

Governance, Legitimacy and Security

Liberal writers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a teleological view of history. They believed that the zone of civility would, inevitably, extend itself in time and space. In his book *Reflections on Violence*,¹ John Keane contrasts their optimism with the pessimism of twentieth-century writers like Zygmunt Bauman or Norbert Elias, who considered that barbarism was the inevitable concomitant of civility. For these writers, violence is embedded in human nature. The cost of allowing the state to monopolize violence is the terrible barbarity of twentieth-century wars and totalitarianism.

The end of the Cold War may mark the end of statist barbarism on this scale. Certainly, the threat of modern war and, in particular, the threat of nuclear war – the absolute expression of twentieth-century barbarism – have receded. Does this mean that violence can no longer be controlled, that the new type of warfare described in the previous chapters is likely to be pervasive, an ongoing characteristic of the post-modern world? The implication of the argument so far is that it is no longer possible to contain war geographically. Zones of peace and zones of war exist side by side in the same territorial space. The characteristics of the new wars I have described – the politics of identity, the decentralization of violence, the globalized war economy – can be found in greater or lesser degree all over the world. Moreover, through transnational criminal networks, diaspora networks based on identity, the explosive growth of refugees and asylum-

There is no self-evident answer. In every era there is a complex relationship between processes of governance (how human affairs are managed), legitimacy (on which the power to govern is based) and forms of security (how organized violence is controlled). On the one hand, the ability to maintain order, to protect individuals in a physical sense, to provide a secure basis for administrative capacities, to guarantee the rule of law and to protect territory externally are all primary functions of political institutions from which they derive legitimacy. Moreover, the character of these institutions is largely defined in relation to the way in which these functions are undertaken and which aspects of security are accorded priority. On the other hand, it is not possible to provide security in the sense defined above without some underlying legitimacy. There has to be some mechanism, whether it is religious injunction, ideological fanaticism or democratic consent, which explains why people obey rules and why, in particular, agents of organized violence – soldiers or policemen, for example – follow orders.

In chapter 2, I described the way in which the evolution of modern (old) war was linked to the emergence of the European nation-state, in which internal pacification was associated with the externalization of violence and legitimacy derived from notions of patriotism embedded in the actual experience of war. The term 'national security' was largely synonymous with external defence of national borders. In the post-war period, the internal/external distinction extended to bloc boundaries, and ideological identities – notions of freedom and/or socialism – drawn from the experience of the Second World War supplanted but did not displace national identities as a basis for bloc legitimacy. Bloc security also meant external defence of the blocs.

Today, there is great uncertainty about future patterns of governance. There is talk of a 'security vacuum'. The debate about how to fill that vacuum is largely an institutional debate. In Europe, it revolves around the future of NATO and the role of other European institutions such as the WEU, OSCE, the CIS and so on. But underlying the institutional debate is a real set of questions about the control of violence. The national monopoly of legitimate organized violence has been eroded from above by the transnationalization of military forces. It has been eroded from below by the privatization of organized violence which is

every era there is a com-
governance (how human
ch the power to govern
anized violence is con-
maintain order, to pro-
vide a secure basis for
the rule of law and to
y functions of political
itimacy. Moreover, the
efined in relation to the
ken and which aspects
e other hand, it is not
defined above without
o be some mechanism,
cal fanaticism or demo-
e obey rules and why,
e – soldiers or police-

which the evolution of
ergence of the Euro-
ication was associated
gitimacy derived from
actual experience of
ely synonymous with
the post-war period,
d to bloc boundaries,
edom and/or social-
Second World War
identities as a basis for
external defence of

ture patterns of gov-
n'. The debate about
titutional debate. In
ATO and the role of
EU, OSCE, the CIS
debate is a real set of
e national monopoly
oded from above by
It has been eroded
ed violence which is

characteristic of the new wars. Under what conditions are exist-
ing or new security institutions able to eliminate or marginalize
privatized forms of violence?

My argument is that this depends on political choice and how
we choose to analyse the nature of contemporary violence and
what conception of security we adopt. Traditional political sci-
ence rooted in nineteenth- and twentieth-century experience is
only able to predict a new variant of the past or else the descent
into chaos. Precisely because the dominant stream of political
science thinking was directed towards the existing system of
governance, providing at once a form of justification or legiti-
mation of that system and at the same time a basis for offering
advice about how to operate within the system, it gives rise to a
kind of fatalism or determinism about the future. In contrast,
critical or normative approaches to political science allow for
human agency. They are based on the assumption that people
make their own history and can choose their futures, at least
within a certain framework that can be analysed.

In what follows, I outline some possible ways of thinking
about security which derive from competing political visions
of the future based on differing perceptions of the nature of
contemporary violence. One of these visions is a restoration of
world order based on the reconstruction of some kind of bloc
system in which cleavages based on identity supplant cleavages
based on ideology. This approach draws on realist assumptions
about international relations in which the main actors are
territorially-based political authorities and new wars are treated
as a variant of old wars – geo-political conflicts. The most well-
known example of this type of thinking is in Samuel Hunting-
ton's *Clash of Civilizations*, where he proposes a variant of the
bloc system based on cultural identity instead of ideology.² A
second vision can be described as neo-medievalism³ or as anar-
chy, and draws on a post-modern rejection of realism.⁴ Propo-
nents of this line of thought recognize that the new wars cannot
be understood in old terms, but at the same time are unable to
identify any logic in the new wars. They are treated as a Hob-
besian 'warre' against all.⁵ This vision is, essentially, a counsel
of despair, an admission of our inability to analyse global de-
velopments. Finally, a third vision is based on a more norma-
tive approach, drawing on the argument put forward for
cosmopolitanism in the previous chapter.

The Clash of Civilizations

Huntington's thesis is a variant of the bloc system in which the source of legitimacy is cultural identity – loyalty to what he defines as historic civilizations. His book has received so much attention because it expresses what many believe to be the unstated convictions of parts of the political establishment, particularly those whose livelihood depended on the Cold War – an attempt to recreate the comfortable certainties of the bipolar world and to construct a new threat to substitute for communism. The Gulf War represented the paradigm for Huntington's approach; Saddam Hussein was literally built up in the communist image. The plan rolled out by the Pentagon had originally been designed to contain a Soviet thrust southwards towards the Persian Gulf. By following organizational routine and mobilizing on a scale commensurate with a Cold War scenario, Saddam Hussein was transformed into a formidable enemy equivalent to his Soviet predecessor.⁶

Huntington argues that we are entering a multi-civilizational world in which culture rather than ideology will be the bonding mechanism for societies and groups of states. As many critics have pointed out, he is rather vague about what is meant by culture, although clearly, for him, religion is a key defining element. Thus, the West is Christian, but only Catholic and Protestant. He is adamant that Turkey cannot be allowed to join the EU because it is Muslim, and he considers that the membership of Greece, an Orthodox country, is a mistake; according to Huntington, Greece is definitely not part of Western civilization. It is also clear that, for him, states are the key guarantors of civilizations. He emphasizes the role of 'core states', e.g. the USA for the West and China for Asia.

He defines some six or seven civilizations (Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American and, possibly, African). But he sees the dominant cleavage which shapes global order running between the West and either Islam or Asia. Islam is viewed as a threat because of population growth and what he sees as the Muslim 'propensity for violence'. Asia is viewed as a threat because of rapid economic growth organized around what he calls the 'bamboo network' of ethnic Chinese. For Huntington, the West is defined as American political creed plus Western

ations

bloc system in which the
 ty – loyalty to what he
 ck has received so much
 many believe to be the
 tical establishment, par-
 ed on the Cold War – an
 ties of the bipolar world
 ite for communism. The
 Huntington's approach;
 the communist image.
 originally been designed
 towards the Persian Gulf.
 mobilizing on a scale
 o, Saddam Hussein was
 quivalent to his Soviet

g a multi-civilizational
 ogy will be the bonding
 states. As many critics
 out what is meant by
 n is a key defining ele-
 nly Catholic and Prot-
 : be allowed to join the
 s that the membership
 mistake; according to
 t of Western civiliza-
 e the key guarantors of
 'core states', e.g. the

ions (Sinic, Japanese,
 n and, possibly, Afri-
 which shapes global
 er Islam or Asia. Islam
 n growth and what he
 e'. Asia is viewed as a
 rganized around what
 nese. For Huntington,
 l creed plus Western

culture. He takes the view that Western culture is decaying and must defend itself against alien cultures; in particular, the USA and Europe must stick together as they did in the Cold War period.

The main source of violence comes from what Huntington calls 'fault-line wars'. He argues that communal conflicts are a fact of contemporary existence; in other words, he accepts the primordialist conception of the new conflicts. According to him, they are increasing in scale partly because of the collapse of communism and partly because of demographic changes. (He thinks that the war in Bosnia was mainly a consequence of the higher birth rate of Muslims.) When communal conflicts involve different civilizations, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they become fault-line wars, calling into being what he calls the kin-country syndrome. Hence, Russia was brought into the Bosnian conflict on the Serbian side, Germany on the Croatian side and the Islamic states on the Bosnian side. (He is a little puzzled by US support for Bosnia, which does not quite fit the thesis, but it can be explained away in terms of the mistaken legacy of a universalizing political ideology.) In other words, the new wars are to be subsumed into a dominant civilizational clash and superpower patrons are to be re-created on a cultural rather than an ideological basis.

Huntington is, at once, highly critical of a global universalizing mission, describing himself as a cultural relativist, and, at the same time, deeply opposed to multiculturalism. He argues that the USA no longer has the capacity to act as a global power, citing the overstretch of US forces at the time of the Gulf War, and that its task is to protect Western civilization in a multi-civilizational world. He also considers that human rights and individualism are purely Western phenomena and we have no right to impose Western political values on societies to whom this is alien. At the same time, he argues that the USA has the task of preserving Western culture domestically. Hence, what he envisages is a kind of global apartheid in which relatively homogeneous civilizations held together from above by core states become mutual guardians of international order, helping each other through their mutual confrontation to preserve the purity of their respective civilizations. In other words, he is proposing a form of bloc political mobilization based on exclusive identity: 'In the greater clash, the global "real clash" between

Civilization and barbarism, the world's great civilizations . . . will . . . hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clashes of civilization are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.¹⁷

A major problem for Huntington is the fact that the Muslim world has no core state capable of keeping order. Just as the USA needed the Soviet Union to sustain the bipolar order of the Cold War years, so the Huntington scenario requires a stable enemy. The absence of a core Muslim state is more than just a problem for the argument, for it has something to do with the fragility of the entire theoretical framework. For Huntington, it is geo-politics as usual. In his framework, states retain the monopoly of legitimate organized violence. Civilizational security is provided by core states and, at least implicitly, provides the basis for the legitimacy of civilizational blocs. But is this realistic?

Huntington does not ask why the Soviet Union collapsed nor what are the factors that characterize the current transition period. Words like 'globalization' or 'civil society' simply do not enter the Huntington vocabulary. For him, history is about changing state relations; models of state structures can be constructed without any regard to changing state-society relations. Seemingly random developments like population growth or urbanization are invoked to explain particular phenomena such as the growth of fundamentalism or the strength of China. But there is no questioning of the content of governance, of how political institutions change in character, and little explanation about how the world moves from today's uncertainty to the new civilizational order. It is assumed that territorial defence of civilizations is the way to maintain order; it ignores the complexities of forms of violence which are neither internal nor external, public nor private.

Nevertheless, the Huntington thesis is influential. I have explored the argument at length because elements of Huntington's thinking are implicit in the security debate of the late 1990s, especially in Europe, even if they are expressed in less extreme ways. Hence, the debate about the enlargement of the EU and NATO and about where Europe ends is not conducted in terms of real security needs, but, rather, in terms of which countries are 'eligible' (worthy) to be members of these

l's great civilizations . . .
ely. In the emerging era,
reat to world peace, and
ations is the surest safe-

the fact that the Muslim
eping order. Just as the
the bipolar order of the
enario requires a stable
state is more than just a
omething to do with the
work. For Huntington, it
k, states retain the mo-
: Civilizational security
implicitly, provides the
blobs. But is this realis-

iet Union collapsed nor
e current transition pe-
'society' simply do not
, history is about chang-
res can be constructed
ociety relations. Seem-
tion growth or urban-
phenomena such as the
of China. But there is
ance, of how political
explanation about how
ertainty to the new
itorial defence of civi-
ignores the complexi-
internal nor external,

influential. I have ex-
lements of Hunting-
ty debate of the late
are expressed in less
: the enlargement of
ope ends is not con-
it, rather, in terms of
be members of these

institutions. According to this approach, Europe has a territorial boundary and certain criteria (levels of income, levels of democratic performance) are used to decide which countries fall inside the boundary. Thus, President Václav Havel, keen that the Czech Republic should join NATO, has talked of a Euro-Atlantic Community of like-minded nations, while the European Christian Democrats have publicly expressed their view that Turkey should not join the EU because it is a Muslim country.

The Coming Anarchy

In contrast to Huntington's thesis, the strength of the anarchy argument is that it takes account of the break with the past and the difference between old and new wars. Robert D. Kaplan's book *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century* is a good example of this type of thinking. It is a kind of political travel book, which contains compelling descriptions of social life as it exists today on the ground. His conclusions are thus derived from direct experience of contemporary realities. Kaplan draws attention to the erosion of state authority in many parts of the world and the myopia induced by a state-centric view of the world:

What if there are really not fifty-odd nations in Africa as the maps suggest – what if there are only six, or seven, or eight real nations on the continent? Or, instead of nations, several hundred tribal entities? . . . What if the territory held by guerrilla armies and urban mafias – territory that is never shown on maps – is more significant than the territory claimed by many recognized states? What if Africa is even further away from North America and Europe than the maps indicate?⁸

In Sierra Leone, he discovers the breakdown of the monopoly of organized violence, the weakening of the distinction between 'armies and civilians, and armies and criminal gangs'.⁹ In Pakistan, he discovers a 'decomposing polity based more on criminal activities than effective government'.¹⁰ In Iran, he speculates about a new type of economy based on the bazaar. His journey gives him scope to describe the growing scarcity of resources, widespread environmental degradation, the pressures of urban-

ization and the new class of restless, unemployed young urban dwellers attracted to the certainties of religious fundamentalism. He talks about global inequalities of wealth and about the global communications revolution which has made these disparities so visible. He describes the growth of NGOs as 'the international army of the future'.¹¹ He dwells on the impact of modern technology on traditional societies – the radio, for example, as magic in Africa.

In his original article in *The Atlantic Monthly*, Kaplan coined the phrase the 'coming anarchy' to depict a world in which civil order had broken down. In West Africa, he observed a return to nature and to Hobbesian chaos which he argued prefigured the future elsewhere in the world. Referring to Africa, Kaplan told a BBC interviewer in March 1995:

You have a lot of people in London and Washington who fly all over the world, who stay in luxury hotels, who think that English is dominating every place, but yet they have no idea what is out there. Out there is that thin membrane of luxury hotels, of things that work, of civil order, which is proportionately getting thinner and thinner and thinner.¹²

In his book, the thesis is somewhat modified. He also finds islands of civility, in Eritrea, in Risha valley in India, or in the slums of Istanbul, where local people have succeeded in establishing or maintaining new or traditional forms of self-management. He is doubtful about whether these relatively isolated examples can provide models for other regions, arguing that their success largely depends on whether or not they have inherited certain civic-minded traditions, on what is or is not inherent in local culture. He goes on to argue:

The map of the world will never be static. The future map – in a sense, the 'last map' – will be an ever-mutating representation of cartographic chaos: in some areas benign, or even productive, and in some areas violent. Because the map will be always changing, it may be updated, like weather reports, and transmitted daily over the internet in those places that have reliable electricity or private generators.

On this map, the rules by which diplomats and other policy-making elites have ordered the world these past few hundred

unemployed young urban
of religious fundamental-
of wealth and about the
ich has made these dis-
rowth of NGOs as 'the
dwells on the impact of
eties - the radio, for ex-

Monthly, Kaplan coined
ct a world in which civil
he observed a return to
e argued prefigured the
to Africa, Kaplan told a

Washington who fly all
who think that English
ve no idea what is out
uxury hotels, of things
nately getting thinner

odified. He also finds
alley in India, or in
le have succeeded in
tional forms of self-
er these relatively iso-
ther regions, arguing
her or not they have
on what is or is not
ue:

ie future map - in a
g representation of
r even productive,
ill be always chang-
s, and transmitted
ive reliable electri-

s and other policy-
past few hundred

years will apply less and less. Solutions in the main, will have to come from within the affected cultures themselves.¹³

Kaplan's argument is essentially determinist. While he rightly dismisses geo-political solutions of the Huntington type drawn on the state-centric assumptions of the past, he implicitly shares Huntington's assumption that the prospects for governance depend on essentialist assumptions about culture. Because he witnesses collapsing states and because he cannot envisage alternative forms of authority at a global level, his scenario contains no security and no legitimacy except in certain arbitrary instances. Like Huntington, Kaplan laments the passing of the Cold War, suggesting that we may, in future, come to see it as an interlude between violence and chaos, like the Golden Age of Athenian democracy. He concludes his book with an admission of helplessness: 'I would be unfaithful to my experience if I thought we had a general solution to these problems. We are not in control. As societies grow more populous and complex, the idea that a global elite like the UN can engineer reality from above is just as absurd as the idea that political "science" can reduce any of this to a science.'¹⁴

Cosmopolitan Governance

In contrast to the above approaches, the project for cosmopolitan governance, or humane governance as Richard Falk calls it,¹⁵ breaks with the assumption of territorially-based political entities. It is a project which derives from a humanist universalist outlook and which crosses the global/local divide. It is based on an alliance, as described in the previous chapter, between islands of civility, noted by Kaplan, and transnational institutions. There are no boundaries in a territorial sense. But there are political boundaries - between those who support cosmopolitan civic values, who favour openness, toleration and participation, on the one hand, and those who are tied to particularist, exclusivist, often collectivist political positions, on the other. In the nineteenth century, the dominant international cleavages were national, tied to a territorial definition of nation. These were replaced in the twentieth century by ideological cleavages between left and right or between democracy/capitalism and socialism, which also became tied to territory. The cleavage

between cosmopolitanism and particularisms cannot be territorially defined, even though every individual particularism makes its own territorial claim.

This is not a project for a single world government. The Kantian notion of cosmopolitan right was based on the assumption of a federation of sovereign states; cosmopolitan right was essentially a set of rules agreed by all the members of the federation. Essentially, what is proposed is a form of 'global overwatch'. It is possible to envisage a range of territorially-based political entities, from municipalities to nation-states to continental organizations, which operate within a set of accepted rules, standards of international behaviour. The job of international institutions is to ensure implementation of those rules, particularly as regards human rights and humanitarian law. Just as it is increasingly accepted that governments can intervene in family affairs to stop domestic violence, so a similar principle would be applied on a global scale.

In some senses, a cosmopolitan regime already exists.¹⁶ Transnational NGOs monitor and draw public attention to abuses of human rights, to genocide and other war crimes, and international institutions do respond in different ways. What has been lacking up to now has been enforcement. The argument here is that some form of cosmopolitan law-enforcement, as elaborated in the previous chapter, would underpin a cosmopolitan regime. In effect, it would fill the security vacuum and enhance the legitimacy of international institutions, enabling them to mobilize public support and to act in other fields, for example, the environment or poverty. Of course, international institutions would need to increase their accountability and transparency, to develop democratic procedures for authorizing the use of legitimate force. What this might entail is outside the scope of this book.¹⁷ The point is, rather, that just as the development of the modern state involved a symbiotic process through which war, administrative structures and legitimacy evolved, so the development of cosmopolitan governance and, indeed, democracy is already taking place through a similar although evidently fragile process involving growing administrative responsibility for upholding cosmopolitan norms.

What are the implications of this approach for the debate about European security? Any security organization has to be inclusive rather than exclusive. An organization with boundaries is

isms cannot be territorial particularism makes

government. The Kantian on the assumption of a itan right was essentially of the federation. Essential overwatch'. It is possible-based political entities, continental organizations, rules, standards of international institutions is to particularly as regards as it is increasingly accn family affairs to stop would be applied on a

ime already exists.¹⁶ blic attention to abuses ar crimes, and internaways. What has been The argument here is cement, as elaborated cosmopolitan regime. and enhance the leling them to mobilize or example, the envial institutions would transparency, to deing the use of legitiide the scope of this development of the through which war, olved, so the develdeed, democracy is igh evidently fragile sponsibility for up-

for the debate about on has to be incluwith boundaries is

one which implicitly emphasizes external defence against a common enemy rather than cosmopolitan law-enforcement. The advantage of NATO was that it became the instrument through which military forces were transnationalized; it provided a basis for transnational pacification. This is probably the most important reason why a war between France and Germany is now unthinkable. The disadvantage was that it kept alive the prospect of bloc war. The proposed enlargement of NATO will include Hungary but not Romania, the Czech Republic but not Slovakia, Poland but not most of the former Soviet Union. External defence of NATO will not protect NATO countries from the spread of new wars, but it will treat those countries outside the boundaries as potential enemies. Those countries that are poorer with less well-established political institutions, that are perhaps Muslim and/or Orthodox, are designated as outsiders. This is unlikely to create a new civilizational order on the Huntingtonian model. On the contrary, exclusion is likely to contribute to the conditions that give rise to the new type of warfare which could easily spread.

A cosmopolitan approach to European and, indeed, global security would try to bring together potentially conflicting countries and to spread as far as possible the transnationalization of armed forces. This could be under the umbrella of NATO, including Russia, the OSCE, or the United Nations. The important point is not the name of the organization but how the security task is reconceptualized. A cosmopolitan approach to security, encompasses political and economic approaches to security, as described in chapter 6. The task of the agents of legitimate organized violence, under the umbrella of transnational institutions, is not external defence as was the case for national or bloc models of security, but cosmopolitan law-enforcement.

Conclusion

Table 7.1 provides a schematic description of the relationship between patterns of governance and forms of security and how this relationship would vary according to the competing visions I have described.

Which of the last three scenarios – clash of civilizations, coming anarchy, cosmopolitan governance – will the future hold?

Table 7.1 *Patterns of governance*

<i>Patterns of governance</i>	<i>Political institutions</i>	<i>Source of legitimacy</i>	<i>Mode of security</i>
States system	Nation-states	Nation-building, patriotism	External defence, internal pacification
Cold War	Nation-states, blocs, transnational institutions	Ideology – freedom or socialism	Deterrence, bloc cohesion
Clash of civilizations	Nation-states, civilizational blocs	Cultural identity	Civilizational defence at home and abroad
Coming anarchy	Pockets of authority	Non-existent	Fortified islands of civility amidst pervasive violence
Cosmopolitan governance	Transnational institutions, nation-states, local government	Humanism	End of modern war, cosmopolitan law-enforcement

Prediction is not possible. The answer depends on the outcome of public debates, on the responses of institutions, on political choices being made at various levels of society. The future may turn on what happens in Bosnia. In the late 1990s there are 30,000 troops in Bosnia involving NATO, Partnership for Peace countries and others. With the exception of Russian troops, they operate under a NATO command, authorized by the UN and, as I pointed out in chapter 3, the operation is the largest military deployment outside the NATO area ever to have been undertaken by the organization. Bosnia may be to the post-Cold War period what Germany was for the post-war period – a paradigm for our competing conceptions of security.

All three approaches I have described are contending in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are those who see the operation as Huntington-style action. The troops are presiding over the partition of Bosnia between a Catholic part and an Orthodox part and maybe a Muslim part as well. Croatia and Slovenia, together with the Catholic part of Bosnia, will become part of a new Euro-Atlantic bloc. Serbia and the Muslim rump will be abandoned to the 'backward East' on the side of Russia. There are

of acy	Mode of security
g, ism	External defence, internal pacification
y - n or m	Deterrence, bloc cohesion
al	Civilizational defence at home and abroad
istent	Fortified islands of civility amidst pervasive violence
ism	End of modern war, cosmopolitan law-enforcement

depends on the outcome
stitutions, on political
ciety. The future may
late 1990s there are
Partnership for Peace
of Russian troops, they
rized by the UN and,
is the largest military
to have been under-
to the post-Cold War
r period - a paradigm
d are contending in
see the operation as
residing over the par-
and an Orthodox part
nd Slovenia, together
come part of a new
rump will be aban-
of Russia. There are

those, especially in the US Congress, who consider that the whole operation is a great waste of money; they favour withdrawal as soon as possible. They are ready to accept anarchy or chaos in places far away and believe that it is possible to fortify themselves against its spread. And there are those in Bosnia as well as outside, among local NGOs as well as international institutions, who are struggling to integrate Bosnia as well as the outside forces, who favour the capture of war criminals, the control of police forces, the establishment of a free pluralistic media and multicultural education, and the reconstruction of economic and social relationships.

Critics of the cosmopolitan approach might argue that it is a modernist / universalist project on an even more ambitious scale than earlier modernist projects like liberalism or socialism, and thus contains within it a totalitarian claim. Moreover, given the secular character of the concept and the explicit rejection of identity-based forms of communitarianism, it might be argued that the concept is open to more severe charges of utopianism and inconsistency than were earlier modernist projects. I take the view that public morality has to be underpinned by universalist projects, although those projects are periodically changed by circumstances; they always produce unintended consequences and have to be revised. Thus, they can never be universalistic in practice, even if they make universalistic claims. Such projects, like liberalism or socialism, are validated by circumstances, at least for a time, or discredited. The eighteenth-century idea that reason is immanent in nature implied that rational (moral) behaviour can be learned through experience; there is a reality in which there are better or worse ways of living and that how to live in these different ways can be learned through experience, for example, the experience of happy or unhappy families or of war and peace. These lessons are never learned for ever because reality is so complicated and the exact set of circumstances in which a particular rationality seems to work cannot be reproduced. But they can be learned for a while and in approximate circumstances.

In today's reflexive era, a cosmopolitan project is, of its nature, tentative. We are likely to live permanently with contending approaches, although the character and assumptions of the different approaches are bound to keep changing. It may be that no approach will dominate in Bosnia, but the operation in Bosnia

may well represent for some time to come a new narrative, a way of telling the story of our political differences.

The optimistic view of current developments is the obsolescence of modern war. War, as we have known it for the last two centuries, may, like slavery, have become an anachronism. National armies, navies and airforces may be no more than ritual vestiges of the passing nation-state. 'Perpetual Peace', as envisaged by Immanuel Kant, the globalization of civility, the development of cosmopolitan forms of governance are real possibilities. The pessimistic view is that war, like slavery, can always be reinvented. The capacity of formal political institutions, primarily nation-states, to regulate violence has been eroded and we have entered an era of long-term low-level informal violence, of post-modern warfare. In this book, I have argued that both views are correct. We cannot assume that either barbarism or civility is embedded in human nature. Whether we can learn to cope with the new wars and veer towards a more optimistic future depends ultimately on our own behaviour.