Unclassified DAF/COMP(2008)9/28
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 21-May-2008
___________________________________________________________________________________________
English text only
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS
COMPETITION COMMITTEE
ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND
-- 2007 --
This report is submitted by the Polish Delegation to the Competition Committee FOR INFORMATION at its
forthcoming meeting to be held on 11-12 June 2008.
JT03246152
Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
DAF/COMP(2008)9/28
Unclassified
Englishtextonly
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1. Changes to competition laws and policies, proposed or adopted
1.1 Summary of new legal provisions of competition law and related legislation
1. The new Act on competition and consumer protection, that has come into force on 21 April 2007,
adjusted Polish regulations to the current day needs, taking into account the OCCP's several years of
experience and the actual market conditions. The changes provide an instrument of increasing the
efficiency of the Polish competition protection system.
2. One fundamental change, comparing with the previous Act, is the elimination of the institution of
proceedings launched upon motion. The amendment allows the President of the OCCP to focus on the
most important violations of the Act that have the most significant impact on the market. Before, the
President of the OCCP could not extend the scope of the proceedings beyond the scope of the motion to
other anticompetitive practices. The OCCP's experience shows that ca. 80% of the motions filed ended
with the OCCP finding that no violation of law had occurred. The new solution, to a great extent, should
shorten the time of conducting proceedings. The new Act also provides that an undertaking has the right to
notify the President of the OCCP of any prohibited practices, which may be an impulse for initiating new
proceedings.
3. The Act also increased the turnover thresholds over which the participants of a concentration e.g.
a merger or a takeover ­ are obliged to obtain the President of the OCCP's clearance. According to the
former Act, a transaction was due for notification if the total worldwide turnover of its participants in the
year preceding the notification exceeded the equivalent of EUR 50 mln. According to the new Act, the
obligation of notification applies to transactions whose participants' total turnover in the preceding year
exceeds EUR 1 bln worldwide or EUR 50 mln in Poland.
4. The necessity for these changes arose from the OCCP's experience ­ they were supposed to
enable the President of the OCCP to focus on the biggest concentrations which may have an actual impact
on the state of concentration on the market.
5. In August 2007 a number of implementing regulations to the act have entered into force. Among
others, regulation on the method for calculating the turnover of entrepreneurs participating in
concentration, regulation concerning the notification of the intended concentration, regulation regarding
the detailed mode and procedure of inspection of entrepreneurs and associations of entrepreneurs in the
course of proceedings before the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection.
1.2 Other relevant measures, including new guidelines
6. The OCCP's Department of Legal Affairs and European Jurisprudence provides, on daily basis,
explanations to the queries of the entrepreneurs concerning the interpretation of the provisions of
competition law.
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2. Enforcement of competition laws and policies
2.1 Action against anticompetitive practices, including agreements and abuses of dominant
position
2.1.1 Summary of activities of:
* The Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
7. In 2007 the OCCP launched 248 proceedings in cases concerning anti-competitive practices
(including 8 on the basis of Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty).
Structure of the proceedings in detail
Total
Antimonopoly proceedings 248
a. antimonopoly proceedings in cases of horizontal agreements
- including: conducted on the basis of Art. 81 EC Treaty
26
1
b. antimonopoly proceedings in cases of vertical agreements
- including: conducted on the basis of Art. 81 EC Treaty
21
c.
antimonopoly proceedings in cases of abuse of dominant position
- including: conducted on the basis of Art. 82 EC Treaty
201
7
Explanatory proceedings 440
Structure of the decisions issued by the President of the OCCP in 2007
Type of practice
Horizontal
agreements
Vertical
agreements
Abuse of
dominant
position
Decisions finding the practice to be in breach with the competition
law, obligating to refrain from it
3 1 34
Decisions finding the practice to be in breach with the competition
law, finding the practice to be desist
3 2 16
Decisions finding the practice to be in compliance with the
competition law1
4 2 21
Interim decisions (Art. 89) - - Other
decisions (e.g., imposing a fine) 2 - 19
Decisions discontinuing the antimonopoly proceedings.
Because of:
2 1 19
a. the practice not found illegal2
- - 1
b. other reasons 2 1 18
1
Till the Act from 15 December 2000 on competition and consumer protection had been in force.
2
As of the Act from 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection has entered into force.
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* Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (CCCP):3
8. In 2007 the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (CCCP) issued a total of 91 rulings
concerning appeals from the decisions of the President of the OCCP. The division as to the type of cases is
the following:
a. judgments with respect to competition restricting practices ­ 87, out of which:
- 67 concerning abuse of dominant position
- 19 concerning horizontal agreements
- 1 concerning vertical agreements
b. judgements with respect to mergers ­ 4.
9. The CCCP overruled 11 decisions of the President of the OCCP, upheld 69 and changed 11 of
them.
* Appeal Court
10. In 2007 the Court of Appeal in Warsaw issued 34 judgments with respect to appeals from the
decisions of the CCCP regarding competition protection. Out of which:
- 30 concerning abuse of dominant position
- 3 concerning horizontal agreements
- 1 concerning vertical agreements
- 0 concerning mergers
* Supreme Court
11. In 2007 the Supreme Court issued 5 judgments with respect to competition cases.
- 4 concerning abuse of dominant position
- 1 concerning horizontal agreements
- 0 concerning vertical agreements
- 0 concerning mergers
3 The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection hears the appeals from the decisions of the President of the OCCP, as
well as those issued by sector regulators.
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2.1.2 Description of significant cases, including those with international implications
* Tender collusion
12. The basis of the OCCP actions was a request submitted by the Parexbud Multitrade Company. It
accused three enterprises ­ Impex Trade, ,,Fornit" Furniture Factory and L&L ­ of concluding an illegal
agreement while submitting bids in the tender. The enterprises bid for a public procurement contract for the
delivery and assembly of the equipment of the buildings on the border crossing in Dorohusk. The
irregularities were confirmed by the antitrust proceedings launched in July 2005 by the OCCP.
13. Institutions having public funds at their disposal are obliged to organise tenders if the
procurement exceeds EUR 14 thousand. That way they can select the best bid, which most often means the
cheapest one.
14. Examining the case, the President of the OCCP found that three bidders concluded an illegal
agreement with each other, which affected the course and the result of the tender. The most important
result of the collusion was the fact that it was the company chosen by the members of the cartel ­ "Fornit"
Furniture Factory ­ which won the bid and the bidders not participating in the collusion were excluded
from the tender.
15. The proceedings showed that the participants of the collusion had agreed the conditions of their
bids ­ including the prices. Moreover, they agreed to undertake common actions consisting in, i.a., a
deliberate failure to remove formal defects in the submitted documents. During the antitrust proceedings
the OCCP also found out that the three enterprises had had mutual business relations and had exchanged
information on regular basis.
16. Price collusion is considered one of the most serious infringements of the ban on competition
restricting practices. Participating in a collusion carries severe financial sanctions reaching up to 10% of
the company's previous year revenue. In the case of public procurement, collusions can additionally cause
unfavourable distribution of public property potentially causing the loss for the whole society. Therefore,
each tender collusion is forbidden irrespective of the market share of the entities taking part in it.
17. Establishing the amount of the fines the President of the OCCP took into consideration both the
income of the enterprises, as well as the extent to which the regulations had been violated. That is why, the
fines were diversified:
* Impex Trade ­ PLN 108 292;
* Fornit Furniture Factory ­ PLN 508 514;
* L&L ­ PLN 326 893.
18. It is worth mentioning that including regulations referring to tender collusiosn in the provisions
of an antitrust act is not a common practice in other European legislations and the Polish act is unique in
this respect.
* Discrimination against public broadcasters
19. The proceedings against EmiTel was launched in late 2005 on the motion of the Union of Public
Media Employers (Związek Pracodawców Mediów Publicznych). Its members ­ Polskie Radio, regional
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public radio broadcasting stations and Telewizja Polska ­ had accused EmiTel of varying rates for its
services.
20. In order to reach their audience, broadcasters disseminate their programmes by means of
transmission networks. Nowadays, radio and TV signal may be transmitted by means of, for example,
terrestrial, digital and cable networks. The most effective way of reaching the audience is the terrestrial
network ­ more than 50% of households in Poland receive the signal through this kind of network
exclusively. TP EmiTel is the monopolist and the main provider of terrestrial network services in Poland. It
owns 459 (out of 527) TV signal transmitting stations and more than a half of the 811 radio signal
transmission stations.
21. In the course of the proceedings the President of the OCCP investigated the agreements signed by
TP EmiTel with its clients. The investigation revealed that the company varied its rates, discriminating
against public broadcasters and favouring the commercial ones ­ the differences amounted to up to 35%.
22. The practices of TP EmiTel were clearly of anticompetitive nature, especially due to the fact that
public broadcasters have been the major and long-term recipients of the company's services. In the opinion
of the OCCP, the discriminatory practices were aimed against potential new transmission networks
operators, which could offer the broadcasters more favourable rates and bind them for a long time. It
should be stressed that changing the terrestrial network operator by a broadcaster entails a number of
technical and organisational issues, such as for instance the need to obtain new frequency reservations.
Therefore, once a broadcaster starts cooperation with an operator, it is considerably less willing to switch
to its competitors.
23. By offering preferential, although still profitable to itself, rates for new commercial broadcasters
entering the market, TP EmiTel discouraged them from looking for alternative operators, thus limiting the
development of competition on the market. Offering preferential rates was even easier for the company due
to the fact that it renders its services to commercial broadcasters using mainly the same infrastructure (for
instance, masts) as with respect to public broadcasters, which has a direct impact on the costs. However,
only TP EmiTel profited from the lower fixed costs resulting from the wider base of clients, since the rates
charged to public broadcasters for transmission services had been growing regularly. Only the agreements
that have been signed recently (in 2007) provide for reduced rates, however, the President of the OCCP
ruled that the rates were still discriminatory.
24. In the opinion of the OCCP, TP EmiTel decided to take over the biggest possible share of the
new market segment that emerged as a result of the liberalisation of the radio and TV broadcasting sector.
Offering attractive rates to the new market participants, TP EmiTel discouraged them from trying to create
or use alternative terrestrial transmission networks.
25. The President of the OCCP fined TP EmiTel with over PLN 19 million and ordered the company
to discontinue its practices. Such a high fine results from an exceptionally blameworthy nature of TP
EmiTel's practices. What is more, the President of the OCCP decided that the fine be immediately
enforceable. Had he not done so, and assuming that the company appeals, this negative market
phenomenon would stay in place. Without the immediate enforceability order, the decision would, in fact,
be ineffective: the discriminated clients might even succumb to the pressure of TP EmiTel, since the
prolonging situation of lack of contractual arrangements concerning the terms of obtaining radio and TV
transmission services would increase the risk associated with conducting business.
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* Competition restrictions on insurance market
26. PZU Życie is one of the biggest insurance companies that operate in Poland. Its share of the
market of employee group insurance remains on a level exceeding 90%. The antimonopoly proceedings,
which the President of the OCCP launched in June 2005 were meant to check if the company had not
abused its dominant position.
27. A motion for the President of the OCCP to launch the proceedings had been submitted by ten
employers. In their opinion, the fact that the insurance company included in its contracts with them
numerous unfavourable clauses (such as, for example, the requirement that terminating the contract is
possible only with prior consent of the insured employees, despite the fact that they are not party to the
contract) violated the antimonopoly law.
28. Having examined the case, the President of the OCCP supported the position of the motioning
party, stating that the insurance giant's conduct may effectively impede the possibility of using the offers
of its competitors and has a major impact on the conditions of operating on this market.
29. In particular, the President of the OCCP considered it reprehensible that employers wanting to
withdraw from the contract with PZU Życie for employee group life insurance were obliged to pay the
premiums for a three-month notice period. Under the existing law, an employee accepting to take out an
insurance policy agrees that the insurance premium be deducted from his/her salary. At the time of
withdrawal from the insurance agreement, such authorisation may be withdrawn as well, and the costs for
the notice period are born by the employer.
30. On 1 January 2004 PZU Życie changed some of the clauses that the OCCP had found
questionable, for instance the requirement of the prior consent of at least 75% of the employees for an
insurance agreement to be effectively terminated. However, not all of the contracts made before that day
have been annexed by now. This means that all of the questionable practices are still applied.
31. Taking the above into account and considering the fact that the employers who entered into an
insurance agreement with PZU Życie in the period 1993-2003 had to obtain a consent of at least 75% of
the insured employees in order to terminate the agreement, the President ordered PZU Życie to change its
conduct immediately.
32. A fine exceeding PLN 50 million was imposed on the company. This severe sanction results from
an exceptionally great scale and long time frame of PZU Życie's infringements.
33. Due to the fact that the practices of PZU Życie may have an impact on the trade between the EU
Member States, the decision was issued on the basis of the EU legislation. According to the relevant
procedure, it was consulted with the European Commission.
* Competition restricting practices of the Polish Telecom
34. The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection initiated the antimonopoly
proceedings against Telekomunikacja Polska (TP SA) in December 2004, based on information from other
telecommunication operators. The competitors of the biggest telecommunications company in Poland
accused it of applying illegal restrictions in the data transmission on the Internet. During the proceedings
the employees of the OCCP conducted inspections at the premises of TP SA. The evidence collected
during the inspections, together with the results of a specially commissioned expert study, formed the
grounds for a decision finding TP SA guilty of using unfair practices. In the opinion of the OCCP, the
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restrictions in the data transmission resulted from Telekomunikacja Polska programming its appliances in a
way that hindered the other operators' access to the Network.
35. The Internet is constructed of a number of mutually connected telecommunication networks, with
the smallest ones consisting of only two computers and the biggest ­ of millions of them. The networks
may be managed by many Internet operators. In order to connect them with one another special appliances
are used. Their task is to orderly transmit the data from the sender to the receiver. These appliances are
called routers and their function may be compared to the role of a policeman steering the traffic ­ they
guide the transmission of data on the Network. Routers' operations are defined in the so-called
configuration files, which are special commands installed in them.
36. TP SA's market competitors may transmit data using the company's infrastructure either directly,
or indirectly, through cheaper foreign operators. The antimonopoly proceedings conducted by the President
of the OCCP revealed that Telekomunikacja Polska had introduced special commands (filters) into its
routers, which was meant to restrict the transmission of the data depending on their origin. When TP SA's
competitors chose to use the transmission services of cheaper foreign operators, the company effectively
restricted their activity by deteriorating the quality of their services with the filters. As a consequence, the
operators were forced to acquire the services directly from Telekomunikacja Polska, for a price that was
even several times higher than that offered by the foreign operators. The result of this practice was a
distinct deterioration, or even a complete impediment, of the transmission of data by TP SA's competitors.
37. In the opinion of the President of the OCCP the practice of Telekomunikacja Polska is illegal the
company breached competition law. As a result of the violation, the services of TP SA's competitors
became unavailable to a great number of TP SA's clients. That is why the OCCP ordered the company to
change its conduct immediately. In addition, a fine of PLN 75 million was imposed on the operator.
38. Due to the fact that the proceedings had been conducted both on the basis of national and
Community law, the draft decision had been consulted with the European Commission.
2.2 Mergers and acquisitions
2.2.1 Statistics on number, size and type of mergers notified and/or controlled under competition laws
39. Number of cases in 2007 ­ 310
40. Number of cases finished in 2007 ­ 263, including:
* clearances: 205
* conditional clearance: 2
* prohibition of merger: 0
* penalty for not notifying the intention of merger: 4
* remittance of proceedings in the case: 40
* return of the motion: 12
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Merger cases in 2007 by sector:
53
39
2016
14
14
13
13
9
38
trade
food
energy
real estate
media
finance
banks
construction
transport
others
2.2.2 Summary of significant cases
* Concentration in concrete
41. The first conditional clearance in 2007 concerned German concern specialising in production and
sales of concrete.
42. Both CRH Deutschland and E. Schwenk operate in Poland in the sector of production and sales
of concrete. They own a total of 40 companies. As the turnover of both companies in Poland exceeded
EUR 50 million the OCCP had to give its clearance for the take over of control by the first entrepreneur
over the second one.
43. Having analysed the planned transaction, the OCCP expressed its consent to it under one
condition. By the end of 2008, CRH Deutschland will have to sell to an independent buyer all the shares in
the Res-Bet company it owns. The execution of this condition aims to protect competition in Podkarpacie
region. Leaving this company in the hands of CRH Deutschland would lead to a strong consolidation in the
Rzeszów region.
44. As a result of the transaction, the German concern will take over the control over E. Schwenk, its
11 subsidiaries and will become a shareholder in 4 other companies, out of which three are concrete
producers.
45. Pursuant to the law, the execution of this transaction without the antimonopoly office's clearance
entitles the President of the OCCP to undertake actions aimed at restoring the state of effective
competition. He may for example order the division of the entrepreneur or a sale of a part of shares and
impose a fine amounting up to 10% of entrepreneur's revenue.
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* Conditional clearance for supermarkets
46. At the beginning of April 2007, acting on the President of the OCCP's request, the European
Commission transferred the case of the two supermarket chains concentration to the Polish antimonopoly
office. Consequently, on 11 April 2007 Carrefour Nederland filed a request to the OCCP for clearance to
take control over Ahold Polska.
47. In the course of the antimonopoly proceedings the President of the OCCP examined how the
envisaged transaction would influence the retail sales of foodstuffs, bulk supplies and the turnover of fuels.
48. The Office's analysis showed that joining the activity of the two chains will have a negative
effect on the retail sales in local markets. That is why the President of the OCCP granted a conditional
clearance for the acquisition. According to the OCCP's decision, Carrefour can take control over Ahold, if,
by the end of 2008, it gives up all rights, including property rights, perpetual usufruct rights and leasholds,
in relation to the following supermarkets: Champion in Grodzisk Mazowiecki, Albert in Jaworzno,
Hypernova in Pabianice, Albert and Carrefour in Chrzanów, Champion in Sochaczew, Albert in
Konstantynów Łódzki and Hypernova and Albert in Zamość.
49. The President of the OCCP decided to grant a conditional clearance, because otherwise the
concentration would lead to a significant restriction of competition in the local markets in Grodzisk
Mazowiecki, Jaworzno, Pabianice, Sochaczew and Zamość.
50. Moreover, the President of the OCCP obliged the company to provide information about the
method of realisation of the imposed condition within a fixed time limit.
51. As a consequence, Carrefour is able to take over 183 Albert supermarkets and 15 Hypernova
mini hypermarkets, as well as 4 petrol stations.
52. Since Poland's accession to the European Union the largest transactions that can influence the
Community internal market must obtain clearance from the European Commission. In special cases the
national antimonopoly office can ask for the case to be transferred. In particular, this happens when the
initial analysis indicates a possibility of granting a conditional clearance or prohibiting the concentration.
So far the OCCP has addressed the Commission in two cases. They concerned the creation of a common
entity by Burda and Hachette Filipacchi (magazine market) and the takeover of BOC by Linde (technical
gases market).
* Take over of Gdansk Shipyard cleared
53. The transaction, notified to the OCCP in October 2007, consisted in ISD Polska, a company
belonging to the Donbass Group, taking control over the Gdańsk Shipyard.
54. The Ukrainian company operates on the smelting products markets, as well as on the coke and
coal derivatives markets. The envisaged transaction was supposed to result in ISD Polska acquiring over
80% of the Gdańsk Shipyard shares.
55. Having conducted the necessary proceedings, the President of the Office concluded that the
takeover is not going to restrict competition, in particular, it is not going to result in the creation or
strengthening of a dominant market position.
56. According to the Act on competition and consumer protection of 16 February 2007 only
transactions involving enterprises whose aggregate turnover exceeded EUR 1 bln world-wide or EUR 50
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mln in Poland in the preceding year must be notified. This way, only the largest concentrations that may
have actual impact on competition are subject to the OCCP's control.
57. It is also worth reminding that carrying out a concentration without prior clearance, even if
unintentionally, may result in the OCCP imposing a fine of up to 10% of the concerned company's
revenue. In some cases, the clearance may be made conditional on dividing the target company, selling part
of its assets, or shares.
3. The role of competition authorities in the formulation and implementation of other policies,
e.g. regulatory reform, trade and industrial policies
58. The activities carried out by the OCCP with an aim of influencing other policies, might be
divided into two categories: Office's opining activities in regard of drafts of the legal acts prepared by
other ministries and participation of the OCCP's employees in the activities of various governmental as
well as parliamentary working groups and committees.
59. The procedural mechanisms for drafting legal acts by the Polish governmental institutions
provide for an obligation to consult all drafts with any other governmental agency, which activities might
be affected by the would-be law. In 2007 the OCCP continued its active participation in legislation process
on Polish and EU drafts of legislative acts and other documents. Furthermore, approximately 2000 drafts of
legal acts were opined by the OCCP. When making its comments the Office puts an emphasis on
consistency of those acts with competition law, including the state aid law, as well as the issues related to
protection of consumers' interests.
60. Since 2004 the President of the Office has been vested with the obligations to monitor State aid.
He gives opinions on aid schemes and cases of individual aid before their formal notification to the
Commission, he evaluates, among others, compatibility of the proposed actions with the common market,
and in case of incompatibility, suggests specific solutions. The opinion of the President of the Office is not
binding, yet, in the light of the hitherto experience, it can be assumed that, as a rule, it reflects the stance of
the Commission.
61. On the basis of the reports submitted by entities granting assistance and its beneficiaries the
President of the OCCP prepares annual reports on State aid, taking into consideration most of all its
effectiveness as well as its impact on competition. In 2007 71 opinions were issued on State aid granted to
entrepreneurs, where 53 opinions concerned aid schemes and 18 ­ projects of individual aid. The Office
received 342 motions for giving the interpretation. 26 projects were notified to the EC through the OCCP.
62. The issues most commonly dealt with concerned: agriculture, hunting and related service
activities, capital funds investing in micro, small and medium enterprises, telecommunications,
forestry, restructuring of transport, storage and communication, monetary intermediation, state aid granted
to the mining and quarrying, air transport and legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and management consultancy; holdings
sector.
63. Furthermore, the OCCP participated in works on legal amendments in Act on the procedural
issues concerning public aid. The reason for these changes is to adjust Polish provisions to EU law, as well
as implementing the electronic system of public aid monitoring. The new resolution on certificates
concerning de minimis aid and de minimis aid in agriculture and fisheries has commenced to be binding in
2007.
64. In addition, the Office is responsible for presenting the annual report on public aid monitoring to
European Commission (so called spreadsheets) and reports for Polish Parliament. Six-months reports
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concerning state aid granted to automobile companies conducting economic activity within the Special
Economic Zones are also prepared and presented to the EC.
65. Moreover, the OCCP continued its work in enforcing of the national State aid monitoring system
aiming at a greater transparency and better exchange of data for securing a reliable register of the aid
granted. The OCCP also elaborated analysis concerning the state aid granted. The most important
document was "Research conception on effectiveness, productivity and transparency of State aid granting
".
4. Resources of competition authorities
4.1 Resources overall4:
4.1.1 Annual budget
2006 2007
PLN USD** PLN USD***
Total annual budget 42 mln 660 14 mln 659.793 46 mln 750 21mln347.031
Expenditure structure
(a) OCCP 25 mln 595 8 mln 795 26 mln 600 12 mln 146
(b) TICI* 13 mln 705 4 mln 709 17 mln 700 8 mln 082
(c) funding for non-governmental
associations carrying out
governmental consumer
protection tasks
2 mln 100 721.649.000 2 mln 400 1 mln 095
*
Trade Inspection Chief Inspectorate
**
1 USD = 2.91 PLN
*** 1 USD=2.19 PLN
4.1.2 Number of employees
* Employment
No. of employees
As of 1 Jan 2007 285
As of 31 Dec 2007 281
On average in the course of the year 276.56
* Employment structure as of 31 December 2007
Lawyers Economists Other professions Total:
2007 124 67 90 281
4
Period covered by the above information: 1 January 2007 ­ 31 December 2007. All amounts rounded
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5. Summaries of or references to new reports and studies on competition policy issues
5.1 Market analysis
66. In 2007 the OCCP carried out 53 researches: 34 concerned nationwide market, 19-local markets.
67. One of the research was devoted to assessing restrictions of competition in the sector of
production and distribution of music recordings. The analysis demonstrated that the market is dominated
by four global phonographic consortiums, whose total market share amounts to almost 75%. The system
of distribution has itself unfavorable impact on the competition. Practically, 70% of the recordings is
directed to specialist, home appliances, radio, TV and large surface networks. The bargaining power of
these networks causes that the required conditions are not to be fulfilled by the smaller entities. As a result,
to reach the mass recipient they are forced to distribute the recordings through the global consortiums.
Therefore, the big phonographic firms are able to control the sale of the independent producers'
phonograms. The outcomes of the research stirred up the OCCP's doubts and anxiety with regard to the
fact that, although the level of the recordings' sale has decreased significantly and despite the development
of the digital music, the reduction of the CD prices has not occurred.
68. Other interesting reports concerned three regulated sectors: fix-lined telephonic network, postal
services and electric energy. The pending changes in regulated sectors, especially gradual opening it to the
mechanisms of free competition, forces the antimonopoly agency and regulators to intensify the activities
undertaken to protect the competition in these fields and give them more focus.
69. Other reports and expertise opinions prepared by the OCCP (or with cooperation of other
institutions) are available at: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/ochrona_konkurencji/analiza_rynkow (only in
Polish version).
70. Reports on OCCP activities are available at:
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/en/information_about_the_occp/general_information/reports_of_activities/
5.2 Information and education activities
71. As in previous years, the OCCP conducted intense information and educational activities, which
were focused mainly on raising awareness as to the law regulations in the area of competition protection.
72. The OCCP had issued numerous publications with regard to competition protection:
5.2.1 Bulletin "competition law in every day life"
73. The OCCP has published 6 issues of a bulletin "competition law in every day life" edited on a
monthly basis. Its main aim is to raise the awareness of the society with regard to competition issues. The
subsequent bulletins contains, among others, such information as: adverse effects of unlawful agreements
concluded by entrepreneurs for the consumers, indirect and direct imposing of unfair practices, impact of
mergers on the position of the consumers on the market. The electronic Polish version:
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/biuletyn/
5.2.2 Book positions published in 2007
`American and European systems of competition protection'- the collection of the papers delivered at the
seminar on the same topic, which was hosted by the OCCP in 2006 :
www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/ochrona_konkurencji/#pytanie18
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`Economic instruments in competition protection'- C. Bongard, D. Moller, A. Reimann, N. Szadkowski,
Warsaw/Bonn 2007 :
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/ochrona_konkurencji/#pytan
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`Competition in contemporary economy'- editorship led by C. Banasinski, E. Stawicki, Warsaw 2007 , the
set of lectures from the seminar hold by the OCCP in Poznan I n 2006 :
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/ochrona_konkurencji/#pytan
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5.2.3 Brochures and press supplements:
`Competition law- the main terms', Warsaw 2007 :
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/ochrona_konkurencji/#pytan
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`Well, what does the competition give to the entrepreneur?' ­ the supplement to the weekly magazine
`Polityka'. It explains the basic issues of the Polish competition law, the OCCP competences in this
scope, indicates what kind of benefits free competition gives to the enterprises :
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/dodatki_do_prasy/#pytanie2
` Well, what does the competition give to the consumers'- also the supplement to the Polityka magazine;
simple guidebook for consumers explaining the antimonopoly issues :
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_edukacja/edukacja/publikacje/dodatki_do_prasy/#pytanie1
74. All together 13 items concerning competition protection have been issued in the previous year.
75. The Office actively cooperated with the national and local media; 24 press releases regarded
competition protection have been published. There have been 14 press conferences organized by the
antimonopoly agency; around 6 with regard to competition protection.