iS Chapter 7 PSI& Political Lessons Drawn u^^^föi^f ^;:a$vi(*. principal oyectäye.cóngre&sioBáli'passágeiofAe; tes* /..■;;/■ oíiii^tííoffciísíippRrtíal''.[of thřAWÁČŠ sale]:, the failure to achieve1 fliis goal :;.;... .w^^ír^jor.': 'defeat;' ft»' ífieJAmeriiKtn rZiotijsi movement: • .;.,' í t .was also' a .c'z4)$égand ■únmíM'gpůii$,..^lessage.,.to. American. Jewry that "yietory is no V ; longer atttematic vvheti it edmes p? maintaining U.S. support fa- Israel."' ' :h£:i-l ■.■':. ~;Davtó;llowar4;ooWberg,JVkipnaí:%cCTťi?e ^.'■■j,;3; Canadian Professors, tor Peace in the .Miťkile Easí Reagfe:feiß).; THE LIMITED POWER OF THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY The first lessori to be drawn trom the AWACS debate is that, contrary to the arguTiciit.s of its critics, the pro-hrae! lobby does not control American policy in the Middle Hasl. If the pro-Israel lobby did so, then the AWACS sale would indeed have been defeated in Congress. However, no nation is more economically and strategically vital to the United Stales than Saudi Arabia; and the Reagan administration had a strong interest in successfully concluding the sale as an essential ingredient in the development of a credible and effective air defense system, which would protect the vital oilfields of the Gulf from hostile air attack. The administration hoped that Saudi Arabia would reciprocate for America's willingness to assume a dominant role in restoring security to the Persian Gulf by continuing its pursuit of an oil policy favorable to the economic interests of the industrial world, and abandoning its opposition to the Camp David peace process in favor of the American effort to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in ihe Middle East. Given the clear and irrefutable case for the AWACS .sale, the deal should have easily sailed through Congress, with little, if any, opposition. The fact that the sale provoked so much opposition in Congress is ample, evidence that tlie pro-Israel lobby u ields enormous political clout on Capitol Hill. In delineating the political powei of the pio-Isiael lobby on Capitol Hill one must distinguish between the House and the Senate. Consistent with the arguments of its critto. the pro-Israel lobby does indeed control American policy in ihe Middle East in the House. As we saw in Chapter I, a majority of House members had lined up behind the Long-Lent Resolution, by July 1. 1981—-fully three months before Reagan notified Congress of his intent to approve the deal. The fact (hat the House did not even give Reagan the courtesy of making his case for the sale—and ultimately passed the Long-Lent Resolution by an overwhelming margin of nearly three to one—is sufficient evidence that the pro-Jsraei iobby controls American Middle East policy in the. House. By passing the resolution, the House completely ignored the catastrophic consequences for the vital national security interests of the United States, and American economic, strategic, and diplomatic leadership in the international community, which would result from the defeat of the sale in Congress. Since the House was unwilling so grs-it serious consideration for the sale, let alone approve the deal, Reagan wisely decided to ignore the House early in the AWACS debate and focus his efforts to obtain approval for the agreement in the Senate. .Unlike the House, the Senate was willing to grant serious consideration to the -ale and allow Reagan to plead his .case for the deal before its members. However, ihe Senate approved the sale by only a narrow margin of three votes, demonstrating thui while the pro-Israel lobby does not control American Middle c.ist policy in the Senate, organized Jewry still exercised enormous influence on mis i-SMiť in the Senate. Indeed, Reagan's efforts to win Senate appioval for (he sale proved to be an exceedingly difficult, arduous, and seemingly insin- The Political Lessons Drawn from the .AWACS Debate 223 mouiiteblfi;fei¥]c*--surnc,ietir proof that the pro-Israel lobby exercises enormous pqIiíieaÍ:jcÍ0uí lift he Senate, though still substantially less so than in the House. Why did the.pro-Israel lobby prove, to have so much more influence in the House than in the.Senate? As we saw in Chapter-2. the answer lies in the fact that HoAimeroljere represent relatively small constituencies, This provides po-.liticalIyp|o*ertäl.'■interest- groups like organized Jewry the ability to mobilize their Äbjtantial('financial and; organizational resources, to defeat those House niemb|if;p?ieeived to be hostile to the interests» of their members. The Jewish community;;« (success in. mobilizing its: resources to:defeat Paul Findtey, the foreniba;;pfirj6 of Israel in Congress during the; 1970s '.arid; early i9ÍŠOs. is illus-?r^ive'.;^jJjiS;'fevorder' to avoid -being targeted for defeat by organized Jewry, Housß:rngtriberS:Bäve generally" served as strong and unswerving allies of Israel; and:it<Í8;6aiay;tp?šěé vvhy the AWACS sale did riot receive seriouS: consideration, ietaIons::;á|pjt»yaLřn;the House.: In COhfrästjtóíHouse members,: senators generally represent large constituencies', interest groups generally; jack- the financial and organizational resources to defeat^ Senator hostile to the mterestspf their members. This is true, given the generáilyí|argfe nmrtber of individuals vvho rote in each state. Accordingly, senators ':||y|;'-|rffiife.r ffexibüityito''co:tis.ider-issues on-their merit and not defer to the .wjÄéfeóf'..interest■^titapS:"'r' \ ■;-' '■Tá^yiii^^^:Í^U^^]^j.^»ŕfítT{^í. intefesr -groups.-: could use^teir substantial resour|!!|ordei^ to theíirítôjrests of their rncrti'$iii^3^^ eaií;.m|i§íí3§ŕ-í^ a -good;:e|Äpéi.:of this is .t|e.;Je«Ä;.ePmiiri^ its stib- stanti4i:|B|íriĚÍa|:-aiid;- orgam-zational:- -resources-- to - defeat '■.lĚhftríesr H,: Percy, one of íheSefäíng erkies -of Israeliti the Senate during me 1970s and 1980s. However.-: arjanizedv-iJewry's: .áiecessfttl cariipaign-:against;-Percy-: was-' based on the exjstehopof ä-|árge Jewish ■eoimnxmityinJilmoiS.rwho voted: against Bsrcy by the oveig^!TOii| «iargMof.nearly two. to.ohe. Absent theexistenceof a large Jewisli;cô(i^h:í% -in Jlliftph;, Percy would -almost, certainly have won his ree-lectit«i:--e^j)äíéh-ro-.:,l.ä84('-.- ■'■ ■■-■ ThejšPít^.:-píJ.Iy.:.four.-states-^Ňew York, California, Florida, and 11.1 inois— where-thŕ^ewíshcommunity is sufficiently large to make a real difference in a Senate election- TI«s means that the eight-senators representing those states must support tr^-interesfö of Israel on every major issue before''Congress if they wish to be:re|Ie^|d,ťItóeedv'i«íthe.caxe'-oť the^ÁWAGS:sale.-only-W6-:pf':those eight senatöi^||}^ 'S J, Ilayakawa of (^li&nia---votea to appjiilllt^'^eai;:. neither senator ..was, reelected after ihe- conclusion €•{ the AW*^pgiÉfc.-;iíí-í.:- . In:-aÄM|Í;:t0-:the;':-dei^ abandoned-his plan to seek:;:re|lfctiíon ...in.(lS?2, - Had Tisyakawa^Ägrit -.reelection,' he- would -have un-douhtóä|ŕ:ilced-'-great difficulty:.^ the..iafeSfenate.campaign, in California as a result''p1P^:!:^ major .224 Selling AWACS ro Saudi Arabu reason why he chose not to run. The remaining ninety-two senators representing the tony-six states with relatively small Jewish constituencies are. relatively free to defy the wishes of the pro-Israel lobby and cast votes antithetical to the !inere->is of Israel with little or no fear thai ihey may be successfully targeted lor defeat by organized Jewry the next time they run for reelection. Since practical !y the entire Senate was free to defy the will of the pro-Israel lobby. Reagan succeeded, albeit with great difficulty, in persuading a majority of its members to approve the AW ACS sale. If the pro-Israel lobby controls the House and, exercises limited, though hardly insubstantial, influence in the Senate, it has practically no political clout in the White House. Presidents generally make foreign policy decisions based on what they perceive to be the national security interests of the United States. This leaves interest groups little, if any. opportunity to influence presidential decision making on foreign policy. ,' Indeed. Reagan completely ignored the enormous pressure die pro-Israel lobby exerted on the White House in its attempt to persuade the president to reverse his decision to approve the AW AC S sale. Such pressure had no impact whatsoever in the-six-month-long. unrelenting battle Reagan doggedly waged in Congress in hi/effort to obtain its approval of the sale. Reagan completely ignored this precisely because he was convinced that the deal was in the vital national security interests of the United States. Reagan was unwilling to even consider sacrificing the national security interests (which dictated thai he ap-pimo ihe sale) in order ro satisfy the political demands of the pro-Israel lobby that he abandon his support for the deal. To be sure, Reagan had a strong political interest in developing close lies to the pro-Israel lobby, since the Jewish community represented an important constituency. It was in Reagan's own political interest not to proceed with the AVYACS sale, since the deal threatened to turn (he Jewish community against him. However, Reagan recognized that, as president, he had to place the national security interests of the United States above his own political interests; and it is this political calculation which led Reagan to ignore the .sustained pressure the pro-Israel lobby exerted on the White House, and pursue his effort to successfully conclude the deal in the face of intense and vociferous opposition from organized Jewry and its allies in Congress. THE SENATE DEFERS TO THE PRESIDENT ON MATTERS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY A second lesson to be learned from the AW ACS debate is that the Senate will tend to defer to the authority of the president on matters of foreign policy and national security, even when his policies confront intense opposition from .i politically powerful and well-organized interest group. This was certainly the case in the AWACS debate. During October 1981, the Reagan administration made an effective and irrefutable case that the AWACS sale was in the vital The Politic.il Lessons Drwn from the AWACS Dch.trc 22S national security interests of the United States, The administration's case v\,is buttressed by the fact that sixteen prominent foreign and national security policy officials agreed to Lssue a statement on October 5 declaring the sale 't;> ho á matter of vital national security. The Reagan administration also benefited from the strong support the AWACS sale received from perhaps the most successful foreign policy leader and expert ever to reside in the White House—Richard Nixon. The fact that the administration considered the sale to be a matter of vital national securitv was to be expected; but the fact that the administration's view was shared by Nixon and sixteen other former foreign and national policy officials (stretching back to the Eisenhower presidency), all of whom were independent of the Reaaan White House, could not be ignored. The Senate had no choice but to consider the sale as a national security issue, given this tact. Reagan's success in making the AWACS sale a matter of national security rather than domestic politics guaranteed Senate approval of the deal. Senate rejection of the sale would have made it appear that senators were placing their own political interests—specifically the need to satisfy the demands of the pro-Israel lobby, above the national security interests of the United States, Tins would have resulted in the loss of political credibility for the Senate as a whole, as well as its individual members. To avoid the appearance that they were playing politics with the AWACS issue, a majority of the Senate, albeit a slim one.'decided they had no alternative but to approve the sale. This was necessary to demonstrate that the Senate was a responsible institution whose individual members were fully capable of placing the national security interests of the United States above their own domestic political interests. By defying the will of the pro-Israel lobby and voting to approve the deal, the Senate did much to maintain its political credibility Its a responsible institution capable of appropriately deciding matters of national security, even on issues as politically charged as the AWACS deal. The Senate vote to approve the sale was certainly one of the finest hours in the history of that institution. THE "PASSIVE" NATURE OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY ^ Perhaps the most enduring image or (he Reagan presidency is thai Ronald Reagan was a passive Chief Executive. Reagan's foremost biographer, Lou Cai<-»on, devotes an entire chapter of his informative and authoritative book or, ilk-Reagan presidency to the "palive" nature of Ronald Reagan's style of decision making. Indeed, the chapter is appropriately entitled ."Passive President:" However,-this examination of the AWACS debate finds Reagan to be anythina but a passive president. Indeed, ii is doubtful that scholars can find substantial evidence of .any president who devoted so much sheer energv and focused attention on a single issue as Reagan did in the case of the AWACS debate To be sure, this is the third book this author has produced on the Reagan presidency. 22ft Selling AWACS to Saudi Arábií The two prcv.iou> books—focusing on the issues of civil rights and immigration—found Reagan to be every bil the passive president his image suggests: but this was far from the case with the AWACS debute, where Reagan devoted . an unusual degree or energy and attention to pursuing his dogged and relentless six-month-long battle to win congressional approval of the AWACS sale.4 Cannon's buok, and the three books this author has produced on the Reagan presidency, suggest that while Ronald Reagan was a passive president, overall, this was not die case on matters involving the economy and national security. In contrast to his generally passive style in managing most issues he confronted as president, Reagan displayed an unusual degree of energy, interest, and activism on issues involving the economy and national security. Why did Reagan display such an unusual level of interest and attention on matters of Ihe economy and national security? The answer is that Reagan was elected to the presidency on a pledge to reverse the. precipitous economic and military decline the United States had suffered during the 1970s. Absent this ' decline. Reagan would have had much greater difficulty winning the 1980 election against an incumbent president—Jimmy Carter. The 1980 presidential election was less an affirmation of public support for Reagan than a rejection of (jJÍrter's leadership. After four years of malaise under Carter, characterized by double-digit inflation and interest rates, long gasoline lines, and one of the greatest military fiascos in American history—the failed Iran hostage- rescue mission of 1980—the public wanted a president who could restore America's sense of economic and mililitry self-confidence. To the public, Reagan seemed to be the perfect figure ro achieve this goal, and he had no trouble defeating the hapless President Carter in 198GV' Since reversing the American economic and military decline during the 1970s was so vital to the credibility of his presidency, Reagan had to take a strong interest in all major issues involving the economy and national security. Nothing was of greater economic and strategic importance to the United States than the need to restore security to the politically unstable, but economically vital, Persian Gulf. From 1979 to 1980, the Persian Gulf was rocked by a series of four destabilizing events—the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the Iran hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. Those events placed ihe industrial world's access to the vast and vital oil reserves of the Persian Gulf in grave jeopardy. Indeed, ii was the political instability of the Persian Gulf during 1979-1980 and the energy crisis linked to the political turmoil in the region transpiring in those two years which resulted in the high inflation and interest rates, long gasoline lines, and military setbacks the United States suffered during the ill-, fated Carter presídency.íR«gjart"$ pledge to reverse these conditions eouWbněvér' have been achieved tmles? (ho-rtéw president toolc action to restore security to ■; the politically troubled and oil-rich Persian Gulf, Essential to achieving this goal '! was the development of a credible and effective air'defense system» which could * protect, the vital oilfields of the Gulf from air attack from anyone of three po- Thc i'oliuc.tl i„e«!>ns Drawn iron rhe AWACS Dcb.uc 2.2' tentjal .sources of hostility—Iraq, Iran, or Soviet military forces in Afghanistan An essential ingredient in the development of such an air defense system was the sale of the AWACS to America's foremast ally in the Persian Guif—Smdi Arabia. The AWACS sale was essential to enable the United States to use its vast military power to protect the oilfields of the Gulf from hostile air attack and to elicit Saudi Arabia's continued pursuit of an oil policy favorable To the economy interests of the industrial world and abandonment of its opposition to the Camp David peace process in favor of support for the American effort to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Those goals could not have been achieved unless the United States granted Saudi Arabia's request for the purchase, of the AWACS. Indeed, failure of the United States to grant this request would have compelled Saudi Arabia to tum to Britain as an alternative source of airborne surveillance technology. This would have disrupted the ability ol the United States and Saudi Arabia to develop the military cooperation necessary to preserve the security of the Persian Gulf, thereby'preventing Washington from playing u dominant role in the defense of the region. Without the protective umbrella of the vast military power of the United Stales, the oilfields of the Gulf would have become vulnerable to air attack. Should such an attack have occurred, it would have resulted in a prolonged interruption in oil exports from the Persian Gulf, and the entire industrial world would have faced economic collapse. The United States could not have been taken seriously as a global .superpower unless Washington retained the capability w protect the oilfields of the Gulf from hostile air attack, precisely because possession of this capability was critical to guaranteeing the economic survival of the industrial world. Saudi Arabia would have retaliated against any congressional action to block the AWACS sale by ceasing to pursue an oil poLtcy favorable to economic interests of the United States. Given the dominant role Saudi Arabia plays in the international oil market such a development would have had catastrophic consequences for the American economy. In addition, a defeat, of the sale in Congress would have dealt a devastating blow to the Reagan administrations efforts to use the deal as a means to induce Saudi Arabia" to abandon its opposition to the Camp David peace process in favor of the American effort to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. With the United ■States unable to play the dominant role in preserving the security of the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia pursuing an oil policy contrary to the economic interesu of this nation while continuing its opposition to the Camp David peace process! American economic, strategie, and diplomatic leadership in the international communÄýAwould.have been gravely undermined, if not destroyed, IwJe^'Attverican economic aftd -strategic leadership in the. mtemational com-mvraHy-.fssfe on 'Washington's capability to use its vast military power to preserve the 'security of-the Persian Gulf and to elicit Saudi Arabia's continued pursuit,öf an oil policy favorable to the economic interests of the industrial -'J K .Selling AW ACS to Saudi Arabia wurid. Consummation of the AW ACS sak was essential to the achievement of ihose two coals. In addition to preserving American economic, and strategic leadership in the international community, the AW ACS sale was critical to Washingtons ability to maintain its diplomatic leadership around the world. Such diplomatic leadership largely rested on America's ability to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Such a settlement was essential to restoring stability to the politically troubled Middle East, which remains the mosteconom-icallv and strategically vital region in the world. The achievement of such a settlement required Saudi support. As by far the wealthiest nation in the Middle Cast. Saudi Arabia had enormous political clout, which could be used to encourage Israel's Arab neighbors to negotiate* comprehensive peace settlement with Israel. The AW ACS sale represented an American gesture of friendship and support for Saudi Arabia. The Reagan administration hoped that Saudi Arabia would reciprocate for this gesture by abandoning its opposition to the Camp David peace process in favor of the American effort to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. However, this couldnot be achieved if Congress blocked the .sale. By representing a slap against Saudi Arabia, such congressional action, would only have encouraged Riyadh to continue its opposition to the Camp David peace process, thereby dealing a severe, and .perhaps fatal, blow to the American efforts in the Middle-East' In the final analysts. American economic, strategic,' and diplomatic leadership in the international community rested on the continuation of close Saudi-American cooperation in preserving the mutual interests, of both nations; and such cooperation could not be achieved unless the United States granted Riyadh's request for the purchase of the AW ACS. By sustaining and enhancing the close relationship existing between the United Sitates -and Saudi Arabia, the AW ACS sale made an indispensable contribution ».preserving, and indeed strengthening. American economic strategic, and diplomatic leadership in the international community. With the exception of the Persian Gulf War of ,1991. no issue the United States had confronted since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 was of greater importance to American economic and strategic leadership in the international community than the AWACS debate. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that Reagan, normally a passive president, would wage one of the most relentless, all-out. and non stop lobbying efforts in Congress ever undertaken by any president to win Senate approval for the AWACS sale. This is especially true given the fact ihi.it the credibility of the Reagan presidency rested so much on his ability to restore American economic and strategic leadership in the international community. C'ongrešsioiul actio» to block the sale would have prevented Reagan from fulfilling his campaign promise to reverse the precipitous economic and military The Political Lessons Drawn from the AWACS Debate 22v> decline the United:States, .suffered during the 1970s; and the credibility of the Reagan presidency %vould have been severely damaged, if not destroyed. No issue '.Reapn ever confronted was more important to him. both as politician and president, than approval of the AWACS sale, and this is precisely why he utilized every ounce of his considerable political skills and leadership talent lo win approval for the deal from a skeptical Senate. By achieving victory in his battle to successfully conclude the sale. Reagan demonstrated not only his mastery of the art of politics, but he proved himself to be every bit the leader tie promised when he was elected to the presidency. By making an enormous contribution to Reagan's success tn restoring American economic and strategic leadership to the international community, the sale enabled the president to perform the central task the voters sent him to Washington to do: end the malaise of the Carter years, and restore America's self-confidence and sense of purpose as a great power. Reagan may very well have been a passive president, but when it came to issues involving the economy and national security, scholars would be hard-pressed to find a president who was more actively committed to assuring continued American economic and strategic leadership in the international community. Rather than "passive," the AWACS debate suggests a more complicated view of the Reagan presidency: while remaining a passive president overall, Reagan was among the most activist of Chief Executives on issues involving the economy und national security. RONALD REAGAN: A CREAT PRESIDENT? A fourth political lesson of the AWACS debate concerns the academic community's efforts to evaluate the Reagan presidency. While historians generally rank Reagan as a below-average president. Reagan's own academic admirers rate him as a great Chief Executive." This book, limited as it is to the AWACS debate, can come to no definitive conclusion in resolving this dispute concerning where Reagan belongs in the ranking of America's forty-two presidents. Nevertheless, the AWACS debate suggests that claims concerning Reagan's alleged greatness cannot be lightly dismissed. The AWACS case suggests that Reagan displayed attributes of presidential greatness for two reasons. First. Reagan demonstrated the political skills and powers of persuasion required to convince a skeptical Senate to approve the AWACS sale. This was no small feat, given the enormous opposition existing in the Senate, to say nothing of the House, to the sale. It is difficult to conceive many other presidents who could have possessed the requisite political skills to perform the seemingly impossible task of mustering a majority in the Senate to approve the sale. Second. Reagan made a major contribution to the vital economic and national security interests of the United States through his success in obtaining Senate approval of the AWACS sale. Congressional action m block the sale would have had catastrophic consequences for the vital ec> .Selling: AWACS to Saudi Arabia ,:'!ta--i- of the United Stůtes for the reasons explained earlier. The .strong econ-,.m\ Mud enhanced national security the United States enjoyed during the 1980s :s due in no small part to Reagan's successful conclusion of the sale, and the ^lengthened cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia which resulted from the deal. By engaging Saudi Arabia in the miiitary cooperation with the United States necessary to preserve the security of the politically unstable Persian Gulf, and Riyadh's continued pursuit of an oil policy favorable io the economic interests of the. industrial world, the sale played a major role ;n Reagan's success in restoring American economic and strategic leadership in the international community. Given the enormous contribution, the sale made :o i he vital economic and national security interests of the United States, Realm's superb and masterful handling of this politically explosive issue provides evidence that he displayed attributes of presidential greatness, though muchfur-iher study of the other major foreign and domestic policy issues Reagan con-irouted during his tenure in office will be required before any definitive judgment can be rendered concerning where he stands in the ranking of America's forty-two presidents, BALANCING AMERICA'S COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Perhaps the.fifth, final, and most enduring political lesson from the AWACS debate is that the United States does not need to sacrifice its special relationship v> ith Israel in order to forge stronger ties with Saudi Arabia. A major fallacy of opponents' arguments against the AWACS sale was that the deal would undermine America's strong and unswerving commitment to preserve the security and survival of Israel. Nothing could have been•furtficr from the truth. The sale in tio way resulted in any diminishing of Reagan's staunch and unequivocal support rr.i Israel. Indeed. Reagan is perhaps the most pro-Israel president ever to have ■vi \ cd in i he While House thus far; and he fully recognized that the sale was ii-.u incompatible with his support for the Jewish state. Opponents of the AWACS sale assumed that the deal would undermine America's commitment to preserve the security and survival of Israel, given Saudi Ambia's unrelenting hostility against the Jewish state. However, opponents ignored the fact that, despite the deep and-.seemingly' irreconcilable divisions between Israel and Saudi Arabia over the Arab-Israeli conflict, the two nations remain united in their support for political moderation in die Middle East, a regio:) which has served as the source of so much political exiremism. Indeed, but» Krací and Saudi Arabia have been the victims, and continue to confront the throat of terrorism from various state-sponsored extremist groups in the Arab and Islamic world bent on the destruction of both the Jewish state and the House os Saud, in addition, Saudi Arabia confronts the continued threat to its security emanating from its two radical neighbors in the Persian Gulf—Iraq and Iran. Boih Israel and Saudi Arabia are moderate nations,- which have opposed the The I'oiidca! Lessons Drau n trom the AWACS Debate 2,11 political extremism emanating from various sources in the Middle East— whether fraqs Iran, or, the'Palestinians. This has driven both nations to seek a strong alliance with the United Stales. The challenge for the United States is to balance its competing interests in the Middle East—to maintain its commitment to preserve the security and survival of Israel while continuing to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in guaranteeing the mutual economic and strategic interests of Washington and Riyadh. The United.States, must engage Saudi Arabia in the necessary cooperation in order to enable Washington to use its vast military power to preserve the security of the politically unstable Persian Gulf and elicit Riyadh's continued pursuit of an oil policy favorable to the economic interests of the industrial world. In addition, the United States needs Saudi Arabia to use the enormous political clout Riyadh wield.s in the Middle East, through its vast oil wealth, to support and contribute to the success of the American effort to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the region. Given both Israeli and Saudi support for American economic, strategic, and diplomatic leadership in the international community, the United States need not pursue a relationship with one nation which sacrifices its ties with the other. Rather, the United States can pursue close relations wtth both Israel and Saudi Arabia in preserving the vital interests Washington maintains in the two nations of the region, despite the enmity existing between them. Strong Saudi-American relations- are not incompatible with close Israeli-American relations, and vice versa. Rather. American retention of strong rela- / lions with both Israel and Saudi Arabia represents an essential ingredient iri' Washington's pursuit of a credible and effective policy in the Middle East, which balances this nation's two competing, but compatible, interests in the region: continuing America's strong commitment to preserve the security and survival of Israel; and engaging Saudi Arabia in the economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation required to guarantee the industrial world's access to the vast oil reserves of the Gulf and achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Through his approval of the AWACS sale, and his reassurances of continued American support for Israel. Reagan demonstrated his recognition of those competing interests and his ability to balance them. That is the great contribution Reagan made to American policy in the Middle East; and the president's skillful balancing of America's compering interests in the region was the essential factor which enabled him to fulfill his campaign pledge to restore American economic and strategic leadership to the international community. Reagan's brilliant handling of the AWACS issue, and the enormous economic and strategic benefits the United States gained from the AWACS sale, is one major reason why claims by Reagan's academic admirers that he ranks among America's greatest presidents cannot be easily dismissed or ignored.