Reflections on Jihad:  
A Former Leader's Perspective 
 
 
An Indepth Conversation with Noman Benotman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By Frank J. Cilluffo and F. Jordan Evert 
 
 
October 16, 2009 
 
 
 
While  many  counterterrorism  experts  pay  much  attention  to  the  tactics  and  modus 
operandi of specific organizations in an effort to defeat them, alQaeda, its franchises, 
and likeminded groups tap into a much broader narrative that inspires and shapes their 
operations.  The  thinking  of  former  members  of  alQaeda  and  associated  groups 
provides a unique window into this narrative.  
 
In  the  past  few  years,  many  key  figures  have  renounced  violent  jihadist  ideology, 
including  members  of  the  Egyptian  alGama'a alIslamiyya;  Sayyid  Imam  alSharif (Dr. 
Fadl),  former  Emir  in  the  Egyptian  Islamic  Jihad,  whose  ideology  is  at  the  core  of  al
Qaeda's thinking; militants from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and across Southeast Asia; and 
most recently, the leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Peter Bergen 
and Paul Cruickshank write here about the impact of such efforts, featuring specifically 
the story of Noman Benotman (profiled with other former militants in Salon here). 
 
Noman  Benotman  was  a  core  member  of  the  LIFG,  an  Islamist  organization  that  for 
decades  dedicated  itself  to  the  overthrow  of  Muammar  Qadhafi.  At  one  point, 
Benotman served as a member of LIFG's governing Shura Committee. In many ways, his 
ideological background is similar to that of alQaeda's senior leadership. He too fought 
in Afghanistan and even advised Osama bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri on strategy.  
 
In the summer of 2000, Benotman traveled as the LIFG representative to a gathering of 
jihadists from across the Arab world convened by bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan. It 
was at this time that Benotman began to break with alQaeda's leaders over differences 
in opinion about strategy.  
 
At  first  the  break  was  private.  Benotman  warned  bin  Laden  that  a  jihad  against  the 
United States would backfire. In November 2007 however, the break became public. In 
an open letter to alZawahiri, Benotman argued that alQaeda's tactics violated Islam's 
call for the protection of "man's religion, life, mind, offspring, and wealth." He called on 
the organization to declare a unilateral cessation of military operations.  
 
During  this timeframe, Benotman  also  met  with  HSPI  Director  Frank Cilluffo  to  share 
initial  thoughts  on  many  of  the  issues  discussed  in  depth  in  the  detailed  interview 
below. 
 
Also in November 2007, alZawahiri and Abu Laith alLiby (who claimed to be speaking 
on behalf of LIFG) announced in an audio recording that LIFG was formally merging into 
the  larger  alQaeda  network.  The  validity  of  this  merger  remains  unclear,  as  is  the 
question  of  who  truly  speaks  for  LIFG--a  topic  that  Evan  Kohlmann's  entry  on 
Counterterrorism Blog addresses here. 
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 1
 
 
 
The  issue  resurfaced  this  summer,  when  a  group  of  authors  writing  under  the  name 
"Islamic Fighting Group ­ Britain" issued a communiqué on July 3, 2009 nullifying LIFG's 
membership in alQaeda. The authors argue that alLiby acted without the consent of 
LIFG's  leadership.  Furthermore,  they  publically  criticize  alQaeda  for  its  "wrongful 
practices like random bombings, destroying private and public property, and targeting 
civilians." 
 
In August 2009, it was announced that LIFG members were preparing to issue the Book 
of Correctional Studies (alkitab aldirasat altashihiyya) [in Arabic here]. The book serves 
as a lengthy refutation of alQaeda's jihadist ideology. The Libyan daily Oea has been 
rolling  out  sections  of  the  book  in  serialized  form.  The  UK's  Quilliam  Foundation  has 
released  a  selected  translation  of  the  text,  and  Jihadica  has  provided  some  initial 
analysis of the text. It is also worth noting that in 2008, on his first visit to the United 
States,  Quilliam  Foundation  Director  Maajid  Nawaz  spoke  at  the  Homeland  Security 
Policy Institute (HSPI) on the topic of countering violent jihadism. 
 
Correctional Studies was authored chiefly by Emir Abdullah al Sadeq, the LIFG's leader, 
and Abu Munder alSaidi, the group's spiritual leader. The theological challenge posed 
by the book has the potential to embarrass, undermine, and isolate alQaeda (and its 
network of violent Islamists) from their target audience of prospective supporters.  
 
One prominent coauthor, Abdul Wahhab alQaid (Abu Idris), is a former LIFG leader and 
the older brother of Abu Yahya alLiby. AlLiby is the spiritual leader of alQaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who seems to be increasingly positioning himself as successor 
to bin Laden. What makes alLiby quite dangerous is that he has a religious pedigree 
that bin Laden and alZawahiri lack. In turn, what makes Abu Idris so compelling is his 
denunciation of alLiby. Jarret Brachman has contributed valuable thinking on both of 
these subjects (see here and here).  
 
Hoping to shed further light on these new developments as well as other related topics, 
HSPI posed a series of indepth questions to Benotman. Topics included the impact of 
the  July  3rd
  communiqué  and  Correctional  Studies  on  alQaeda's  ability  to  keep 
supporters  and  recruit  new  followers;  conceptions  of  legitimate  jihad;  the  governing 
structure of LIFG; the process of transitioning from an alQaeda ally to open critic; and 
strategies  for  resolving  the  conflict  in  Afghanistan.  For  their  candor  and  insight, 
Benotman's  responses  are  a  valuable  resource  for  policymakers,  practitioners,  and 
academics alike. 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 2
 
 
 
How  was  the  decision  to  release  the  July  3rd  communiqué  reached?   Was  there 
a particular event or set of criteria that precipitated this decision?   
 
It  was  a  very  difficult  decision  because  of  the  absence  of  charismatic,  powerful 
leadership,  so  all  these  people  had  to  cooperate  based  on  open  dialogue.  There  are 
some key figures who played a significant role to galvanise support to get individuals to 
agree with the dialogue between the government and the LIFG. One of the main factors 
that encouraged these people to release the communiqué was their conclusion that the 
process of dialogue had reached its final stage. 
 
Two  important  measures  convinced  them  to  support  the  dialogue.  First,  they  were 
certain  that  the  group  and  its  leaders  in  prison  were  acting  based  on  their  free  will. 
Second, the Libyan Government was seriously committed to dialogue and reconciliation. 
 
In  November  2007,  AlQaeda's  Ayman  alZawahiri  along  with  Abu  Laith  alLiby 
announced  with  great  fanfare  that  LIFG  had  merged  with  AlQaeda,  yet  in  the 
communiqué it states Abu Laith alLiby did so on his own and without "approval of 
most members in the Shura Majlis."  Can you expand upon this statement?  How is 
LIFG governed?  Have the rules for decisionmaking changed over time?  What insights 
can you provide on Abu Yahya alLiby, now one of the leaders of AQIM and also a 
current or former member of LIFG? 
 
The decision to dismantle the group, or merge with another group, or even to change its 
name, is an organizational decision that no individual in the LIFG leadership has the right 
to make on his own. The LIFG in its constitution puts these kinds of decisions in the 
hands of the shura council members collectively. Not even the leader of the group has 
the power or the authority to make organizational decisions regarding the group. That's 
why Abu Laith's decision does not represent the group and is illegitimate. 
 
The LIFG constitution specifies its governing structure of committees, departments, and 
authorities, as well as the nature of the relationships between the parts of the group. 
The constitution has developed over the years. Since the early90s, the shura council 
discusses and reviews the constitution as part of the agenda for every general meeting. 
 
Abu  Yahya  alLiby  (Hassan  Gayid)  has  not  announced  his  resignation  from  the  group 
directly  because  of  his  loyalty  to  the  group  and  its  leadership.  Because  of  the 
circumstances surrounding him, he decided with other individuals to subscribe to the al
Qaeda network. This action from the LIFG point of view means he is no longer a member 
of the group--its automatic dismembership.  
 
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 3
 
 
 
The bottom line is that Abu Yahya alLiby is a significant part of the AlQaeda leadership, 
not just in AQIM, but in the whole network worldwide he is the most influential and 
spiritual  figure  so  far.  In  the  future,  for  him  the  sky  is  the  limit  to  be  the  top  Jihadi 
theorist worldwide, but I am not sure he can make it as bin Laden's successor, as some 
reports have mentioned. 
 
What strategic impact do you think the July communiqué will have?  Upon AlQaeda 
specifically?  How  about  upon  alQaeda's  narrative,  "brand,"  and  strength?   Do  you 
think  the  effects  will  vary  among  Muslim  populations  living  in  the  Arab  world  and 
those living in the West and elsewhere?  The communiqué is signed "Islamic Fighting 
Group ­ Britain."  Are the authors vulnerable to charges that they do not represent 
the majority of LIFG members?   
 
The communiqué by itself has no impact on the strategic level, despite its importance  in 
encouraging and supporting the LIFG members and leadership in prison to keep doing 
good work and to reach the final destination of the dialogue between the group and the 
government. The communiqué will deny anyone in the future the opportunity or the 
possibility  to  try  to  regroup  and  reorganise  for  another round  of  struggle  based  on 
violence. 
 
The real strategic impact will come from the recently released book, "Corrective Studies 
in Understanding Jihad, Accountability, and the Judgment of the People," written by six 
members of the LIFG leadership, including Abdullah Sadik, the leader of the group, and 
Abu Munder Saidi, the spiritual leader of the group.  
 
This new book is the fruit of the dialogue between the government and the LIFG that 
started in January 2007. A lot of Arab national daily newspapers started running series 
of  this  book,  including  papers  in  Libya,  Algeria,  and  Jordan.  I  think  this  book,  if  it  is 
compounded with the release of the approximately 200 LIFG members in prison, will 
have much more strategic effect. The most important strategic impact for the 478page 
book is not that it has pragmatically denounced violence, but that it has ideologically de
legitimised violence. 
 
What are the hallmarks of legitimate jihad?  When is it permissible and under what 
circumstances?  How sound are AlQaeda's theological underpinnings?  Do you believe 
that their ideology should be further theologically challenged by Islamic scholars and 
other  jihadist  leaders?  What  are  AlQaeda's  greatest  strengths?   What  are  their 
greatest  weaknesses?   If  they  continue  down  the  path  they  have  pursued,  what  is 
their future?  
 
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 4
 
 
 
Discussing  what  is  legitimate  Jihad  and  what  is  not  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  and 
complex  issues  facing  all  Muslims  worldwide  and  the  rest  of  the  intellectuals  and 
thinkers in the West. Despite all that I would like to say, the most important thing is the 
framework and the approach to discuss arguing, theorising, and conceptualising Jihad.  
 
From my point of view, I would like to say taking in account the religious text in the 
Quran and authentic Hadeeth (saying of the prophet) in the twentyfirst century is not 
just a Muslim issue despite it being one of the Muslim duties in specific circumstances, 
but it's an issue affecting the whole world because here we talk about war and peace. 
That's why  I strongly believe that the departure point arguing about  legitimate Jihad 
should be approached from an international relations studies point of view. That means 
when we are theorising and analysing Jihad we take in account our contemporary world, 
which is significantly different from various historical phases in the past.  
 
My point is Muslims should theorise and understand Jihad (war and peace) based on the 
contemporary phase. That is why I believe the departure point is international relations 
studies, so we can utilise the knowledge compilation developed by humanity to discuss 
how to regulate, control, and establish laws and rules for war. 
 
What  I've  said  makes  AlQaeda's  theological  underpinnings  unrelative  and  unstable, 
because AlQaeda heavily depends on two elements. First, a mechanical understanding 
from ideas, concepts, and visions written hundreds of years ago. So I can say AlQaeda 
understands and theorises our modern life through glasses made thousands  of  years 
ago. Second, the imbalance of power between Muslim countries and the West, which is 
one  of  the  main  sources  contributing  to  Muslim  weakness,  fragmentation, 
underdevelopment, and grievances. 
 
AlQaeda  poses  serious  threats  not  to  the  West  only  but  to  the  Muslim  countries  as 
well. If it's killing thousands of Westerns and NonMuslims worldwide, it is doing the 
same  thing  in  the  Muslim  countries,  plus  highjacking  Islam  itself.  So  an  ideological 
confrontation  between  AlQaeda  and  Muslim  scholars,  intellectuals,  and  thinkers  is 
inevitable to uncover and delegitimise terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, which are 
established as a school of thought in terms of understanding and having a strategy to 
act in the name of Islam. 
 
In the last nine years, you've transitioned from being an alQaeda ally, to sincere critic, 
to a position of open dissent ­ why? 
 
The  bottom  line  is  I  am  a  politician.  I have  dreams,  hopes,  and  vision.  Taking  that  in 
account, my agenda dictating who is my Ally and who is not. And during the period of 
the Soviet's invasion in Afghanistan, all the parties who shared the same objective of  
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 5
 
 
 
defeating the Empire of Evil (The Soviet Union) were one way or another allies despite 
the  differences  between  all  of  them.  And  AlQaeda  20  years  ago  was  completely 
different  from  the  AlQaeda  of  today.  I  strongly  believe  all  Muslims  should  criticise 
and resist AlQaeda attempts to hijack the Islamic agenda, in both levels domestic and 
international. 
 
When you joined LIFG, what was your concept of the movement?  What were your 
hopes  and  goals  in  Libya;  in  Afghanistan;  and  for  Islamic  communities  around  the 
world?  
 
I never ever believed that the LIFG is the Muslim nation or the Libyan society. It's just a 
group  of  Muslims  who  believe  that  Libyan  society  constitutes  100%  of  Muslims  who 
have the right to establish and build a Nation State based on Sharia law. And the LIFG 
can act as driver, catalyst, and vanguard to speed up the process of transforming the 
Libyan society to the Islamic version.  
 
Our  goal  in  Afghanistan  was  achieved,  which  was  to  defeat  the  enemy,  liberate  the 
whole country from communism, and help the Mujahideen to take over the governance 
of Afghanistan. Since then the LIFG quit fighting, and it didn't take any part in the civil 
war between yesterday's Mujahideen and today's Rulers. Even during the period of the 
Taliban the LIFG took no part in the fight against the other groups, and it was a Shura 
decision.  
 
Regarding  the  communities  in  the  Islamic  world,  we  are  as  individuals  in  the  Islamic 
fighting  group  the  LIFG.  We  have  our  individual  hopes  and  sketchy  visions  for  the 
Muslim nation worldwide, but the group itself, LIFG, has no agenda regarding that issue 
because  it's  been  built  based  on  National  Struggle.  This  despite  the  cooperation 
between the LIFG and other Muslim groups in other places of the world, but that's a 
normal  response  to  given  circumstances,  not  based  on  political  agenda  intentionally 
being developed. 
 
What motivated LIFG and the Libyan government to engage in peace talks in recent 
years?  What is the current status of these discussions?  What lessons can be learned 
from this process?  
 
I have to say the idea and the initiative was launched by Saif Islam AlQadafi, Colonel 
Muamer AlQadafi's son, in December 2007. Because I was in the heart of that process 
since its  launch,  I  can  say  without  a doubt  that  Saif  AlIslam  himself  was  the main 
driver and the power house for its sure success. And the LIFG, when they knew that Saif 
AlIslam was sponsoring the initiative, they showed no hesitation to accept the window 
of opportunity to engage in the process of peace talks. 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 6
 
 
 
And  I  think due  to  the circumstances  surrounding  the  group,  when  the  initiative  was 
launched it did motivate the group to engage. Most of the group had been arrested, 
including six of the leaders. At this time there was also the dominance of the AlQaeda
like style of Jihad, which is based on stray, blind violence. So the group was in a position 
to think and reflect about their experience and to come to a conclusion about the use of 
violence and the negative impact imposed by Radical Islam Ideology to the future of 
Islam itself. And here I can say I am quoting them because they have told me that in 
person in 2007, during one of my visits to the prison when we were in the middle of 
peace talks. 
 
As  for  the  current  status,  I  can  say  we've  reached  the  final  destination,  thank  god 
successfully, because the group issued their new book [Correctional Studies] which de
legitimises the use of terrorism and violence. And now we are waiting for the final move 
from the government to start the process of releasing all of them, taking in account the 
security  measures  and  precautions.  There  are  many  lessons  one  can  take  from  this 
process, but the most important one is sometimes we face problems which appear to be 
unsolvable because our minds have been set by default. And when we start to think of 
the unthinkable we find that those unsolvable problems are actually solvable, and the 
main problem was our way of thinking, not the problem itself. 
 
Is complete reconciliation possible?   
 
Yes of course. 
 
In your November 2007 open letter to Dr. Ayman alZawahiri, you urge alQaeda to 
take  a  more  inclusive  approach  and  return  to  "mainstream"  Islam.   What  are  the 
tenets of mainstream Islam?  Can alQaeda ever really support it? 
 
This is one of the main problematic and debatable issues, mainstream Islam. And that is 
because the political presence of the Muslim nation, the Caliph, does not exist anymore. 
So we don't have a political entity we can identify as the Muslim nation. The current 
existence of the Muslim nation is at the faithful level--people sharing the same faith, 
belief, and creed. But they are divided into about 55 independent sovereign countries, 
plus dozens of Muslim communities in non Muslim States.  
 
Taking that in account imagine how difficult it is to identify mainstream Islam in this 
plural  sphere,  despite  all  I  can  say  about  the  fact  that  throughout  the  history  of  the 
Muslim nation--since its existence over 1500 years ago--the Sunni School of thought 
always is the dominant power and force representing mainstream Islam. Our problem 
here is AlQaeda itself. Its point of departure is between the Sunni sect of Islam and the  
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 7
 
 
 
Salafist  Ideology,  but  public  opinion  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  Muslim  Sunni 
worldwide reject and do not accept AlQaeda's understanding or interpretation of Islam.  
 
The main three different points here between AlQaeda and the Sunni sect of Islam are: 
 First; the issue of loyalty. AlQaeda practically transformed this concept from its 
traditional understanding--which is that all Muslims are loyal to each other--to 
the notion that all Muslims should be loyal to AlQaeda and if you're not, that 
means there is something wrong with your faith, belief, and creed, and you may 
end  up  being  identified  as  a  non  Muslim  from  AlQaeda's  point  of  view.  This 
understanding is one of the main sources of bad and sometimes evil reactions 
committed by AlQaeda members. 
 Second; their understanding of Jihad, which has been transformed from ethical 
and moral action based on justice to be nonsense terrorist activities.  
 Third;  traditionally  Muslim  leaders  are  of  two  characters.  One  is  people  with 
authority and power, like presidents, kings, and princes. They are the source of 
political legitimacy. The other is people who have the moral power, the Scholars 
(Ulama), and they are the source of religious legitimacy. Traditionally this is the 
structure of power in the Muslim society.  
I myself am asking here where does AlQaeda fit in these categories, taking in account 
that they claim to represent the whole Muslim nation, including launching a global war 
against many different nations on behalf of the Muslim nation. 
What salience does the new field manual "Rules for Mujahideen" have for operations 
and  with  Islamic  communities?   What  effect  will  it  have  on  Islamist  operations 
themselves or the perceptions of such? 
 
Let me first describe the manual itself. It's not an ideological or theological argument or 
thesis about Jihad, so my point of view is I believe it's an administrational reaction from 
the Taliban movement to certain circumstances. In different words, they believe they've 
entered a new phase a little bit more advanced than the previous one, and if you see 
the manual itself, which is more than 60 pages, it's all about how to control and run 
areas under their control. There are many other articles in the manual which we can 
describe as a code of conduct and rules of engagement.  
 
According  to  what  has  been  mentioned,  its  impact  outside  of  Afghanistan  will  be 
insignificant, if that. Just if you look at Algeria, Iraq, and now Somalia, all Jihadists are 
still active in these areas based on their old rules, which were mentioned in the manual 
released on May 9th
, 2009. Take for example kidnapping for ransom, which is strictly  
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 8
 
 
 
prohibited according to the manual, but is still part of the Jihad in Algeria, Somalia and 
Iraq. 
 
Do you continue to believe alQaeda should cease its military operations (both in the 
Arab world and in the West), and focus its operations on the battle in Afghanistan? 
 
Yes I still believe AlQaeda should cease military operations both in the Arab world and 
in the West. Regarding Afghanistan, I don't think AlQaeda has the right to develop their 
own agenda to benefit from the conflict at the cost of the Afghan people and Taliban 
themselves. So if they decide to stay or to stand the course with Taliban, they should 
participate within the Taliban framework and based on their rules, because we know in 
the past that AlQaeda is fully responsible for bringing this war to Afghanistan. And I 
believe it is the right time for AlQaeda as an origanisation to revise and judge their 
ideology, strategy and tactic based on their own experience. And if they keep repeating 
the slogan with doing this for the sake of our nation only, I would like to ask them, 'Does 
your nation really want/need you?'. And the reality is that you've imposed yourself on 
your nation. 
 
What ought to be done for the people of Afghanistan ­ by countries in the Islamic 
world and those in the West?  Are there avenues and opportunities for cooperation in 
stabilizing and rebuilding the Afghan state? 
 
There are two ways of answering this question. The first one is in a typical politician's 
style, offering fine words but little action to satisfy a specific audience. The second one 
is  transforming  leadership--making  things  happen  through  conflict  like  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt and his historical shift from Dr. New Deal to Dr. WintheWar. I will try to 
make some points based on the second rather than the first.  
 
There are always opportunities to stabilise and rebuild Afghanistan, but the problem is 
that we need some luck and a lot of skill to explore those opportunities. We have to 
understand two fundamental issues to start to think about stabalising and rebuilding 
Afghanistan.  First,  we  are  the  world  facing  multidimensional  challenges  of  building 
peace in Afghanistan. Second, rebuilding Afghanistan should be prioritized towards the 
top of the international political and security agenda. 
 
The immediate challenge in Afghanistan is its still in the conflict phase, so we should 
urgently develop strategy to take it to the next phase, which is the postconflict phase.  
 
As long as we are still stuck in the conflict phase, it's going to be extremely difficult to 
rebuild  the state,  to  stabilize  it,  and  to  deliver  peace and security. And  that  strategy 
should be formulated based on one reality: The Afghanisation of the Conflict. 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 9
 
 
 
And  here  if  I  may  refer  to  the  distinguished  article  in  Foreign  Affairs  magazine,  July
August issue, titled 'Flipping the Taliban,' written by Fotini Christia and Michael Semple. 
Changing sides, realigning, flipping is called the Afghan way of war. The missing point 
here is the context, and by this I mean the Afghanisation of war, people changing sides, 
flipping from one Afghan group to another. It's very hard to find an example that people 
involved in the armed struggle change sides from the resistance to the foreign occupiers 
or from the resistance to the government side, since the 70's if I may say ­ it's been the 
other way around.  
 
To clarify more, if some groups of Mujahideen switch sides from Taliban to Hikmatyar, it 
wouldn't make any difference in the big picture because they're still fighting the same 
enemies.  The  existing  president,  Hamid  Karzai,  is  expired  and  should  leave.  A  new 
government should be formed from leaders capable of launching the process of taking 
Afghanistan  gradually  to  the  postconflict  phase,  and  it  should  include  Mujahideen 
leaders who fought against the Soviet Invaders during the 80's.  
 
Militarily, instead of the strategy aiming for a comprehensive military victory over the 
Taliban,  another  strategy  should  be  developed  based  on  convincing  the  Taliban  that 
they  can't  win  the  war.  Full  responsibility  and  burden  should  move  to  the  United 
Nations  to  sort  out  all  the  challenges  from  the  Afghan  conflict.  Delink  from  the 
approach of global war on terror, which includes redefining the Taliban movement as 
an  indigenous  national  resistance  movement  instead  of  a  terrorist  group  in  order  to 
pave  the  way  to  engage  them  in  the  near  future  in  peace  talks  and  in  the  political 
process.  Pakistan,  Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar  should  play  a  major  role  to  the  conflict 
resolution. 
 
What  message(s)  should  members  of  Islamic  communities  be  hearing  from  their 
leaders (Islamic scholars, politicians, NGO's, community leaders, etc.)? 
 
Wake up and learn how to pick yourself up out of the dust and reject the helpless state. 
Stop  playing  the  role  of  the  victim,  because you  are  the victim  of  your  own  despair. 
Connect yourself with the inspiring part of Islamic identity, with values that can give you 
strength and hope. Try hard to open a new horizon for yourself away from radicalization 
and extremism, walk away from the destructive cultures and teachings of death, and 
start to think optimistically to a different kind life. A better future. And if under any 
circumstances  you  begin  considering  war,  you  should  first  stop  to  think  of  peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on Jihad: Benotman | Page 10
 
 
 
What did you think of President Obama's remarks in Cairo?  What impact, if any, do 
you think it will have in opening up a new dialogue between the United States and 
Muslim communities around the world? 
 
The problem is not about remarks in Cairo or dialogue between the United States and 
the  Muslim  communities,  it's  about  avoiding  a  traditional  Western  approach  when  it 
comes  to  the  Middle  East  (talking  idealistically  and  acting  brutally),  that  is  if  the 
Intellectual President Obama wants to influence the Muslim communities world wide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frank J. Cilluffo is HSPI's Director. F. Jordan Evert is a Presidential Administrative Fellow 
at HSPI. 
 
Founded in 2003, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute 
(HSPI) is a nonpartisan "think and do" tank whose mission is to build bridges between 
theory and practice to advance homeland security through an interdisciplinary approach. 
By convening domestic and international policymakers and practitioners at all levels of 
government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and academia, HSPI creates innovative 
strategies and solutions to current and future threats to the nation. 
 
Comments should be directed to hspi@gwu.edu. For more information on HSPI and its 
programs, please visit our website. 
 
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