The development of management thought
Chris Pollitt
In this [...] chapter, [...] the intention is to offer enough of a potted history to enable
has itself developed through several a fuller treatment of the history of advised to seek it through the more , Dunsire (1973), Perrow (1979) and
the reader to see how management thought historical phases. [. . .] Those who wish for management and administrative thought are specialist references, particularly Child (1969). Thomas (1978).
Pushing simplification somewhere near to the point where its drawbacks begin to overtake its advantages, one may say that managerial thought grew up hastily in the final decades of the nineteenth century and has since moved through at least six broad phases. (Not too much should be made of these, since, in practice, they frequently ran side by side. The sequence here depicted is e logically neat summary of what was actually ä fairly untidy process.) •In the first phase theorists struggled to come to terms with the process of industrialization, and the concomitant creatioi of large workforces concentrated at particular sites of production. How were these workforces to be selected, controlled, paid and prevented from endangering the increase in production and the accumulation of capital?
Factory work involves specialization, sub division and fragmentation. Decisions about the general rules and procedures and detailed work specifications are vested in experts, managers or machinery. The speed and quality of work cannot remain with the individual workers ... These features required a new 'rational' work ethic on the part of the hands. (Salaman, 1981, vP.33)
Explicit, theorizing on these questions was perhaps most noticeable in the US, which indušťrializeä later and even faster than Germany or the UK. In the US in the 1870s and Í880s doctrines of Social Darwinism were widely expounded. Ideas of competition and natural selection suggested that entrepreneurs and owners need have little regard . fpF: the active welfare of their workers. Nature's 'laws' would in any case ensure the survival of the fittest, and the sensible employer should therefore go with the grain of
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this 'legislation' by retaining the healthiest, strongest workers and not paying too much attention to the rest (Perrow, 1979, pp. 60-1).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, fresh theories were beginning to suggest that far more initiative lay in the hands of the owners and managers themselves. In the US the New Thought Movement emphasized not biology but the power of positive thinking. It spawned advisory texts with what now sound preposterously exhortatory titles such as Your Forces and How to Use Them or Pushing to the Front (Perrow, 1979, pp. 61-2). The emphasis was on willpower and mental energy - if individuals applied themselves keenly enough then wealth and success lay within reach (one can detect echoes of this in many popular expressions of contemporary 'new right' political and economic thought, for example Michael Heseltine's Wliere There's A Will (1987), or the Conservative Parry's 1987 slogan 'The resolute approach').
Hard on the heels of the New Thought Movement came the considerably more detailed and practical body of thought most commonly associated with the name of Frederick Winslow Taylor. His Principles of Scientific Management (1911) became enormously influential, and its basic approach remains with us to this day. Though countless social scientists have subsequently criticized or scorned Taylor's techniques:
A successful and durable business of management consulting and an endless series of successful books rest upon the basic principles of the classical management school. These principles have worked and are still working, for they addressed themselves to the very problems of management, problems more pressing than those advanced by social science. (Perrow, 1979, p. 59; see also Merkle, 1980)
Taylor's work was so seminal that it is worth quoting from it at some length:
This paper has been written:
FIRST. To point out through a series of simple illustrations, the great loss which the whole
country is suffering through inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts.
SECOND. To try to convince the reader that-.the remedy for this inefficiency lies in
systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man.
THIRD. To prove that the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined
laws, rules and principles, as a foundation. And further to show that the fundamental
principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our
simplest individual acts to the work of our great corporations, which call for the most
elaborate co-operation. (Taylor, 1911, pp. 5-7)
Taylor is perhaps best known as a pioneer of time and motion techniques, and for his
studies of the detailed movements of workers dealing with particular, well-defined -tasks. As the above manifesto clearly shows, however, his ambitions ran far beyond this
[....]. Scientific management constituted: 'a clearly-marked complex that ties together i patterns of technological innovation with techniques of organization and larger
designs for social change, unifying jts entire structure with an ideology of science as a
form of puritanism^(MerMe^^9^;:p;;ll).
Two of his claimsáre^pfíip^iqultólmpprtance. First,-.there is the assertion that
management can b^||!tpa&|ciätóe^|^h:áil =the,eqnnotaripns; of ■ discovering precise,
imppr^onalülaAvs)i;Sß
ÍQ:V- ;                                                                   ORGANIZATIONS, RULES AND BUREAUCRATS
uirianactivities are subject to the laws thus discovered. Both these claims, but perhaps 5pepiaUy the second one, can still be heard todav - anything can, and should, be
min aged,
^XáyľôVs ideas had considerable influence on both sides of the Atlantic, and in both riyäte: and public sectors. The notion that management could be divided off as a ípärafe and scientific field of study combined very neatly with what was by the 1920s populär view of public administration in the US' As long ago as 1887 Woodrow rflsOiijhäd written what later became an influential paper, 'The study of adminis-•atipn'.Here Wilson urged that 'administrative questions are not political questions' Wilson, 1887). This had been widely interpreted as marking out a distinct sphere of 1^11^51x3^0^ in which politics constituted an unwelcome and improper intrusion Dunsire, 1973, pp. 87-94). Within this sphere, therefore, 'scientific' methods could be ppjied-Various attempts were made to do just this, especially among the 'progressive' ^formers of municipal government (SchUesl, 1977, especially pp. 163-5). ■ contain the impact of Taylorism was less pervai ive, but its spirit was nevertheless leärlyípresent in some influential quarters. The Haldane Committee report on the iächiňery of government espoused the general idea of a set of functional principles by tfücfrthe optimal pattern of government departments could be determined (Cd 9230, 9Í8.).;ín-1922 the first issue of Public Administration, journal of the newly founded nstítutě-of Public Administration (now RIP A), carried an article entitled 'Public dministration: a science', and editorialized in favour of this stance. Then, as now, it ŕäs supposed that, if only management and administration could be established as a ciehtific. discipline, then public officials would be better protected against the [rationalities of 'political interference'. [...] Erorn Taylorism flowed many attempts to identify and enumerate the correct prin-iplešifbr the design of organizations. This extensile literature, much of it published lunngythe 1920s and 1930s, has become known as 'classical management theory', ^mpng its exponents was Luther Guliek, best known for the list of chief executive unctions (POSDCORB) [...]. However, scientific1 management was not without its ivaisi-irom the early 1930s a new perspective was developed, one which has been etTQspécťjvely dubbed the 'human relations school. The key difference from Taylor-inivVas" the advancement of a considerably more sophisticated model of the individual /brker. Whereas in early scientific management the worker was treated as an ^dividual unit.responding directly to some fairly simple incentives and punishments, he^hmhan relations school substituted a model of rather a complex being who respon-iedj^ä;muchi wider variety of environmental factors, including behavioural norms reätédíänd sustained by informal groups of fellow, workers. Whilst Taylor had been wäre; of work group solidarity he seems to have seen it as an obstacle to be overcome arJierUian as a phenomenon which needed to be understood and turned to management; advantage. For human relations theorists, however, what was required for a ŕnopthlý functioning organization was no less-than a rational assessment of the whole leŕsori^sét hi a context of the social relations of the workplace (Perrow, 1979, p. 4-9). ■gJhe^humaníTeíations; approach grew from roots in the work of industrial i|ycho]^i$t?■durjn^hé^j^t^i|d War, Taut thejňvestigations which established it as
THE: DLVELOPMENTOFMANAGEMENTTHOUGHT                                                                      331
a major force in management were the 'Hawthorne Studies', carried out between 1926 and 1932. The classic text, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation, was published by the leading researcher, Elton Mayo, in 1933 (Mayo, 1933). The significance of this work for managerialist ideologies today is that it established the idea that informal relations within and without the organization are of considerable importance. It is not only the formal organization chart, distribution of functions and systems of work measurement which are important, but also the feelings, values, informal group norms and family and social backgrounds of workers which help determine organizational performance. 'Man is not merely - in fact is very seldom -motivated by factors pertaining strictly to facts or logic' (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1969, pp. 54—5). Subsequently this general message has been developed in many and various detailed applications - modern techniques of job enrichment, participative management styles and 'self-actualisation' (Argyris, 1960) are part of the intellectual heritage of the human relations school.
It should be noticed, however, that the genuinely 'humanizing' tendencies of the human relations movement have their limits. Many critics of the approach: 'point to
the excessive concern of the authors with consensus and co-operation___Conflict is
given little attention, such instances as are noted being attributed to worker irrationality' (Salaman, 1981, p. 149).
Furthermore:
whereas management like [a company] have a definite interest in recognizing more fully that production is social production - i.e. in recognizing that men are not simply commodities but thinking, social beings, with potentially valuable contributions to make, and with the potential to work together more productively - they also have an interest in limiting the development of these human potentials. And this is because, though it would suit workers to act as if there were rsally socialism inside work, managers themselves have to operate in a world in which marke t forces reign and impede the development of the very unstinted co-operation they wish to bring about. (Nichols, 1980, p. 298)
One might add that, in a contemporary public-sector context, one could substitute, v thout diminishing the accuracy of Nichols' generalization, the words 'cash limits, p ;rformance indicators and staffcuts' for 'market forces'.
The fifth main phase in the development of management thought is even harder to ^ inimarize than the first four. One problem here is that the sheer volume of material -i 2W enormously during the three decades after 1945. This was in large part due to the i ipid growth of management-related disciplines (social psychology, sociology, organ-i/ ition theory etc.) in universities and business schools. This growth was itself related t the emergence of new dominant organizational forms, especially the large multinational corporation in the private sector, and to the appearance in the UK of
-ry large nationalized industries (mainly created by the 1945-51 Labour government) \ hich greatly enlarged the public sector. In the face of this flood of ideas I have decided l > term the period up to the mid 1970s the 'decisions and systems' phase. I do this I ^cause, alongside continuing woritin the scientific management and human relations li lditions, two major newfoclemergedrfirst^aconGe^

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ORGANIZATIONS, RULES AND BUREAUCRATS
índwdgal arid group decision making in organizational contexts and, second, attempts ^understand the macro-features of organizational performance by characterizing i^rnas.'qperi,socio-technicalsystems' (Sayles, 195^}.
^rThe decisionrmaking focus is most closely associated with the name of Herbert ^moii;although it has now diversified into dozens obub-approaches (Simon, 1947). Alterns approach' enjoys many well-known advocates, but none quite so pre-wm- fK?Pth persPectives share a concentration on goal-directed activity (Bourn, :|'{ty™?ľ are centrally concerned with the processes of objective setting, the review alternative courses of action, the weighing and selection of these alternatives, the implementation of choices once made and the feedback (or lack of it) the decision
t^ri TViVe -°Ut the conse(iuences of the strategies which have been implemented^ The decision-making approach concentrates more on the detailed cognitive maeirjohonal processes at the individual and small-group levels, whereas the systems ipproach typically operates at the level of the organization as a whole, its major inputs
■ :Qutputs, and the nature of the wider environment in which it is set. Neither 'Ppro.^c deniesthe imPortance of the formal structures and behavioural processes iiehľ J.ntey?Sted the Taylorists, nor do they ignore the social processes which were
g ughted by the human relations school. Rather they incorporate and modify these ns&htš, claiming to provide a more dynamic (actionjoriented) synthesis. nstľd011? pUrp0?es £he nature of these modifications is of particular significance ecis searchin8 for a timeless 'one best way' of structuring any organization, the biecfDS and SyStems PersPective attempts to relate structures to organizational J 1V^s't0 ^e nature of the organizational environment (stable, unstable, highly ithü]i th 0lig0polistic etc-) and t0 the particular productive technologies employed rove h ' 0rganization- Tilus> instead of arriving at a set of fixed 'administrative ere ľľ í ^ ^ classicaI school/Taylorists tended to do, decisions and systems writers Meet t0 ad0pt a mUch more reiativistic stance. They say, in effect, 'If your )i u 1VeS are SD"and'S0) and tne environment you face is like this, and the technology is qQ 1S °f ^^x'then y°u snould design your organization as follows'. Because of
»  ne sub-school of the systems approach (which became particularly prominent in at th"0 Clr^IeS d"ring the 1970s)is kn°wn as 'contingency theory', reflecting the idea 'ttin ^ rptimai intemal structure for an organization will be determined by the Ne/rľh i    environmental contingencies (Clark, ±975; Pugh and Hickson, 1976) cisio            ' SOme br0ad features of toe classical school are still discernible. The
1 or nS.andsystems paradigm is usually assumed tc be universal in its applicability. ane8^1112^10118 ^ systemSj with inPuts, outputs etc. All set goals and then need to near H-S1011 processes t0 serve those goals. Figure 1, or something similar, has P. ln dozens, probably hundreds of publications, some aimed at corporate " T?' SOme at cnemicai Plan£ managers, some at local government managers, ™ at hospital administrators and so on.
e second common feature with the classical school is a seeming distaste forany
ysis of politics and power struggles. Systems and decisions can, it is usually
med, be discussed in a detached, rational, scientific manner. Values^pf course, /e their Place, but they enter the analysis preformed, from^outsidé^v;@nééM:here»
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ENVIRONMENT            THE ORGANIZATION         ENVIRONMENT
Technical subsystem
Inputs
I-------(^sources, -------*-   Psycho-social sub-system
demands etc.)
t                                        Structural sub-system
(the formal organization)
1-----------------------------■«------------feedback------------M---------------------------1
figure 1 Typical systems diagram
they can be slotted into the decision calculus, but -with a few honourable exceptions, including Simon himself- most writers in this genre do not spend much time discussing the origins, formation or substance of the values which provide fuel for the whole decision process Furthermore, 'systems theorists, whether functionalist or not, have
. failed to provide a theoretically satisfactory framework for the satisfactory analysis of power relations' (Martin, 1977, p. 19). Clearly, therefore, if one regards the nstitutions of the welfare state as being imbued with a distinctive set of social and johtical values, values which are crucial to theirmodes of operation, then the decisions uid systems corpus may be limited in its explanatory and diagnostic strengths.
Decisions and systems ideas, like scientific management, extensively penetrated government and the public sector, as well as the world of business and commerce. Like Eaylorism, however, they influenced some parts of the public sector more than others. Iľheir presence was probably most noticeable in the training of general administrators, íspecially m central government/federal departments, and in the general administrative, planning and pohcy formulation units of state, local and city government. The anguage of systems - 'feedback', 'inputs', 'environment', 'interface' etc. - was widely 'earned and used, even where the impact of these concepts went little beyond rhetoric. In some areas, however, the influence of 'decisions and systems' went considerably ■urther [An important example was] the introduction of planning, programming and Dudgeting systems (PPBS) in the federal government (from the early 1960s) and, later tnd on a smaller scale, m Whitehall (for brief summaries, see Patten and Pollitt, 1980; nd Wildavsky, 1979, pp 32-4) When British central government was restructured by idward Heath's incoming government in 1970 the white paper The Reorganization of ''entral Government was redolent, of this brand of thought. Its first aim was:
Ta improve the quality of policy formulation and decision-taking in government by presenting
ministers, collectively in cabinet änd;ín&
options, costed where possibl^^Mďjŕeíäi^g-i^d choice between options to the contribution
they can make to meeting natíonaläeeäsHiffímnď
1984,pp 82-406)            -    "-'"'lilflltlttl^^
Outputs (decisions, products, services)
Ä'
ORGANIZATIONS, RULES AND BUREAUCRATS
:;[t,-;Ň];;Elaborate planning systems and data requirements were installed at the top of ^government but they made little change to the operating agencies and, it soon ■appeared, were not necessarily regarded as terribly interesting even by the ministers in wriöse departments they had been installed. In local gpvernment, too, new management systems were mpre likely to be found in tie departments of the new (post-1972) ;;eHef executives than in social services or education. [...] The limited penetration of •íhe. operating arms of the welfare state by decisions and systems ideas seems to have ■ibeen connected to both limitations in the ideas themselves and resistance (actual or Hahtícipated) from the professional service deliverers. Doctors, teachers and social -workers had their own practices, and their own professional cultures. The prospect of •'outsiders' refiningŕ/ieŕr goals, streamliningr/teir professional decision procedures and inspecting their 'feedback' was not an overwhe mingly attractive one.
-Ů, however, specific borrowings could be made from this body of thought, and those
;bprrpwings could be kept under the control cf the profession concerned, then that
would be a different matter. Thus decision theory techniques have begun to be
employed to assist doctors with problems in ir edical diagnosis. In other professions,
loo/the spread of computer-based 'expert systems' is widely predicted (for a survey of
-the:techniques and their implications, see Dowie and Elstein, 1988).
■-.".:; From the beginning of the 1970s the decisions and systems perspective came under
heavy-attack. Criticisms centred on 'the incapacity of the dominant systems paradigm
; toídéal withthe inherent complexity of social action and the intellectual paralysis which
■this had produced within the field' (Reed, 1988, p. 36). An alternative 'social action'
-perspective was advanced which espoused a voluntaristic epistemology, emphasized
theimportance and legitimacy of differing perceptions of organizational 'realities' and
rested -on a moral philosophy which asserts the primacy of individual ethical choice
-pyer^the normative imperatives entailed in institutions' (Reed, 1988, p. 37; for an
influential early example see Silverman, 1970). Subsequently a more overtly 'political'
critique directly attacked these normative imperatives by attempting to show that, far
frpmlbeing 'necessary' or unavoidable, they constituted a central element in a process
of systematic domination by particular social groups (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
iThesemethodological and ideological criticisms effectively dethroned the systems and
j decisions perspective (at least within the academic world) but they largely failed to
proyide a coherent new orthodoxy. Since the mid 1970s the field of organizational
■ studies has been particularly kaleidoscopic - and therefore extremely hard to charac-
, terizein a brief summary such as this. Reed describes the situation as one in which
LuĚeré.was a 'melee of competing theoretical perspectives that jockeyed for intellectual
;;?i|Kfli=pqsition'" (1988, p. 40).
;C^There has, however, been one special recent trend which merits particular mention ;:|Eliis;-:my sixth and final key development in management thought - emerged during ;thĚ>1970s^and became very fashionable in th'e 1980s. I am going to call it 'culture iimMagerhehť, because.it borrowed the concept of 'culture' from anthropology and 'š[gBioIpgy;anď:attempted to make it cenrraiitqll^eistudy otorganizations. Just as the ^umaňdelations .school^ ^flepj^eäpäpthe
IMC DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT
335
decision-theoretic and systems analyses neglected the importance of symbolism and ritual in organizational life (see, e.g., March and Olsen, 1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pettigrew, 1985; Westerlund and Sjostrand, 1979). They aired this view in both academic journals such as Dragon, and in more popular fprmats such as In Search of Excellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982). A comprehensive and widely read text which integrated cultural aspects with other salient issues in management thought was Charles Handy's Understanding Organizations (1976).
There are almost as many alternative definitions of'culture' as of'ideology' (indeed the two concepts are often used in overlapping ways). One useful and influential one was that offered by Donald Schon, who said that culture was the theoretical dimension of an organization which met the need for the 'inhabitants' of the.organization to gain a view of itself, its role within some large system, the nature of its environment, its own operation and the norms which govern its behaviour' (Schon, 1971). Handy, similarly, refers to 'sets of values and norms and beliefs', and points out that, far from there being 'one best culture', cultures may legitimately vary both between and within organizations (Handy, 1976, p. 176). Peters and Waterman tended to be more prescriptive. They argued that the successful companies they studied were 'value-driven' - that their staffs were motivated by carefully maintained cultures of excellence. The task of shaping the organizational culture was seen as one for senior management. 'Even management's job becomes more fun. Instead of brain games in the sterile ivory tower, it's shaping values and reinforcing through coaching and evangelism in the field - with the worker and in support of the cherished product' (Peters and Waterman, 1982, p. xxv).
Subsequently this cry was taken up in the public-sector context, and writers in the field of public management began to argue that one of the tasks of top public officials was to change the old culture of advice and regulation in favour of a much more responsive and proactive style. Thus Metcalfe and Richards claimed that: "The values round which public management cultures should develop include learning, experimentation, adaptability and flexibility. The need for these values arises from the rate of change with which governments will have to cope in future' (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987, p. 85).
One problem with this approach is the generality of its key concepts. It is hard to derive very specific prescriptions for action from something as vague and elusive as culture'. Yet despite this vagueness the emphasis on culture also has its sinister side. For in crude or unscrupulous hands it is not hard to see how this line of thinking could be used to suppress dissent and harass staff who did not appear to have 'appropriate attitudes'. In the 'culture' movement one can see how Taylor's original attempt at direct, stick-and-carrot control of the workforce has long since given way to a much more subtle and indirect approach. Managers now work to create the right 'climate', to encourage identification with corporate goals, high motivation, internalization of constructive attitudes'. Those who can comply with these blandishments may be granted not simply higherpay but also discretion, status and other privileges (Salaman, 1981, pp. 172-4). Ultimately they may even cease to see contradictions or injustices within their-empldyiňg organizations; tojbecpme what in political science terms might
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be:termed the willing victims of the 'third dimension' of managerial power (Lukes,
V./.: Subtle managerial manipulations of organizational cultures may thus become a :iocu5 for growing concern. As yet, however, it is not clear that management possesses either the kinds of reliable theories or the kinds of inducements that would allow them
1 tq-jertiould a given culture 'to order'. [. . .] Such attempts as have been recently ..-.■■■-nióunted in British and American public services have been either crude or contradictory or largely ineffective or some combination of all three. Part of the difficulty lies in the oft-made assumptions that management somehow 'owns' an organization's culture, and that the culture can be spread homogeneously throughout the various vertical and horizontal sub-divisions of the department or agency in question (Lynn Meek, 1988). .Such assumptions are contradicted by much empirical work which, by contrast, reveals that large organizations are usually honeycombed with different and contrasting cultures, many of which are deep y embedded in the belief systems of the staff concerned and are unlikely to be substan ially altered by short-term management campaigns to promote a new 'image'. In sum, the cultural perspective can be of considerable value as a complement to more instrumental, goal- or decision-oriented approaches. It reminds managers (and academics) of the general importance of the symbolic dimension of organizational life, but it may never be able to furnish a practical 'toolkit' for producing new, 'management-designed' cultures on demand. Even if it could, there would remain a wholelset of further questions concerning the nature of the links between belief systems and actual behaviours. Many studies have shown, that staff are often involved in actions which do not appear to 'fit' their ostensible values and preferences. The links between culture and action are not straightforward.
^Finally, I want to draw attention to a recently emerging analysis which sets distinct liinits to the practical usefulness which managers may hope to derive from any general theory of management. Whitley notes that 'the goal of an integrated, coherent and
; practical "science of managing" seems, if anything, further away than it did in the,
-.: 1950s' (1988, p. 48). This apparent failure he' attributes to the fact that: 'managerial
: ; skills differ considerably from other sorts of expertise in their limited standardization
across industries, their susceptibility to change, their specificity to situations rather
than problems and their diffuse, varied knowledge base' (Whitley, 1989a).
,';£.. .] To the extent that we find the same, generic model of management being
: .applied across a variety of non-standardized situations and tasks within the public - seryicesitwill be appropriate to enquire how 'appropriate' or 'realistic' this appears to lbe to the. 'locals' who actually run these services. Note that Whitley is not taking the
,; .extreme position that there are no common factors; rather he is arguing that these are
.. of limited provenance, and that effective management will require a lot of local and
'í particular knowledge besides:
::   there are general and political skills which are conmon to all managerial jobs insofar as these ■ - invölvewörkihgwith people, and indeed are pro jably required for all those jobs where tasks r'-i ■: rare-intěrdépenďeht ^However, where judgementand discretion are involved in complex tasks ÖI- la ^                                                                                                                                            i
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33:
organizational fields. Here industry knowledge and personal networks are often crucial tc effective management and skills are often not readily transferable. (Whitley, 1989b)
[     ]
Summary
Even in such a compressed history as this it is plain that management thought ha; bequeathed to the modern manager a rich and varied armoury of theories, concept; and techniques. Various tensions are visible - for example between the desire for a hard-edged 'science' and the fascination with evidence of idiosyncratic leadership, the strength of informal processes or the existence of exotic organizational symbolism. Yet behmd all these variations lies the broader, unifying set of [...] assumptions concerning the growing social importance of management and the special roles and responsibilities of managers. There may also be corresponding assumptions, often hidden, to the effect that other forms of social co-ordination and integration, such as political activity, voluntary co-operation or friendship, are less efficient and probably of relatively diminishing social significance.
Though most of the major developments in management thought had their origins m the private sector (Taylorism, the Hawthorne experiments, PPBS, culture management), many of them also left their mark in the public sphere. Yet this was not a uniform influence. It was more noticeable in those parts of public sector organizations dominated by general administrative or clerical work, and in 'industrial' type areas such as nationalized industries or local authority direct labour forces. The specialist, professionalized welfare services were among the least affected. But from the mid 1970s, in both the US and the UK, this began to change. By the mid 1980s these same services were at the focus of a major movement for management change. The driving force behind this movement was a generic model of management, that is to say one which minimized the difference between private-sector business management and the running of public services. What is more [...] the particular species of genericism which was dominant tended to be of a neo-Taylorian character.
References
Argyris, C. (1960) Understanding Organizational Behaviour, London: Tavistock.
Bourn, J. B. (1974) "The administrative process as a decision-making and goal attaining system',
;BIock 2, Part 2 of D331 Public Administration, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. BúrrelI, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, London:
Hememann.                           .  _-. .., _
;Child, J. (1969) British Management Jliought, London: Allen & Unwin.
Glark, P. A./{1975):;Qrganizati6na^                         of key problems', Administration and
_Jfoaetf47:={2)i4ü^^                                                   -^-."I".-- "ä,:■- .'--"':;.';,:/;;
Cd 923Ü'X1918);Ä^