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# Family-Friendly Organizations?

## Work and Family Programs in the 1990s

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Benefits that enable employees to manage better their work and personal lives are an important form of compensation offered by some but by no means all organizations. Using data from the 1996 National Organizations Study, the authors test three theoretical perspectives (internal economic, external economic, and institutional pressures) on the existence of four family-friendly benefits in U.S. establishments. These theories are not opposing, and the authors find support for each: Different benefits are provided in response to different pressures. Furthermore, although most organizations had one family-friendly benefit in 1996, these benefits have not been universally adopted.

**Keywords:** *family-friendly employment practices; economic theory; institutional theory*

Scholars have widely acknowledged that the spheres of work and family are interdependent in the postindustrial economy and thus must be examined together. There is considerable evidence that work-family conflicts have adverse effects on individuals, families, and organizations (for reviews, see Glass & Estes, 1997; Higgins, Duxbury, & Lee, 1994; Menaghan, 1991; Wallen, 2002). Because the U.S. government has a limited role in mandating family accommodating provisions for workers compared to some western

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European countries, addressing the family needs of workers has been left largely to the discretion of employers (Orloff, 1993).

Family-friendly policies may be regarded generally as “any benefit, working condition, or personnel policy that has been shown empirically to decrease job-family conflicts among employed parents” (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995, p. 382). We focus on four types of family-friendly benefits: flexible scheduling, paid and unpaid parental leaves, and dependent care benefits. Flexible scheduling allows workers to have some control over when they work as opposed to having their schedules set by their employers. Paid leave provides workers with pay while they are away from work caring for a new child, whereas unpaid leave enables workers to be absent from work to care for a new child without pay but with job security. Flexible scheduling and leave benefits, when used, allow workers to respond to their family needs without being penalized at work. Dependent care benefits assist families in caring for children or older relatives—thus enabling workers to better concentrate on their work—by providing the care onsite, subsidies for dependent care, or referral services to help employees locate providers.

Provision of family-friendly benefits by U.S. organizations is far from ubiquitous. For example, whereas 61% of establishments surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1987 reported flexible scheduling of some sort (one of the most common family-friendly benefits), only 2% provided on-site child care (one of the rarest family-friendly benefits; Glass & Fujimoto, 1995, p. 383). More recent (1996 and 1997) surveys have found that only 2% of employees in small organizations and 10% in large organizations had access to employer-provided childcare assistance (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1998, 1999). Only 27% of employees had available to them some type of flextime, according to the 1997 Current Population Survey (Golden, 2001). Therefore, most workers lack access to family-friendly benefits.

Despite their potential importance for workers' lives, our understanding of which organizations have family-friendly policies and which theories best explain the variation among organizations in their implementation is still limited. Most studies are restricted to a single company (e.g., Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2002), samples of workers (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995), or to samples of large organizations; nationally representative samples of organizations are rarely used to examine such practices (see Kelly, 2003, for exception). Samples that only include organizations with at least 100 employees (Poelmans, Nuria Chinchilla, & Cardona, 2003; Wood, de Menezes, & Lasasosa, 2003) are not representative because in the United States and Europe, only 2% of all firms have more than 100 employees (Aldrich, 1999). Osterman (1995) examined the organizational correlates of work-family

programs using the 1992 Survey of American Establishments, a more representative sample of for-profit organizations with at least 50 employees.

In this article, we examine the extent to which diverse kinds of organizations use various family-friendly practices and evaluate which theories best explain their use. Our analysis extends Osterman's research in three primary ways: (a) Our sample includes small organizations as well as not-for-profit organizations; (b) we examine leave, dependent care, and flexible scheduling benefits separately (as opposed to grouping them into a single measure of work-family practices) to determine if there are differences in their organizational correlates; and (c) we examine the influence of institutional pressures in addition to internal and external economic pressures.

We first draw on several sociological and economic theories to formulate hypotheses about sources of variation in organizational provision of family-friendly employment practices. We then test these hypotheses using data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. establishments in 1996. After summarizing our results, we consider some of their major implications for research and policy.

## Background

Concern with family-friendly practices as ways of promoting work-family balance increased in the United States during the 1990s. From the perspective of workers, this increased concern reflected the greater difficulties families had reconciling their work and family lives that resulted in part from three important labor force and family trends. First, the labor force participation of women, especially mothers, increased: By the end of the 1990s, 58% of mothers with children younger than 3 years old were employed in the U.S. labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Mothers' participation in the labor force increased for various reasons, such as the time limits and employment requirements of welfare reform that pushed mothers into the labor force (Edin & Lein, 1997). Also, more married mothers entered the labor force either full- or part-time because single incomes are often insufficient to support families (Martin & Kats, 2003; White & Rogers, 2000). Second, many workers, particularly those in high-skilled occupations, experienced an increase in hours worked in the past quarter century (Coleman & Pencavel, 1993; Jacobs & Gerson, 1998, 2001; Schor, 1992). Parents often do not want to cut back on their work hours, however, because of the financial obligations associated with parenthood (Reynolds, 2003). Third, the number of single-parent households increased: In 2000, single mothers headed 10 million fam-

ilies (26% of families) compared to three million in 1970, whereas single men headed 2 million families in 2000 as compared to 400,000 in 1970 (Fields & Casper, 2001). The growth of dual-career and single parent families has made it particularly difficult for many Americans to cope with the often-competing demands of their work and family lives.

Employers were increasingly motivated to respond to the concerns of their employees in the 1990s. Due largely to the tight labor markets and economic expansion of this period, employers had considerable difficulty finding and keeping workers, particularly women and skilled workers (White & Rogers, 2000). Adding to these pressures on employers was the passage of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999), which guaranteed workers meeting certain qualifications up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid leave with job security to care for family members. Although the FMLA offered only modest provisions and has had a limited impact on workers (Gerstel & McGonagle, 1999), the government sent a message through the FMLA that employers cannot penalize workers for having families but rather should help workers to balance their work and family lives.

### **Theoretical Perspectives**

A variety of explanations have been offered to account for why organizations use family-friendly benefits (for examples, see Glass & Fujimoto, 1995; Osterman, 1995; Wood et al., 2003). Some studies use one theory, such as institutional theory, to explain which organizations adopt a particular family-friendly benefit (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly, 2003; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999). Other studies rely on several theoretical perspectives and use predictors for each (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998; Osterman, 1995; Poelmans et al., 2003; Wood et al., 2003). Some of these theories have points of convergence and redundancy, and therefore adjudicating the empirical merits of each theory, is problematic. For example, Barringer and Milkovich (1998) note that agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost economic theories may make similar predictions regarding which conditions or organizational characteristics are likely to be associated with particular types of benefit programs and thus proposed that these theoretical perspectives be integrated in such research.

Osterman (1995) identified three main reasons for why organizations might provide family-friendly practices: practical responses, links to internal labor markets, and high commitment work systems; he found high commitment work systems best explained the use of work and family programs. Wood et al. (2003) found that adoption of family-friendly practices was best

explained by organizational adaptation, a combination of institutional pressures as well as competitive forces, local and technological factors, situational conditions, and managerial values, knowledge, and perceptions regarding work and family programs.

We classify explanations of the existence of family-friendly practices in organizations into three major categories: The first two explain the provision of family-friendly benefits as a response to economic concerns, whereas the third category focuses on organizational responses to institutional pressures. First, structures and practices inside the organization that can make turnover or shirking particularly costly or detrimental to organizations should be associated with the use of family-friendly employment practices to enhance loyalty, satisfaction, and productivity among workers. Second, reliance on workers that are more likely to have high turnover in view of labor market and other conditions outside of the work organizations should be associated with the use of family-friendly employment practices in hopes of reducing turnover of these workers. Finally, characteristics that make organizations more susceptible to external institutional pressures (whether they are coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphic pressures) should be associated with family-friendly employment practices as organizations seek greater legitimacy from external entities.

We elaborate on each of these theories and derive hypotheses from each regarding the provision by U.S. establishments of the various kinds of family-friendly benefits.

### **Internal Economic Pressures: Protecting Investments**

Various studies have emphasized the importance of internal economic pressures that lead organizations to provide family-friendly practices. These internal pressures have been referred to by the following labels: internal labor markets (Osterman, 1995; Poelmans et al., 2003), economic rationality (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995), organizational adaptation (Wood et al., 2003); expected efficiency gains (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998), and the high commitment perspective (Osterman, 1995; Poelmans et al., 2003; Wood et al., 2003).

These studies argue that substantial investments of organizational resources in employees make turnover detrimental and costly, and thus, organizations have family-friendly employment practices that are likely to enhance commitment, satisfaction, and lower turnover. Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981) argues that some organizations internalize (make) their workforce when they can benefit from firm-specific knowledge

(asset specificity), whereas others externalize (buy) it when they cannot (see also Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993). Organizations characterized by high performance work practices, firm internal labor markets (FILMs), and training are more likely to provide family-friendly employment practices so as to discourage workers from taking jobs in other organizations and thus retaining the firm-specific skills in which they have invested.

Providing family-friendly benefits raises the opportunity costs for employees leaving their organizations for alternative employment. Several studies have demonstrated that access to family-friendly benefits reduced turnover (Aryee, Luk, & Stone, 1998; Batt & Valcour, 2003; Glass & Riley, 1998; Holtzman & Glass, 1999; Poelmans et al., 2003; Scandura & Lankau, 1997; Smith & Bachu, 1999). The explanation often given for the reduced turnover is that employees who are able to use family-friendly employment practices experience less work-family conflict and are more satisfied with their jobs, more likely to remain in the labor force, and more likely to remain employed with their particular organization, especially when labor markets are tight as in the mid- to late-1990s (Konrad & Mangel, 2000; Lambert, 2000; Scandura & Lankau, 1997).

By contrast, when skills are not firm-specific, a more market-based employment relationship may be present in which workers and organizations freely enter and exit employment relationships. In these sorts of situations, workers seek to maximize compensation without regard to organizational loyalty and companies seek to minimize costs and maximize flexibility (Stroh & Reilly, 1994). Organizations are more inclined to lay off workers to cut costs or use temporary, part-time, or contract workers as opposed to full-time employees and less likely to offer family-friendly benefits to their replaceable workers.

*High performance work practices.* The label *high performance work organization* has been used to refer to a broad set of human resource management practices that enable organizations to be more competitive, innovative, and flexible (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000). A consensus has emerged that these practices include the use of self-directed teams, off-line committees, cross-training, and job rotation. These practices encourage workers to offer suggestions to improve productivity in organizations rather than to simply follow orders of their superiors. It is generally assumed that for these kinds of practices to enhance organizational performance, employees need to be highly committed to the organization. High commitment is thought to reduce turnover—which disrupts team-based work—and elicit employee effort and contribution of ideas for improving the production process (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lambert,

2000; Osterman, 1994; Williamson, 1981). Therefore, high performance work organizations should be more likely to use family-friendly policies to encourage commitment and retention among their employees (Glass & Estes, 1997; Osterman, 1995; Poelmans et al., 2003).

Accordingly, we hypothesize that,

H1: Organizations with high performance practices such as self-directed work teams, off-line committees, and job rotation will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

*FILMs and training.* Organizations that have FILMs rely heavily on existing employees to fill job vacancies, have multiple levels of jobs through which individuals can be promoted, and reward employees on the basis of seniority (Royal & Althausen, 2003). These practices represent investment of substantial resources in training employees and so organizations with FILMs are more likely to have family-friendly policies to retain their workers and preserve these investments in firm-specific knowledge and skills (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998; Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999; Konrad & Mangel, 2000; Osterman, 1995; Williamson, 1981). Formal training is another example of substantial investment of monetary resources in employees that is economically viable only when trained workers become more productive and remain with their organizations (Knoke & Ishio, 1998; Knoke & Kalleberg, 1994). Somewhat surprisingly, neither Osterman (1995) nor Poelmans et al. (2003) found statistical evidence to support the view that organizations with FILMs were positively related to family-friendly benefits. Nevertheless, an internal economic argument would lead us to expect

H2: Organizations that have FILMs will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

H3: Organizations with formal training programs will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

### **External Economic Pressures: Competing for Workers**

Some organizations depend on workers who have many opportunities outside of organizational boundaries and so may provide family-friendly employment practices to recruit new workers when they are needed, in addition to retaining those workers they already have. This sort of reasoning has been labeled alternatively: practical responses (Osterman, 1995; Poelmans et al., 2003); situational (Wood et al., 2003); organizational adaptation



(Wood et al., 2003); economic rationality (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995); expected efficiency gains (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998); and workforce and worker leverage (Kelly, 2003).

*Recruitment and retention of employees.* Organizations that are highly dependent on women workers may be likely to find family-friendly employment practices an attractive solution to their recruitment and retention concerns (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Konrad & Mangel, 2000; Osterman, 1995; Reskin, McBrier, & Kmec, 1999). Such organizations are more likely to suffer when employees have work-family conflict issues (Glass & Estes, 1997; Hochschild, 1997). First, women continue to devote more time to childrearing and household labor than men (Brayfield, 1995; Demo & Acock, 1993; Higgins et al., 1994; Hochschild, 1989; Kroska, 1997; Menaghan & Parcel, 1990; Perkins & DeMeis, 1996). Second, parenthood has greater negative effects on the work status of women compared to men: Parenthood increases the labor force participation, hours worked, and pay of men but decreases the labor force participation, hours worked, and pay of women (Hakim, 1996; Kaufman & Uhlenberg, 2000; Milkie & Peltola, 1999; Rosenfeld, 1996; Vandenheuvel, 1997). Third, flexibility and family-friendly policies influence whether mothers remain at their jobs after childbirth (Aryee et al., 1998; Desai & Waite, 1991; Drobnic, Blossfeld, & Rohwer, 1999; Glass & Riley, 1998; Holtzman & Glass, 1999; Scandura & Lankau, 1997; Smith & Bachu, 1999).

Offering family-friendly employment practices may thus be a useful way for organizations to reduce work-family conflict and to recruit and retain their women workers. Although the causal ordering of this relationship may be somewhat unclear (i.e., organizations with family-friendly employment practices may simply attract more women workers and thus increase their representation—Kelly, 2003), we predict that

H4: The proportion of women employees within the establishment will be positively associated with the existence of family-friendly employment practices.

More generally, our fourth hypothesis suggests that employers who have difficulty recruiting and retaining skilled workers should be more likely to have family-friendly practices to attract and retain employees (Osterman, 1995; Wood et al., 2003). Despite hypothesizing that employers who report having difficulty recruiting and retaining skilled workers are more likely to have family-friendly policies, both Osterman (1995) and Wood et al. (2003) found that employers with recruitment and retention problems are less likely, not more likely, to have family-friendly benefits. In any event, we predict that

in the mid-1990s, a time in which organizations were competing for workers and family-friendly employment practices were getting a great deal of attention, recruitment problems would create motivations for having family-friendly employment practices.

H5: Organizations that report that they have difficulty attracting skilled employees will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

*Managers and professionals.* Organizations that depend on a highly skilled workforce such as professional and managerial workers may be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices. Such workers have a great deal of power because they have multiple job opportunities; they are in high demand relative to their supply and may be difficult and costly to replace (Batt & Valcour, 2003; Glass & Estes, 1997; Kelly, 2003; Konrad & Mangel, 2000; Osterman, 1995). Such workers have been characterized as using occupational labor markets in which workers can freely move from organization to organization because their skills are marketable across organizations (Royal & Althausen, 2003). Moreover, as predicted by resource dependence theory, the considerable control over critical resources that these workers have within their organizations creates pressure for organizations to respond to their demands: "Internally, certain positions or employee groups controlling critical resources can, theoretically, impose preferred structures on their organizations" (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998, p. 310). We hypothesize that

H6: Organizations whose core workforce is managerial or professional will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

### **External, Institutional Pressures: Coercive, Normative, and Mimetic Isomorphism**

Organizational patterns may result from efforts to decrease uncertainty or to increase legitimacy, as managers seek to respond to institutional as well as economic pressures. Thus, organizations may have family-friendly benefits because they regard them as accepted and legitimate practices, whether they actually enhance recruitment and retention, increase efficiency, or lower costs. Early adopters of an organizational innovation may be especially motivated by efficiency concerns whereas late adopters may be influenced more by legitimacy concerns (Wejnert, 2002). The institutional perspective assumes that institutional environments shape organizational practices (Dobbin et al., 1993): For example, organizations may be more apt to adopt family-friendly

practices when their competitors do so or when they feel scrutinized by external agencies, particularly legal bodies.

*Coercive pressures.* Organizations may adopt family-friendly policies to comply with a law or a court decision or to preempt lawsuits (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999), an example of coercive pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Some organizations face greater institutional pressures than others and we expect the existence of family-friendly benefits to vary according to the magnitude of these institutional pressures. Larger organizations are especially likely to experience greater external scrutiny and hence coercive institutional pressures. Large organizations are more visible to the public and to regulators and thus may be more motivated than small organizations to appear legitimate to these bodies. Larger organizations also tend to have more interorganizational linkages and may have policies and programs that are viewed as accepted practice to seem more legitimate to the organizations with which they have relationships (Glass & Estes, 1997). Moreover, large organizations are often subjected to regulations from which small organizations are exempt (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995), such as the FMLA (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999), which applies only to organizations with at least 100 employees.

Large organization size is also a necessary condition for many benefit programs because they operate on economies of scale, and their cost is too great or their administration too unwieldy for small organizations (Barringer & Milovich, 1998; Glass & Estes, 1997; Glass & Fujimoto, 1995; Konrad & Mangel, 2000; Osterman, 1995). Wejnert (2002) noted that larger organizations, which are more powerful, often adopt innovative practices early and can compel smaller, less powerful organizations to follow. Therefore, we acknowledge that any size effects can result from either coercive pressures or economies of scale and power. We hypothesize that

H7: Larger organizations will be more likely than smaller organizations to have family-friendly employment practices.

Organizations that have to report information regarding equal opportunity to the government may be particularly sensitized to concerns regarding potential discrimination lawsuits from workers unable to balance work and family and are more likely to experience coercive pressures (Wood et al., 2003). We predict that

H8: Organizations reporting statistics on gender, race, and age composition of their employees will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

Organizations that are more formalized, keeping written records on varied organizational activities and policies, are also more likely to face coercive pressures. Organizations with extensive written records are also more apt to have elaborate benefit plans, including the provision of family benefits (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999; Osterman, 1995). Formalization is often an act of legitimacy seeking itself, as formalized organizations aim to present an impression that their practices are fair and acceptable (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Written documents and contracts are often reviewed or even prepared by attorneys to ensure their legality and to protect organizations; therefore, the attorneys are likely to advise organizations regarding legality of personnel practices and seek to avoid potential litigation. By far, leave provisions have received more legal attention compared to flexible scheduling and dependent care given legislation such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the FMLA 1993 (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999). Formalization should therefore be particularly important for leave policies. We hypothesize that

H9: Organizations with a high degree of formalization in the form of written records will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

*Normative pressures: Human resource departments.* Organizations with separate human resource departments that are responsible for hiring, training, compensating, and firing employees are more likely to face normative isomorphic pressures. Normative pressures stem from the formal education of professionals and the “growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse rapidly” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 152). Human resource departments employ professionals who learn about the newest trends in their field and may encourage their organizations to have such practices. Thus, they may champion family-friendly employment practices as a way for companies to become cutting edge and achieve legitimacy (Kelly & Dobbin, 1999; Glass & Estes, 1997; Osterman, 1995; Wood et al., 2003). “Many work-family programs are located in personnel or human resource departments because this is where most of them began” (Wallen, 2002, p. 3). We expect that

H10: Organizations with separate human resource departments will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

*Mimetic pressures.* Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organizations imitate the practices of other organizations they perceive as successful as they seek to respond to uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whether

they have a demonstrated effect on economic efficiency or productivity. Such imitation has also been referred to as trait imitation, in which organizations adopt the practices of prestigious organizations and frequency imitation, in which organizations adopt the most popular practices in the organizational landscape (Aldrich, 1999). Organizations are more likely to mimic or model the practices of other organizations they perceive as successful when there is internal or external uncertainty (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

The extent to which organizations are aware of the human resource practices of other organizations should influence their adoption of family-friendly employment practices as a result of mimetic pressures. The diffusion-of-innovation literature suggests that interactions among organizations and spatial effects determine the amount of influence organizations have on one another (Wejnert, 2002). We are not able to examine interorganizational relations or spatial effects. Rather, we assert that organizations expressing interest in the training practices of other organizations may be actively seeking human resource or benefit models to imitate compared to organizations with little interest in the training practices of other organizations, regardless of the level of uncertainty.

H11: Organizations reporting higher levels of sensitivity to the training practices of other organizations will be more likely to have family-friendly employment practices.

## Data and Measures

We test our hypotheses using data from the second National Organization Survey conducted in 1996 to 1997. The National Organization Survey is based on a nationally representative sample of organizational establishments. The sample includes organizations of varying sizes as well as profit and nonprofit organizations and establishments from all industries.

The sample was drawn from a list of U.S. establishments maintained by Dun and Bradstreet Information Services (see Kalleberg, Knoke, & Marsden, 1995; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, & Spaeth, 1996).<sup>1</sup> Establishments were selected with probability proportional to size from each of 40 size categories (ranging from 1 to 4 employees to 5,000 or more employees). Data were collected in a computer-assisted telephone interview conducted by the Center for Survey Research at the University of Minnesota; some informants were unable to complete a telephone interview but did agree to complete an identically worded mail questionnaire. Informants were generally the human resource manager or a functionally equivalent informant from each estab-

lishment.<sup>2</sup> Interviews were completed with 1,002 establishments (54.6% of those eligible). We dropped cases with missing values; our final sample includes 639 establishments.

### Dependent Variables

We constructed four dependent variables to represent various types of family-friendly organizational practices and programs: *provision of flexible scheduling*, *unpaid leave*, *paid leave*, and *dependent care*. We expect that organizational predictors of each will vary and so we treat these as separate indicators of the family-friendly benefits provided by organizations. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1 and details on the construction of all variables are provided in Table 2.

Because larger organizations were disproportionately more likely to be sampled, we present both unweighted and weighted descriptive statistics in Table 1. The weight is the inverse of the probability of an establishment being sampled, given its size. The weighted descriptive statistics represent the incidence of family-friendly benefits in the population of U.S. establishments. The weighted results show that flexible scheduling and unpaid leave are present in most establishments but paid leave and dependent care are offered by fewer than one third of the establishments. Note that weights do not diminish the incidence of flexible scheduling and therefore flexible scheduling appears not to be strongly associated with organization size.

### Explanatory Variables

*Internal economic pressures.* We constructed variables that measured the extent to which organizations had high performance work practices, FILMs, and formal training. These measures are examples of investments organizations make in the skill development of their employees. Such investments would be lost when employees leave organizations and therefore may provide motivations for having family-friendly benefits to encourage workers to remain with the organizations.

*External economic pressures.* Our measures of external economic pressures on existence of family-friendly benefits in organizations include indicators of the proportion women employees in the establishment, recruitment problems, and whether the core occupation is a manager and professional. Each of these measures taps into factors outside the organization (either in the labor market or in the family lives of employees) that influence the ability of employers to recruit and retain workers. Because benefits (including

(text continues on p. 210)

**Table 1**  
**Descriptive Statistics**

	Unweighted		Standard Deviation	Range	Weighted		Weighted Standard Deviation
	M	% Yes			M	% Yes	
Family-friendly employment practices							
Flexible scheduling		64.16	–	0, 1		67.65	–
Unpaid leave		82.79	–	0, 1		54.95	–
Paid leave		43.35	–	0, 1		27.66	–
Dependent care		41.47	–	0, 1		22.90	–
Internal economic							
High performance work practices	0.523		0.271	0–1	0.420		0.271
Firm internal labor markets	0.430		0.367	0–1	0.250		0.319
Formal training		57.28	–	0, 1		31.63	–
External economic							
Proportion women in the establishment	0.460		0.285	0–1	0.401		0.355
Recruitment problems	0.362		0.266	0–1	0.316		0.251
Managers and professionals as core occupation		35.37	–	0, 1		32.57	–
External institutional							
Size, logged	4.153		2.163	0–10.021	2.057		1.288
Equal opportunity reporting		53.05	–	0, 1		19.14	–
Formalization	0.641		0.334	0–1	0.364		0.361
Human resource departments		56.96	–	0, 1		21.99	–
Attention to training practices in other organizations	0.372		0.386	0–1	0.177		0.333

Control variables									
Profit	73.40	-	0, 1		84.09	-			
Private	82.63	-	0, 1		91.58	-			
Union	22.69	-	0, 1		7.09	-			
Age, logged		1.059	0-5.889	2.831		0.955			
Service industry	39.59	-	0, 1		44.06	-			
Benefits	87.48	-	0, 1		62.88	-			
Temp workers	30.05	-	0, 1		21.16	-			
Independent organization	69.01		0, 1		83.26				

Note: *N* = 639 for unweighted, 623 for weighted.



**Table 2**  
**Construction of Variables Used in Analyses**

Variable Name	Questions and Alphas, Pearson's Rs, and Formulas as Appropriate
Family-friendly employment practices	
Flexible scheduling	Does (organization) offer its employees flexible hours or flextime scheduling? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Unpaid leave	Does (organization) offer its employees unpaid parental leaves? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Paid leave	Does (organization) offer paid parental leaves to employees who have just had children? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Dependent care	(1) Does (organization) offer assistance in caring for elderly family members to any of its employees? (0 = no; 1 = yes) (2) Does (organization) currently provide a day-care program for employees' children, either on-site or elsewhere? (0 = no; 1 = yes) (3) Does (organization) help employees cover any costs of day care for their children? (0 = no; 1 = yes) (4) Does (organization) currently provide information to employees on day-care services available in the community? (0 = no; 1 = yes) Alpha = 0.5245 Formula: 1 if any equal 1, 0 otherwise

<p>Explanatory variables</p> <p>Internal economic pressures</p> <p>High performance work practices</p>	<p>(1a-1d) Off-line committees. Does your organization have established committees made up of workers and managers who meet regularly to deal with (a) the implementation of new technology, (b) quality control or improving quality, (c) other problems in production or service delivery, (d) health and safety? (for each 0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>(2) do workers regularly meet by themselves, without management, to discuss issues related to production or service delivery? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>(3) When (core occupation workers) do their job, are they involved in work teams? If yes, do these teams make decisions about task assignments or work methods? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>(4) Are (core occupation workers) cross-trained, that is, trained in skills for more than one job? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>(5) Are (core occupation workers) involved in job rotation? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>Alpha = 0.7329</p> <p>Formula: <math>(10.25 * \text{sum of 4 offline committee responses}) + [\text{sum of 4 other responses}] / 5</math></p>
<p>Firm internal labor markets</p>	<p>(1) How often does (organization) fill (core occupation) vacancies with people already employed at (organization)? never (0), rarely (1), often (2), very often (3)</p> <p>(2) Are there different levels of (core occupation)? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p> <p>r = 0.126</p> <p>Formula: <math>\text{sum of two responses} / 2</math></p>
<p>Formal training</p>	<p>In the past 2 years, did (organization) provide any (core occupation workers) with formal job training? (0 = no; 1 = yes)</p>
<p>External economic pressures</p> <p>Proportion women in establishment</p>	<p>In total, how many full-time employees were on the payroll of (organization) as of June 1, 1996? By full-time, we mean 35 or more hours per week. Of these, about how many were women?</p> <p>Formula: <math>\text{number of full-time women} / \text{number of total full-time employees}</math></p>
<p>Recruitment problems</p>	<p>It is difficult to find highly skilled workers. Strongly agree = 1, agree = 0.67, disagree = 0.33, strongly disagree = 0</p>

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Variable Name	Questions and Alphas, Pearson's Rs, and Formulas as Appropriate
Manager/professional	What are the job titles for the employees who are most directly involved with (core product or service)? Managerial and professional occupations = 1, otherwise = 0.
Institutional pressures	
Size	(1) In total, how many full-time employees were on the payroll of (organization) as of June 1, 1996? By full-time, we mean 35 or more hours per week (2) In total, how many part-time employees were on the payroll of (organization) as of June 1, 1996? By part-time, we mean less than 35 hours per week? Formula: $\log(1 + \text{full-time} + 0.5 \times \text{part-time})$
Equal opportunity reporting	Is (organization) required to report the sex, race, and age composition of its employees to any government agency? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Formalization	Do each of the following documents exist at (organization)? (a) written job descriptions for most jobs? (b) written records of nearly everyone's job performance? (c) employment contracts? (d) documents telling how personnel evaluations are carried out? (e) documents outlining hiring and firing procedures (for each, 0 = no, 1 = yes) Alpha = 0.7902
Human resource department	Formula: sum of 5 responses/5 Is there a separate department or section that has the main responsibility for personnel or labor relations? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Attention to training practices in other organizations	To what extent does (organization) pay attention to the training practices of other organizations? Not at all (0), very little (0.33), somewhat (0.67), or very much (1.0)
Control variables	
Profit	Is this a nonprofit or a for-profit organization? (0 = nonprofit; 1 = profit)
Private	Is (organization) public or private? (0 = public; 1 = private)
Union	Are any (core occupation employees) represented by a union contract? (0 = no; 1 = yes)

Age	In what year did (organization) start operations? Formula: $\log([1996 - \text{year established}] + .01)$
Service industry	What is the main (produced produced/service provided) there? Business, entertainment, personal, professional service = 1, otherwise = 0.
Benefits	Does organization offer medical or hospital insurance to any of its employees? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Temp	Does organization use any temporary workers (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Independent organization	Is establishment an independent organization (as opposed to a part of a larger organization)? (0 = no; 1 = yes)

family-friendly benefits) are often only offered to full-time employees, our measure of proportion women employees only considers full-time employees.

*Institutional pressures.* Our indicators of coercive isomorphism include size as measured by the log of the number of employees; whether organizations must report age, race, and gender statistics to a government agency (*equal opportunity reporting*); and the level of formalization in the organization. Each of these measures reflects the extent to which organizations are susceptible to external forces that may compel organizations to have family-friendly benefits. We measure normative isomorphism by whether organizations have separate human resource departments, given that human resource professionals are important diffusers of benefit innovations. We measure mimetic isomorphism by the extent to which organizations are attuned to the practices of other organizations, particularly the attention paid to training practices of other organizations.

### Control Variables

Our models also control for a variety of other factors that may influence organizational use of family-friendly employment practices. Profit-seeking, nonprofit, and public organizations may differentially adopt family-friendly benefits (Glass & Estes, 1997; Gonyea, 1999). For example, government organizations are not as flexible as for-profit organizations yet tend to offer more benefits overall compared to nongovernmental organizations (Kelly, 2003; Wallen, 2002). Therefore, we include two dichotomous variables indicating whether an organization is (a) profit or not-for-profit and (b) private or governmental.

Unions may be important advocates for workers in convincing organizations to adopt family-friendly benefits (Glass & Fujimoto, 1995), and so we control for whether employees in the organizations are represented by a union.

Older organizations are generally less flexible (Aldrich, 1999; Kelly, 2003; Stinchcombe, 1965), and so we control for organizational age (logged).

We also included a measure of whether the organization was located in a service industry (business, entertainment, personal, or professional services). Guthrie and Roth (1999), for example, found that establishments in service industries were less likely to offer paid leave benefits.

We control for whether organizations provided other benefits such as health insurance, to isolate family-friendly benefits from traditional benefits. Osterman (1995), for example, found that organizations that provide human resource benefits such as health insurance, pensions, sick pay, and disability

were not significantly more likely to provide family-friendly benefits and thus concluded family-friendly benefits differ from other human resource programs and compensations organizations provide.

We finally control for whether organization uses any temporary workers (temp) and whether the establishments are independent or part of larger organizations.

## Results

We estimated equations predicting each of our four dependent variables using logistic regression analyses. Coefficients are expressed as odds ratios (obtained by exponentiating the coefficients) for ease of interpretation. Although some of our explanatory variables have large bivariate correlations (see Appendix), variance inflation factor levels are well below the conventional threshold for indicating problematic results resulting from collinearity.<sup>3</sup> Table 3 presents the results of our analyses of organizational differences in the presence of the four kinds of family-friendly employment practices.

### Internal Economic Pressures

High performance work practices are associated with an increase in the odds of having flexible scheduling, unpaid leave, and a dependent care benefit but not paid leave (see also Osterman, 1995). Organizations that use all high performance work practices (compared to establishments without any high performance work practices) are twice as likely to offer flexible scheduling, almost three times as likely to offer unpaid leave, and more than twice as likely to offer a dependent care benefit. These results provide strong support for H1 and are consistent with the argument that organizations with high performance work practices are more likely to offer programs to help workers balance job and family responsibilities in hopes of retaining these workers and eliciting greater effort from them.

Neither FILMs nor formal training are significantly related to any of the four family-friendly practices, in contrast to H2 and H3. Although not consistent with these hypotheses, these results are similar to Osterman's (1995), who also found that FILMs did not significantly predict the presence of family-friendly programs. These results suggest that organizational leaders do not view family-friendly benefits as a means of maintaining firm-specific skills generated through formal training and FILMs.

**Table 3**  
**Logistic Regression for Family-Friendly**  
**Policies 1996; Coefficients Expressed as Odds-Ratios**

	Flexible Scheduling	Unpaid Leave	Paid Leave	Dependent Care
Hypothesis variables				
Internal economic pressures				
High performance work practices	2.036 <sup>†</sup>	2.983 <sup>†</sup>	1.271	2.404 <sup>††</sup>
Firm internal labor markets	0.773	1.442	0.675	1.160
Formal training	0.576	0.609	0.796	0.562
External economic pressures				
Proportion women in the establishment	2.356 <sup>††</sup>	2.316 <sup>†</sup>	1.527	3.999 <sup>†††</sup>
Recruitment problems	2.921 <sup>†††</sup>	0.668	2.445 <sup>††</sup>	1.383
Managers and professionals as core occupation	1.667 <sup>†</sup>	0.570	2.413 <sup>†††</sup>	1.418
External institutional pressures				
Size, logged	0.972	1.423 <sup>†††</sup>	1.023	1.153 <sup>††</sup>
Equal opportunity reporting	0.910	1.855 <sup>†</sup>	1.974 <sup>†</sup>	1.685 <sup>††</sup>
Formalization	1.594	3.203 <sup>††</sup>	1.581	0.820
Human resource departments	0.866	1.510	1.065	1.459
Attention to training practices in other organizations	2.998 <sup>††</sup>	1.811	2.705 <sup>††</sup>	3.655 <sup>††</sup>
Controls				
Profit	1.122	0.577	1.070	0.779
Private	1.132	2.373	0.851	2.226
Union	0.673	0.498	1.138	1.649*
Age, logged	0.989	1.145	1.146	1.251
Service industry	0.815	1.069	0.861	1.198
Benefits	0.370**	1.071	1.226	1.347
Temp	1.141	2.664**	1.455	1.174
Independent organization	1.317	0.462*	0.782	0.472
Constant	-0.180	-1.563	-2.406	-4.158
Chi square	60.11***	162.22***	122.28***	195.75***
df	19	19	19	19
Log likelihood	-386.88	-212.362	-376.112	-335.706
N	639	639	639	639

Note: Constants are not exponentiated.

<sup>†</sup> $p < .05$ . <sup>††</sup> $p < .01$ . <sup>†††</sup> $p < .001$  one-tailed tests. \*  $p \leq .05$ . \*\*  $p \leq .01$ . \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , two-tailed tests.

### External Economic Pressures

The proportion of women in the establishment is significantly related to flexible scheduling, unpaid leave, and dependent care but not to paid leave. We find that an organization with all women employees is more than twice as likely to offer flexible scheduling and unpaid leave and almost four times as

likely to offer a dependent care benefit compared to establishments with all men employees. These results are generally supportive of H4.<sup>4</sup>

Organizations reporting difficulty attracting skilled workers were significantly more likely to have flexible scheduling (2.9 times as likely) and paid leave (2.4 times as likely). This provides partial support for H5.

Organizations in which the core occupation is managerial or professional are more likely to have flexible scheduling (1.7 times as likely) and paid leave (2.4 times as likely) than are organizations with different core occupations. Our results partially support H6.

### **Institutional Pressures**

*Coercive.* Larger organizations are more likely to provide unpaid leave and dependent care benefits, but there is no relationship between organization size and paid leave or flexible scheduling. We thus have only partial support for H7. The results for unpaid leave and dependent care benefits may reflect organizational responses to coercive isomorphic pressures associated with increased scrutiny from outsiders as well as greater organizational resources that enable organizations to implement these family-friendly employment practices. The size relationship to unpaid leave is not surprising given the FMLA 1993 (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999) mandating that large organizations provide unpaid leave to employees. The lack of relationship between establishment size and flexible scheduling may reflect the fact that this does not require the same kind of investment of monetary resources that offering leave and dependent care benefits do; flexible scheduling may be a feasible way for small as well as large companies to accommodate families of their workers.

Organizations that report the age, race, and gender characteristics of their workers are more likely to offer paid leave, unpaid leave, and dependent care, supporting H8. Such organizations are almost twice as likely to offer unpaid and paid leave and 1.7 times as likely to offer a dependent care benefit.

Formalization is positively related to unpaid leave (but not with the other three benefits), providing only marginal support for H9. Organizations with all the indicators of formalization are more than three times as likely to have unpaid leave compared to organizations that keep no such written records, reflecting the coercive pressures on leave policies following the FMLA 1993 (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999).

*Normative.* Establishments with a human resource department were not significantly associated with any family-friendly benefit, providing no support for H10. Although human resource departments may serve as champi-



ons of relatively expensive cutting-edge benefit plans (Glass & Estes, 1997; Osterman, 1995), their presence does not seem to affect the family-friendly benefit policies within their organizations.

*Mimetic.* Organizations that pay a great deal of attention to training programs of other organizations are significantly more likely to have flexible scheduling, paid leave, and dependent care benefits. These organizations are between 2.7 and 3.7 times as likely to offer family-friendly benefits as organizations that pay no attention to training practices of other organizations. These results support H11. The finding for attention paid to training, coupled with the result that formal training (H3) is not significantly associated with any family-friendly benefit, bolsters a mimetic isomorphism argument: Organizations are more likely to offer family-friendly practices when they are imitating the human resource practices of other organizations rather than as a result of mere economic calculations.<sup>5</sup>

## Discussion

We proposed that reasons why organizations offer family-friendly benefits could be classified as responses to internal economic, external economic, or external institutional pressures. High performance work practices (H1); percentage of women in the organization (H4); reporting sex, race, and age characteristics (H8); and attention to training programs of other organizations (H11) received the strongest support in our analyses, as each variable was significantly and positively related to three of our four family-friendly benefits. Each of the theoretical explanations (internal economic, external economic, and external institutional) received some support, although the internal economic model received the least empirical support.

Our results suggest that organizations may provide different family-friendly benefits in response to different sets of economic and institutional pressures. Flexible scheduling is primarily associated with economic (internal and external) rather than institutional pressures. Unpaid leave is strongly associated with coercive isomorphism external institutional pressures. These results are not surprising given that unpaid leave is now mandated in many organizations by law through the FMLA 1993 (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Kelly & Dobbin, 1999). Paid leave is best explained by external economic and external institutional pressures. Dependent care is partially explained by internal and external economic pressures but is best explained by institutional pressures.

Our results help us to understand several issues about which workers have access to benefits enabling better balance of work and family. First, organizations that invest in workers through training and internal labor markets do not secure their investments by offering family-friendly benefits in hopes of retaining workers. Although workers receiving training and promotions within their organizations may garner many advantages (Knoke & Ishio, 1998), they are not more likely to have access to family-friendly benefits. Second, although organizations and occupations with high concentrations of women tend to be associated with lower pay, mobility, and benefits (Jacobs, 1995; Reskin et al., 1999), our analysis shows that organizations with greater proportions of women full-time employees are more likely to offer flexible scheduling, unpaid parental leave, and dependent care. Third, organizations more susceptible to external, institutional pressures are more likely to have each of the four benefits. As shown in the correlation matrix (see Appendix), the coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphic pressures are correlated with one another and in particular are all linked to organization size.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, organization size remains an important factor in the distribution of myriad rewards among workers (Baron & Bielby, 1980; Hollister, 2004). Workers in larger organizations are more likely to have access to family-friendly benefits not only because these organizations have more resources but also because these organizations are subjected to greater scrutiny by external entities than smaller organizations.

## Conclusion

Changes in the composition of the labor force have helped to focus attention on the problem of work-family conflict. Our results help to illuminate why organizations have particular family-friendly employment practices and which social contexts facilitate or hinder individuals balancing their work and family lives. First, family-friendly employment practices occur in organizations faced with greater economic and institutional pressures to have them. Second, different family-friendly benefits are at best loosely coupled, with different family benefits accounted for by different theories.

The results from our nationally representative sample of U.S. establishments show that U.S. organizations have done relatively little to respond to the family needs of their workers, at least by the mid-1990s. Although workers and families have changed with the increase in mothers working, organizations have largely not accommodated the changing needs of workers. Furthermore, it is unlikely that market forces alone will lead to the widespread adoption of such programs, as suggested by our findings that organizations

only sometimes react to economic justifications for the provision of family-friendly employment practices. Organizations appear to respond strongly to institutional pressures when adopting family-friendly employment practices. Therefore, widespread adoption of these practices is likely to come mainly from increased legitimacy of these practices. Such enhanced legitimacy may be stimulated by government mandates, such as programs of guaranteed paid leave and child care present in countries like Germany and Sweden.

Our results point to some needed directions for future research into the causes of family-friendly benefits adoption among organizations. Enhanced data collection techniques may help clarify some of the theoretical questions that remain unanswered from our study. First, longitudinal analysis is needed to determine if the economic and institutional pressures are causally related to family-friendly employment practices. Longitudinal analysis could also better test the assumptions of the internal and external economic perspectives, that is, whether family-friendly employment practices enhance retention, effort, and recruitment and decrease tardiness and absenteeism. Second, as companies develop more inclusive work-life benefits such as health and wellness programs, educational programs, and telecommuting, future research could profitably collect and analyze data on these job rewards. Third, future data on representative samples of organizations should also include information on factors shown to affect adoption of family-friendly policies such as whether organizations offer above average wages not available in the current study. Finally, future researchers should collect information on organizations to uncover why some investments in workers (such as high performance work practices) are positively associated with family-friendly benefits and others (training and FILMs) are not.

In addition to information on organizations, we also need more data on which workers are able to access and benefit from the family-friendly employment practices. Not all workers within family-friendly organizations are offered benefits and whether workers have access to benefits may depend on their skill level, tenure, or employment status.<sup>7</sup> Some individuals are also excluded from family-friendly benefits because of narrow definitions of family that exclude nonmarried partners, siblings, and extended family members from benefits. Given the resentment excluded employees may feel, organizations may need to respond to work-life concerns more inclusively to recognize the diversity of their workforce and the different needs at varied stages of the life course.

**Appendix  
Correlation Matrix**

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. High performance work practices	1											
2. Firm internal labor markets	0.194	1										
3. Formal training	0.279	0.138	1									
4. Proportion women in the establishment	0.073	-0.029	0.141	1								
5. Recruitment problems	0.051	0.026	0.092	0.118	1							
6. Managers and professionals as core occupation	0.098	0.047	-0.029	0.180	0.156	1						
7. Size, logged	0.240	0.313	0.340	0.103	0.144	0.042	1					
8. Equal opportunity reporting	0.184	0.240	0.234	0.102	0.151	0.099	0.464	1				
9. Formalization	0.313	0.185	0.397	0.274	0.152	0.183	0.449	0.425	1			
10. Human resource departments	0.254	0.227	0.304	0.093	0.140	0.081	0.537	0.430	0.455	1		
11. Attention to training practices in other organizations	0.321	0.170	0.813	0.116	0.136	0.013	0.325	0.268	0.408	0.328	1	
12. Profit	-0.099	-0.095	-0.141	-0.231	-0.261	-0.392	-0.170	-0.197	-0.321	-0.180	-0.117	1
13. Private	-0.098	-0.110	-0.162	-0.167	-0.231	-0.283	-0.184	-0.224	-0.270	-0.173	-0.191	0.762
14. Union	0.084	0.194	0.136	-0.036	0.215	0.084	0.363	0.293	0.258	0.297	0.164	-0.308
15. Age, logged	0.061	0.189	0.130	-0.008	0.118	0.083	0.282	0.220	0.221	0.264	0.144	-0.341
16. Service industry	0.032	-0.051	-0.032	0.304	0.067	0.459	-0.045	-0.008	0.147	0.006	0.013	-0.353
17. Benefits	0.157	0.205	0.266	0.024	0.082	0.062	0.382	0.307	0.393	0.340	0.262	-0.142
18. Temp	0.104	0.115	0.090	0.013	0.051	0.101	0.158	0.090	0.029	0.122	0.098	-0.123
19. Independent organization	-0.122	-0.150	-0.250	-0.066	-0.133	-0.056	-0.247	-0.274	-0.278	-0.207	-0.292	0.102
20. Flexible scheduling	0.094	-0.062	0.014	0.131	0.116	0.109	-0.055	-0.036	0.040	-0.037	0.067	-0.014
21. Unpaid leave	0.208	0.179	0.210	0.154	0.054	-0.010	0.355	0.285	0.362	0.307	0.224	-0.124
22. Paid leave	0.148	0.058	0.194	0.133	0.201	0.238	0.209	0.234	0.263	0.205	0.245	-0.217
23. Dependent care	0.230	0.181	0.233	0.196	0.154	0.155	0.362	0.327	0.307	0.328	0.3	-0.191

(continued)

## Appendix (continued)

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
1. High performance work practices											
2. Firm internal labor markets											
3. Formal training											
4. Proportion women in the establishment											
5. Recruitment problems											
6. Managers and professionals as core occupation											
7. Size, logged											
8. Equal opportunity reporting											
9. Formalization											
10. Human resource departments											
11. Attention to training practices in other organizations											
12. Profit	1										
13. Private	-0.373	1									
14. Union	-0.331	0.291	1								
15. Age, logged	-0.186	0.027	0.034	1							
16. Service industry	-0.124	0.194	0.231	-0.013	1						
17. Benefits	-0.159	0.126	0.124	0.028	0.073	1					
18. Temp	0.113	-0.178	0.006	-0.025	-0.141	0.018	1				
19. Independent organization	0.011	-0.094	-0.048	0.051	-0.115	0.020	0.036	1			
20. Flexible scheduling	-0.089	0.118	0.150	0.013	0.253	0.145	-0.189	0.040	1		
21. Unpaid leave	-0.207	0.167	0.164	0.099	0.159	0.129	-0.158	0.068	0.198	1	
22. Paid leave	-0.142	0.242	0.202	0.111	0.213	0.100	-0.275	0.126	0.216	0.219	1
23. Dependent care											

N = 639.

## Notes

1. Dun and Bradstreet provides a good balance of ease of use and representativeness, compared to less representative samples like those based on Chamber of Commerce memberships or difficult-to-manage samples of White-pages listings (Kalleberg, Aldrich, Marsden, & Cassell, 1990). Dun and Bradstreet samples do, however, have a bias toward older organizations, excluding very new organizations.

2. Responses of human resource managers may differ from those of other employee informants. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (2004) National Compensation Survey interviewed individuals from several occupations in each establishment surveyed and found that access to benefits varied by occupation within establishments. Therefore, responses from human resource managers may overstate the availability of benefits to employees within the organizations.

3. We estimated the flexible scheduling model by ordinary least squares to get variance inflation factors and tolerance because such diagnostics do not exist for logistic regression models.

4. Other studies have found that proportion of women in the establishment was not a significant predictor of family-friendly policies such as maternity or sick leave (Guthrie & Roth, 1999) or dependent care flexible spending accounts (Kelly, 2003, although she did find significant effects for onsite day care). These estimates included part-time employees as well, who are more likely to be women. In analyses not shown, we included a measure of proportion women in the organization with part-time employees included. This too was significant. However, a measure that examined only the proportion of part-time employees that were women did not produce significant results. It is important to note that part-time employees are often excluded from health care and family-friendly benefits (Jacobs, 1995).

5. Formal training was also insignificant when attention to training of other organizations was excluded from the model. Thus, we are confident the significance of attention to training of other organizations on family-friendly practices is not an artifact of its high correlation with formal training.

6. See columns 7 through 10 in the correlation matrix.

7. By employment status, we are referring to whether a worker is a full-time employee, part-time employee, temporary worker, or contract worker.

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