involvement (a deficit in solidarity) and, on the other hand, to fiscal crises (see




Figure 1 The Democratic Dialectic and its Avatars (from Bernard, 1999)

Iversen and Wren, 1998). Lastly, societies that bank too heavily on the principle of solidarity may tend towards ideological indoctrination (a deficit in freedom), which in turn strengthens the domination by those who control the actions supposedly required for the cause (a deficit in equality).

Although these three principles are in a state of constant opposition and tension, they do form a whole in which each component is indispensable. For this reason, Jane Jenson (1998) has argued that social cohesion loses its meaning if, in trying to temper the social consequences of an increasingly influential neoliberalism, it shrinks down to calls for solidarity based on common values. Indeed, no genuine cohesion is possible except where each and every citizen enjoys access to a minimum of resources, and where relative equality prevails among them. In short, social exclusion undermines social cohesion.

One might even argue that welfare regimes are all pursuing this very social cohesion as they manage, each in its own way, the levels and types of tension among these three principles. Reducing inequality, a characteristic of advanced societies, can indeed provide individuals with the means for attaining real freedom,² while furthering the development of genuine solidarity, in communities where members all have a say in what happens. But the role of public institutions is quite different in various societies, and as a result it shapes in different ways the relationships individuals have with the labour market and their families.

Comparative studies discussing the differences among welfare regimes date from the 1960s and 1970s. This period was marked by the emergence of welfare states in the context of postwar prosperity. Marshall (1964), Rimliger (1971) and Titmuss (1974) were then looking at the progress societies had been making in the expansion of social rights. During the following decade, characterized by economic disruptions in the wake of two oil crises, Castles (1982), Korpi (1983) and Skočpol (1985) endeavoured to understand the mechanisms that support financing for welfare states despite the obvious crises confronting these countries.

During the 1990s, when the role of the welfare state underwent a thorough re-evaluation, work on the resilience of welfare regimes gained considerable prominence. The reference work was, without a doubt, Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Based on an analysis of the arrangements between the market, the state and the family, this author was able to categorize advanced capitalist societies into three types of institutional arrangements, each designed to reconcile economic development with measures to protect citizens against the risks of the marketplace: the conservative regime (particularly in Germany and Austria), the liberal regime (primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries), and the social-democratic regime (in the Scandinavian countries). Using Esping-Andersen's model, Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) added a fourth type to the typology, which they called 'Latin', or southern, because it was found mainly in Southern European countries.³ Figure 2 summarizes the characteristics of these welfare regimes as they emerge from the work of these authors.




Figure 2 The Characteristics of Welfare Regimes

In the Scandinavian countries, the emphasis on equality confers a considerable role on the state. In the Anglo-Saxon countries (including, to a large extent, Canada), freedom holds a more prominent place, and thus markets become the key institution. Finally, the principle of solidarity predominates in the conservative regimes of Continental Europe, with their insurance schemes often based on occupational groups, just as in the familial regimes of the Mediterranean countries, where the family plays the crucial role in the maintenance of material well-being. We now examine each of these regimes in greater detail.

In the social-democratic regime, inequalities produced by the labour market are reduced by social programme expenditures, which by design apply universally. Their purpose is not only to fight social exclusion, but also to foster economic growth (for instance through investments in education and vocational training). The importance accorded to the notion of resources can be seen in the social programmes set up to minimize dependence on the market (the process of decommodification⁴ of the working population). Moreover, as Esping-Andersen (1999b: 278) wrote, ‘the commitment to equality between the sexes and their massive provision of health care to children and the elderly, with generous parental leave and benefits for families with dependent children’ makes this a defamilializing regime: it is characterized by a commitment to collectivizing the burdens and responsibilities of raising a family.⁵ For

instance the institutional arrangements under social-democratic regimes, while recognizing the importance of the roles of the family and the market, transform the state into a key resource for individuals in the management of their life courses.

Countries with a liberal regime rely first and foremost on the market economy to meet everyone's needs, and they avoid as much as possible social programme expenditures, which would threaten economic performance (particularly because of disincentives to work). The state thus delineates residual assistance policies, supplying only minimum levels to the most disadvantaged through means-tested programmes (Titmuss, 1987). This places strict limits on the decommodification of the working population, and the family must rely to a large extent on the market to meet its needs. Freedom is the primary ideological foundation of the regime, which translates into the promotion of market sovereignty: theoretically, the market affords all participants the opportunity to satisfy their needs, even if in practice such regimes 'promote market solutions . . . [but consequently] to the disadvantage of citizens' entitlements' (Esping-Andersen, 1999a: 74-5).

Conservative welfare regimes emphasize the risks incurred by workers (and, as a consequence, by their families) during their working life (unemployment, sicknesses, etc.) or afterwards (retirement, death of a spouse). To compensate, social insurance provides certain benefits, more often than not in return for social security contributions. But given that 'in a social insurance system based on employment, the effects of exclusion from the paid labour force are compounded by exclusion from the social welfare system' (Palier and Bonoli, 1999: 406), the process of decommodification of the working population is possible only for those who belong to the family circle of someone who has a job. As a consequence, the family becomes the central actor in the satisfaction of the needs of those of its members who are having problems; it is the last resort for those excluded from the paid labour force. The social policies of the state seem all the more familialistic given that they also perpetuate the traditional model of the male breadwinner. The underlying motivation here is thus predominantly solidarity. But in a sense, it is a class-based solidarity since benefits are related to income levels and, more generally, to social position. Insurance systems based on employment serve to reinforce professional social stability and social integration by developing social networks of mutual support.

Lastly, the Latin welfare regime includes countries located in Southern Europe. Their redistributive social policies are more rudimentary, but the jobs of the primary family breadwinners generally include extensive fringe benefits, which in turn makes adapting to globalization more problematic. The Latin regime is very familialistic, even more so than the conservative regime: the family is the basic source of support when people are experiencing difficulties, and even when they are not. That said, the similarity between

these two regimes is so great that some authors, including Esping-Andersen, have refused to consider them separately.

A Three-Pronged Research Objective

In this article we strive to achieve three successive objectives, each more ambitious and complex than the previous one: first, to validate the welfare regime typology with quantitative data, something that has not so far been done in a satisfactory manner; then, to examine the question of the convergence of welfare regimes, which we do by comparing the configuration towards the end of the 1990s with that prevailing 10 years earlier; and finally, once we have established the resilience of the welfare regimes during this period, to use our quantitative data to examine the reasons behind it.

Validating the Typology Using a Quantitative Model

We first need to determine, using new empirical data and a quantitative model, whether the 20 or so OECD countries enjoying similar levels of development may be classified using the Esping-Andersen and Leibfried-Bonoli-Ferrera typology (the latter adding a Latin regime). While the determination of these types has been based primarily on the qualitative study of the main public policies governing social security – on occasion also using a few general additive indices – we hope instead to look at a broad set of social indicators measured during the second half of the 1990s. As will be seen, our hierarchical cluster analysis leads to a quantitative confirmation of the relevance of this typology.

Two opposite objections might be raised with regard to such an approach. On the one hand, it will not yield anything new because the nature of the regimes has already been determined by other methods. On the other hand, each country presents a situation far too complex, on the level of social policy, to be characterized simply by assigning it to a single type.

The answer to the first objection does not draw merely on the systematic nature of quantitative approaches, but also, in a much more significant way, on the inductive nature of the method we are using here. We use a large number of indicators to portray a variety of aspects of welfare regimes, without arbitrarily weighting any one more than the others at the outset. Thus, only the empirical associations that emerge among these indicators will dictate how the countries are grouped and what regime they belong to. Such an inductive approach does not make much sense when used alone. But when various authors have considered a number of different alternatives for classifying welfare regimes, as is the case here, an analysis such as ours can give some of these alternatives a significantly greater plausibility than others.

The second objection, it should be noted, is directed at the idea of even

developing typologies as such, not only at the quantitative approach we are using to do so. Arts and Gelissen (2002) discuss this point extensively, and they demonstrate persuasively the heuristic potential of such types in a relatively new field of research. To this end, one must avoid 'sacralizing' the types; they are only meant to represent the essential features of the situation and to reveal the forest rather than the myriad individual trees – even if, of course, these individual peculiarities are undeniable and even if certain cases remain difficult to fit into only one type. In fact, types and individual characteristics are both recognizable, and they can each reveal things about the other. It is against the backdrop of broad types, worked out using the full set of indicators for all countries, that the individual features of each society will stand out. Most, if not all, societies do fall primarily into one type, though they may present some features associated with another type.⁶ In addition, Arts and Gelissen note, a typology is useful only if we can use it to do something else. This is precisely what we will do in pursuing the other two objectives of our research.

Verifying the Resilience of Welfare Regimes

Advanced countries are now facing market forces that are increasingly powerful and independent. The decisions of the main economic actors seem to escape the sphere of influence of states. What becomes of welfare regimes in this context? Do governments manage to maintain their own arrangements among the three pillars of material well-being constituted by the market, the state and the family and civil society's institutions? Or are we instead seeing nations converge towards a similar model of social and political organization, where economic freedoms would predominate, bringing about both an increasing polarization of living standards and a certain degree of community disintegration?

From a 'neo-institutionalist' theoretical perspective, the path dependency hypothesis suggests rather that political choices are heavily determined by earlier choices (Myles, 1998). Policies already in place would indeed benefit from an 'increasing returns' phenomenon (Pierson, 2000), mainly because of the efforts and the costs involved in developing new policies. 'Once established, basic political ideas are generally tenacious and favour continuity over change' (Palier and Bonoli, 1999: 406). Noël (1996) maintains, moreover, that analyses of policy change must focus more on the erosion of programmes in place than on radical breaks with them, since far-reaching policy transformations involve costs (institutional conversions, adoption of new mind-sets, changes in the established order, etc.) that political parties cannot generally support. Pierson (1997) identifies four reasons why increasing returns and path dependency are found at the heart of political choices: (1) the predominance of short-term horizons among politicians, who must periodically seek re-election; (2) the limited possibilities for

recognizing or measuring the efficiency of a project; (3) political institutions, such as constitutions, that are often designed to resist change; and (4) the complexity of mobilizing large numbers of actors, which is often required to change things.

Political decisions would thus be dependent on past choices, and they would shape social situations on the basis of established political culture. From this perspective, the convergence of welfare regimes as a result of market requirements is far from automatic, and the hypothesis that regimes are resilient is just as plausible, if not more so. It is for this very reason that researchers have turned to the notion of regimes, which expresses both the comprehensive character, and the likely resilience of different kinds of arrangements between the market, the state and civil society.

We evaluate here the stability of these regimes by redoing our analyses using data for the 1980s, which also allows us to validate the typology one more time. The decade-long period separating these data sets is admittedly not very long. But it should be noted that our analysis spans a period of turbulent political, social and economic circumstances in these countries and at the international level, as Castles (2001: 149–50) has shown. Of course, stability over a decade – or, indeed, over an even longer period – is no guarantee of future trends; but stability does indicate, at least, that welfare regimes are resilient, and it suggests that further work remains to be done on the causes of their reproduction through time.

Understanding the Resilience of Welfare Regimes

In pursuit of these causes, one has to take into account the dynamics of public spaces, namely ‘the arena into which are channelled power struggles and the interests of established actors’ (Lagroye, 1993: 111). These dynamics are implicitly mentioned in the work on welfare regimes, but we want to make them much more explicit here and to develop hypotheses from them about the resilience of these regimes.

Esping-Andersen has never thought that welfare regimes could be reduced to a simple list of social policies in different countries. On the contrary, he emphasized from the outset ‘the historical characteristics of States, and particularly the history of political coalitions based on class as the most decisive causes of the variations in welfare regimes’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 1). He sees three factors as crucial in this connection: the nature of class mobilization (particularly for the working class), class-based political action structures, and the historical heritage conferred by the institutionalization of a given regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 29).

In addition, Esping-Andersen identifies two fundamental characteristics of welfare regimes: decommmodification, discussed earlier, which refers to the ability of individuals to obtain services and income without having to turn to the market; and the social stratification that results from social policies, as

well as the breadth or narrowness of the social solidarity that underlies them (see Arts and Gelissen, 2002). These two characteristics thus refer on the one hand to social rights and social policies (stratification), and on the other hand to their outcomes (decommodification).

In parallel with these distinctions in Esping-Andersen's approach, we identify and use in our own analysis three components of the dynamics of public space, which we measure using three distinct sets of social indicators: indicators of *social situations*, of *public policy* and of *civic participation* by citizens. Figure 3 illustrates the interrelationships among these three components, as well as the associated indicators we used.⁷

By social situations we mean what citizens experience in the areas of economic activity and employment, family life, health and education. These situations are determined, to a significant extent, by public policy (whether minimalist or more interventionist). Of course, these policies themselves (e.g. the place of the state, its policies concerning education, health, employment, material well-being) are in turn determined in two ways by these social situations. On the one hand, public policies can be efficiently adjusted, to a greater or lesser extent, to the needs of the population. On the other hand, policies are influenced by civic participation (through voting, the intensity of political discussion, union activity, mutual trust and the like); this participation reflects in turn, although in complex ways, the social situations that citizens are experiencing.

We might hypothesize, for example, that social-democratic societies give the state a key role in correcting social inequality, and that this political action is based on citizen involvement in situations and social issues such as work arrangements, gender equity, universal access to education and to health care, etc. Liberal societies, by contrast, have fewer public policies that attempt to limit the development of social inequality, a feature that over time tends to yield relatively low levels of citizen involvement in social issues.

We should emphasize here the key role of the civic and political participation component. It is through the institutions of civil society (that is, unions, parties, associations, media, etc.) that the demands made by citizens come to matter. It is because of these institutions that civic issues may be debated in a public forum, that politicians are called upon to intervene, that various ideologies take shape, and that the stakes of public political debates are defined (see Milner, 2001). Citizen participation allows societies with diverse points of view that are beset with social conflicts to remain cohesive (Bernard, 1999; Flacher, 2000).

We therefore think that there exists a *mutual causality* among these three components: the way political participation gives meaning to social situations helps orient public policies; these policies in turn transform social situations and then give rise to new mobilizations and modes of participation. To test this hypothesis about a causality loop (shown by the arrows in Figure 3), we




Figure 3 The Dynamics and Transformations of Welfare Regimes

repeat our typological analyses – using hierarchical cluster analysis – *separately* for each set of social indicators that we have identified. If social situations are actually, to a significant extent, the product of public programmes, as well as the product of the intensity and type of social participation, then the indicators describing the social situations should *by themselves* permit classifying different countries into categories that reflect the welfare regimes about which we are hypothesizing. The same division into regimes should hold when we look at the public policy indicators by themselves, then at the participation indicators alone, since each set of indicators will bear the imprint of the other two sets shaping the regime.

If, in other words, we find the same country groupings by regime in our three typological analyses (each with separate indicators of situations, policies and participation respectively), that will tell us that these regimes, once established, so dominate the economic, social and political scenes of the various countries that they give the same ‘colour’ to their social situations, to their government programmes and to the civic commitment of their citizens. The three components reinforce one other, thereby producing a resilience that, hypothetically, would characterize welfare regimes.

Mediated by path dependency, this resilience is part of the history, culture and demography of different societies, and it leads them to make the most of their geographical situation and of their position in the global economy. It is worth noting that this neo-institutionalist perspective goes

hand in hand with another, which draws on the resource-mobilization approach: if welfare regimes persist through time, it is not simply because of institutional inertia; it is also because the social forces shaped by the regimes take an active role in ensuring that they perpetuate themselves.

Methodological Considerations

To test the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen and Leibfried-Ferrera-Bonoli, hierarchical cluster analysis is the most appropriate method because it allows grouping countries that have similar characteristics across a set of variables, thus leading to homogeneous empirical types (Rapkin and Luke, 1993).⁸ It is called hierarchical because it divides a set of cases (the countries) into ever more numerous and specific subsets, according to the distance measured among all pairs of cases, taking into account their position across the whole set of variables under analysis.⁹ Given that this inductive method is based exclusively on similarities among the cases, its results depend on only two factors: on the one hand, the actual structure of the observed phenomenon, and on the other hand, the methodological decisions concerning the choice of cases and variables, as well as the statistical method used to identify subsets. We now briefly examine the rules we have adopted so as to eliminate all arbitrariness in identifying the observed phenomenon.

Since we want to compare advanced societies, namely, the societies that have capitalist market economies and rather broad social programmes, our analysis must include the full set of these societies and only these. At first we decided to use the 30 countries of the OECD. But early testing showed that about 10 of them, among which were Mexico, Korea and Turkey and the ex-Communist countries (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic), had much lower levels of development in this regard; moreover, far fewer standardized data are available about the social programmes in these countries. This situation forced us to withdraw them from our analysis (for more information, see Saint-Arnaud et al., 2000). This in no way compromises our objective of validating the welfare regime typology, since most other authors have analysed the same countries we have selected here.

The choice of variables represents the greatest challenge to our analysis, for it is on this basis alone that the notion of welfare regime will be operationally defined. We have already indicated that our guiding concern would be to represent the three causally interrelated components of welfare regimes: social situations, public policies and political participation. It is obviously impossible to include all the variables having to do with these components, since only a limited set appear in the standard statistical sources.¹⁰ But selecting a reasonably diversified sample of them is sufficient

to be able to characterize the countries and regimes with respect to the task at hand: we need a sample covering all three components, of course, but also diversified into a variety of areas (employment, health, education, public budgets, contributions to social programmes and various forms of civic participation).¹¹

We must circumvent two difficulties in this connection. On the one hand, we must not include in the analysis any variables that, although interesting, might contrast the countries on bases that would be irrelevant to our specific concern. On the other hand, we must be careful not to incorporate into our analyses any indicators that *directly* measure inclusion in one or another regime, a choice that would lead to fruitless circular reasoning. A recent study by Obinger and Wagschal (2001) used hierarchical cluster analysis, just as ours does, and obtained similar results, but it did present, to a degree, both of these shortcomings.

These authors chose to include in their analyses a set of economic variables (e.g. GDP per capita, the openness of the economy to imports and exports, surpluses or deficits in the balance of payments, the proportion of the workforce engaged in farming) that put more emphasis on the absolute level of development and economic wealth than on the type of social security regime: that is, on the configuration of political and fiscal choices that those societies had made. At the same time, Obinger and Wagschal used variables measuring the political composition of the government (for instance, the percentage of members of the social-democratic, conservative and liberal parties present in government). This short-circuits the analysis and makes it partly circular: if the data analysis tells us that in countries oriented towards various regimes, political representatives explicitly espouse these political orientations, we do not learn much about the resilience of those regimes.

We have avoided these difficulties by restricting ourselves to indicators that measure exclusively the specificity of social situations, as shaped by public policies, themselves the outcome of a variety of types of civic participation (and not the resultant ideological positions measured directly).

Last, as far as the method used to identify subsets is concerned, we have made four choices that should elicit little controversy. First, we have standardized all the variables we used on a scale from 0 to 1, to prevent the sort of skewed analysis that might result if some variables with a broad range of absolute values were allowed to dominate the data analysis. Second, we have chosen the classic measure of distance known as 'squared Euclidean' to evaluate the similarities between cases, as it gives more importance to greater distances, and thus makes it possible to bring out the differences between countries whose profiles still show high degrees of similarity.¹² Third, for the actual groupings themselves, we have adopted the usual Ward's method, which minimizes the variance within groups and thus maximizes their homogeneity. Fourth, in keeping with normal practices for exploratory analyses

of this kind, we have decided on the number of country groupings in such a way that they made theoretical sense while offering a parsimonious and manageable representation of reality.¹³

It should be emphasized that even if hierarchical cluster analysis does not require validity tests in the strictest sense, since it is an exploratory method (Falissard, 1996), we did nevertheless perform some checks on the model and the variables we used. For example, we withdrew each of the individual variables in turn from our analyses to make sure that no single one of them was by itself exerting undue influence in the determination of the outcome. By applying the *F*-test and Tukey's *b*-test, we were also able to find out which variables were significantly contributing to the grouping of cases, and whether these variables were significant when comparing the groupings (the results of this last test are shown in Table 1). After applying these tests, we removed certain variables from the model and redid the hierarchical cluster analyses, which produced results very similar to those presented in the following section.

Validating the Typology of Welfare Regimes

Our analysis of the set of indicators for the 1990s reproduced the Esping-Andersen and Leibfried-Bonoli-Ferrera typology. Figure 4 shows that the main countries generally considered as liberal indeed form a cluster (Canada, the US, the UK, New Zealand, Australia), just as do the conservative countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Austria), the social-democratic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark) and the Latin countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal). The dendrogram also shows very clearly the similarity between the conservative and the Latin regimes, which share more characteristics among themselves than they do with the other two, as Esping-Andersen (1999a: 90) predicted. But the fact that a four-group analysis conforms so closely to the predictions of Leibfried, Bonoli and Ferrera leads us to conclude that a regime specific to Latin countries does exist. As for Iceland and Ireland, whose welfare regimes have been subject to little study, our analyses suggest that these countries fall into the liberal camp.

Given that hierarchical cluster analysis is an exploratory method, deciding on the number of subsets to keep is a function of the theoretical interpretability of the groupings. Although we have actually explored as many as seven groupings, this additional differentiation yielded no country groupings that resembled welfare regime typologies already existing in the literature.¹⁴ We have thus limited ourselves to the four groups illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Using All Variables (1993–8)
Note: The dendrogram is based on the Ward amalgamation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean.

Features of Welfare Regimes

Besides confirming the typology, this first analysis makes it possible to characterize the four welfare regimes using averages on each variable computed for each of the country groupings (see Table 1). These data thoroughly confirm the descriptions of these regimes presented earlier.

Thus, liberal countries invest very little in the public sphere; social security transfers in particular are by far the smallest. Considerable importance is placed, however, on subsidies to private- and public-sector enterprises, which are markedly higher than in the other regimes. In the liberal model, both workers and employers pay very little in social security contributions. By contrast, it is in these countries, with the exception of the social-democratic ones, that individuals pay the most in taxes. Liberal health regimes are very costly, if one considers the proportion of public expenditure on health relative to total public expenditure. Public investment in education is considerable, although inferior to that in the Scandinavian countries, but it is very weak in vocational training. As for unemployment, the liberal

Table 1 Position of the Welfare Regimes (and Canada) on the Social Indicators 1993–8, 1993–7

	<i>Mean score for the regimes</i>				
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>Social-democrat</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Latin</i>
<i>Characteristics of governmental programmes (1993–7)</i>					
General governmental total outlays for 1996 (% of GDP) ^a	38.9	42.8	56.6	48.9	46.1
As % of total governmental outlays					
Final consumption expenditure ^a	44.2	44.3	40.0	32.9	35.7
Social security transfers ^a	12.9 ^b	15.6	30.1	31.1	34.8
Subsidies	27.7	15.5	16.2	21.8	9.1
Investments	5.3	4.8	4.9	4.5	6.0 ^c
Debt interest payments	11.8	19.8	8.9	9.7	17.9
General government receipts for 1996 (% of GDP) ^a	38.1	44.1	56.4	48.2	42.1
Income tax of unmarried individual workers as % of gross earnings in 1996 ^a	20.7	22.0	29.0	14.4	10.0
Social security contributions on income of individuals as % of gross earnings for 1996 (based on average single wage of unmarried worker) ^a	4.1	5.0	7.5	20.8	10.8
Contribution of employers to social security for the average unmarried single-waged worker for 1996	5.3	6.0	14.0	20.2	24.3
Public expenditure on health as % of all public expenditures for 1996 ^a	15.6	14.9	10.9	13.0	11.6
Public expenditure on health as % of GDP for 1996 ^a	6.0	6.4	6.5	6.8	5.4
Number of physicians per 1000 persons for 1996 ^a	2.3	2.1	2.9	3.0	4.2
Public expenditure on education as % of GDP for 1996 ^a	6.1	7.6	8.1	5.4	4.5
Public expenditure on training as % of GDP for 1996 ^a	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2
Number of years since the first law on old age, disability and death	86.7	73.0	80.8	92.6	73.3
Number of years since the first law on sickness and maternity	58.7	29.0	86.3	95.2	75.5
Number of years since the first law on unemployment	67.6	60.0	84.0	82.4	60.5
Number of years since the first law on work injury ^a	93.6	92.0	103.0	105.4	93.8
Number of years since the first law on family allowances	58.4	56.0	51.8	59.4	56.3

Table 1 continued

	<i>Mean score for the regimes</i>				
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>Social-democrat</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Latin</i>
<i>Social situation variables (1993–7)</i>					
Unemployment rate for 1997	7.2	9.2	8.1	8.9	12.5
Incidence of long-term unemployment (as % of total unemployed) for 1997 ^a	26.2	12.5	25.3	45.4	58.3
GDP annual growth rate in % for the period 1988–98	3.0	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.2
General government employment (as % of total employment) for 1995 ^a	16.2	21.5	29.9	17.1	16.0
Average annual rate of inflation in % for 1996 ^a	2.3	2.4	1.6	1.9	5.7
Overall employment rate for 1997 ^a	49.6	51.9	51.1	46.5	43.1
Female labour participation rate (1997) ^a	66.6	67.8	74.1	60.4	51.0
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) in 1995 ^a	6.4	6.0	4.4	5.6	6.8
Total fertility rate for 1996 ^a	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.3
Life expectancy at birth for 1997	77.7	79.0	77.3	77.6	77.3
Average age of women at the birth of their first child for 1993	26.9	26.8	26.4	26.7	26.2
R&D scientists and technicians (per 1000 people) for 1990–6 ^a	3.4	3.7	5.5	4.0	1.6
<i>Political participation variables (1993–7)</i>					
Voter turnout at latest elections	73.3	69.0	78.3	80.6	75.8
Level of trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997) ^a	45.3	49.6	57.9	32.6	26.3
Daily newspaper read per 1000 people for 1990/6 ^a	271.3	159.0	449.4	258.2	107.9
Union membership for 1995 ^a	38.5	37.4	77.1	31.8	28.2

^a Significant variable according to the Tukey's *b*-test.

^b Australia excluded from the computation of score (the value has been estimated).

^c Greece and Spain excluded from the computation of score (the value has been estimated).

countries have better results than all the other regimes. They also perform well concerning the general employment rate and the labour force participation rate of women. When it comes to political participation, the liberal model ranks second after the social-democratic regime on all variables except those dealing with voter turnout, where it ranks last.

In the social-democratic model, investment in the public sphere is extensive: public administration expenditure and receipts, social security transfers (but not other transfers and subsidies) and education and vocational training expenditures set this regime apart from the others. It should be emphasized that the efforts made in education seem to be bearing fruit since these countries have the highest proportion of scientists and research and development technicians. This is also the regime that has the highest taxes, which in part explains the sizeable government receipts. As for employment, the social-democratic regimes have low unemployment levels, high rates of employment in public administration and high professional participation rates among women. Finally, the social-democratic model distinguishes itself from the other regimes by its high scores on measures of political participation (voter turnout rates, levels of trust towards others, the number of newspapers read, and the proportion of unionized wage-earners).

The conservative regime is also characterized by relatively high levels of investment in the public sphere (current public administration expenditure, health, vocational training, social security transfers). It also takes in, much like the social-democratic regime, significant government receipts, but relatively little in the form of income taxes; moreover, social security contributions made by employees and by companies are very high. Both general and long-term unemployment rates are high (as in the Latin countries). In addition, the predominance of the 'male breadwinner' model results in low employment rate for women, which keeps the employment rate for the population as a whole modest. Finally, although the conservative regime countries have the highest voter turnout rates, other variables measuring political participation suggest that it is not very high.

Finally, the Latin regime bears a strong resemblance to the conservative regime, but public administration expenditure is generally more limited, though still above that of the liberal countries. A large share of the expenditure takes the form of social security transfers, the largest of all the regimes. In addition, it is largely employer contributions (rather than income taxes) that finance these social security programmes. Here, investments in health, education, and vocational training are the lowest. Both general and long-term unemployment rates are high, and women have labour force participation rates even lower than in the conservative model. Lastly, political participation in the countries belonging to this regime is much lower than the average for the other regimes.

Only one country is misclassified when its figures are compared with




Figure 5 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Using All Variables (1986–90)

Note: The dendrogram is based on the Ward amalgamation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean.

more qualitative, classical political analyses: the Netherlands, classified here with the conservative countries and not, as most authors do, with the social-democratic countries. Recent work by Esping-Andersen (1999a) suggests, however, that the Netherlands has a social assistance model (coverage, programme structures and generosity in redistribution) similar to the social-democratic regime, but that other measures, like the extent of social and family services, indicate greater affinity with the conservative type.

Welfare Regimes in the Mid-1980s

We have evaluated the stability of these regimes through time by performing additional analyses on the same variables, this time covering the period of the mid-1980s.¹⁵ The results again matched the same typology, as can be seen in Figure 5. The liberal countries clustered together (Canada, the US, the UK, New Zealand, Australia, to which, here again, Ireland and Iceland are added), as did the countries having a conservative profile (Belgium, France, Germany,

Austria and, again, the Netherlands), the countries having a social-democratic profile (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland), and finally the Latin countries (Greece and Portugal). As in Figure 4, the dendrogram displays the similarity between the conservative and Latin regimes; this proximity explains in part why Spain and Italy are found under the conservative, rather than the Latin, regime.

As far as the variables used in our model can tell, the convergence of economic markets does not seem to have affected the way welfare regimes are shaped: the four types persisted over a period of about 10 years. It would thus seem, as Palier and Bonoli (1999: 402) suggest, that once established, these basic political profiles generally hold together well and promote continuity rather than change: we see that path dependency predominates, so that political arrangements sustain through time the distinctions among the welfare regimes of the countries under study.

Confirming the Typology for Each of the Three Interrelated Components of Regimes

We have hypothesized that the resilience of the welfare regimes rests on a mutual reinforcement, over the years, between patterns of social situations, of public policies and of political participation that characterize each of the regimes: each component assumes, in each country, a specific form that is in fact dictated by the development of the regime with which the country is associated. We thus expect to find the same country grouping when we examine separately the social indicators corresponding to each of the three components. Our results conform to these expectations on the whole, with slight deviations that may be explained in part by the limited number of variables available in certain cases (especially with respect to political participation).

Results from the analysis for social programmes are illustrated in Figure 6. We can discern four distinct models of social and economic policy organization. The countries of the liberal and social-democratic types are very clearly identified. Some ambiguity is nevertheless present between the Latin and conservative regimes. Italy and Spain (of the Latin regime) are classified with the conservative model, thus leaving Portugal and Greece alone in one group. An examination of the variables¹⁶ shows that Italy and Spain have social and fiscal policies similar to those of the conservative countries, while Greece and Portugal have less generous programmes.

Figure 7 presents the analysis of social situations. The typology is quite clear, and it differs from Figure 4 in three cases only: France falls under the social-democratic regime, and Portugal and Ireland are grouped with the conservative countries. A closer look at the variables shows that France has a high




Figure 6 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Using Only the Programme Variables (1993–8)
Note: The dendrogram is based on the Ward amalgamation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean.

rate of employment in public administration and a sizeable contingent of technicians and scientists in research and development, much like the social-democratic countries; but this does not mean that it truly belongs to this regime, for it diverges from it in a number of other indicators for social situations. Portugal stands out from the averages for the Latin regime countries because of better employment circumstances (unemployment, paid employment in general and among women), an area in which it comes closer to the conservative regime. Finally, Ireland has a few social characteristics in common with the conservative countries.

In the case of political participation (illustrated in Figure 8), we see three distinct models of political mobilization – a coincidence with Esping-Andersen's views. The liberal and the social-democratic countries form their own separate groups, while the conservative and the Latin countries make up only one. Here again the Netherlands fall into an unexpected category, since the country aligns itself with the liberal regime; such a result is not unusual in qualitative policy analyses, and it illustrates the complex nature of this country.

Thus, a few of the variables we have analysed do not conform to the logic




Figure 7 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Using Only the Social Situation Variables (1993–8)

Note: The dendrogram is based on the Ward amalgamation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean.

of welfare regimes (for example, the rationale presiding over the construction of a strong state in France), which leads to a few anomalies in the way our results play out for each of the three regime components. Even so, we see very close linkages between the organization of social programmes in these different societies, the social situations that have resulted from these social policies, and the political participation that mobilizes citizens to shape social programmes. It thus seems plausible that the stability of these welfare regimes reflects the strength of these linkages and their resilience when confronted with the effects of the economic transformations caused by globalization.

Our analyses allow us to reach for a supplementary objective: to situate Canada among 'the worlds of welfare capitalism', to examine its similarities and its differences with other societies and regimes, to characterize its possible evolution, taking into account its past (path dependency) as well as the constraints of its international environment. This is the question we finally turn to.




Figure 8 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Using Only the Political Participation Variables (1993–8)

Note: The dendrogram is based on the Ward amalgamation method; distance measure: squared Euclidean.

Canada is a Liberal Country, But . . .

Canada, as we have seen in the various figures shown earlier, belongs to the liberal welfare regime. There is nothing surprising about that, particularly given its geographical proximity to the US and the magnitude of its economic exchanges with that country (Banting, 1996). But the data in the second column of Table 1 give us reason to believe that it is closer, in some specific respects, to social-democratic, conservative and Latin perspectives.

Public expenditures and receipts represent, in Canada, a relatively small proportion of the gross domestic product, as in the other liberal countries. But that proportion is still higher in Canada than in the other members of the liberal regime, and it comes close to the proportion in the conservative and Latin countries, although it does not reach the level of the social-democratic countries. Social security transfers are also very small in Canada, as in the other liberal countries. In contrast to these latter, however, Canada uses subsidies and other transfers only very modestly. In the matter of public receipts, the profile for Canada is similar to that of other liberal countries,

given the low payroll taxes paid by employees and employers. Income taxes are nevertheless slightly higher, a situation that brings us a little closer to that of the social-democratic countries, while distinguishing us markedly from the conservative and Latin countries. Moreover, the rate of public administration employment is also higher than in other regimes, with the obvious exception of the social-democratic regime.

Canada devotes a significant proportion of its public expenditure to health, as do the other liberal countries. But it sets itself apart in that its public outlays for education bring it somewhat closer to the social-democratic countries. These outlays do not, however, extend to vocational training, in which the social-democratic states are the only ones to invest heavily.

What is the outcome of these various public interventions in Canada? Our unemployment rate is closer to that of the conservative and Latin regimes than to that of the liberal and social-democratic regimes, where it is limited respectively by low levels of social transfers, and by active employment policies. Canada has, however, relatively little long-term unemployment. The employment rate is high, comparable to that for the social-democratic regimes and a little higher than that for the liberal regimes. The labour force participation rate for women is also high, as in the last two regimes. Finally, in the matter of political participation, Canada is a long way from the situation in the social-democratic countries, coming much closer to the liberal countries, except with respect to daily newspaper readership, where it falls almost to the low level of the Latin countries.

In short, Canada is a liberal country, but certain peculiarities set it apart from the liberal regime. Public interventions in Canada are a little more pronounced, and in certain respects social situations approach, if only timidly, those prevailing in Europe. But political participation remains relatively low, particularly if one compares it to social-democratic countries.

Conclusion

In this study we have tried to demonstrate, using new empirical data, that some advanced societies systematically differ in their choices when it comes to the interdependence between social expenditure and economic performance. Despite the influence of macroeconomic constraints (Clement and Myles, 1994; Banting, 1996; Soskice, 1999), our results confirm the presence and persistence in these societies of significant distinctions in social policy organization, in struggles over social inequality, and in the interrelationships between the state, the market and the family.

Using hierarchical cluster analysis, applied to a set of quantitative indicators, we have validated the typologies of Esping-Andersen and of Leibfried, Ferrera and Bonoli, which hypothesized the existence of four welfare regimes:

liberal, social-democratic, conservative and Latin. Comparing results has allowed us to reject, at least for the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the hypothesis of an overall convergence of regimes resulting from the constraints of economic markets. We were able to shed light on the stability of the regimes by analysing in turn each theoretical component of the model: social programmes, social situations and political participation. The typology can be reproduced – with only slight deviations – using data about each of the components taken separately; we interpreted this parallelism as indicative of close ties between the organization of social programmes in these societies, the social situations that are in part the result of social policies, and the political participation that leads people, to a greater or lesser extent, to work in concert in order to shape social programmes. The stability of regimes suggests that current choices closely depend on past choices (path dependency), a fact that fails to point towards convergence for the future.

Finally, by comparing the results for Canada with the averages for each regime, we observed an overall similarity with liberal countries. But in some ways Canada also resembles other regimes, and in particular the social-democratic one: public interventions are more pronounced there than in the other liberal countries, which reflects the particularities of our political situation and the resilience of our own path.

Notes

The support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and of the University of Montreal is gratefully acknowledged. The article was translated from the French by Robert Sullivan.

- 1 At least before taxes and transfers, in the case of Canada.
- 2 This is in fact the notion that Amartya Sen (1999) advances in *Development as Freedom*.
- 3 Castles and Mitchell (1993) also propose adding another type to Esping-Andersen's classification, located at the Antipodes and comprising Australia and New Zealand. These countries would be characterized by state interventions with respect to inequalities aimed, on the one hand, at the labour market (and indeed at pre-tax and transfers income), and consisting, on the other hand, in rather generous, if means-tested, income maintenance programmes. The data on public policies that are available to us at this point in our research, which emphasize social programmes expenditures rather than income tax issues, do not allow us to test this hypothesis here.
- 4 The notion of decommodification of the workforce refers to the scope of freedom that social actors have, under a given welfare regime, to sell (or not sell) their labour on the market to achieve an acceptable standard of living (Martin, 1997). To be sure, in all advanced capitalist societies work remains the main source of livelihood for individuals, but it also brings about social inequality. People who

have no choice but to depend on their labour to meet their daily subsistence needs find themselves at a disadvantage when dealing with the owners of the means of production. In order to reduce the social inequality caused by the market, advanced societies have adopted various decommodification rights. These rights translate into social policies that allow citizens to opt at will for non-work when they deem it necessary, without significant losses in employment rights, income, or general material well-being (Esping-Andersen, 1999b). The process of decommodification may take the form of benefits granting access to government services in education, health care, income security, etc. The degree of decommodification will vary according to the ideological values (liberty, equality, solidarity) mainly emphasized in a particular society.

- 5 To return to Esping-Andersen (1999b), this defamilialization of social policy constitutes a prerequisite for reconciling work and motherhood for women. A high level of defamilialization in social policy means that the state is committed to funding programmes that convert unpaid labour into paid services. Conversely, familialistic societies (with low or non-existent levels of defamilialization) maintain that in most circumstances the family is where the social needs of family members should be met, an orientation reflecting a predilection for the traditional model in which males are the primary, if not the exclusive, breadwinners.
- 6 We have occasion to come back to this point towards the end of the article, when we examine in greater detail the place of Canada in the worlds of 'welfare capitalism'.
- 7 Obinger and Wagschal (2001) briefly allude to the presence of this mutual causality in Esping-Andersen's perspective.
- 8 Among the various methods for grouping variables or cases (for instance, factorial analyses of different kinds), this is the method of choice, especially since in this case we have a large number of variables but few cases.
- 9 Put more simply, it is as though one were asking the model to separate the cases into the two most internally homogeneous subsets possible, but with the highest degree of difference possible between them (based on the multidimensional distance between the cases). Once these two subsets have been determined, one then performs the same operation again on each of them, and so on down the line.
- 10 The variables used in this research have been taken from the statistical sources of the OECD, the UN, UNICEF, the World Bank, work by Knack and Keefer (1997), the Social Security Online website in the US, and the World Values Survey. Detailed information on statistical sources is available from the authors on request.
- 11 A summary list of variables has already been presented in Figure 3, and a more detailed version is given in Table 1.
- 12 We did, however, redo our analyses, substituting for the Euclidean squared distance method the block, Euclidean, Minkowski and Chebychev methods; this did not alter the original outcome.
- 13 No rule specifies exactly where to stop the disaggregation into finer and finer subsets, which would ultimately result in simply recognizing that each case (or country) has its own specificity. But such an outcome is hardly useful for identifying regimes, and thus similarities among countries, as Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999a) has demonstrated. We justify in greater detail, later on, our choice of the four-group model.

- 14 It should nevertheless be emphasized that a five-group analysis shows Canada and the US moving closer together (a convergence to which we return later). It is moreover noteworthy that in addition to this case, three of the four groups are regional in nature (the social-democratic countries of Northern Europe, the conservative countries of Continental Europe, the Latin countries of Southern Europe). As Banting (1996) argues, the geographic proximity of countries probably has an impact on the development of their social policies: because of economic exchanges and of workforce migration between contiguous countries or regions, certain social programmes (e.g. those having to do with employment, education and health care) must become more compatible and even comply with international and interregional agreements, which can, up to a certain point, bring about a homogenization of social situations.
- 15 It is difficult to extend this analysis further into the past because before the 1980s the base data were not uniformly aggregated for a group of countries similar to the one we have studied.
- 16 Detailed supporting statistics are available from the authors on request.

Bibliography

- ARTS, Wil and GELISSEN, John (2002) 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report', *Journal of European Social Policy* 12(2): 137–58.
- BANTING, Keith (1996) 'Social Policy Challenges in a Global Society', International Development Research Centre, posted at: www.idrc.ca/books/focus/761/banting.html
- BERNARD, Paul (1999) 'La cohésion sociale: critique dialectique d'un quasi-concept', *Lien social et politique – RIAC*, no. 41, printemps, 47–59 [also published as a Research Paper of the Family Network, Canadian Policy Research Networks, under the title 'Social Cohesion: A Critique', posted at: <http://www.cprn.com/en/doc.cfm?doc=311>].
- BERNARD, Paul (2001) 'Le quasi-concept d'inclusion sociale et ses paradoxes', paper presented at the conference 'Les facteurs d'inclusion sociale ont-ils changé?', organized by CRITERES and the Policy Research Secretariat, Montréal, February.
- BETCHERMAN, Gordon and LOWE, Graham (1997) *The Future of Work in Canada: A Synthesis Report*. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, Work Network, posted at <http://www.cprn.com/cprn.html>.
- BONOLI, G. (1997) 'Classifying Welfare States: A Two Dimensional Approach', *Journal of Social Policy* 26(3): 351–72.
- CASTLES, Francis G. (2001) 'Reflections on the Methodology of Comparative Type Construction: Three Worlds or Real Worlds?', *Acta Politica* 36(3): 140–54.
- CASTLES, F. G. and MITCHELL, D. (1993) 'Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations', in F. G. Castles (ed.) *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- CLEMENT, Wallace and MYLES, John (1994) *Relations of Ruling: Class and Gender in Postindustrial Society*. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

- ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (1999a) *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (1999b) *Les Trois Mondes de l'État-providence; Essai sur le capitalisme moderne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- FALISSARD, Bruno (1996) *Comprendre et utiliser les statistiques dans les sciences de la vie*, Collection 'évaluation et statistique'. Paris: Masson.
- FERRERA, M. (1993) *Modelli di solidarietà*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- FERRERA, M. (1996) 'The "Southern" Model of Welfare in Europe', *Journal of European Social Policy* 6(1): 17–37.
- FLACHER, B. (2000) 'La Participation politique', PNF de Lyon; posted at: <http://sceco.univ-aix.fr/cepe/ecjparticppolit.html>
- GIDDENS, Anthony (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. New York: Polity Press.
- GODBOUT, Jacques T., in collaboration with CAILLÉ, Alain (1992) *L'Esprit du don*. Montréal, Boréal and Paris: La Découverte.
- GOODIN, Robert E., HEADY, Bruce, MUFFELS, Ruud and DIRVEN, Henk-Jan (1999) *The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- IVERSEN, Torben and WREN, Anne (1998) 'Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy', *World Politics* 50 (July): 507–46.
- JENSON, Jane (1998) *Mapping Social Cohesion. The State of Canadian Research*. (CPRN Study No. F03). Ottawa: Canadian Social Policies Network, 49 p., posted at: <http://www.cprn.com/cprn.html>.
- JESUIT, David and SMEEDING, Timothy (2002) 'Poverty and Income Distribution', Center for Policy Research, posted at: www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/faculty/smeeding/papers/index.htm
- KNACK, S. and KEEFER, P. (1997) 'Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1251–88.
- KORPI, W. (1983) *The Democratic Class Struggle*. London: Routledge.
- LAGROYE, Jacques (1993) *Sociologie Politique*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques & Dalloz.
- LEIBFRIED, Stephan (1992) 'Towards a European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty Regimes into the European Community', in Z. Ferge and J. E. Kolberg (eds) *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*, pp. 245–80. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- MAIONI, Antonia (1996) 'Les systèmes de soins de santé au Canada et aux États-Unis: convergence impossible?', *Politique et sociétés* 30: 135–57.
- MARSHALL, T. H. (1964) *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- MARTIN, Claude (1997) 'La Comparaison des systèmes de protection sociale en Europe. De la classification à l'analyse des trajectoires d'État providence', *Lien social et politique – RIAC* No. 37: 144–55.
- MILNER, Henry (2001) *Civic Literacy: How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- MYLES, John (1998) 'Les Limites des prophéties, ou les raisons d'être de la modestie intellectuelle en sciences sociales', *Sociologie et sociétés* XXX(1).

- NOËL, Alain (1996) 'Vers un nouvel État providence? Enjeux démocratiques', *Politique et sociétés* 30: 3–27.
- OBINGER, Herbert and WAGSCHAL, Uwe (2001) 'Families of Nations and Public Policy', *West European Politics* 24(1): 99–114.
- O'CONNOR, Julia (1997) 'Social Justice, Social Citizenship and the Welfare State 1965–1995: Canada in Comparative Context', paper presented at RC 19 Meeting, 'Welfare State Challenge, Marginalisation and Poverty', Copenhagen, 21–4 August.
- OECD (ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT) (2001) *Sustainable Development: Critical Issues*. Paris: OECD, posted at <http://www.oecd.org/EN/longabstract/0,,EN-longabstract-0-nodirectorate-no-15-13450-0,00.html>.
- ORLOFF, A. (1993) 'Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship', *American Sociological Review* 58: 303–28.
- PALIER, Bruno and BONOLI, Giuliano (1999) 'Phénomène de Path Dependence et réformes des systèmes de protection sociale', *Revue française de Science Politique* 49(3): 399–420.
- PIERSON, Paul (1997) *Path Dependence and the Study of Politics*. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute.
- PIERSON, Paul (2000) 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review* June, posted at: www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m0259/2_94/63909266/print.jhtml
- RAPKIN, Bruce D. and LUKE, Douglas A. (1993) 'Cluster Analysis in Community Research: Epistemology and Practice', *American Journal of Community Psychology* 21(2): 247–77.
- RIMLIGER, G. (1971) *Welfare and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia*. New York: Wiley.
- SAINT-ARNAUD, Sébastien (2001) 'Une analyse typologique des régimes providentiels des pays avancés', unpublished, University of Montreal.
- SAINT-ARNAUD, Sébastien, BERNARD, Paul and BOISJOLY, Johanne (2000) 'Une analyse classificatoire hiérarchique des régimes providentiels dans les pays de l'OCDE', communication to l'ACFAS, 19 May, Montreal. .
- SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. (1952) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 4th edn. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- SEN, Amartya (1999) *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf.
- SKOČPOL, T. (1985) 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skočpol (eds) *Bringing the State Back In*, pp. 3–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SOSKICE, David (1999) 'Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s', in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John Stephens (eds) *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 101–34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- THUROW, Lester C. (1997) *The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World*. New York: Penguin Books.
- TITMUSS, Richard M. (1974) *Social Policy: An Introduction*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- TITMUSS, Richard M. (1987) 'Developing Social Policy in Conditions of Rapid Change: The Role of Social Welfare', in Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss (eds) *The Philosophy of Welfare: Selected Writings of Richard M. Titmuss*, pp. 254–68. London: Allen and Unwin. (Orig. pub. 1972.)