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Intellectuals, the 'information society' and the disappearance of the public sphere

PHILIP ELLIOTT*

This paper attempts to raise a series of questions about intellectuals, the mass media, the current course of technical and economic developments in society and their consequences for the culture.[1] It deals not only with the current situation but also with longer-term trends. Society is at the point when there is about to be another shift in the distributive forms of the mass media. This re-opens many of the questions which have already been discussed about centralized broadcasting, both radio and television, as well as other earlier mass media. It also raises questions about the future of the intellectuals in the sphere of cultural production.

The thesis I wish to advance is in marked contrast to that of Alvin Gouldner (1979), outlined by Philip Schlesinger in the opening paper. My argument is that the shift in the location of power from the nation state to the international economic system is graphically illustrated by current developments in the mass media and so too are the implications of this shift for the intellectual fraction of Gouldner's 'New Class'. It is not just that the 'new class' is destined not to come to power. The intellectuals are about to be robbed of those public forums in which they could engage in their 'culture of critical discourse'. Their toe-hold on power is crumbling under their feet.

The new distributive technologies have already re-opened some of the more enthralling controversies of the past. To take a trivial example, space invader games have already been criticized for taking too much of the time and attention of the young, for introducing them to violence and warfare and even leading them into delinquency to get the money to play the games. Such criticisms are very reminiscent of the worries that have greeted each new type of entertainment which was particularly attractive to youth and/or the lower classes.

More seriously, the battle lines are already being drawn between the cultural optimists and pessimists. There are those who see no reason to expect anything from technological developments than an acceleration of trends they already deplore. As an example we may take the following observation from Joe Weizenbaum, Professor of Computer Science at MIT, in an exchange with Daniel Bell:

We may recall the euphoric dreams articulated by then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover at the dawn of the commercial radio broadcasting and again by others when mass TV broadcasting was about to become a reality. It was foreseen that these media would exert an enormously beneficial influence on the shaping of American culture . . . . The technological dream was more than realised.

. . . But the cultural dream was cruelly mocked in its realisation. This magnificent technology, more than Wagnerian in its proportions. . . . What does it deliver to the masses? An occasional gem buried in immense avalanches of the ordure of everything that is most banal and insipid or pathological in our civilisation (Weizenbaum, 1980: 553–554).

Weizenbaum goes on to illustrate his argument by taking the home computer as a product for which there is no demand until it exists and another example of a trivialized, sensationalized version of the great ideal showing computer games as a trivialized, sensationalized version of the great ideal showing how intellectual potential can be transformed into a toy to kill, maim and destroy.[2]

On the other side Daniel Bell (1976, 1980), though he has his moments of general pessimism when considering topics like religion, speaks for the optimists who see the new technology as bringing about a quantum shift in the organization of society, a shift which will increase the scope for individual choice and rational decision. Bell is fond of drawing an analogy between the new computer technology with its communication adjuncts and the Alexandrian Library. This treasure house with its communication adjuncts and the Alexandrian Library. This treasure house of knowledge in the ancient world contained all human knowledge as it was then available. The library made it freely available for the general benefit of mankind at that time. Computer science, cable technology and data banks are about to realize this dream on a much grander scale.

As always, it is important to set such technological changes in their social context. In this case the aim is supported by the fact that communication changes have vast implications for the organization of work, the economy, the rôles which people are able to play in society, their relationship to that society and to the polity. The corollary of this is that it is important to look not just at the technology but also at the political economy in which it is being developed, to consider what type of organizations and corporations are associated with the present range of type of organizations and corporations are associated with the present range of media provision and which with the new technologies that are likely to be introduced, what interests they are likely to pursue, consciously and unconsciously, and the type of social and political structures that they are likely to both promote and reflect. These structural changes are bound to have a profound effect on the organization and content of forms of intellectual work.

The thesis I wish to advance is that what we are seeing and what we face is a continuation of the shift away from involving people in society as political citizens of nation states towards involving them as consumption units in a corporate world. The consequence of this for the culture is a continuation of the erosion of what Habermas called the public sphere or C. Wright Mills the community of publics. The hallmark of both these types of polity were contests between politically expressed demands based on knowledge, information and association in expressed demands based on knowledge, information and association in democratic, nation states—a type of society which Habermas sees as typical of the bourgeois moment of capitalism. Instead a mass society develops founded on an acceptable level of comfort, pleasure and control in which people participate as members of the market.

The consequence of relying on the market, as Nora and Minc (1978) argue, is to set very real limits on what people can hope to achieve. The market provides not for participation but for consumption. In other words, there is a sleight of hand in the arguments of Daniel Bell and others who look forward to an explosion of information and communication such as will create an information-based society with a more rational form of culture than we now enjoy. The sleight of hand lies in the assumption that new technologies will increase general access to information and open up new possibilities of two-way communication.

The first problem is one of access; the second, what we mean by information and communication. Access is not just a matter of physical means. It also involves having the rights and resources to make use of them. The analogy of a library is appealing because it suggests an open store of knowledge simply waiting for us to bumble around in. Moreover, the public library system is another of those services, like public education, established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in recognition of a general right to knowledge. However poorly the ideal has been realized in practice, the library system has been inspired by the aim of an informed citizenry.

The weakness of the analogy between the old and the new becomes apparent however as soon as we consider the aims of the new controllers of information. What is in prospect, as Herbert Schiller (1981) has pointed out, is the privatization of information. The new information producers are commercial corporations who have a primary interest in keeping information secret to protect their commercial secrets. Their secondary interest is to produce a commodity for sale in the market. In the pursuit of this end, the American information industry is already putting pressure on the sources of public information, of which the main one is the government, to commercialize its operations. Information which was once available to the public as of right will, in future, be available at a price. As Schiller argues, there is likely to be a knock-on effect. Information for which there is not a market will not be produced. In Britain there is a neat illustration of the coincidence between political convenience and market forces in the gradual disappearance of the poverty statistics.[3]

There are other problems with the library analogy. Even libraries have catalogues—catalogues designed to make it easy to answer some questions and so inevitably more difficult to answer others. Who will be writing the catalogues? Who will be setting the questions and the range of possible answers? Indeed, who will have accumulated the stock of knowledge? Not, I submit, the myriad of individual subscribers at their computer terminals and yet, another characteristic of the technological Utopia will be a further domestication of living functions and privatization of social life.

Privatization in this sense is one of the key processes associated with the Frankfurt School's analysis of the media and their effect on social relationships, not through the messages they carry but the type of interaction they encourage. By concentrating activities within the home, the broadcast media of radio and television set up a type of human group which has no other connection with each other than their common use of the same service. The strong version of the Frankfurt school argument is that this opens up the possibility of manipulation, an argument which has been severely questioned by 'effects' research. A weak version of the argument is that this process of privatization deprives people of the possibility of answering back because it deprives them of the opportunities for association in which common needs might be recognized and demands formulated. Instead, to take a flippant but tragic example of someone who is, as they say, at the sharp end of this process, the modern housewife 'goes rushing for the shelter of a mother's little helper', in the words of the old Rolling Stones' lyric and seeks an individual solution to her problems. The example is not so flippant when you consider that the housewife is the supposed epitome of the isolated individual able to exercise free choice in the cornucopia of the consumer society.

The second problem of Bell's vision of a rational, information-rich society is that

much of what we now take as information and as an informative process of communication based on a rational model are anything but, having a high level of symbolic, mythical content and passive, entertainment value. The importance attached to the concept of information owes much to the resilience of the ideal of society as a rational, democratic polity and to the success of intellectuals in promoting the equation information plus rational choice equals social progress. It is an equation which has been much disputed by conservative intellectuals. 'Hayek's law' for example claims that attempts at legislative reform always have opposite effects from those intended. It is only recently, however, that such arguments have begun to carry weight against the interventionist intellectuals of Gouldner's 'New Class' who had insinuated themselves into the machinery of national government as the providers and processors of the information on which the government should act. While the Labour Party and the SDP dispute their right to Tawney's name for a new interventionist, intellectual society, the intellectual initiative has passed to various right-wing societies and institutes.[4] These are able to attract private funds whereas the financial and occupational base of interventionist intellectualism in public sector research and educational institutions is being put under increasing pressure.

Nevertheless, the persistence of the Fabianesque concept of information as a necessary social resource can also be seen in discussions of the mass media. The growth of the press was based on two processes, the provision of useful information, mainly commercial and financial intelligence to interested parties, and political controversy. Print was the medium which underpinned the concept of the public sphere by providing an arena for political debate. Over time, both these functions have been transformed. From its original base in elite information, the commercial function has expanded beyond all recognition and with the transformation of news into a commodity, the political function has been eclipsed. Nevertheless, debates about the press are still carried on in terms of the argument for a free press able to supply the information and reflect the opinions necessary to foster decision-making in a democracy. The recent introduction of a new daily newspaper in Britain, the *Daily Star*, shows clearly that the mass market daily papers are a very different sort of animal. The lead features in the three tabloids on the day on which the *Daily Star* started in publication showed a quite explicit concern with irrationality, magic, extra-scientific potential and play on the sacred and profane dimensions. One featured a round-the-world-yachtswoman and a sex-change witch, the second organized an experiment among its readers to show that metal could be bent by mental power and the third discovered a vicar who painted nudes *à la* Gaugin.

A similar distinction was drawn by William Randolph Hearst, the American newspaper magnate, when he contrasted 'interesting' with 'merely important' news. 'Important news' was concerned with institutions, organizations and decision-making in society. 'Interesting' was that which appealed to individuals *qua* individuals, as individual members of the human race. This human interest aspect of news is part of the basis for a populist form of culture, one which exaggerates the commonalities between people and plays down structural divisions of interest. Those commonalities are exaggerated which revolve around consumption and the pursuit of pleasure. Consider the shift in meaning of 'us' and 'them'. As described by Richard Hoggart in *The Uses of Literacy*, 'them and us' was a common part of the working-class view of the world in the inter-war period he was describing. He defines 'them' as follows:

'Them' is a composite dramatic figure, the chief character in modern urban forms of the rural peasant-big house relationships. The world of 'them' is the world of the bosses whether those bosses are private individuals or as is increasingly the case today, public officials (Hoggart, 1958: 72).

Compare this with the idea of 'them' contained in a *Sun* editorial on the Notting Hill Carnival of 1977:

What Notting Hill has shown yet again is that violence on the streets is not a case of black against white or rich against poor. It is the yobs against the rest of us. That is true not only in Notting Hill but in Lewisham, Ladywood and in the turmoil that engulfed the Grunwick dispute. The same goes for the louts who disrupt soccer matches and smash up railway trains. It is not society which is on trial in any of these cases but the effectiveness of justice to defend the ordinary peaceful man.

Populist culture cannot magic away the evidence of social division and conflict. Instead it turns it into a question of membership or non-membership of society or even the human race. Non-members 'disrupt' entertainment and 'smash up' property. It is, as the *Sun* so elegantly puts it, a matter of 'the yobs against the rest of us'.

Information and communication are also the catch words used to describe the new type of society which will be ushered in by technological change and developments in electronics, data systems and the new distributive media. The new society, it is argued, will involve changes in the power relations within the mode of production. Those who control the information, intellectuals in one form or another, will have control of one of the means of production and so have a base for class power. The fallacy of this argument becomes apparent if we consider how much power the working class have been able to exercise through their control of another means of production, labour. The point is not who is allowed to contribute to the process of production but who extracts the surplus value from it and so has the resources to control the course of its development. Obituaries for the old class of money and capital to be found in the work of Gouldner *inter alia* seem a little premature. This leopard has changed its spots. The supra-national species has become more important, if less immediately visible, than the more familiar national species which is being extinguished.

National capital and national enterprises are increasingly vulnerable as the economic system becomes more and more internationalized. As Raymond Vernon has emphasized, this process of internationalization involves a complex and intricate network of commercial and financial ties and dependencies, a complexity which makes any attempt to identify a single class of institutions like the multi-national corporations or, more popularly, the 'gnomes of Zurich' liable to gross over-simplification. The complexity provides the old class with a new and effective camouflage in its changed form. Nevertheless, Vernon concludes that while greater economic interdependence is 'indispensable for continued economic growth . . . it seems at times to threaten some of the national goals for which the growth was intended, including national stability, egalitarianism, participation and protection' (Vernon, 1977: 193).

These national goals are ones which have been promoted, if not realized, by intellectuals. Indeed, as Schlesinger points out in his paper in this issue, the history of the intellectuals is that of a group which came to prominence through the promotion of nationalism in this century and the last. The nation state and its political system have given some intellectuals a mechanism through which to promote social policies which intervened in the operation of economic forces and attempted to alter some of their effects. The resurgence of monetarism is only a

particularly topical reminder that many intellectuals have actively opposed such interventionism. As Eric Gabus of Nestlés put it in a conference defending the rôle of the multi-national corporations, 'the businessman depends on intellectuals to update the trend of public opinion'. But in so far as intellectuals had an independent hold on power to promote different goals, it was through the medium of the nation state and the attempt to use its political power. The process of technological change in the mass media provides us with a useful case to examine the implications of the shift in power away from the nation state and into the international economic system and the effects this is likely to have on culture, the rôle of the intellectuals and the future of the public sphere in which intellectuality was exercised.

To start with developments in the culture, we have already noted the growth of consumer populism, a development which Daniel Bell is quite pessimistic about for fear that shameless hedonism may overtake the Protestant ethic. One of the common interests which can be promoted on behalf of all 'the ordinary, peaceful citizens' of the *Sun* editorial, quoted above, is 'law and order'. This couplet has acquired a special significance in British culture as a way of turning consumer populism into a repressive form of culture which justifies strengthening the agents of the state, their exercise of power over the citizenry and the erosion of democratic, political control over that power.' Thus, in a period of general wage restraint, the police and the army have been consistently privileged, police powers are about to be further increased and the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, James Anderton, has explicitly called for an end to 'political' scrutiny of the police. The use of 'political' in this and similar contexts has important negative overtones compared, for example, to 'democratic'. It illustrates the process of ghettoizing politics and politicians to which I shall return in discussing the effects of broadcasting on politics below. Another example of the increasing rôle of the repressive forces of the state is the use of military forces in a domestic operation, the Iranian Embassy siege.[6]

Three processes are especially noteworthy as contributions to this repressive culture.

(1) An exaggeration of crime, criminality and violence, as for example, the repeated claim that we live in a particularly violent age.
(2) The process of turning political, industrial and social dissent into a form of criminal activity and identifying such action with violence.
(3) The resurgence of that long-established form of ideological management, the Cold War, or its more recent variant, the War against Terrorism, so that dissent becomes identified with an alien threat to the nation, the Western World or our way of life.'

This last process is a timely reminder that these cultural developments are to a large extent international. In most parts of the world repression has gone far beyond the culture. The interests of the international economic order are such that the residual rôle assigned to national governments is to be the keeper of national order. To quote Vernon again, 'Foreign investors have demonstrated an unsurprising preference for a stable and friendly economic environment. In a number of developing countries that preference has meant that multinational enterprises have expanded their activities sharply immediately after a Rightist government has taken power or have reduced their activities immediately after a Leftist regime has taken control' (Vernon, 1977: 144).

These twin features of the contemporary culture—consumptive hedonism and anti-political repression—have a special significance given the implications which the new technology has for structural unemployment and the international reorganization of work and production.[8] People deprived of their only means of being involved in the capitalist system by right—that is by selling their labour power—will have to be involved from the other end by a right to consume. In the eyes of some protagonists of the new international system, this right is already established as the new basis for legitimating the distribution of power. Thus Gabus claims 'in a democratically, decentralised society the Multinational Company . . . can retain its economic power only through the goodwill of consumers who by the daily selection of the products they purchase, judge the usefulness of the Multinational Company and put a value on the services it supplies. The survival of this goodwill depends entirely on profitable dealings with a clientele whose needs the Multinational Company appreciates across national boundaries' (Gabus, 1977: 133). But if the right is established, capitalism is a long way from providing everyone with the means to exercise their rights. As we can see from the current international depression the $64,000 question with which the capitalist system seems unable to cope is how to ensure that supply reaches demand.

The preference, demonstrated by the current monetarist and deflationary policies adopted by most governments, is for a strategy which reduces supply to meet effective demand. Thereby large sections of the national and international population are effectively disenfranchised by their exclusion from the market. This brings the repressive aspect of the culture into play to restrict the scope for dissent of those unable to participate in the consumer society and to support repressive action by state forces against them.

The signs are that the market will be the main mechanism for allowing access to the new media services, either directly through the purchase of discs, tapes or subscription services, such as even the BBC is planning for its satellite transmissions, or indirectly through the sale of international advertising space. Direct sale will disadvantage a growing proportion of the population given that unemployment will prevent them from acquiring adequate means. Indirect sale gives another twist to the international spiral by putting yet more emphasis on cross-border consumerism.

The results of relying on these forms of the market are already apparent in the press where the only viable form of journalism is that founded on definable markets as in the leisure interest magazine field. In the case of the British provincial press monopoly control over a sectionalized market is an added bonus. By contrast the political journal and political content is being squeezed out and with it one locus for the operations of critical intellectuals, one forum through which they have contributed to the formulation of policy within the nation state. In so far as politics is not a consumable product, there is no advertising revenue on which political journalism can rely for the support of its services.

These developments in the press are suggestive of the type of content which is likely to survive in new forms of distributive media dependent on sale of item or sale of audience. The BBC's initial catalogue of video cassettes, for example, covers cooking, gardening and other leisure interests, already familiar topics in the magazine field. Plans to include drama and entertainment packages are held up by negotiations on the rights of performers and producers, but such material is expected to predominate once agreements have been reached. The possibility of political or current affairs cassettes has not been mooted.

Broadcasting in its traditional forms has already had a considerable impact on the political culture. The system of control under which it has operated has left little room for political partisanship. Instead the media of radio and television have given considerable support to generalized notions of public and community. Since its inception broadcasting has treated politics with considerable circumspection. Partisan politics was at first excluded completely and then confined to limited ghettoes and subject to stringent rules of balance. Election broadcasts and party politicals are both special cases in the general run of output. Such programmes are disputed. In the place of partisan politics, general broadcasting has been heavily signposted and the editorial control of the broadcasters is relinquished or particularly influential in developing a general notion of public and community as a way of meeting the requirements of balance and objectivity. Formulae were devised for the discussion of public affairs in, for example, BBC Radio's *Any Questions?* which gave pride of place to prominent citizens who were 'non-political'. One of their main qualifications for taking part was independence of party. In a sense broadcasting was only developing a standard practice of British administration to use those who have achieved prominence in one field to superintend developments in another by appointing them to various boards, committees and commissions. Recent work on the history of broadcasting has shown how the BBC was colonized by intellectuals of the professional middle class.[9] They were attracted by the opportunity to discuss public affairs in talks and feature programmes in terms of a general notion of the public interest. It was this same public interest to which intellectuals appealed to support their interventions in policy making and social engineering. The concept of the public good allowed intellectuals to step outside a straightforward technical rationality of judging the efficacy of means to take on questions of ends as well. Public service broadcasting enshrines such an idea in its very title.

Even such generalized notions are likely to be set aside as the new media limit the scope for political discourse even further. The pressure will be felt in two ways. First, the new distributive forms will simply leave out political discussion and criticism. Actuality programming, topical and with limited appeal, is the type of content most at risk. Second, the development of new distributive systems puts public service broadcasting under severe threat.

At least two conditions were necessary to enable public service broadcasting to develop. The first was the framework of government regulation which required a non-partisan approach. Successive governments have had continued misgivings about the progressivism of the community approach when it raised embarassing questions about current policies. The second was the national basis of distribution so that community was co-terminous with the citizenry of the nation state. To make the connections quite explicit, public service broadcasting can be said to have been a political medium of both the intellectuals and the nation state.

The current threat to public service broadcasting provide us with a very clear illustration of how weak is the intellectuals' hold over power and influence. Public service broadcasting has pursued a number of characteristically intellectual goals such as the preservation of the national culture by promoting broadcast versions of national classics and maintaining domestic production, the guardianship of cultural values by sponsoring non-commercial culture and programming for cultural values, and promoting national debate on public issues through a service of news, current affairs and documentaries. This last goal was pursued against con-

sistent political suspicion and opposition, as ... e William C...(19.. .ake. clear in her account of the development of political television. As a result the debate has taken on the form outlined above.

Much media sociology has been particularly critical of the form as embodied in television news and emphasized the limited contribution that has made to awareness.[10] But on the other hand factual television in its various forms has been influential in putting issues on the public agenda. It has attracted accusations of left-wing bias and more generally that broadcasting has usurped the role of parliament. The documentary has been an effective way of raising questions about the public good and the documentary and current affairs departments of broadcasting have been successful in recruiting the type of educated elite which has traditionally gone into other intellectual and professional positions. News, as well as longer forms of presentation, has shown people suffering through no fault of their own by, for example, war and other disasters, natural and man-made. More important, there is the implicit or explicit suggestion that someone, national governments or international agencies, should do something about it. Disaster reports, for example, are routinely followed by enquiries into cause, prevention and what is and can be done to provide effective relief.

There is a sense in which such information necessarily has interventionist implications. This is what has led to a critique of the media from the Right. Coverage puts pressure on the authorities to act and it may be pressure to act in directions different from those they wish to take. Suffering stories in particular may make it more difficult for the authorities to maintain the support for the policies which produce the suffering such as going to war, pursuing a deflationary economic strategy or not preparing or providing for natural disasters.

So far this system has kept running on an uneasy combination of control and concession. Control by government ownership and economic influence on the broadcasting authorities to contain the liberal perspective in the public sphere of broadcasting and the acceptance by democratic governments of a responsibility to try to mitigate and contain the effects of various disasters for the comfort and well-being of their subjects. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that both the liberal aspect of the media and the ability and willingness of governments to accept such responsibilities are under threat in the developing crisis.

Of these two the public sphere in the media is clearly the most vulnerable. To a large extent the intellectual space there rests on notions of public service and journalistic responsibility. Public service is no longer financially viable. Broadcasting has exhausted non-advertising revenue as the licence fee becomes an increasingly unacceptable poll tax. Even without advertising revenue, public service broadcasting has had to compete with commercial systems and become less able to pursue different goals and to preserve its own distinct identity. The process is illustrated by the co-production movement or, more recently, by the BBC's agreement with the Rockefeller Centre Inc. to become a cable service supplier in the USA. Overseas the BBC is becoming another commercial media producer and distributor. In the United Kingdom, it is fighting a rear-guard action against moves to cable the country for entertainment, moves which appear to be unstoppable as they are led by the prospect of profit rather than public demand. In the press responsible journalism depends on the willingness of owners to pursue non-commercial goals. Conglomeration has made this less likely. Owners and managers are unable to allow the commercial slack in which journalistic space can develop.

Apart from finance, a second problem is the lack of regulatory will to continue to put national communication policy into regulatory form. The coalition of paternalist interests, to use Graham Murdock's phrase, that set up public service broadcasting—intellectual and cultural elites, politicians anxious to lay down rules of debate and new professionals skilled in the techniques of the new media—has been put on the defensive. While it can rally support against the government on an issue like the BBC external services, it is powerless against commercial interests campaigning in terms of variety and independence. Hence, in the United Kingdom cable franchises have been given to companies with no requirements for access or public service programming and in the United States such commitments are being written out of the Federal Communication Act.

Even given the political will however, a third problem is that national power is no longer adequate to regulate supra-national bodies. This problem is raised most dramatically by satellites but already pirate radio and the difficulties the Dutch and Italians have experienced in keeping control of land-based transmissions and cable systems show the dimensions of the problem. An exhibition of the new technology, organized by Philips, the Dutch electrical company, cites as a virtue of the new system of satellite communication that 'there is no need for the countries covered to give their permission'. A special problem for the democracies will be the difficulty of enforcing any rules of political debate. In so far as it survives it will depend on the ability of the wealthy to buy time, a prospect which clearly underlines the way in which the course of history favours an old, familiar class and not some aspiring newcomer, however well-intentioned.

In other fields it is possible to show separately how the nation state is under threat from internationalization and the intellectual hopelessly insecure in the face of the intelligentsia. The inability to control capital flows provides an illustration of the first and the demand for 'relevance' in education one of the second. Dealing with the media and cultural processes has the advantage, however, of demonstrating how these processes are intertwined. In this paper I have tried to do no more than outline a scenario but the argument should be sufficient to suggest that in this field of the media, which Hall (1977) has identified as the current site of the class struggle, the conflict is likely to be resolved by material rather than ideological processes.

Notes

1. I am indebted to my colleagues at the Centre for Mass Communication Research, Leicester University for discussions on the topics raised in this paper and to Philip Schlesinger, whose paper in this issue provided the final impetus to put pessimism to paper.
2. *The Daily Mirror* (10 April 1982) reported that British Telecom had designed a game of sink the Argentine navy for its Prestel service after the British task force had sailed for the Falkland Isles. Following protests this game was withdrawn.
3. Thus, for example, figures on the take-up rate of means-tested benefits are no longer available and the number below the 'poverty line' is now calculated biennially instead of annually.
4. On the dispute over Tawney's inheritance see Raphael Samuel's Socialist Society pamphlet, published by *The Guardian* (29 March and 5 April 1982). Examples of bodies which have begun to make more of the ideological running are the Institute for the Study of Conflict, the Institute for Economic Affairs, which now includes within it a Unit for Social Affairs, the Freedom Association, the Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy Studies.
5. The work of Stuart Hall has been particularly influential in drawing attention to this process. See, for example, his Cobden Lecture, published in *The Guardian* (5 January 1980) and Hall *et al.* (1978). Other studies include Chibnall (1977) and Taylor (1981).
6. On the siege, see Philip Schlesinger (1980/81).
7. Chomsky and Herman (1979) make some pertinent observations on both these phenomena.
8. On unemployment see Jordan (1982) and Showler and Sinfield (1981).
9. In addition to Brigg's official history of the BBC there is the growing body of work by Scannell (1980) and Cardiff (1980).
10. For a general review see Golding and Elliott (1979). The most publicized critique is that of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980).

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