Middle East.[13] Nixon, in particular, had a notion about an American-Soviet trade-off involving Vietnam and the Middle East.[14] If the Soviets pressured North Vietnam to end the war, the United States, in turn, would make its Middle Eastern position more flexible. The Soviets, initially, were unenthusiastic about such a scheme; yet for the sake of a paramount issue like SALT, and in view of the desire for Western trade and technology, they were somewhat willing to discuss these problems in terms of the linkage approach.

Another aspect of linkage in international politics was the Kissinger emphasis on tripolar politics—the new relationship involving Moscow, Peking, and Washington. Even though the American-Chinese rapprochement had its own intrinsic significance, this new tripolar relationship was motivated in part by White House efforts to induce Soviet cooperation in regard to Vietnam and the Middle East.[15] Interestingly enough, President Nixon privately reassured the Chinese leadership about American determination to resist threats in the Middle East.[16] In addition, despite the initial shocks in Japan regarding the American-Chinese rapprochement, this new tripolar relationship would show American allies around the world, especially Japan and Western Europe, that détente was not a two-power (U.S.-Soviet) condominium at their expense.

Another long-term goal of American strategy was to develop some Soviet cooperation in the region. After the reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East (e.g., after the expulsion of the Soviet military forces from Egypt in July 1972), Kissinger expected the Soviets to be more cooperative in regard to the area. Clearly, once he realized, at the May 1972 summit, that the Soviets were not going to change their basic orientation to the Middle East, Kissinger maneuvered the Soviets into a "holding pattern" with respect to both military and political expansion. Moscow's restraint was motivated largely by its reluctance to support an Arab military solution in the face of Israeli military power and, of course, by the need to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States.[17] As one American diplomat described the episode, "This took the Middle East out of the major power arena to some extent; . . . the major power factor in the equation certainly had been greatly reduced as a result of the events of 1972."[18] Politically, the 1972 summit proved to be a watershed in Soviet Middle Eastern policy. The Soviets were outwardly reluctant to accept any theory of détente which would be opposed by their local clients; but, in reality, Moscow's desire for détente with the United States, and for the apparent benefits that would be derived from it, exceeded regional concerns. As one Middle Eastern expert observed, "Moscow's interest in a global détente with the U.S. proved greater than its interests in capitalizing on the Egyptians' or other Arabs' helplessness."[19] Kissinger considered the 1972 summit a turning point

in the Middle East situation because shortly thereafter, the moderate Arab leaders started to move in Washington's direction in search of a settlement.

All in all, the Basic Principles Agreement (of the May 1972 summit) and the Agreement on the Prevention of a Nuclear War (reached at the June 1973 summit) seemed to legitimize the process of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Though these agreements were not legally binding, Kissinger considered them standards of conduct (guidelines) for evaluating the progress in areas of concern involving the two countries. The Middle East was one such area of concern. In his view, these agreements marked the end of the cold war.[20] In fact, during the 1973 October War, Kissinger urged the Soviets to exercise restraint, reminding them of their responsibilities under these agreements.[21] However, the Soviets must have regarded the war itself as a vindication of their earlier warnings to American policy makers, in 1972 and 1973. Kissinger, nonetheless, regarded the 1973 war not as an example of the failure of détente, but as an indication of its limits.[22] As he saw it, even though the Soviets did not play a positive role in the Middle East conflict, Moscow could have made it harder for Washington to play a mediator's role in the postwar negotiations.[23]

The Nixon Doctrine and the Middle East Conflict

Conceptually, the Nixon Doctrine had its roots in previous foreign-policy experiences. These included Eisenhower's new-look defense program of the 1950s, Nixon's assessment of the Asian situation in the 1960s (the belief that the United States had a vital interest in the Pacific region), and domestic sentiments (public and congressional) against the Vietnam War.[24]

The strategy of the Nixon Doctrine (which Nixon and Kissinger preferred to call a "strategy for peace") was conceptualized in terms of strength, partnership, and negotiation.[25] These elements signalled a new pragmatic relationship between the United States and its regional allies. In short, regional allies were expected to share the burden of defense to a larger degree than was the case in the past. Kissinger placed less emphasis on formal alliances and more emphasis upon interest-based commitments.

The underlying assumption of the Nixon Doctrine was simple: American military technology and economic aid had become the substitute for direct American intervention in regional disputes. The doctrine was really not one of retrenchment; it did not support the no-more-Vietnams syndrome. Thus, in the future regional disputes, the emphasis would be on strategy and method rather than on objectives.[26]

Seen in this light, the aim of the doctrine was to sustain the American involvement in regional affairs through proxies and through tactical adjustments to changing circumstances. The doctrine, therefore, was far from reducing American commitments abroad or even redefining American interests—although it was cast in a phraseology conducive to good public relations toward a public soured on Vietnam. In reality, the doctrine was intended to put together an informal network of unwritten alliances throughout the world.[27] For instance, countries like Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, and Ethiopia (later exchanged for Somalia) became advanced American positions within the framework of the doctrine.[28]

In a variety of ways, American Middle Eastern policy, after the June war of 1967, could be characterized as consistent with the underlying principles of the Nixon Doctrine. Above all, there was a continuity in American support for Israel and also, of course, support for overall Middle East stability.[29] But after the 1967 war, the Soviets expanded their influence in the Middle East. That influence seemed to undermine the stability of the region and to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this context, the Nixon Doctrine was designed, in part, to discourage Soviet exploitation of regional conflicts. It amounted to a new containment of the Soviet Union at the regional level. In practice, this meant the retaining of American predominance in the Middle East through proxies such as Israel, Iran, and Jordan.

Even though the doctrine was initially designed for application in Asia—i.e., it was used for Vietnamization and the containment of China—Kissinger hoped to use the Middle East (especially after the Jordanian civil war) as a model for other regions of the world. In reference to the doctrine, Kissinger was prepared to help these countries that were willing to defend themselves against external and internal threats. Israel, therefore, qualified as a preeminent example because it needed only American economic and military aid, rather than American forces, to defend its national security.[30] In this instance, however, the premises of the doctrine coincided with American ethnic politics and with the moral foundations of the American ethnic political culture supporting democratic countries and Western values.

In the light of the doctrine, Kissinger was unwilling either to impose a settlement on Israel or to pressure it to accept a peace it considered harmful to its national security. He felt an imposed settlement of any kind would not contribute to the long-run stability of the region. It was easier, therefore, for the Nixon administration to remain detached—provided Israeli security was preserved—than to favor a settlement under the auspices of the two superpowers, which would be opposed by Israel.[31] Israel, for its part, supported the Nixon Doctrine as a counteraction to Soviet threats, because its security in the long run depended upon the willingness of the United States to be globally involved.[32]

Clearly, the Nixon Doctrine was based on the overriding assumption that local clients needed a high degree of stability in order to protect themselves and American interests at the same time. In the Middle East, the outcome of the Jordanian civil war seemed to convince Kissinger of Israel's importance as a bulwark against radical ideology (including communism) and as a strategic ally against Soviet advancements in the region. American aid to Israel was thus justified on two grounds: to preserve the security of Israel and to insure the stability of the region (in the sense of perpetuating the status quo). Nevertheless, an American partnership with the moderate Arab states of the region was also considered important. In summary, the Kissinger policy sought to devise a strategy in which the political, economic, military, and psychological (ideological) components were combined in an effectively integrated policy.[33]

Because the status quo of the Middle East was shattered, the October War can be seen as a failure of the Nixon Doctrine. Yet the net result of the war and its aftermath demonstrated the relative success of the doctrine in several ways. First, American predominance was preserved in the Middle East, especially with the decrease of Soviet influence. To Kissinger, local predominance was essential for the survival of détente in an unstable area like the Middle East.

Second, the American commitment to Israel increased as a result of the war. The American airlift during the war (albeit somewhat belated) and the subsequent aid after the disengagement agreements highlighted the special relationship that has existed since 1948. Israel, realizing its great dependence on the United States during the October War, placed a great deal of emphasis on the military and economic aspects of the Nixon Doctrine. By contrast, Kissinger put more stress on the political dimension of the doctrine, especially during the post-October War negotiations; after all, the Israeli emphasis on the military aspect had failed to guarantee either the status quo or the overall stability of the region.

Finally, even though the American commitment to Israel increased after the war, American influence and prestige remained intact in most of the Arab world. In addition to its use in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger tried to promote the Nixon Doctrine in the Persian Gulf area, with its vital oil resources. This emphasis on regionalism and self-reliance through arms transfers and economic ties might not, however, guarantee American interests in the long run.[34] International politics are much too complicated to be controlled by the magic of aid alone. Threatened or actual use of American military power might well be necessary at times.

THE KISSINGER MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY—A SUMMARY

Kissinger sought to develop a Middle Eastern strategy appropriate to global détente with the Soviet Union, yet the strategy should include elements specifically tailored to the needs of the particular region. To elaborate, the Middle East policy should be set within the constraints of the Nixon Doctrine, including the preservation of American predominance in the area.

Immediately upon taking office on January 20, 1969, President Nixon initiated a review of American foreign policy, including Middle East policy as well as the global perspective. The State Department promptly presented its policy proposals to President Nixon. It proposed the continuation of the Jarring mission in the context of UN Resolution 242 (of November 22, 1967). The Johnson administration had placed considerable faith in the mission's ability to accommodate the Arab-Israeli dispute. Now the State Department also supported the idea of big-power talks on the Middle East—four-power and two-power talks. These talks were intended, first, to augment the Jarring mission and, at the same time, to provide a framework within which the Arabs and the Israelis could negotiate a settlement. Secretary of State William Rogers supported these various efforts, in the belief that the process itself might create its own momentum for peace. In his view, nothing would be lost if the United States acted as a mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis. By the end of 1969, however, the gap between Israel and the Arabs had shown no movement. Clearly, neither the big-power talks nor the Jarring mission produced meaningful negotiations, especially in the light of the on-going war of attrition at the Suez Canal.

Therefore, on December 9, 1969, the State Department presented a comprehensive American plan—known later as the Rogers Plan—based on Resolution 242. It was announced as a "balanced" solution to the conflict. Essentially, the Rogers Plan called for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for a genuine peace with the adjacent Arab states. The Arabs were unenthusiastic about the plan; worse still, the Soviets and the Israelis rejected it.

With the failure of the Rogers Plan, the State Department reverted back to the Jarring mission; but by the beginning of 1971, this mission too had reached an impasse. Yet the State Department continued to support the mission, largely for tactical purposes: to encourage the Egyptians to extend the cease-fire that was due to expire in February. There was little reason to believe Israel would accept the Jarring mission, since Jarring's substantive ideas were similar to the Rogers Plan, already rejected a year earlier.

Kissinger was frankly skeptical about the State Department's policy, since it assumed the road to peace in the Middle East lay rather exclusively in Washington's pressuring of Israel to return to the June 4, 1967, boundaries.[35] Kissinger felt there were severe liabilities in this kind of pressure on Israel. In part, it involved reasons of American domestic politics; there was already enough national divisiveness over Vietnam, without adding the Middle East. Kissinger also opposed the anti-Israel policy because he was unwilling to press Israel as long as the Soviets and the Arabs refused to modify their positions. The logic of the situation dictated a militarily strong Israel that could avoid the necessity of American intervention (the Nixon Doctrine) on its behalf.[36] In brief, Kissinger resisted imposing a settlement on Israel.

The Nixon administration had little confidence in the United Nations' ability to effect a solution. Before the October War (1973), Kissinger, and to some degree the president, saw little opportunity for a settlement. Positions were simply too irreconcilable, unless a crisis occurred, to change the status quo. Neither the Soviets nor the local parties were ready, according to Kissinger, for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute at this time. Yet just such a crisis to break the status quo was produced by Anwar Sadat in the October War.

By 1970, Nixon and Kissinger were more concerned about a Soviet exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict than they were about finding a comprehensive solution to it. The Soviet Union had now escalated the shipments of military weapons to Egypt. The expanded aid included sophisticated weapons such as SAM-2s and SAM-3s. Even more worrisome, Moscow had begun to send its own personnel to operate these weapons. In short, the modern military technology and the Soviet military presence in Egypt—including now the movement of SAMs into the forbidden standstill zone of the Suez Canal—created a mood of pessimism in the White House.

Given these considerations, the Jordanian civil war of September 1970 seemed to convince Kissinger that the Middle East conflict was essentially a microcosm of the larger East-West conflict. In his view, the favorable outcome of the war, as well as the Israeli-American cooperation during the war, demonstrated to the Soviets and their local clients the relative success of the Nixon Doctrine strategy. But in reality, the White House overemphasized the Soviet role in the civil war. This overemphasis, in turn, led to a faulty assessment of the situation: that the American-Israeli strategic unity, newly coalesced during the Jordanian civil war, could preserve the status quo almost indefinitely. The October War demonstrated the error of this assessment.

Thus, in the period between the Jordanian civil war and the 1973 October War, White House efforts were aimed at preserving the stability of the region. Only in this context could Kissinger support the

State Department's efforts at trying to promote an interim agreement on the Israeli-Egyptian front. Henry Kissinger felt it would be a mistake to try to link the State Department's 1971 interim initiative to a comprehensive peace treaty. He supported the initiative because he felt it would reduce the Soviet military presence in Egypt. As it turned out, both the Egyptians and the Israelis were not ready for even a limited agreement.

While President Nixon supported the State Department's initiative at first, he gradually abandoned that position and moved to support Kissinger's long-term strategy to split the Soviet-Arab unity and drastically reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East. Seen in this light, the moderate Arab states clearly held the key to the Kissinger strategy. After neutralizing the Soviet position, it was important to induce the Arabs to look toward Washington for a solution.

The 1972 and 1973 summits gave Nixon and Kissinger the opportunity to freeze the situation in the Middle East. In effect, this amounted to the incorporation of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the overall Soviet-American process of détente. From this emerged the Kissinger strategy for influencing the Soviet Union (through the incentives of arms limitation [SALT], Western technology, and expanded trade credits) to act with restraint and be cooperative in relation to the United States in the Middle East. It was a strategy of détente based upon linkage and "the-concert-of-great-powers" idea.

The American challenge was to induce Moscow toward greater Soviet-American cooperation; this implied some replacement of Soviet influence with American influence, to create an acceptable great-power role for the United States in the Middle East.

Sadat realized that the White House's pro-Israel stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict was directly linked to the Soviet military presence in Egypt. He decided to remove this obstacle to the improving of relations with the United States; this was done in July 1972 (as previously discussed). Next, President Sadat set out to further modify the international politics of the Middle East. He found the no-war, no-peace situation of the status quo to be intolerable, and he was determined to change it. The situation would have to be changed either through the diplomatic route (e.g., Ismail met with Kissinger in 1973), or by resort to the military option. Interestingly enough, Kissinger himself had similar thoughts on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether in Vietnam or in the Middle East, Kissinger believed both sides of the regional conflict needed a "brutal episode of battle" before meaningful negotiations could start.[37] A Middle East war was considered almost indispensable in order to break the stalemate; after all, with some luck, a regional war could be manageable under the umbrella of détente.[38]

Given this assessment, the October War of 1973 created the political fluidity necessary for the Kissinger strategy. Indeed, Kissinger's efforts, after the war, were designed to produce a situation in which the local disputants could feel secure about their ability to make concessions. Essentially, he wanted to conduct the substantive negotiations under American auspices, while keeping Moscow out of the negotiating process until an Arab-Israeli agreement was at hand. The Soviets' cooperation would be necessary in this American endeavor, and their "hands-off" cooperation would have to be paid for—with luck, it could be purchased—by the promise of prestige resulting from a highly publicized, highly visible, jointly sponsored U.S.-USSR conference that would formally approve the Arab-Israeli peace agreement negotiated by the United States. If the price for cooperation were inadequate, additional "funds" would have to be found in détente—the carrot of trade credits, agricultural products, Western technology, etc.

As far as the United States was concerned, Kissinger's Middle East efforts, after the October War, should be considered in the context of saving détente while striving to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict under American auspices. In this context, Kissinger's step-by-step approach attempted to break the psychological barriers between the disputants. The negotiations avoided, for the time being, a discussion of the central issues: final borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinians, etc. Despite the convening of the Geneva conference under UN sponsorship and under joint Soviet-American cochairmanship, the actual disengagement talks were conducted under American auspices. Kissinger, of course, kept the Soviets informed about the negotiations so as to keep them "in the Middle East game."

In negotiations with the Arabs, Kissinger articulated the American position: The United States was the only country that could influence Israel to make concessions; another war was possible but should be kept out of the disengagement talks. In the negotiations with Israel, Kissinger noted that absolute security for one country meant absolute insecurity for all other countries; Israel needed to look for long-term security interests rather than short-term military considerations. Israel would have to enlarge its perspective to consider American global concerns, such as détente and the energy crisis, in assessing its negotiating position. Kissinger talked to Israel about the importance of stable, regional economic relationships. He projected Middle East economic commissions that would include Israel. Kissinger felt the development of economic ties was an important complement to the politics of conflict resolution.

AMERICAN POLICY: ITS STRENGTHS

The Nixon-Kissinger era (or, to use Stanley Hoffmann's phrase, the "Kissinger cycle") coincided with a major transformation in Amer-

roots? What is it that stimulates the citizenry, through common purposes, to a sense of common achievement worthy in terms of something to live by? A national society without community values is hardly a community worth defending—or, for that matter, capable of defending itself. Kissinger's grand design emphasized Realpolitik to preserve the status quo but was weak in building national motivation and voluntary support for common values that made national survival worthwhile.

Developing meaning and purpose in the life of a society, Kissinger may perhaps correctly affirm, is not the responsibility of a statesman. In Bismarckian terms, it may well be praiseworthy to note his heroic task of containing the law of the jungle (the very purpose of civil society)—and, equally commendable, the deflation of righteous crusades. But who, then, will fill the role of developing meaning and aspirations in the national society—so that we can have something worthwhile to defend in national security terms? In fairness to Kissinger, he did, on occasion, address the issue.[40]

In line with the above discussion, critics pointed out various other weaknesses in the Kissinger foreign policy. They charged, with considerable validity, that too little attention was devoted to an effective and sustained policy toward the Third World's claims of economic injustice; toward promoting a more equal status relationship and greater shared political values among the Western powers; and toward the threatened malaise of Western society itself—e.g., the "strange spiritual emptiness,"[41] arising simultaneously with the rise of Western material affluence and scientific development, by which man destroys his humanness through his subconscious self-conversion into a machine, via engineering, to promote material productivity.

With regard to Israel and the Arab world, the Nixon administration had no coherent policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1969 until late 1971 (when Nixon authorized Kissinger to take a more active role in Middle East affairs). The reason for this was simple: Nixon and Kissinger were restraining the State Department from actively pursuing its initiatives in the area. This restraint undermined the authority of American diplomats (including Rogers and Sisco) to deal with the Arab and Israeli leaders. In fact, by 1972 all the important diplomatic transactions regarding negotiations in the Middle East were conducted by Nixon and Kissinger from the so-called White House back channel rather than from the normal channel of the State Department. The White House back-channel approach reflected Kissinger's priority on global policy over regional policy when the two seemed to overlap; centralization of decision making brought efficiency and integration to global foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger were more concerned about the Soviet influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and (until mid-1972) the continued Soviet military presence in Egypt, than they were about finding a diplomatic resolution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This overriding concern with Soviet influence almost invariably overshadowed the dynamics of the regional conflict. Whereas Rogers saw the Middle East problem as an American predicament that needed the harmonizing of Soviet-American differences for the sake of a settlement, Kissinger considered the problem a Soviet difficulty that could be magnified so as to split the Soviet-Arab position. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to make compromises with the Soviets because they feared Moscow would win the acclaim of the Arab world if its Middle East policy succeeded, and it became the successful champion of the Arabs. Furthermore, the Soviets would be seen as instrumental in pressuring the United States toward a more pro-Arab policy—a development Kissinger found intolerable.

Kissinger's back-channel preemption of Middle East policy can also be seen in the way the White House ignored the Soviet warnings, in 1972 and 1973, of a renewed war in the Middle East. The White House similarly dismissed the State Department's repeated concerns about war in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The long-standing view of the State Department was that, sooner or later, war would break out if there were no progress on the diplomatic front. The October (1973) War vindicated the Soviets' as well as the State Department's assessment of the situation.

After the October War, Kissinger pursued a Middle East policy known as step-by-step diplomacy, in coping with the exceedingly unstable cease-fire that had left Israelis on the west bank and Egyptians on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy had serious liabilities. First, it was never conceptualized as the initial step in the pursuit of an overall peace settlement; rather, it was a policy designed to cope with the present threat of renewed hostilities. Viewed from this angle, Kissinger, ironically, was implementing the essential provisions of the now-defunct Rogers Plan—the step-by-step emphasis, the very same thing he opposed in 1969-70.

Second, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy, being a highly personalized effort, was effective only when it involved a bilateral setting such as the case with Egypt and Israel; however, it was ineffective when the number of actors increased.[42] In a highly complex situation such as the Middle East conflict, Kissinger's diplomacy proved inadequate for the multilateral dimensions of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, the diplomacy produced a paradox in American policy: On the one hand, Kissinger urged the Israelis to take a long view of the international situation; on the other hand, he concentrated on the short-term advantages for the United States—emphasizing the immediate arrangements while deemphasizing the long-term goals.[43]

Third, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was somewhat unrealistic in trying to isolate the Soviet Union and Western Europe from the substance of the negotiations. It should be noted, however, that the

Soviets themselves underestimated the timely confluence of interests that occurred between the Arab states and the United States after the October War. The Soviets hinted vaguely about participating in guarantees for a final settlement, while, at the same time, waiting for the Arabs to become disillusioned by Kissinger's diplomacy. Yet the Soviets could have created added difficulties for Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy had they chosen to do so. Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger were continually aware of the necessary Soviet participation in any final peace settlement—an insurance policy to keep the Kremlin leadership from negating the American peace effort.

Finally, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy avoided the central issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Quite obviously, Nixon and Kissinger recognized the impossibility of finding a meaningful and lasting settlement for the Middle East dispute unless the Palestinian problem were resolved, yet they consistently rejected any contacts with the PLO. It was not until November 1975 that one of Kissinger's top Middle East aides admitted the obvious: "In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of the conflict."[44] Kissinger, like most Washington foreign-policy decision makers before and since, maintained that the Palestinian problem should be dealt with in the context of a Jordanian-Israeli settlement. In his view, the Israel-Jordan peace settlement should come first. Once this were achieved, the Palestinians should then settle their differences with the Jordanian regime, not with Israel. It was a very attractive solution, however utopian, to resolve the Palestinian issue via the moderate, pro-Western government of Jordan. In effect, Kissinger wanted to transform the Palestinian problem from an international problem to an intra-Arab one. Yet it was a game both sides could play. The Kissinger strategy suffered a severe blow when the Arab League, meeting in Rabat on October 29, 1974, unanimously agreed to make the Palestine Liberation Organization "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory." Jordan felt compelled to publicly affirm its support for this resolution.

In conclusion, any critical evaluation of Kissinger would be incomplete without touching two bases: the chronic occupational hazard of any political practitioner—the problem of morality, including deception; and the nihilistic nature of responses to conflicts of will and interests in any semianarchical situation such as international politics.

No foreign-policy decision maker can survive over time without giving a certain priority to the defense of the national interest. Henry Kissinger frequently came under attack for his willingness to utilize national power in the attainment of national interests. Similarly, he was criticized for his excessive determination to achieve results, even to the extent of sacrificing personal integrity, i.e., deception.

In this journey of the statesman, how can the guideposts of morality be affirmed? What is morality in international affairs? Answers are perilously difficult, and respondents frequently become the victims of public predation. Yet we can posit the following standard: Foreign policy cannot validly be judged directly by absolute or eternal moral injunctions. Rather, a policy is moral if it maximizes the net results of all relevant values measured in terms of both ends and means, and available alternatives based on available information. We shall, however, accept one qualification: In system-overload situations where severe cases of individual moral agony threaten the very personal integrity of the individual's subjective self, Western Judeo-Christian culture has tended to allow for a "backup system" of "checking out" of political reality and into "inner spirituality."

Thus, for serious students of international affairs, the issues related to (1) some kind of theoretical guidance as to the optimum "sugar-vinegar" mix in international confrontations and (2) a theory of political deception demand a response. Let us examine the second issue first.

Kissinger defended his numerous incidents of behind-the-scenes maneuvering as justifiable action to achieve comprehensive results. This is not unusual, for it is frequently pointed out how interpersonal interaction, even in the intimate relations between spouses, is stabilized by sensitivity to the other's particular mental-emotional and/or value status; unessentials are best left unsaid if they threaten the stability of the relationship. Yet at what point do behind-the-scenes diplomatic assurances and deliberately created impressions, lacking in verity, become morally intolerable deceptions—or a fatal flaw in developing trust upon which détente was to be built?

The basic Kissinger genius in working out disengagements in Sinai and in meeting the expectations of King Hussein on the Jordanian front involved, for instance, personal assurances that omitted very important information to the respective parties. Kissinger's model for avoiding the disaster of total nuclear war focuses on this very point. He emphasized that an expansionist state should be confronted with an incentive to become a "legitimate" state, by being offered respect for its legitimate interests in the international community. The respect would emphasize trust and integrity.

Henry Kissinger prided himself (and justifiably so) in developing President Sadat's trust in him ("my friend Henry") in the Sinai disengagement negotiations. Yet, when he felt Moshe Dayan was willing to make concessions to Egypt beyond those that, Kissinger had indicated to Sadat, Israel was willing to make, he waffled. He cautioned Dayan to retract some of his concessions in order to give Egypt the impression (deception) of more determined U.S. efforts to get concessions for Egypt from Israel. In Years of Upheaval, Kissinger makes numerous references to deceptions of this kind in U.S.-USSR diplomatic con-

tacts. One cannot charge such behavior as being a priori, immoral since each side suspected the other was somewhat aware of what was going on. Yet trust should have some common meaning if it is to play the Kissinger-designated role.

In an address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,[45] Kissinger noted the importance of "modes of conduct that extend beyond the letter of agreements to the spirit of relations as a whole." In essence, he again stressed the important role envisioned for trust in the easing of international tensions. But we look in vain for transcendental values or meaning by which national decision makers assume a trusting role in their national leadership positions. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, for Kissinger, trust in international diplomacy is an exceedingly illusive concept that all too often evolves into an act of prudence for the prevailing moment.

A second basic issue raised by the Kissinger legacy concerns some kind of theoretical guidance for an optimum sugar-vinegar mix of policy in any confronting situation. How does one change the enemy's mind—or, for that matter, how does the enemy change one's own mind in the matter of an excessive definition of "legitimate" national interests or "just demands" of one's own state? Karl von Clausewitz reminds us of the intractable dimension of the answer by his axiom that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means.

Presumably, what the world demands of political scientists, or perhaps wise men sophisticated in political reality, is to avoid the supreme holocaust—World War III. In this context we look at Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy for clues to the vital priority question of guidance in optimizing the sugar-vinegar mix. To illustrate what is at stake, we can look at the foreign-policy choices of any state, yet the case is most obvious if we take Israel as an example. Israel's national interest will not be maximized by either depending on goodwill and entirely renouncing the use of force in its policy toward the Arabs; or by relying exclusively on a hard line (vinegar), i.e., no compromise—the objective of unconditional surrender of all Arab armies.

An optimum policy is based upon an optimum mix, and that mix decision has all too often been based on a hunch or a fleeting feeling far removed from objective theoretical considerations. What did Kissinger contribute to the sugar-vinegar dilemma of foreign-policy analysis? If it is true, as Peter Dickson's elaborate analysis concludes, that "Auschwitz made it impossible for Kissinger to believe in . . . universal moral principles and eternal values . . ." and that he "was unable to find an ultimate value or purpose in historical process because he considered death final,"[46] is there any possible conclusion except that of political nihilism? Does anomie prevail broken only by the impact of the challenge-capitulation dilemma in which "might makes it right," or the verdict in the dispute is decided in favor of the state most successful in exploiting the reluctance of the other to go to war? The development of a carrot-stick (sugar-vinegar) trade-off theory is impossible without some kind of knowable pattern of expectations and responses in international confrontations.

In one of his most memorable speeches to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,[47] Kissinger presented the outlines of his own theory of an optimum sugar-vinegar mix in foreign policy—at least as it was relevant to the United States in the mid 1970s. The context of a U.S.-USSR confrontation is not appropriately characterized by anomie or anarchy in the sense of the challenge-capitulation dilemma, i.e., the Soviet Union being guided by an attempt to exploit goodwill and gain from the reluctance of the United States to resort to a violent confrontation. Kissinger projected a reciprocal Soviet response to ease tensions resulting from a U.S. détente initiative. The sugar portion of the American foreign-policy mix ought to include providing the Soviet Union with a substantial enrichment of its national interests in terms of the most-favored-nation treatment in trade, technology, etc.; and avoiding American interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs as it related to Jewish emigration, internal civil-rights policies, etc.—at least not by public pressures. The vinegar portion of the American policy mix involved a cancellation of the above Soviet interests (a retraction of American détente policy) if the USSR attempted to interfere in our defense alliances; if crises were used to achieve unilateral gains; if the Soviet Union failed to cooperate in arms-limitation agreements; and "if it does not contribute to progress toward stability."[48]

Optimistically, Kissinger projected a movement "from competition to cooperation" and the development of habits of prior "consultation"; an expanding of the network of relationships between the United States and the USSR; increasing "collaboration between East and West";[49] and even the developing of more harmonious national policies in international organizations, leading to a greater sense of world community. The result would be one of essentially changing each state's priorities from developing war capabilities associated with a state's responsibility for national security to the tasks more commonly associated with the domestic political order.

We have here a Kissinger at his optimistic best. In this moment of semieuphoria, Kissinger's theory of the optimum sugar-vinegar policy mix is not anomic indeterminism, but an orderly response scenario in which gradual increments in a sugar policy, while force is kept in reserve (vinegar policy), elicit a more or less reciprocal sugar response evolving eventually, if one may extrapolate somewhat, into a vast stable network of legitimized responsibilities and obligations resembling a stable domestic political system.

Whether Kissinger actually believed this or whether he simply developed the fine art of public relations, telling the public what it wanted to hear, the reader must judge for himself.

NOTES

1. Dan E. Caldwell, "American-Soviet Détente and the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1978), pp. 147-56.
2. David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 7.
3. J. L. S. Girling, "Kissingerism: The Enduring Problems," International Affairs 51 (July 1975): 341.
4. Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 1-2.
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Relations with Communist Countries, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, pp. 248-49.
6. Interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC and State Department, Washington, D.C., August 3, 1977.
7. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 898-99.
8. Interview with Morton Halperin, NSC, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1977.
9. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 897.
10. Interview with a top Kissinger aide, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1977.
11. Caldwell, "American-Soviet Détente and the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy," pp. 240-41.
12. See Kissinger's statement on détente in United States Relations with Communist Countries, p. 249.
13. Caldwell, "American-Soviet Détente and the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Strategy and Grand Design," pp. 166-67.
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16. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 574.
17. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1297.
18. Alfred LeRoy Atherton, Jr., "The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in The World Balance and Peace in the Middle East: Reality or Mirage?, ed. Seymour M. Finger (London: Associated University Presses, 1975), p. 203.

19. Malcolm H. Kerr, "Nixon's Second Term: Policy Prospects in the Middle East," Journal of Palestine Studies 2 (Spring 1973): 28.
20. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1250; Caldwell, "American-Soviet Détente and the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy," pp. 260-62.
21. Caldwell, "American-Soviet Détente and the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy," p. 444.
22. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 941; also see Kissinger's Statement on détente in United States Relations with Communist Countries, p. 267; and Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente, chap. 5.
23. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 1038; also see Kissinger's statement on détente in United States Relations with Communist Countries, p. 263.
24. Melvin Gurtov, "Security by Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine and Southeast Asia," in Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia, eds. Mark Zacker and R. Stephen Milne (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 208.
25. Walter F. Hahn, "The Nixon Doctrine: Design and Dilemmas," Orbis 16 (Summer 1972): 363.
26. Gurtov, "Security by Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine and Southeast Asia," p. 233.
27. See Naseer Aruri, "The Nixon Doctrine and the Mideast," New York Times, May 20, 1972, p. 33.
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31. Kerr, "Nixon's Second Term: Policy Prospects in the Middle East," p. 25.
32. Aruri, "The Nixon Doctrine and the Mideast," p. 33.
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