Psychology of Women Quarterly, 16 (1992), 1-15. Printed in the United States of America. ETHICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENSIONS IN APPLYING A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE TO FEMINIST RESEARCH Katherine R. Allen Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Kristine M. Baber University of New Hampshire We examine tensions that arise in applying postmodernism to feminist research. First, we consider epistemological tensions generated in the process of deconstructing existing knowledge and constructing new knowledge that benefits women. Second, we examine six ethical issues that reflect the tensions in feminist practice as we attempt to justify the dialectic between knowledge and power. In keeping with a postmodernist perspective, we pose these six issues as questions: Is feminist postmodernism "postfeminist"? Does postmodernist language mystify feminist practice and goals? Are qualitative methods more feminist than quantitative ones? Must feminists have a liberatory purpose in their research? Is the personal too personal? Whose aims are served, feminists or their collaborators? We conclude that by adopting a postmodern feminist perspective, we can embrace the struggle between knowledge and practice rather than privilege one over the other. Social science research invariably raises dilemmas that challenge scholars philosophically and ethically. This is particularly true in feminist research, This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the National Council on Family Relations, Seattle, WA. We thank the reviewers of this manuscript for their helpful suggestions. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Katherine R. Allen, Department of Family and Child Development, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0416, or Kristine M. Baber, Department of Family Studies, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824. Published by Cambridge University Press 0361-6843/92 $5.00 + .00 1 2 Allen and Baber which by definition is driven by a political agenda. Tension, paradox, and contradiction infuse our work as feminist scientists and activists. In this paper, our goal is to examine critically the tension between our theoretical stance regarding the construction of knowledge and our practical stance as feminists working for social change. The tension between the idealism of scholarship and the pragmatism of political change creates ethical issues. Part of the problem is that feminist researchers must make choices among methodologies with compromised histories. Traditional science has been used to exploit women's labor and mystify women's experience, so feminists must seek methods that more accurately and comprehensively reveal women's lives. Feminists are in dialectical tension with a system that they are part of as scholars yet are excluded from in other ways because they are women. Feminist researchers use methodologies similar to those of everyone else (Harding, 1987; Peplau & Conrad, 1989). Feminists interview people, observe people, and examine documents and artifacts. Yet, certain practices are unique to feminist research: "defining women's experiences as suitable problems and sources of answers; designing research for women; and locating both researcher and researched on the same critical plane" (Coyner, 1988-1989, p. 291). Feminist research involves many of the same practices as do other types of inquiry; but by placing women in the center of vision, doing research that benefits women, and clarifying the actual steps in the research process, feminists engage the academic and scientific systems they criticize by asking new questions. In turn, asking new questions raises new ethical concerns. Questions about feminist solidarity and difference are at the center of these concerns. In this paper, we confront several dilemmas in feminist research and practice. First, we examine the epistemological debate about the nature of knowledge claims and about the methods used to generate knowledge that is enlivening multidisciplinary feminist scholarship. Second, we explore six ethical dilemmas that we, and other feminist practitioners, have confronted. We also examine relationships between feminists as collaborators and informants and within the broader systems of gender hierarchy and power in which feminists live and work. By raising these six dilemmas as ethical concerns, we join other feminists (e.g., Bordo, 1990; Hare-Mustin & Mareček, 1988; Nicholson, 1990) in experimenting with the application of a postmodern theoretical stance to the practical goals of feminism. We address the problems and possibilities generated through the linkage of the new theoretical concerns raised by postmodernism with historic analyses of women's oppression raised by feminist activists. Postmodernism, by offering the tool of interpretive insights and a method of critique, can be employed by feminists to deconstruct existing knowledge (Bordo, 1990). But feminists, because of their political agenda, must be careful not to simply reconstruct oppressive views of reality; thus, feminist practice has an important caution to offer ^^^^WBWIil^MIBMWfflWBPtgiffl^llMmWWWip^ Ethical Tensions 3 postmodernism (Bordo, 1990; Pierce, 1991). We raise the following six questions and attempt to clarify some of the tensions that are at stake within each one. 1. Is feminist postmodernism "postfeminist"? 2. Does postmodernist language mystify feminist practice and goals? 3. Are qualitative methods more feminist than quantitative ones? 4. Must feminists have a liberatory purpose in their research? 5. Is the personal too personal? 6. Whose aims are served: feminists or their collaborators? EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENSIONS Feminists are called on to stand for principles that are congruent with their theories and practices. The ethical standards that guide feminist practice arise from assumptions about the nature of truth. Such assumptions, which characterize certain ways of thinking and knowing, represent an epistemology. There are many ways of knowing; likewise, there are many feminist epistemologies. In citing the explosion of feminist claims of truth, Hawkesworth (1989), like Harding (1987), identified three major types of feminist epistemology: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism. Feminist Empiricism Feminist empiricism, based on positivism, accepts the mainstream scientific practices of systematic experimentation, observation, and recording. The observer's subjectivity is controlled allegedly by neutral procedures. This empiricism posits the existence of a reality independent of the human knower that is waiting to be revealed through logical inquiry and empirical research (Hawkesworth, 1989). Feminist empiricism differs from traditional empiricism in arguing that social inquiry, the questions asked and the interpretations made, has been androcentric, resulting in partial and distorted explanations and understandings (Harding, 1987). One corrective that feminist empiricism proposes is an acceptance and acknowledgment of the context in which the research is carried out and an awareness of how characteristics of the researcher may bias the research process. Feiminist Standpoint Theory A second epistemological position, feminist standpoint theory, is a phe-nomenological approach rooted in Marx's view that social being determines consciousness (Hawkesworth, 1989). This approach claims that 4 Allen and Baber class, race, and gender structure a person's understanding of reality. More oppressed individuals have the potential for a more complete and less distorted understanding of reality because of their disadvantaged position (Nielsen, 1990). To survive, less powerful groups must be attuned to the culture of the dominant group. By living out their lives in both the dominant culture and their own culture, the disadvantaged come to have a type of double vision —a more comprehensive understanding of reality (Westkott, 1979). Women as a group are seen as being less advantaged relative to men and, therefore, are capable of a less distorted view of the world. A feminist standpoint, however, is not something that a woman merely has by virtue of her gender; it is something she develops and achieves through intellectual and political struggles against gender inequality (Harding, 1987) or racial inequality (Collins, 1989). Standpoint theorists tend to valorize women's activities, values, and characteristics without critical analysis. Uncritical acceptance of women's ways of knowing, being, or doing may naturalize behavior that is actually the consequence of centuries of oppression (Hawkesworth, 1990). For example, role-taking perspectives in sociology and social psychology argue that lower status people are more accurate at role taking than are people with higher status. Thus, role taking and empathy may be more characteristic of the social structure than of personality (Thomas, Franks, & Calon-ico, 1972) or gender (Dressel & Clark, 1990; Tronto, 1987). Feminist Postmodernism The third position, feminist postmodernism, takes standpoint theory to its logical conclusion by questioning the existence of some unitary human consciousness (Hawkesworth, 1989). Postmodern feminists are skeptical about claims of a single truth or reality. A commitment to plurality and the tolerance of difference is important to this approach. Feminist postmodernists reject the notion of one privileged standpoint and challenge the belief that women's experiences and identities are determined only by gender. Other axes of experience that are just as important are class, race, age, sexual orientation, and family status. Subsuming all women into a general category obscures differences in behavior, desire, and experience and ignores existing inequalities among women (Scott, 1990). Postmodernism is "deconstructive," challenging and exposing existing beliefs and concepts that are accepted as natural or absolute (Hare-Mustin & Mareček, 1988; Scott, 1990). Everything, including constructions of truth, knowledge, power, and gender relations that are often taken for granted and used to legitimate social arrangements, is called into question and analyzed (Bordo, 1990; Flax, 1987; Tong, 1989). The feminist project of deconstructing the family, for example, has challenged the prevailing view of the family as a monolithic entity (Boss & Thorne, 1989; Ferree, Ethical Tensions 5 1990; Glenn, 1987; Thorne, 1982). Deconstructing the family is a process of decomposing concepts, such as family harmony and role structures, that are accepted as truth or as an unchanging reality. Separation of the family into constituent parts exposes the underlying structures (Glenn, 1987). The family in decomposed relief places women in the center of analysis so that their experiences can be examined separately. The breakdown of assumptions about individuals and families suggests alternative ideas about how women construct their experiences. These reconstructions and woman-centered representations go beyond simply modifying existing male-centered concepts (Glenn, 1987). Postmodernism is also "constructive" in that it perceives knowledge, truth, power, and gender relations as created through process (Flax, 1987; Hare-Mustin & Mareček, 1988). Through interaction with others and the social world, individuals create their own evershifting realities. Challenges and Possibilities of Feminist Postmodernism A postmodern deconstructive approach is particularly useful in the feminist project of reevaluating and altering existing gender relations (Flax, 1987; Hare-Mustin & Mareček, 1988). Viewing gender as a social construction allows sources of power and domination in the lives of women with different histories to be identified. Yet, like Bordo (1990), Fräser and Nicholson (1990), Hawkesworth (1989), Offen (1990), Pierce (1991), and others, we are concerned about the risks of relativism inherent in postmodernism. Postmodernism seems to derail at the point at which most feminists engage. Feminists embrace the solidarity of women's experience as oppressed and devalued people; feminists work together for political change and personal empowerment. Although it is important to acknowledge a variety of perspectives, when feminists reach the point of taking action, some particular view of reality must be endorsed to guide policy and practice (Nielsen, 1990). Early in the second wave of the women's movement, diversity in beliefs and orientations was evident, yet the thrust of the movement was to identify commonalities among feminists. Shared feminist beliefs and values centered around three main issues: a belief that women are exploited, devalued, and oppressed; a commitment to change the conditions of women; and the adoption of a perspective that is critical of intellectual traditions (i.e., androcentric scholarship) (Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983). Recent analyses deconstructed women's essential similarity and have become more informed by empirical and subjective findings arising from the use of feminist research methods. A current theme of feminist scholarship acknowledges the valid and painful criticism of feminism as a white, middle-class, heterosexual, liberal movement. New ideas about difference 6 Allen and Baber are grounded in the very real differences among women (Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, & Cohen, 1989), informed by the confrontation between white feminists and feminists of color (Lugones & Spelman, 1983). Feminists are also reclaiming and reevaluating the struggle that has divided lesbians and heterosexual women (Echols, 1989; Rich, 1986; Zimmerman, 1984). Thus, our analyses are sharpened by the increasing recognition of the earlier idea of women's oppression/subordination and by sensitivity to the diversity and differences among women in terms of relative power and disadvantage associated with class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, mothering, homosociality, occupation, and education. The differences among feminists —as well as the subordination and oppression within private relationships and the patriarchal social structure —generate and sustain problems for feminists in dealing with one another and with others who do not share a feminist perspective. The danger of uncritically adopting feminist postmodernism is that as feminists uncover their differences, they risk sliding toward a depoliticized relativism where every viewpoint becomes equally valid and true. Taken to its postmodernist extreme, every woman's experience becomes the basis for a feminist epistemology, thereby deconstructing their experiences in the world to such an extent that feminists are in danger of erasing the solidarity that is needed in working toward women's liberation. As feminists seek to value women's unique voices and experiences, they confront the problem of the personal as the sole basis for a feminist epistemology (Hawkesworth, 1989; Zimmerman, 1984). If "reason" as a basis for knowledge claims is rejected completely because reason is associated with male forms of thinking and knowing (Grant, 1987), the feminist movement may come to a dead end as the result of solely valuing private epistemologies (Pierce, 1991). The debate about difference has brought feminists face to face with a new controversy over which feminist epistemologies are best suited for feminist agendas. Grant (1987) advocated that feminists should be wary of the simple slide into relativism or dualism, which is appearing in feminist critiques of male theories as exclusionary of women's experience (Harding, 1987). If feminist knowledge claims are grounded in women's experience, either as individual females or as a diverse group, feminists must also evaluate the interpretation of that experience rather than jump axiomati-cally from experience to theory (Grant, 1987). Conversely, if feminists ignore women's solidarity as a group that shares a history of subordination and uncritically adopt postmodernism as a theoretical basis for evaluating future knowledge claims, they "delegitimate a priori the exploration of experiential continuity and structural common ground among women" (Bordo, 1990, p. 142). In confronting these epistemological tensions, feminists face the dialectic between knowledge and power; between what is known and what is done with what is known. We agree with Hawkesworth (1989) that the ^M»Mli|W!llMWMWWWWI»IWmiPIWlll^^ Ethical Tensions 7 method chosen for studying certain topics must be congruent with the epistemology. Thus, we embrace the feminist postmodern project of deconstructing and reconstructing commonly assumed aspects of social life for women. Yet, we also attempt to go beyond feminist postmodernism by adopting a critical perspective that brings into creative tension both the knowledge feminists critique and construct and the work feminists do toward the goal of empowering women and transforming unequal social relations. ETHICAL ISSUES There are a number of ethical issues that are raised by any choice of epistemology. The issues discussed below reflect tensions within the dialectic between knowledge and power. Is Feminist Postmodernism "Postfeminist"? A chief dilemma feminist scholars confront is that a postmodern perspective, even one that includes a critique of itself, threatens to become "post-feminist." Paradoxically, as feminists seek more effective ways of addressing distortion and exploitation in their explanations of women's lived experiences, they risk undermining the work that has been accomplished by previous generations of women. In adopting postmodernism, feminists risk deconstructing the existing solidarity among women who share the experience of oppression. By rejecting not only the empiricist notion of an "unmediated truth" but also the feminist contention that there is one privileged standpoint common to all women, or at least all enlightened women, feminists are left with a relativism that can degenerate into ambiguity and distortion of women's experiences — exactly what they seek to remedy. Gagnier (1990) asserts that feminists can and cannot be postmodernists. They can be postmodern by embracing the heterogeneity of women's experiences in terms of the multiplicity of influences by age, class, race, religion, sexual orientation, education, and other significant experiences. At the same time, however, the oppression of women must be acknowledged (Bordo, 1990). Female solidarity is necessary to the feminist project of making the world better for women. The feminist goal of emancipation is for women as a group. Those who fear that a postmodern approach may threaten and dilute the energy, awareness, and anger at injustice that fuels such a project ask, "Are you with us or against us? Are you ally, enemy, fellow traveler, fifth column?" (Offen, 1990, p. 15). Postmodernism need not threaten feminist goals. It is an approach that offers practical guidance for more precisely and completely identifying the needs and experiences of a wide variety of women. A more comprehensive 8 Allen and Baber knowledge of the diversity of women's lives should result in a more inclusive feminist agenda rather than one extrapolated from the experiences of a privileged subgroup. Does Postmodernist Language Mystify Feminist Practice and Goals? A related issue concerns the complexity inherent in postmodernism. As academic theories become more complicated and the language becomes more removed from that used in common daily discourse, postmodern feminists risk increasing rather than decreasing mystification. Until recently, simple slogans such as "sisterhood is powerful" and "the personal is political" have symbolized feminist unity and politics; but postmodern language abandons simple constructions in favor of textual multiplicity. Postmodernists look and sound like they are "doing" theory, but their work as scholars is at risk of becoming irrelevant to most women's daily lives. Postmodern feminism risks becoming "feminism for academics" (Tong, 1989). To counteract this tendency, postmodern feminists can actively work to translate their philosophical discourse. Concepts such as deconstruction and construction can be expressed in everyday language in a manner that clarifies rather than obscures their meanings. By putting concepts to use in day-to-day life, postmodern feminists can demonstrate the utility of their epistemology. For example, most feminists agree that mothers must have access to adequate childcare; however, only after deconstructing (i.e., taking apart and looking at the component pieces) the notion of "adequate childcare" is the complexity of its meaning clear. A married woman working part time who has one child undoubtedly constructs her idea of adequate childcare somewhat differently than does a single mother of three working an 8-hr night shift. Strategies for addressing commonalities, as well as differences, can be included in the policies advocated by postmodern feminists. Are Qualitative Methods More Feminist Than Quantitative Ones? Methods themselves are not inherently feminist (Harding, 1987). There is nothing in qualitative approaches that prevent them from being used in a sexually biased way, and there is no reason why quantitative methods and statistical analyses cannot be used to address and support feminist concerns (Peplau & Conrad, 1989). The criteria by which the quality and usefulness of research are judged must be their effectiveness or potential for improving women's lives. Although there have been on-going debates about which methods are and lllllillll)ll«W»l»ll|llllll|ll»ll.l.|lll.»..»..'~.™..l.J-.|.l,i..«|.»W!|llllll,.IIL.I