THE TYRANNY OF FEMINIST METHODOLOGY
IN WOMEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH
Sally Thorne, RN, PhD
University of British Columbia School of Nursing, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada
Colleen Varcoe, RN, PhD
University of Victoria School of Nursing, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Awareness of the insufficient degree to which mainstream research
has created useful knowledge about women' s health has drawn many
researchers to feminist methodologies. Such approaches tend to priv-
ilege qualitative designs, emancipatory objectives, and cooperative
strategies. They challenge the notions of expert power, the appropri-
ation of voice, and ownership of the research products. By uncover-
ing the extent to which power inequities are embedded in our re-
search traditions, including such issues as who conducts research,
which questions are studied, and how they are studied, feminist cri-
tique can be a powerful tool toward stronger research with more
socially relevant findings. However, taken to extremes, feminist
methodological requirements can immobilize and discourage active
inquiry. In this paper, we articulate major directives of a feminist
stance, explain the extremes at which they become problematic, and
propose responsive options for women' s health researchers. We
intend such analysis to overcome divisiveness and promote inclu-
siveness without sacrificing excellence in research and action.
In defiance of claims that traditional research has ignored issues of im-
portance to women, extrapolated to women from research conducted on
men, denied women's experience, and silenced women's voices, feminist
research has arisen and evolved to a position of prominence in the study
of women's health. Indeed, feminism seems an ideal posture from which
to develop a body of health knowledge for and about women. Harding
Health Care for Women International, 19:481 493, 1998
Copyright 1998 Taylor & Francis
0739-9332/98 $12.00 + .00
481
Received 24 July 1997; accepted 2 March 1998.
The ideas contained in this paper were developed in the context of lively discussion in the
feminist research cross border seminar group of faculty and doctoral students from the Univer-
sity of British Columbia School of Nursing and the University of Washington School of Nursing.
Address correspondence to Sally Thorne, RN, PhD, UBC School of Nursing, 2211 Wesbrook
Mall, Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 2B5. E-mail: thorne@nursing.ubc.ca.
(1987, 1989) argues that the distinctive power of feminist research arises
from features such as (1) using women' s experiences as a resource for
determining the questions to be asked and theories to be developed, (2)
designing research for women, (3) focusing on new subject matter for in-
quiry (studying ourselves and studying up), and (4) locating the re-
searcher in the same critical plane as the subject matter. Such power
offers women' s health research a platform on which to build inquiry
based on women's experience and focused on issues of importance to
women.
As committed feminist researchers, we have struggled with what it
means to counter the ideologies of traditional, nonfeminist science in
order to do feminist research in relation to women's health. There is no
 one way to  do feminist research; indeed, there are multiple  femi-
nisms that provide profoundly different directions for research (Miller,
1997). For example, Harding (1987) contrasts the epistemology of femi-
nist empiricists and feminist standpoint theorists. However, across and
within the various feminisms that have been applied to women's health
research, we have encountered strands of ideology that we believe are
counterproductive to the goals of women's health.
These insidious forms of feminist ideology are most counterproduc-
tive when they are articulated in the form of rather absolute claims.
Absolute claims have been made regarding who can be considered a
legitimate researcher, what problems are appropriate for feminist inquiry,
how feminist research must apply gender as its primary analytic variable,
how researchers must locate themselves, which research methods can
be applied to the study of women's health, what the objects of research
ought to be, and who ought to have authority over the products of re-
search. As Grant (1993) explains, some of the notions that have come
to be considered the core of feminist theorizing have paradoxically im-
posed a structure on feminist theory, reinforcing certain aspects of the
theory and ignoring others. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
more extreme form of some of the claims with a view to exposing their
implications for the larger project of women' s health knowledge devel-
opment and thereby preventing the rhetoric associated with some femi-
nist ideology from replacing traditional science ideology with an even
more restrictive orientation. Toward this purpose, we identify the manner
in which the extreme positions are expressed, explore the problems these
claims may impose on the larger project of women's health knowledge,
and suggest alternative perspectives that we believe serve the goal of
knowledge development in a fundamentally acceptable manner.
SELECTIVITY AND SPECIFICITY
One of the implicit claims made in feminist research is that the only
valid feminist research is on, for, and about women (Romyn, 1996). We
see several serious difficulties arising from this position. Research that is
482 S. Thorne and C. Varcoe
concerned only with women can be problematic in that considering
women separately from men implies that women can be studied in isola-
tion from their cultural contexts and that women' s health issues are unaf-
fected by men and structures dominated by men. The claim that feminist
research is on, for, and about women rests on the assumption of an antag-
onistic relationship with a male  other (Strathern, 1987), which rein-
forces essentialist notions about women (Alcoff, 1988) and ignores men
as part of the  solutions to women's health problems. Finally, exclusive
attention to women can contribute to blunting critical analysis by closing
avenues of inquiry and analysis. For example, knowledge in such fields
as violence against women will develop quite differently if it is assumed
that the only meaningful forms of knowledge are those that can be con-
structed from the victim perspective, and practically applicable knowl-
edge toward correcting social injustices may be entirely inaccessible
(Maguire, 1996). Thus, we believe that the selectivity argument may
restrict a notion of what counts as feminist research in a manner that it
inappropriately limits knowledge development.
A closely related claim is the position that women's health research is
exclusively concerned with issues that are gender based. Stated differently,
this position assumes that gender is the central organizing variable in
understanding women's social reality (Acker, 1989; Lather, 1991). This
stance privileges gender over other socially constructed identities, invok-
ing a feminism that is solely concerned with gender and gender oppres-
sion at the expense of attention to other sites of oppression (Fraser &
Nicholson, 1990). It assumes that gender operates in a particular manner
to influence social reality regardless of cultural or historic context (Di
Stephano, 1990). And it overshadows the influence of other locations,
such as race, sexual orientation, age, or social class as important deter-
minants of health in women' s lives (Coser, 1989).
Instead of beginning from a position where women are considered
the sole focus of inquiry in women' s health research, we contend that
women's health issues should be examined as gendered but not only as
gendered. Rather, the larger context of women's health can only be under-
stood within networks of relationships, within contexts of culture, and
with an awareness that women subjectively experience themselves as
individuals defined by many and diverse factors beyond gender (Alcoff,
1988). Thus, an overly narrow interpretation of women's health issues
may systematically bypass critical elements of knowledge and produce
understandings that distort what the women themselves would recognize
as truth.
LEGITIMACY OF THE RESEARCHER
In congruence with these first two claims, it is often implied, and
sometimes stated, that only women and only feminists can do feminist
research in women's health research (Sigsworth, 1995). This is problem-
The Tyranny of Feminist Methodology 483
atic in three ways. First, privileging  woman as the social location of
importance denies the importance of other social locations. Such privi-
leging can reinforce issues of knowledge ownership, and gender distinc-
tion in knowledge form, that may, in turn, reinforce stereotypes. Second,
the claim that only women can research women leads logically to the
conclusion that the researcher' s social location must match the social
locations of subjects in other ways (Gorelick, 1991). If this is so, then,
for example, only poor people can do research with poor people, only
disabled, diabetic, nonwhite women can do research with disabled, dia-
betic, nonwhite women, and a paralysis of legitimacy ensues. Attempts
to match the social positions of researcher and subject raises challenging
questions. How could one account for multiple positionings? Which
declared positions would  count ? Which undeclared positions would
 count ? And how can we contend with those social positions for which
research is not feasible? Finally, the idea that women's health researchers
must be feminists raises the question of what qualifies one as a feminist.
Is it adequate to  declare a political position as a feminist? Or are there
(and if there are, they are hotly contested) criteria for qualifying as a
feminist? How would a feminist who is also a man be judged in terms of
legitimacy in undertaking women's health research?
Rather than interrogating the legitimacy of the researcher on the basis
of declared social locations, we consider it far more useful to strive for a
much more complex accounting for both the positional and the theoreti-
cal legitimacy of the researcher (Coser, 1989). Instead of presuming that
simple declarations of location vis-, -vis the critical variables ascribed to
the subjects of research are sufficient, we argue that a much deeper
analysis is required of the match between the researcher and the research
questions, the researcher and the methodology, the researcher and the
data, and the researcher and the analysis. Thus, a researcher' s legitimacy
would arise from such credentials as expertise in method or substantive
knowledge rather than such dubious qualifications as womanhood or
declared feminist intentions. In and of itself, location is not the central
issue; rather, reflective accounting for the way in which the researcher
may have influenced the question, the data, or the conclusions should
form a critical element of all inquiries into women's health issues.
LOCATION
In a similar vein, it is commonly understood as an imperative for fem-
inist researchers to locate their own identity in relation to the identities
of those they are researching (Romyn, 1996). For example, Harding
(1987) says that researchers must strive  to avoid the `objectivist' stance
that attempts to make the researcher' s cultural beliefs and practices
484 S. Thorne and C. Varcoe
invisible while simultaneously skewering the research object's beliefs
and practices to the display board (p. 9). She recommends that the
class, race, culture, and gender assumptions as well as the beliefs and
behaviors of the researcher be placed within the frame of the picture that
he or she attempts to paint. The imperative of locating the self has made
the practice of listing the researcher' s categorical locations endemic to
research claiming to be feminist (Patai, 1994). Routinely feminist re-
searchers position themselves as a white, middle class, heterosexual
woman or a Metis, wealthy, lesbian woman, using some combination of
self-applied labels to position their credibility as researcher. Similarly,
many feminist researchers feel obliged to report such attributes as their
own educational level, relationship status, history of violence, or taste in
reading in order to be considered credible to a particular feminist audi-
ence.
This practice of prefacing research with inventories of one' s own
location, which Viveswaren calls an  increasingly sterile maneuver
(1994, p. 49), is problematic for a number of reasons. First, there is an
underlying assumption that locating oneself communicates clearly the
impact of these categories on the research and on the relationship be-
tween researcher and researched (Harding, 1990). Using such reduction-
ist categories implies a known set of essential influences that flow from
whatever leads to the act of self-labeling in a particular manner (Buker,
1991). Stating that one is Metis may come from the experience of having
lived on an  Indian reserve in poverty, with little status in relation to
one' s neighbors, or the act of identification may arise from having Metis
parents but having lived within an adoptive family in which being Metis
was reviled, experiences that may influence the researcher in profoundly
different ways. In using such categories to locate the researcher, the
influence of experience underlying the labels is lost and the richness of
meaning is disregarded (Harding, 1990).
Second, as Dorothy Smith argues, beginning with these categories is
to begin in discourse that is already constructed by what she terms the
 relations of ruling (1990). The categories that are commonly used
(e.g., woman/man, white/black) are dichotomous and oppositional. Leav-
ing the analysis of the influence of such categories to the mercy of
the reader's thinking, whether it be critical or stereotypical, invokes the
reader's assumptions regarding these categories and, worse, reveals the
researcher' s uncritical acceptance of such categories. For example, to
claim nonwhite status may lead to readers assuming that the researcher
has experiences of racism, whereas the writer may have been able to
 pass as white. Indeed, in invoking the legitimizing claim, the researcher
may not have recognized the profound difference between the two. Fur-
ther, the selection of categories to be used in this manner is necessarily
The Tyranny of Feminist Methodology 485
limited and may or may not capture the experiences that are most influ-
ential in each particular piece of research. Increasingly, it appears that
there is an implicit protocol for feminist research that suggests which
types of categories are required, with little critical analysis of why cer-
tain categories of location are selected.
Even when preset categories are avoided and more detailed descrip-
tions of experience are employed to locate the researcher, we believe that
there is danger that the categorizations that emerge invoke stereotypical
assumptions. For example, a researcher in the field of violence against
women who positions herself as having been in an abusive relationship
may invoke the category of  battered woman, and that experience may
be seen as the defining feature of that researcher's contribution. Per-
haps even more dangerous is the possibility that locating the researcher
through categorization may lead to a similar reduction of those being
researched.
Finally, merely locating oneself does not necessarily reflect analysis
of the influence of the categories or experiences identified. For example,
if a researcher self-identifies as having experienced racism, does that
imply that the researcher is free of racial bias? Does self-identifying as a
woman negate the power differential between the researcher and the
women being researched? While location of the self is considered an
obligatory preface to research, the influence of the researcher' s location
may be only briefly, if at all, explored and then dismissed as having been
 done.
Locating the self is complicated by the common practice of uncritical
use of labels that arise from certain world views and the further practice
of relying on location to imply that the researcher' s identity is impervi-
ous to the influence of the research. The consequences of locating the
researcher in this manner can be detrimental to the relationship between
the researcher and the researched, and to the research itself. The act of
locating the self can appear to absolve the researcher from examining the
influences of his or her multiple positionings throughout the research.
How one articulates location may lead to dismissal or acceptance of
research based on the assumptions of the reader. In the attempt to make
visible his or her beliefs and biases, the researcher may further obscure
them with categories and preemptively dismiss their influence.
Rather than beginning from a location defined by particular categories
or experiences, it may be more useful to analyze the influence of the
researcher' s frame of reference by beginning from the assumptions,
values, and biases that the researcher brings to the research. Then, for
example, a researcher in the area of violence against women could locate
the self by stating that, from various experiences, s/he assumes that al-
though violence occurs without regard to race, class, or sexual orienta-
486 S. Thorne and C. Varcoe
tion, women who have less access to resources because of racism, clas-
sism, and heterosexism may experience violence differently. Instead of
treating location as a preface to research, expressing the researcher' s
location as assumptions, values, and beliefs may more usefully serve as
an analytic backdrop to the entire research project.
NONREDUCTIONIST METHODOLOGY
In keeping with the notion that women' s health research ought to
reflect women's reality rather than the traditional scientifically accepted
norms for what counts as knowledge, feminist scholars increasingly
reject reductionist methods, objectivist epistemological stances, and real-
ist ontologies (Jayaratne, 1993; Smith, 1989). Recognizing knowledge as
a social construction, such scholars argue that what we know cannot be
detached from the ideological origins of our truth claims (Gorelick,
1991; Stanley & Wise, 1990). Thus, it is often suggested that knowledge
reflective of women's reality cannot derive from objective positions (J. K.
Smith, 1990); rather, the scholarship privileges subjective, multiple, and
coexisting realities and reveals a deep suspicion toward any objective no-
tions of truth (Grant, 1993). This kind of reasoning leads to the claim
that qualitative research methodology alone is consistent with feminist
objectives (Mies, 1993).
While the traditional overreliance on empiricist traditions and quanti-
tative, reductionist methodologies is acknowledged as a limiting factor
for women's health knowledge, we believe that the opposite position is
equally problematic. If subjective knowledge is considered more real or
true than objective knowledge, a relativist conclusion is inevitable (Allen,
1992; Buker, 1991). If multiple coexisting truths are assumed, it be-
comes difficult to justify discrediting some of those competing truth
claims that must be addressed in order to advance a feminist agenda
(Harding, 1990). For example, it can be argued that individualism and
subjectivism are inconsistent with a feminist stance on collective con-
sciousness as social, rather than private, reality. From our perspective,
countering the traditional overreliance on objective reality should not
require the extreme stance that subjective reality is the only truth accept-
able to feminist research. Our understanding of feminism is that it inher-
ently derives from a notion of some realist epistemological positions at
the same time that it acknowledges the subjective primacy of  experi-
ences of truth. Because social realities cannot be considered irrelevant
to individual realities, the forms of knowledge amenable to quantifica-
tion will remain necessary for the larger feminist project (Jayaratne,
1993; Jayaratne & Steward, 1991; Maguire, 1996). We believe that femi-
nist researchers ought to interrogate the tensions between individual real-
The Tyranny of Feminist Methodology 487
ities (the particular) and social realities (the general) in order to construct
knowledge that transcends method.
EMANCIPATORY INTENT
Because feminism emerged from a critical social orientation toward
correcting injustices, some researchers have taken the position that femi-
nist research is always concerned with emancipatory aims for the research
subject as well as for the social group (Anderson, 1991). While no one
would argue the converse (that it is appropriate to oppress research sub-
jects for the purpose of uncovering liberatory knowledge), some conclude
that a full partnership model is the only acceptable manner in which to
conduct women' s health research from a feminist perspective (Mies,
1993). Thus, action research and other models in which the research
questions arise from those being studied and in which the researcher takes
no special privilege with regard to the process of the research have be-
come prominent within women's health research scholarship.
While many inquiries work well from this perspective, we believe that
it is important for feminist researchers to remain mindful of the theo-
retical origins of emancipatory work. Because such research emerges
from a critical social theory perspective (Fraser & Nicholson, 1990; J. K.
Smith, 1990), it presumes a  false consciousness amenable to study and
assumes at very least an agreement about the greater social good that is
inconsistent with the notion of coexisting multiple realities (Gorelick,
1991). Focusing emancipatory intent on the participants of the research
itself rather than the larger objective of the research can lead to a number
of systematic errors in what gets studied and how. For example, such a
position fails to recognize the social inequities that might render full
partnership impossible, especially where  community has not been con-
structed naturally. If partnership research is the only credible form of
feminist research, knowledge about the most disadvantaged women may
lag behind knowledge about the groups of women most available for
such participatory forms of inquiry. Another problem inherent in eman-
cipatory research is that it can permit representative appropriation of
voice by more powerful members of a community over others in a mis-
guided attempt to avoid researcher misuse of power. Where research
subjects control findings or interpretations, some will inevitably acquire
more authority than others, and the implications of a subset of voices
will be overlooked. While a researcher may enter a project with emanci-
patory intent, such intent is clearly not the equivalent of an emancipatory
outcome, nor is an emancipatory outcome precluded from an intent that
stops short of emancipation (Lather, 1991). Finally, it may be recognized
that in the more extreme forms of partnership models, anyone with edu-
488 S. Thorne and C. Varcoe
cation or research training would be precluded from active involvement
in relation to some research questions (Ladwig & Gore, 1994).
While we would agree that the intent underlying the partnership
model is worthy of consideration in any women' s health research pro-
ject, we argue that the position must not be so rigid as to constrain
inquiry into issues that are not yet within the collective consciousness
(Gorelick, 1991). Instead, emancipatory methodology can be oriented to
the possibilities for consideration of emancipatory change rather than the
expectation of such change (Gore, 1992). Further, we believe that knowl-
edge toward creating an expanded repertoire of viable options may be in
and of itself emancipatory, regardless of whether the options are selected.
Thus, claims about emancipatory research as a requirement for feminist
methodology may detract from the full range of issues about which we
need to know to advance women' s health.
CONSENSUAL VALIDITY
A final extreme position that we hope to challenge is that feminist
research requires negotiation of meaning between the researcher and
researched throughout the research process. From the perspective of
some feminist researchers, research findings and interpretations are
inherently suspect if they are not shared with or cocreated by research
participants (Finch, 1993; Hall & Stevens, 1991; Maguire, 1996; Mies,
1993). As is evident in much of the current literature, research partici-
pants read transcripts, approve or disapprove certain interpretations, and
control the dissemination of findings. However, we believe that such a
position denies the existence of tacit knowledge (which we understand to
be a foundational assumption in feminist theorizing). In many instances,
because it denies consciousness-raising processes, such an orientation
may also preclude an emancipatory intent, since the researcher may be
forced to re-create or perpetuate hegemonic ideology that emerges from
subjectively constructed knowledge. Further, it stands in direct con-
tradiction to claims about multiple coexisting realities and may inhibit
researchers from consideration of explanations that are not as yet acces-
sible to participants. Thus, the value of obtaining participant agreement
on all research interpretations may well constrain researchers from inter-
pretive options beyond  common knowledge (Fine, 1994).
From our perspective, to remain true to the ideals of a feminist tradi-
tion, it makes sense that our interpretive work should remain as close to
the data as possible and attend to a number of validity principles. How-
ever, we argue that because the possibility of theoretical explanations
beyond the conception of individual participants must be preserved, al-
ternative credibility measures must be legitimized. In our view, the
The Tyranny of Feminist Methodology 489
logic of any individual pattern of credibility standards will be consider-
ably more important than a fixed position on which set is used. Because
the reader of feminist women's health research must be able to access the
logic of the interpretation, researchers should be called on to explicitly
and credibly account for any discrepancies in consensual validity.
DISCUSSION
As researchers apply and develop feminist perspectives within their
inquiries into women' s health issues, they may be tempted by the moral
superiority inferred by some of these absolute methodological claims. It
is our view that scholars within nursing and the health sciences cannot
afford the academic luxury of mere theorizing but, by virtue of their
practice imperatives, must work out epistemological and methodological
options that simultaneously respect both the ideological underpinnings
and the moral intents of feminist knowledge development. Because they
must construct knowledge of the general (patterns, shared realities, com-
mon experiences, and so on) and apply that knowledge in the particular
(inherently unique individual cases), researchers within the health care
disciplines are perhaps ideally placed to address tensions between the
abstract and the concrete implications of knowledge. In an applied, prac-
tice context, both subjective and objective knowledge must be under-
stood, neither inherently more nor less true, but each applicable on its
own terms and in its own contexts.
Thus health professionals working from a standpoint consistent with
feminist theorizing will not disregard the potential for quantitative re-
search or empirical science within the larger project of developing knowl-
edge for the reduction of gendered social inequities. Neither will they
ignore the insights that can be drawn from inquiry that permits construc-
tion of subjective truths and multiple coexisting realities. Rather, they
will devise ways in which both can be examined as part of feminist in-
quiry and work out techniques whereby  probable truths can be deter-
mined. As members of socially constructed disciplines whose mandate
inherently presumes action toward a greater social (as well as individual)
good, their practices must be founded on knowledge that is shared,
accounted for, and applied. However, as socially conscious and histori-
cally constituted entities, the health professions should also be capable
of accepting that all shared truths are amenable to ongoing scrutiny, that
some will be found faulty as time and context reveal their ideological
linkages, and that new and compelling (sometimes competing) truths
will be discovered or agreed on as the evolution of disciplinary scholar-
ship and practice evolve. It seems to us that health professionals work-
ing within feminist scholarship traditions can contribute, not only to
490 S. Thorne and C. Varcoe
women's health knowledge, but also to feminist inquiry itself, offering a
moderate realism that balances absolute claims in the postmodern con-
text and a respect for individual subjective reality that balances ideologi-
cal primacy within critical social theory.
In conclusion, it seems apparent to us that the health professional dis-
ciplines stand to benefit greatly from application of feminist perspectives
in their women' s health scholarship but must retain a sense of perspec-
tive that permits them to rise above the ideological morass apparent in
some of the more rigid claims about what constitutes feminist methodol-
ogy. In our view, issues about legitimacy and location of the researcher
must not be permitted to stagnate the scholarship; rather, health profes-
sional researchers using feminist approaches will do well to draw upon
and apply knowledge about perspective and bias, using reflexivity and
critical scholarship as mechanisms to make explicit their interpretive
claims. While a feminist orientation toward research methods that are
not in themselves oppressive is entirely consistent with the objectives of
the health disciplines, the absence of oppressive strategies within re-
search is not a sufficient condition to constitute feminist scholarship.
Knowledge that will address and correct socially constructed inequities
will necessarily extend beyond questions specific to women's lives and
women's health; thus, overly narrow claims about what inherently counts
as feminist research will not be widely acceptable. Feminist scholarship
within health care will also have to include multiple forms of science
and a range of methodological options, respecting both the individual
and the population mandates of the health professions as well as the
mandates at all levels in between. While the emancipatory intent of fem-
inist scholarship is not at all inconsistent with a moral duty to society,
health professional knowledge must always include consciousness of the
problem of the individual the fact that the subjective reality of each
unique individual we confront in the clinical encounter must be respected,
supported, and dignified. Because they live in the world of multiple real-
ities, health care professionals are ideally placed to address the inherent
complexities of respecting diversity and at the same time acknowledg-
ing that some fundamentally agreed-upon principles underlie their prac-
tice. Applied thoughtfully, we contend that feminism can provide some
of those principles.
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