THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN From Aristotle, "De Generatione Animalium," trans.
   Arthur Platt, in The Oxford Translation of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
   1912), Vol. 5, Bks. I, II; "Historia Animalium," trans. D'Arcy W. Thompson, in O. T.A. (1910),
   Vol. 4, Bk. IX; Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), Bk. I.

   

   Thus we shall make it clear (1) whether the female also produces semen like the male and the
   foetus is a single mixture of two semens, or whether no semen is secreted by the female, and,
   (2) if not, whether she contributes nothing else either to generation but only provides a
   receptacle, or whether she does contribute something, and, if so, how and in what manner she
   does so. ...                      On this subject, then, so much may be laid down. But since
   it is necessary (1) that the weaker animal also should have a secretion greater in quantity
   and less concocted, and (2) that being of such a nature it should be a mass of sanguineous
   liquid, and (3) since that which Nature endows with a smaller portion of heat is weaker, and
   (4) since it has already been stated that such is the character of the  female—putting all
   these considerations together we see that the sanguineous matter discharged by the female is
   also a secretion. And such is the discharge of the so-called
   catamenia.                                               It is plain, then, that the catamenia
   are a secretion, and that they are analogous in females to the semen in males. . . .   
                                                                                                                             Now
   a boy is like a woman in form, and the woman is as it were an impotent male, for it is through
   a certain incapacity that the female is female, being incapable of concocting the nutriment in
   its last stage into semen (and this is either blood or that which is analogous to it in
   animals which are bloodless owing to the coldness of their nature). As then diarrhoea is
   caused in the bowels by the insufficient concoction of the blood, so are caused in the
   bloodvessels all discharges of blood, including that of the catamenia, for this also is such a
   discharge, only it is natural whereas the others are morbid.                               
                                                                                                                Thus
   it is clear that it is reasonable to suppose that generation comes from this. For the
   catamenia are semen not in a pure state but in need of working up, just as in the formation of
   fruits the nutriment is present, when it is not yet sifted thoroughly, but needs working up to
   purify it. Thus the catamenia cause generation by mixture with the semen. .. .

   In_ all products of Nature or art, a thing is made by something actually existing out of that
   which is potentially such as the finished product. Now the semen is of such a nature, and has
   in it such a principle of motion, that when the motion is ceasing each of the parts comes into
   being, and that as a part having life or soul. . . .

   Has the semen soul, or not? The same argument applies here as in the question concerning the
   parts. As no part, if it participate not in soul, will be a part except in an equivocal sense
   (as the eye of a dead man is still called an "eye"), so no soul will exist in anything except
   that of which it is soul; it is plain therefore that semen both has soul, and is soul,
   potentially. . ..

   The next question to raise and to answer is this. If, in the case of those animals which emit
   semen into the female, that which enters makes no part of the resulting embryo, where is the
   material part  of it diverted if (as we have seen) it acts by means of the power residing in
   it? It is not only necessary to decide whether what is forming in the female receives anything
   material, or not, from that which has entered her, but also concerning the soul in virtue of
   which an animal is so called (and this is in virtue of the sensitive part of the soul)—does
   this exist originally in the semen and in the unfertilized embryo or not, and if it does
   whence does it come? For nobody would put down the unfertilized embryo as soulless or in every
   sense bereft of life (since both the semen and the embryo of an animal  have  every  bit  as 
   much  life  as  a plant),   and  it  is productive  up  to  a  certain  point.   That  then  
   they possess   the nutritive soul is plain (and plain is it from the discussions elsewhere
   about soul why this soul must be acquired first). As they develop they also acquire the
   sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal. For e.g. an animal does not become
   at the same time an animal and a man or a horse or any other particular animal. For the end is
   developed last, and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each
   individual. Hence arises a question of the greatest difficulty, which we must strive to solve
   to the best of our ability and as far as possible. When and how and whence is a share in
   reason acquired by those animals that participate in this principle? It is plain that the
   semen and the unfertilized embryo, while still separate from each other, must be assumed to
   have the nutritive soul potentially, but not actually, except that (like those unfertilized
   embryos that are separated from the mother) it absorbs nourishment and performs the function
   of the nutritive soul. For at first all such embryos seem to Jive the life of a plant. And it
   is clear that we must be guided by this in speaking of the sensitive and the rational soul.
   For all three kinds of soul, not only the nutritive, must be possessed potentially before they
   are possessed in actuality. And it is necessary either (1) that they should all come into
   being in the embryo without existing previously outside it, or (2) that they should all exist
   previously, or (3) that some should so exist and others not. Again, it is necessary that they
   should either (1) come into being in the material supplied by the female without entering with
   the semen of the male, or (2) come from the male and be imparted to the material in the
   female. If the latter, then either all of them, or none, or some must come into being in the
   male from outside.

   Now that it is impossible for them all to pre-exist is clear from this consideration. Plainly
   those principles whose activity is bodily cannot exist without a body, e.g., walking cannot
   exist without feet. For the same reason also they cannot enter from outside. For neither is it
   possible for them to enter by themselves, being inseparable from a body, nor yet in a body,
   for the semen is only a secretion of the nutriment in process of change. It remains, then, for
   the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion
   with the activity of reason. . . .

   Let us return to the material of the semen in and with which comes away from the male the
   spiritus conveying the principle of soul. Of this principle there are two kinds; the one is
   not connected with matter, and belongs to those animals in which is included something divine
   (to wit, what is called the reason), while the other is inseparable from matter. . . .

   Now semen is a secretion and is moved with the same movement as that in virtue of which the
   body increases (this increase being due to subdivision of the nutriment in its last stage).
   When it has entered the uterus it puts into form the corresponding secretion of the female and
   moves it with the same movement wherewith it is moved itself. For the female's contribution
   also is a secretion, and has all the parts in it potentially though none of them actually; it
   has in it potentially even those parts which differentiate the female from the male, for just
   as the young of mutilated parents are sometimes born mutilated and sometimes not, so also the
   young born of a female are sometimes female and sometimes male instead. For the female is, as
   it were, a mutilated male, and the catamenia are semen, only not pure; for there is only one
   thing they have not in them, the principle of soul. For this reason, whenever a wind-egg is
   produced by any animal, the egg so forming has in it the parts of both sexes potentially, but
   has not the principle in question, so that it does not develop into a living creature, for
   this is introduced by the semen of the male. When such a principle has been imparted to the
   secretion of the female it becomes an embryo. . . .

   To consider now the region of the uterus in the female—the two blood-vessels, the great vessel
   and the aorta, divide higher up, and many fine vessels from them terminate in the uterus.
   These become over-filled from the nourishment they convey, nor is the female nature able to
   concoct it, because it is colder than man's; so the blood is excreted through very fine
   vessels into the uterus, these being unable on account of their narrowness to receive the
   excessive quantity and the result is a sort of haemorrhage. The period is not accurately
   defined in women, but tends to return during the waning of the moon. . . .

   In all females, then, there must necessarily be such a secretion, more indeed in those that
   have blood and of these most of all in man, but in the others also some matter must be
   collected in the uterine region. The reason why there is more in those that have blood and
   most in man has been already given, but why, if all females have such a secretion, have not
   all males one to correspond? . . .

   Now the reason why it is not all males that have a generative secretion, while all females do,
   is that the animal is a body with soul or life; the female always provides the material, the
   male that which fashions it, for this is the power that we say each possess, and this is what
   is meant by calling them male and female. Thus while it is necessary for the female to provide
   a body and a material mass, it is not necessary for the male, because it is not within the
   work of art or the embryo that the tools or the maker must exist. While the body is from the
   female, it is the soul that is from the male, for the soul is the reality of a particular
   body. ...

                                                                                                  

   The embryo, then, grows by means of the umbilicus in the same way as a plant by its root, or
   as animals themselves when separated from the nutriment within the mother, of which we must
   speak later at the time appropriate for discussing them. But the parts are not differentiated,
   as some suppose, because like is naturally carried to like. Besides many other difficulties
   involved in this theory, it results from it that the homogeneous parts ought to come into
   being each one separate from the rest, as bones and sinews by themselves, and flesh by itself,
   if one should accept this cause. The real cause why each of them comes into being is that the
   secretion of the female is potentially such as the animal is naturally, and all the parts are
   potentially present in it,,but none actually. It is also because when the active and the
   passive come in contact with each other in that way in which the one is active and the other
   passive (I mean in the right manner, in the right place, and at the right time), straightway
   the one acts and the other is acted upon. The female, then, provides matter, the male the
   principle of motion. . . .

   Of the animals that are comparatively obscure and short-lived the characters or dispositions
   are not so obvious to recognition as are those of animals that are longer-lived. These latter
   animals appear to have a natural capacity corresponding to each of the passions: to cunning or
   simplicity, courage or timidity, to good temper or to bad, and to other similar dispositions
   of mind. . . .

   In all genera in which the distinction of male and female is found, Nature makes a similar
   differentiation in the mental characteristics of the two sexes. This differentiation is the
   most obvious in the case of human kind and in that of the larger animals and the viviparous
   quadrupeds. In the case of these latter the female is softer in character, is the sooner
   tamed, admits more readily of caressing, is more apt in the way of learning. . . .

   In all cases, excepting those of the bear and leopard, the female is less spirited than the
   male; in regard to the two exceptional cases, the superiority in courage rests with the
   female. With all other animals the female is softer in disposition than the male, is more
   mischieveous, less simple, more impulsive, and more attentive to the nurture of the young; the
   male, on the other hand, is more spirited than the female, more savage, more simple and less
   cunning. The traces of these differentiated characteristics are more or less visible
   everywhere, but they are especially visible where character is the more developed, and most of
   all in man.

   The fact is, the nature of man is the most rounded off and complete, and consequently in man
   the qualities or capacities above referred to are found in their perfection. Hence woman is
   more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more jealous,
   more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is, furthermore, more prone to
   despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of shame or self respect, more false of
   speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is also more wakeful, more
   shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a smaller quantity of nutriment.

   He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything
   else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place (1) there must be a union of
   those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may
   continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in
   common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them
   an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both
   may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and
   master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master
   and slave have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and
   the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many
   uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended
   for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and
   slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and
   female. Wherefore the poets say,— "It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians"; as
   if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

   Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the family first
   arises, and Hesiod is right where he says,—"First house and wife and an ox for the plough,"
   for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for
   the supply of men's every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas "companions
   of the cupboard," and by Epimenides the Cretan, "companions of the manger." But when several
   families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily
   needs, then comes into existence the village. . . .

   When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly
   or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of
   life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore^ if the earlier
   forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed]
   nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we
   are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is
   the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

   Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
   political animal. . ..

   Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state, we must
   speak of the management of the household. The parts of the household are the persons who
   compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by
   examining everything in its least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are
   master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what
   each of these three relations is and ought to be:—I mean the relation of master and servant,
   of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child.

   But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is
   expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

   There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For
   that some should rule, and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but expedient; from
   the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

   And whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects, that rule is the better which is
   exercised over better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild
   beasts. The work is better which is executed by better workmen; and where one man rules and
   another is ruled, they may be said to have a work. In all things which form a composite whole
   and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the
   ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but
   not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have
   no life, there is a ruling principle, as in musical harmony. But we are wandering from the
   subject. We will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the living creature which, in the first
   place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the
   other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain
   their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who
   is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation
   of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the
   soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. First then we may observe in living
   creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a
   despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal
   rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the
   rational element over the passionate is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two
   or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of
   men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when
   they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and
   the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity,
   extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
   or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and
   who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as
   for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and
   therefore is .another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to
   have, reason, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason;
   they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very
   different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to
   distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile
   labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life
   in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally: for some slaves have
   the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one
   another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods dp from men, all
   would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if there is a
   difference in the body, how much more in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas
   the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and
   others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right. . . .

   Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master
   over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a
   husband. A husband and father rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs,
   the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although
   there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than
   the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But
   in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a
   constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at
   all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference
   of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of
   Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there
   the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he receives
   both love and the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer
   has appropriately called Zeus "father of Gods and men," because he is the king of them all.
   For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind
   with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

   Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of
   inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we
   call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may
   indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond merely instrumental
   and ministerial qualities— whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice,
   and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever
   way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they
   differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in reason, it seems
   absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and
   children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and
   is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may ask about the
   natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For a
   noble nature is equally required in both, but if so, why should one of them always rule, and
   the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the
   difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, and therefore not of degree; yet
   how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have
   virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how
   can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is
   evident therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying according to
   their various natures. And this is at once indicated by the soul, in which one part naturally
   rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from
   that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational
   part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all
   things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs;—the freeman rules
   over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the
   man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are
   present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has,
   but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be
   with the moral virtues also; all may be supposed to partake of them, but only in such manner
   and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to
   have moral virtue in perfection, for his duty is entirely that of a master artificer, and the
   master artificer is reason; the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of
   virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them;
   but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a
   woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding,
   of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we
   look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition
   of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such
   definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes
   must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a
   woman's glory," but this is not equally the glory of man. . . .

   Inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a
   family, the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. And therefore,
   women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the state, if the virtues of
   either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must
   make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a
   state are women.