Chapter 4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER INTRODUCTION If, as many social scientists argue, power is the distinguishing characteristic of political activity, then a key question is, to what extent does the distribution of power vary from one society to another? This question has exercised philosophers and political scientists, sociologists and psychologists, among many others. Some provide normative, some empirical answers, and not a few a combination of both, in that having described 'reality', they offer a prescription. Efforts to provide answers go back at least to the Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, both of whom presented ideal forms of government and compared them with the reality of their experience. Thus Plato believed that there exists a number of absolute moral truths to which men should aspire and that the perfect society resulting from the application of such truths could only exist where power was in the hands of philosopher-kings, who understood these truths. His views stemmed from his experience of the Greek city-states, and of Athens in particular, where the reality of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy - power in the hands of an arbitrary individual, a selfish few, or the mob - appalled him. Aristotle also posited government of a single ruler, the few, and the many, but in ideal and pervened versions of each: monarchy was the ideal for a single ruler, tyranny its perverted form; aristocracy the 58 Ä ŕ/k o ť The distribution of power ideal of rule by the few, oligarchy its perversion; and rule by the polity - the responsible citizens - the ideal of rule by the many, democracy - rule by the mob - its perversion. Later philosophers, such as St Augustine of Hippo and St Thomas Aquinas, brought Christian ideals to bear on politics; others, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, related their prescriptions to their perceived reality of a dangerous and chaotic world, Machiavelli with his ideal prince and Hobbes with his absolute sovereign or Leviathan. Lgcke and Rousseau placed greater faith in the ability of men to recognise their mutual self-interests and co-operate in the running of society. Not dissimilarly, utilitarians, like JejgmyJBtentham and James Mill, argued that self-interest determined individuals' ^befiaviouTand would therefore produce, in Bentham's phrase, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. However, James Mill's son, John Stuart Mill, although strongly influenced by utilitarian ideas, stressed" the need to curb the_exercise-0f.poiY.er, especially to avoid what he termed Itjhi^ľdéspousm pf_ public opinion' (1887 [1838], pp. 376-8). „Marx^of course, was in no doubt where the power lay: it.lay with the. class „that,cpntrplled the means of production, but once this was-understood Marx and his successors tended tcTtake the distribution of power as a given dependent variable, which needečTno^íúrther discussion other than to explain howthe dominant class.maintained its position and in what circumstances that position could be overthrown. Marxist views apart, however, modern theories about the distribution of power may be divided into four basic types - elite theory, pluralism, totalitarianism, and democracy. ELITE THEORY The word 'elite' is widely used socially to denote a superior group in terms of ability or privilege. Furthermore, in a social context it often has a pejorative connotation, leading it to be associated with other terms like 'the establishment', 'the powers that be', and 'the chosen few'. However, while such usages give something of the flavour of its meaning, elite theorists are concerned only with the distribution of power in society, with the distinction between rulers and ruled. In the words of one writer on the subject: 'The core of elitist doctrine is that there may exist in any society a minority of the 59 m Politics and Society population which takes the major decisions in the society' (Parry, 1969, p. 30). iilite..theorists are mainly..,anti-Marxist, and two of the classical theorists, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Paretg>„se.t.out. specifically to. disprove Marx's íheorféš"oFJcpiipmic determinism and the class.struggle. Elite theorists are also largely anti-democratic, since they argue that democratic theory is at variance with reality and, in practical terms, an inherently weak form of government. In a frequently cited passage Mosca clearly stated the basic premise of elite theorists: 'In all societies-- from societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilisation, down to the most advanced societies -two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that.isruled,.'.He goes on to elaborate: The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, and in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism. (Mosca, 1939 [1896], p. 50) Implicit in elite theory is that the dominant group or elite is conscious of its existence, cohesive in its behaviour, and possesses a common sense of purpose (see Meisel 1965). Above all, elite theory is regarded as historically and universally applicable, except for one theorist, C. Wright Mills (1956), who concentrated on the distribution of power in the United States and conceded that the power structure in other societies might differ radically from the American model. Parry divides the elite theorists into four types, as shown in Figure 4.1, each having a different approach or emphasis The organisational approach - Mosca and Michels According to Mosca, 'the individual ... stands alone before the totality of the organised minority' (1939 [1896], p. 53) and both he and Michels (Í915"[Í9Í I J) believed that the existence of the elite and its domination ofsocietyrest onits organisational position and abilities. In short, the organised minority will invariably outmanoeuvre 60 The distribution of power Elite theorist Principal works A. Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) Robert Michels (1876-1936) B. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1927) C. James Burnham (1905-87) D. C. Wright Mills (1916-62) Approach The Ruling Class (1896, rev. 1923, Organisational trans. 1939) Political Parties: A Sociological Study Organisational of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (1911, trans. 1915) The Mind and Society (1916, trans. Psychological 1935) The Managerial Revolution (1941) Economic The Power Elite (1956) Institutional Figure 4.1 Classifying elite theorists (Source: based on Parry (1969), Chapter II). the less organised or unorganised majority in society. Mosca divided the ehte^intojj£r^r^nd_lr^ex^rata, the upper stratum consisting of a small group of political decision-makers and the lower stratum performing lesser leadership functions, such as opinion leaders and political activists. Not surprisingly the more numerous lower stratum provided the main recruitment pool for the upper stratum. The relationship between the elite or ruling class and the rest of society is measured in terms of authority and elite recruitment and varies according to two pairs of variables. The authority relationship depends on either the autocraticj^rinciple, m VHÍČlTáuth7>nty^ows' from the elite to the masses, or the liberal principle, in which it flows from the masses to the elite. Recruitment depends on a similar, ^dicJiQlomy: the arisjoCTatic^jenděncy7 in which móvemeTS~iš~res-tricted to within the elite, moving frornjheJower.tq the upper stratum; and the dernocrau^tendeiicy, in which there is n^emelrnrom themasses into the elite. These are, however, Weberian ideal types and particular societies will invariably exhibit elements of several variables. For example, an elected executive, such as the President of the United States, fulfils the liberal principle, but the President's Cabinet, all of whom are appointed, fulfils the autocratic principle. Similarly, an autocratic society might recruit members of its bureaucracy on merit, thus fulfilling the democratic tendency. Although Mosca argued that the recruitment or regeneration of the /%: K\ minority within the non-elite would be responsible and., in any case, ?*L<^aíM^Jiynojd^ class. Mosca w_as originallystrongly anti-democratic, but later shifted his ground and accepted that representative government-was.the best way to articulate interests in a society, to which the elite should respond, andj3fjymjrqnmg the^utocratic authority of the bureaucracy through the liberal authority of a representative assembly. None the less, Mosca remained firmly elitist in his views: a ruling class was necessary to provide leadership and to manipulate the rest of society for its own good. In fact, Mosca would have restricted the franchise to the middle and upper classes, but conceded that historically it was too late to reverse the trend towards universal suffrage. Although Michels' principal work was much narrower in scope thaiTtEät"oTother elite theorists in that it concentratesonpoHtical parties, his famous 'iron law of oligarchy' (1915 [1911], pp. 377-92) has much wider implications and applications. Michels sought to test his theory of oligarchy - self-perpetuating dominance by the few - by examining the organisation of European socialist parties, especially the German Socialist Party, since he argued that if his 'iron law' really existed then there could be no better test than finding out who exercised power in parties that claimed that their mass membership controlled the party. Michels concluded that orgarnsation was. the inevitable consequence of the scope and.com-ple^ty of human activity. Onc^es^^shedjn^orgamsaüpriJ^c^mes dominated by its leadership: 'who says orgaju^arion,„says oligarchy'-(19T5'Tľ9ÍÍJ, p. 418). Tn order to'function successruly^lrrthe modern conditions of mass electorates a pojitícal party needs_ajnass membership to raise funds, promulgate its policies, and, above all, to fight elections. This was not a new observation: M. Ostrogorski (1854-1919) had made the same point in detail in his Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties in 1902, but Michels took it an important stage further. Arguing that parties are essentially machines for winning and retaining power, Michels says that in order to do this they need to moderate their ideologies and policies to win support beyond the confines of their party activists. The initiative in all this lies largely 62 The distribution of power with the party leadership and they, and the party's bureaucrats and legislative representatives, have a clear organisational advantage over ordinary party members. This advantage is reinforced by_ a.psycho-logical factor.,- the apathy of the majority of the population, who are basically ignorant "of and uninterested inpölMcs, except when it diréctlý"äŕľécts their interests. Here^Michels anticipates one of the ideas of Kornhauser (1959), whose theory of the mass society posits circumstances in which the non-elite is available for manipulation by the elite and vice-versa, which will be examined later in this chapter. Michels, of course, regards the manipulation of the non-elite by the elite as the normal state of affairs in society. The psychological approach - Pareto ' /"fsSl'-C Pareto and Mosca were contemporaries and rivals; they differed on ^ f/H' the constitution of the elite, the reasons for its existence, and the? j.^ manner of its recruitment or regeneration. Like Mosca, Pareto says ~ ~: W^i the elite is divided into two sections, but Pareto draws a distinction •-ľ>; between what he terms 'the^gOTe^r^eJitPlriór'me^on-governing elite'. The governing elite are those who directly or mdirectíy~mflu-ence political decisions, and the nc;n-g_oxernmgj?jite those who hold leadership positions in society, b_ut jwhajia noxJnflugnce_ political decisions. This means that Pareto^s j:lite_is_a Jarger group than Mosca's and that he comes closer to the commonplace concept of a „social, elite. There are, however, more important distinctions between the two -€.£. \ theorists in explaining the existence of the elite. Pareto explicity /»0,ď "/r JB^ctsjiieJtfarxjsj:^^ 1 productof__e£pjaonúcforces, or social forces for that matter, and ^ asserts that the elite stems from human attributes, from individua! -, abilities and instincts. Human beings, according to Pareto, do not ' act logically but seek to justify their actions logically tfooughideolo- -8«s_0£TOhiesawhichJ!ä^ These values or deri- > iY^tipns^produce instincts^or„states^ of jróäl JhauPareto calls ' 're^idue^ancTiOš these that form the basisof human„acmaty. kareto divides the residues into two types or classes -^'instincts of ' combination' and 'pCT^ence_oLaggEegaies'. The forměTinvolvěs the use of ideas and imagination, and Pareto dubs those who operate on this basis as 'foxes'; the second stresses permanence, stability and ' order, and those who operate on this basis Pareto calls 'lions' In this ! 63 'MA ,;„' °c ■ ■ 'Cjt Politics and Society Pareto is reminiscent of Machiavelli, whose ideal in The Prince is a combination of wisdom and mthlessness, similar to Pareto's ideal elite of a mixture of 'foxes' and 'lions' (see Figure 4.2). Pareto acknowledges that his ideal elite of 'foxes' and 'lions' seldom materialises and that the balance between the two changes, so that there is a 'circulation of elites'. Thus 'foxes' replace 'lions' and 'lions' replace 'foxes', but 'foxes' gradually replace 'lions', whereas 'lions' suddenly replace 'foxes'. Recruitment or regeneration, therefore, can be either by evolution or revolution, but in either case the downfall of one elite is brought about by its own inherent vices: 'foxes' become over-mampulajive^or^ompromise once too often; 'lions' become too self-important and unacafpiabl^fathleBSj for example. P^eto„also..differ.s.jrortLMpsca, andjother elite theorists, in that he does not subscribe to group coherence and cqinmon purpose amongst the elite, but argues thatindividuals.actas individuals and for this reason often fail to foresee the consequences of their own actions, as well as those of others. The economic approach - Burnham James Bumham^grees^jwth^J^aix that power lies with those_ who control jfo means of production and acknowledges that, whereas in Class 1 Class II 'instincts of combination' 'Persistence of aggregates' 'Foxes' 'Lions' Intelligent Strong-minded Imaginative Reliable Manipulative Possessing integrity Persevering Ruthless Consensual Confrontational Compromiser Inflexible Patient Impatient Ideal = political fixer, Ideal - determined, charismatic wheeler-dealer leader Figure 4.2 Pareto's types of elites (Source: Pareto , Mind and Society, Vol. 4, Sec. 2178, 2227, 2274, 2275). 64 The distribution of power the aftermath of the industrial.revolution this was the minority interests. By definition no particular.interest^canjperjorce expect .to. prevail^ even where its interests are directly and significantly affected, but, as another leading pluralist Nelson Polsby (1963) argues, in a polyarchy virtually all views or interests will be listened to by those charged with decision-making. The pluralist view, developed .out of the concgpt_of pressure or injerestjgroiips - organisations which seek to influence poHcý^dea-sions affecting their views or interests. Interest group theory argues that society consists of a great variety of interests, many of which organise themselves to press the government to respond to their demands. As far back as 1908 A. F. Bentley put forward such a view in The Process of Government, but studies of pressure politics flourished in the 1950s and later, especially after the publication of David Truman's Tfie Governmental Process in 1951. Pluralists took interest group theory a step further by arguing that if an interest existed it would develop organisational representation, since this was the only means of making its presence felt. The stress on organisation provides a linkage with the organisational elite theorists, especially Michels, though this was not the intent. It was no accident that pluralist views came hard on the heels of increased academic interest in pressure politics, nor that it fitted in well with what was called 'tíie_end^ondeobgythesis' (see Chapter 10), the view that there was, in liberal-democratic societies, a basic agreement on ends, and only disagreement over means. The common denominator was the American political system which, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, best fitted interest group theory, pluralism, and the end of ideolog}' thesis. How applicable 68 The distribution of power these ideas were and are to other political systems is a different matter. Even so, it is the pluralists who have provided the principal non-Marxist challenge to elite theorists. A critique of pluralist theory The most obvious critj^mjhaLC-OU^^ New Haven, a^itjwas of Hunter's stud^o^AtíantajWas that it was ařypTčaT^that there was no reason to doubt the findings, but that they were not necessarily valid for other cities, let alone American politics generally. Certainly, ^nericanjp£ajj*overrm^ form in that significantly different systems operate from state to state, and case studies, such as Robert^Presthus' (19jH)jWenjz!JÄe (^ Top, found greater evídenceofditismjnoj^rplaces m States than Dahl found at New Haven. However, the most^serious criticism of j^hn^alism relates to what Steven Lukes has called the sec8nb!"and third dlrr^^sjon^af-PQwer. 'These were discussed in Chapters, but they are worth examining again in the context of pluralist theory. Bachrach and Baratz (1962,1970) point out tJiat phi;ra]istjud£a^ deci- £> sions., issues that actually get onto the political agenda, and therefore ignore those that are kept off the agenda. This was tested by Crenson (1971) in a study of US Ste^sjbüitvjtocontrol the political agenda in the the steel town of Gary, Indiana. This is trie second dimension of power. Lukes_(1974) suggests that there isja third dimension, that _..>.£. °^!MSSl£P^Icts^"s^^íSíllÍ.nlíSal interests of members of society. This relates to the Marxist.concept,of^eologylis^false cons- .:; cipusness', in whicjxiadiyidjia^^ ^^av^jhe^p^era^Iing vajries^in jtoriet^Jead^ themjo misronsjrue^ reality. Thus the perceptions of individuals will affect their political behaviour, leading in some cases to inaction rather than action. The second dimension is a serious criticism of the pluralist view and it is not difficult to find evidence to support it, but the third dimension, while logically impeccable, is difficult to prove, since truth, like beauty is ultimately in the eye of the beholder. Nevertheless, it too is a serious criticism and in particular questions the consensual notions of pluralist theory. Clearly there are competing interests in any society, but even in American politics it is also clear that those who are active in politics are a minority; that those who hold and wield political power are a minority; that those who 69 Politics and Society exercise influence are a minority; and, while it is possible to agree with pluralists that they are not all part of the same minority, it is an assumption that the majority of the members of society are represented in the political process and that they necessarily accept the political system and the policies it produces in their name. If this is the case for the United States, then it is even more the case for other political systems, some of which appear to fit elite theory more closely than they do pluralist theory. For instance, before the Communist Party gave up its 'leading role' in 1990, the Soviet Union appears to accord with elite theory. The Leninist theory of the Party as the 'vanguard of the proletariat' is explicitly elitist and the ability of its leaders to maintain control over it seems a clear example of Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy'. On the other hand, some writers claimed to have detected signs of pluralism in the USSR, arguing that interests were institutionalised through the Party, which responded to demands from below, as well as issued instructions from above (see Skilling and Griffiths 1971; Solomon 1983). Much of the evidence for pluralism, like that for elites, is circumstantial, and pjurajist,theory can be seenj^sjajfonrj^gf elite theory, but one o:Pcornjpj^jrig_el^ fľ2VďditionaTlTgfiTis thrown on both elite and pluralist theorieslSy" examining political socialisation, participation and recruitment in Part IV, but it is also helpful to look at totalitarian and democratic theories of the distribution of power. TOTALITARIANISM Totalitarianism and democracy are often understandably seen as diametrically opposed concepts, but they have in common concern with mass political participation ir^contrastwith elitejheoryT^whieh tends largely to dismiss the masses as subordinate and subject to manipulation by the elite, and pluralism, which sees the masses as a multiplicity of competing interests. Furthermore, bothjtotali-tarianism and democracy can usefully, be seen us ideal types which in practice are tendencies^_rather t^an abjpl^tes. History is replete with regimes in which considerable power has been concentrated in the hands of an individual or small group of individuals, largely unrestrained, often arbitrary in its use, and in which failure to obey risks severe punishment, not infrequently 70 The distribution of power death. Aristotle called such rule tyranny and both Greek and Roman history produced their quotas of tyrants; much of the history of medieval England is concerned with attempts to impose restraints upon monarchs; eighteenth-centuryEurope is sometimes described as 'the age ofjibsolutism'; and the period between the First and Second 'World WarTfias been called 'the._age_.of dictators'. These regimes" were variously described as tyrannical, absolutist, dictatorial, and, more recently, authoritarian. A number of justifications have been advanced.for „abspjute rule, ranging, from Plato's phÜö1soj|her-^ Levia- thanto Marx's dictatorslupj>fj:heproletariat. In the first two, absolute rule waTternpered by wisdom and God's law respectively; in the latter two, the end justifies the means, order being vastly preferable to violent chaos and a classless, communist society to anything that preceded it. Totalitarianism could therefore be„saidjx) be in jhe absolutist tradition,, taking absolutism to its logical extreme by seeking to control everything in society, but this is also its distinguishing feature. Tyranny, absolutism "and dictatorship demand obedience, but do not seek to be all-pervasive, to re-shape society in its entirety: totalitarianism deirmnds^n^^njyjobedience but belief. Defining totalitarianism Two types of definitions have been advanced, the phenomenological and the essentialist. Carl J. Friedrich (1954,1969, p. 126) provided the most well-known phenomenological definition, according to which a totalitarian state has the following six characteristics: 1. A totalist or all-embracing ideology. 2. A single party committed to that ideology, usually led by one man. 3. Police power based on terror. 4. A monopoly of communication. 5. A monopoly of weaponry. 6. A centralised economy and control of all organisations. Zbjgniew Brzezinski, who collaborated with Friedrich in a study of totalitarianism', produced a definition to which he added the purpose of totalitarian regimes: Totalitarianism is a system in«JKÍlicÍLlQchnologically advancěd^S^^ wielded without 71 Politics and Society restraint by a centralised leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population. (Brzezinski 1967, pp. 19-20) Both Friedrich and Brzezinski emphasise the extent to which society is penetrated and controlled by those holding political power, to which Brzezinski makes the important addition that totalitarian regimes through that control and penetration seek to transform society from the present or perceived reality to an idealised form reflected in an all-pervasive ideology. The second type of definition, the essentialist, seeks to isolate the essences or key attributes which explain the sort of characteristics j delineated by Friedrich and Brzezinski. Hannah-Arendt (1951, _ p 466), in The Origins of TuisMtmsmm^ states that 'total terror, [is] f the essence of totalitarian government'; J. L. Talmon (1952, pp. 1-2) argues that totalitarianism politicises the whole of life and 'is based on the assumption of a_solgJUid^exch^iy^truth in politics. - _* It may be calkd^ôTiticHMessianism'; similarly, Harry Eckstein and David Apter (1963, p. 434) say that 'the essence of totalitarianism / . is that it annihilates all boundaries between the state and the groupings of society, even the state and the individual personality'. Both types of definition stress the relationship between politics and society and a reasonable short definition of totalitarianism would be: a social system involving the political control of and intervention in all aspects of public and private life. The origins of totalitarianism Hannah Arendt (1951) explains the origins of totalitarianism in socío-his'toľjcal terms, basing her conclusions on an analysis of the rise of Nazi Germany, but also applying them to the Soviet Union. She argues that totalitarianism in Germany developed as a consequence of four factors: first, a breakdown of community resulting from rapid industrialisation before and military defeat in the First World War, combined with the introduction both before and after the war of liberal ideas; second, the rapid enfranchisement of the masses in the absence of an appropriate liberal political culture, 72 The distribution of power leaving them open to manipulation by demogogic leaders; third, the creation in the form of the National Socialist Party of a mass movement with which individuals could identify; and, finally, a population sufficiently large and widespread against whom considerable prejudice already existed - the Jews, who could be cast in the roie of scapegoat for the ills of society. Similar, though not identical, features could be listed for the Soviet Union. Talmon (1952) offers an ideoJp^cal__KtpjÄnatíon, tracing totali-tanaru^nTBack to eighteenth-century messianic beliefs, Rousseau's concept of the Genera^ Will^ and JacoBinTdeas in revolutionary France, all of which, he argues, are based on thebeUrf that^there is *l^oje_e^^Í5ífi-loi!ÍUajpolitica!, Talmon luřther argues~tnaT totalitarianism can take ideologically left and right forms, with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany representing the totalitarian right and communist regimes in the USSR, the People's Republic of China (PRQ, and Eastern Europe representing the totalitarian left. The latter he describes as 'democratic totalitarianism' because the regimes claim to know the true interests of the people and thus be able to realise their democratic will. Support for this view can be found in the Leninist doctrine of democratic centralism in which free discussion was centred within the Communist Party, but the party remained the custodian of the truth and the guide to action. A third explanation of the origins of totalitarianism has been put forward by a number of psychologists who argue that some individuals exhibit particular psychological tendencies, such as aggression, intolerance towards groups in society other than their own, and deference to authority, attracting them to highly disciplined organisations, which, in certain social conditions, may secure or seize political power. The best known of the psychological explanations is that advanced by Theodor Adorno et al. (1950) in The Authoritarian Personality. They sought to measure various personality traits which, for example, rendered individuals receptive to taking orders, intolerant of opposition, and having a highly structured view of the world. In particular, they developed a number of scales, the best known of which was the Fascism or F-Scale. Erich Fromm (1941) in Escape from Freedom suggested that individuals who were alienated from the modern world sought refuge in authoritarian or highly structured societies, while Milgram (1974) conducted a series of laboratory experiments to test the extent to which individuals accepted orders from those they perceived to be in authority over them. 73 Politics and Society It is important to note that much of the research into totalitarianism was conducted in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It tended, therefore, to concentrate far more on what Talmon called totalitarianism of the right and on Nazi Germany in particular. Relatively speaking, far less attention was paid to communist systems. Studies of the 'authoritarian personality' in particular were directed largely at the Nazi experience, seeking explanations of how Hitler had 'subjugated' the German people, secured their 'unquestioning obedience', and 'persuaded' a significant number of them to perform what others regarded as atrocities. Thus one of the major criticisms made of Adorno and his colleagues is that they do not deal adequately with 'left-wing authoritarianism'. Later studies, like Milgram's, are criticised for the artificial nature of their experiments, but also because they concentrate on the concept of obedience to the neglect of the more subtle concept of acceptance. On the other hand, although Arendt's study (especially the first edition published in 1951) documents more fully totalitarianism in Nazi Germany than in the Soviet Union, the latter is far from ignored, while Talmon concentrates almost entirely on totalitarianism of the left, to which he regards communists as the natural heirs. It is worth noting that even when the earliest of these studies was published the Soviet Union had already existed nearly three times longer than Nazi Germany, though not, of course, Fascist Italy, and that since then the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had a life of some forty years and the People's Republic of China continues to survive. None of the explanations offered alone seems to provide complete explanation of the origins of totalitarianism, but each emphasises a credible part of what is probably a wider whole. The rapid societal changes and the military defeats which preceded the Soviet and Nazi regimes may well have provided fertile ground for messianic answers to the uncertainties, dislocation and hardship that faced many people in Russia and Germany at the time, and it would be surprising if some individuals were not better psychologically suited to and disposed towards authoritarian regimes, but account also needs to be taken of the particular circumstances in which Lenin's Bolsheviks and Hitler's Nazis came to power. The Tsar had been overthrown in Russia in February 1917 and, until the return of Lenin, his fellow Bolsheviks proposed to cooperate with the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky, 74 The distribution of power but Lenin immediately abandoned the policy and single-mindedly set in train the Bolshevik seizure of power, which took place in October 1917. In Germany Hitler's Nazi Party rose from winning less than 3 per cent of the national vote in 1928 and electing a mere twelve members to the Reichstag to winning 37 per cent of the vote in July 1932 and being the largest party, with 230 out of 608 seats, still short of an absolute majority, however. At a further election in November 1932 the Nazi vote dropped by two million and its number of seats fell to 196, but the NSDAP remained the largest party. However, the extreme fragmentation of the parties in the Reichstag made forming a government extremely diflicult and, as leader of the largest party, Hitler was invited to take office as Chancellor at the end of January 1933. As it was the Nazis held only three of the eleven Cabinet posts, but Hitler used his power as Chancellor very skilfully, called another election in March, at which the Nazi vote increased to 44 per cent and the number of seats to 288, again short of a majority. But the election of fifty-two Nationalists gave Hitler a majority in the Reichstag and the means to consolidate the Nazi grip on power. In both cases the role of the leader was crucial, but so also was what they did with power once it was in their grasp. The Bolsheviks and the Nazis not only moved swiftly to strengthen their grip, but used the power they had to impose a totalitarian regime, placing their supporters in key positions in the police and enforcing their will by the systematic use of terror. Once in power it became extremely difficult to loosen that grip: opponents were quickly eliminated, the media brought under strict party control, and the ideological penetration of society set in train. A similar pattern can be delineated for the countries of Eastern Europe which came under Soviet hegemony at the end of the Second World War. For the most part totalitarian regimes were imposed from outside and depended ultimately, as the events of 1989 illustrated, on Soviet backing, but once installed the communist regimes rapidly made themselves virtually invulnerable internally. Much the same is true of the PRC: once Mao Zedong had militarily defeated the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek the way was open to extending his totalitarian regime to the whole of mainland China. The question remains, however, whether these regimes should properly be described as totalitarian. 75 Politics and Society Totalitarianism in practice It is common to describe Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the USSR, the PRC, the various communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and one or two other countries like North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam (North Vietnam before the American withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1972) as totalitarian. To a considerable extent these societies do fit Friedrich's six characteristics and Brzezinski's definition. All are characterised by a single ideology, which claims to be all-encompassing in its applicability. There is an ideological view on all aspects of life, not simply the 'political' in a narrow sense. Thus arts are not merely harnessed for propaganda purposes, but must reflect the ideology; history assumes ideological truth and is rewritten and, if necessary, rewritten again and again to reflect that 'truth'; sport and other leisure activities are seen as a reflection of the ideology; and all expression of thought must be couched in ideological terms. Each of the societies was or remains dominated by a single party. In a limited number of cases, such as Poland and the PRC, other parties were permitted to exist, but subject to strict control. Moreover, the single or dominant party is committed to the official ideology and the state apparatus is penetrated by or subject to party control. The dominance of a single individual obviously characterised the Soviet Union under Stalin, Germany under Hitler, Italy under Mussolini, and the PRC under Mao, but other dominant leaders emerged elsewhere - Tito in Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha in Albania, Kim Il-sung in North Korea, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba, although the position is less clear in other cases. However, after the demise of their leaders Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany collapsed in military defeat and the successors of Stalin, Mao, Hoxha, and Ho Chi Minh were and are less secure. Similarly, although clear leaders emerged in all the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe and Deng Xiao Ping became the dominant figure in the PRC, none was as secure as Stalin, Hitler and Mao. The Italian Fascist and the Nazi regimes were heavily dependent on their respective leaders and it is doubtful whether they would have survived the peaceful demise of Mussolini and Hitler. In the Soviet Union Khrushchev successfully resisted attempts to overthrow him from within the Communist party, before eventually succumbing to a party coup in 1964. His successor Leonid Brehznev secured a firm grip on the party, but it never assumed Stalinist proportions and none of Stalin's successors 76 The distribution of power achieved his dominance. Indeed, in all communist regimes the party has been the vehicle of leader dominance. The use of terror, backed by a widespread network of informers, encouraging informing (even from within the family), and generating an atmosphere of suspicion and fear, is also common to these societies. Police powers were enormous, often used arbitrarily, so that no one felt safe, and ultimately justice was conceived in terms of loyalty to the ideology, the party and, often above all, to the leader. Periodic purges reinforced the system, and fear of the concentration camp and the gulag, or worse, was ever present. Control of all means of communication, especially the media, was crucial. Indoctrination, particularly through the education system, was widespread and the dissemination of information strictly controlled, not simply by preventing the 'wrong' information from reaching individuals, but in ensuring the provision of 'correct' information in appropriate ideological form. In Ceaucescu's Romania, for instance, all typewriters had to be registered and contacts with foreign tourists reported to the police within twenty-four hours. Both the police and the armed forces were subject to strict control and the principal means of force were firmly in the hands of the state. The police, particularly the secret police, were a crucial means of societal control and the military clearly subordinate to the political leaders. Armed resistance was not necessarily impossible, but highly unlikely. The military was not only subject to indoctrination, but heavily penetrated by politically reliable individuals. In the case of communist regimes this was formally so through a network of political commissars. In order to meet the policy objectives of the single or dominant party the economy was subject to central direction. Communist regimes especially had elaborate economic plans, usually covering five-year periods, with detailed production targets. Other societal organisations were subject to state control and there was widespread ideological penetration of all aspects of society. The term 'totalitarian' clearly implies an absolute rather than a relative state of affairs, but for analytical purposes this is a disadvantage, since not only can it be argued that no society has ever been totalitarian in the absolute sense, but it means that a given society must be classified as totalitarian or not. Contradictory as it may appear, therefore, there is much to be said for using totalitarianism as an ideal type against which particular cases can be measured. This 77 Politics and Society allows more fruitful comparisons between cases and of particular cases over time. In this sense, for example, Nazi Germany may be said to have been more totalitarian than Fascist Italy and the Stalinist Soviet Union more totalitarian than the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. This also makes sense in considering various aspects of political behaviour, especially socialisation. In the absolute sense socialisation in a totalitarian society must be totally successful, yet the experience of Eastern Europe under communism should serve as a reminder that the reality is more complex. Applied therefore as a tendency rather than an absolute, totalitarianism is a more useful analytical tool. Least of all should it be used pejoratively, even though regimes normally associated with it are widely regarded as abhorrent. As an analytical tool it could, possibly usefully, be applied to fundamentalist Islamic regimes, such as Iran after the fall of the Shah. Muslims do not, of course, accept that their religion is an ideology, but Iran (and to a lesser extent some other Islamic states) share many of the characteristics associated with totalitarian states - an all-pervasive 'ideology', a single party or its equivalent, something close to a monopoly of communications, and extensive control over the operation of society. Totalitarianism also focuses attention on the role of ideology and values and it should be acknowledged that all societies are pervaded by definable sets of values, but that key characteristic of totalitarian societies is that no conflict is permitted between rival or alternative sets of values. It is therefore misguided to see totalitarianism itself as an ideology; it is the relationship between ideology and society that characterises totalitarianism. DEMOCRACY 'Democracy' and its adjectival antonym, 'undemocratic', are among the most widely used words in the political vocabulary, and possibly among the most disputed. With the exception of a small handful, such as Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, all modern regimes have claimed or claim to be democratic. Is it therefore a meaningless term? What is almost certainly the most famous definition of democracy illustrates the problem. In his Gettysburg address Abraham Lincoln spoke of 'governmentroŕthe people7"by-the people, and for thg-peepleC —~ ,„~—— .^w_~, _ 78 The distribution of power It may be assumed that 'government of the people' presents no problem, but beyond that difficulties arise which allow for widespread variations in interpretation. If it is conceded that in populous and complex modern societies not all the people may regularly or frequently be engaged in government (though not all would concede it), then 'government by the people' may be interpreted to mean governing in the name of the people or through their representatives, but how are such claims to be substantiated? Similarly, 'government for the people' may be no more than sheer altruism, but it may also mean claiming to know better that the people, knowing where their true interests he. It is such claims that allow so many disparate regimes and societies to assume the epithet 'democratic'. Historically democracy can be traced back to the Greeks, but neither Plato nor Aristotle looked favourably upon it. Plato feared the demagoguery that he associated with democracy and Aristotle regarded it as the perverted form of the rule of the many, although Aristotle's ideal of the polity or responsible citizenry has much in common with modern ideas of democracy. Similarly, in the eighteenth century democracy was widely equated with the rule of the mob and the Founding Fathers of the United States were not believers in democracy; they too feared the mob, regarding it as ignorant and therefore strongly inclined to irresponsibility. Individuals had, they believed, rights - freedom of speech and association, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and freedom of religion - but these were the rights of free men and citizens, and citizens had responsibilities as well as rights. Those rights, now normally seen as an essential part of democracy, in fact preceded modern ideas about democracy, as does the right to vote. In many of the New England townships direct democracy was indeed practised (and continues to be practised) through town meetings that decided particular issues and elected office-holders, but the right to participate was not universal. The right to vote in various elections, now regarded as absolutely fundamental to democracy, not only excluded women, but was linked to the ownership of property or subject to other limitations. Democracy was therefore treated with, at worst, outright hostility and, at best, fear and suspicion, so that its positive image is historically relatively recent. Clearly democracy involves the consent of the governed and of the implementation of the popular will. Contract theorists like Locke (1924 [1690]) certainly favoured the idea of an elected government, 79 Politics and Society but effectively introduced the other side of the democratic coin, that of popular control. ^a^seau!s-ideaL(1913 [1762]) was the/Greek city-state._in_wlTicj^a^ of the population in reality) could participate directly in making decisions, but he regarded this ideal as impractical in the Europe of his day, seeing only the island of Corsica as being a possible location for its fulfilment. In particular, Rousseau did not regard the idea of representative democracy as an adequate substitute for direct democracy. None the less, this is the principal form that democracy has taken in the modern world. In practice, democracy is best seen as a principle involving popular consent and control on the part of the governed which may find expression in various political practices and forms of government. Like toaalkana^smjjt^is more fruitful to see deinoci^y_jn_relative .'ratl^jhan^absolujejerms, so that it is possioTe'to"conceive degrees of democracy. This raises two fundamental questions. How is popular consent to be elicited? And how is popular control or accountability to be achieved? The most obvious answer is by means of elections, but elections generate a whole series of further questions. Who should be allowed to vote? What is to be decided by elections? If it is to choose representatives, what should be the basis of representation - territory, population, interests, or what? How frequently should elections be held? What type of electoral system should be used? Should the will of a simple or relative majority (the largest number) prevail, or should an absolute majority of more than 50 per cent be necessary for certain decisions? Who should be able to decide when elections are held or should elections be held at fixed intervals? All these questions raise issues to which there are a multiplicity of answers, some of which are shown in Figure 4.3. The democratic mechanisms available may be direct in the sense that the people (usually those who constitute the electorate) participate directly in deciding something, such as choosing a leader or determining a policy issue through a referendum. The device of recall allows a specified proportion of the electorate to demand that an elected representative or office-holder present himself or herself for re-election before the normal term of oJfice has expired, and the initiative is a similar variation on the referendum, allowing the electorate to demand that an issue be decided by a direct vote. Both devices are used in a number of American states and both may be 80 The distribution of power Consent Control Elections Referenda . .. Initiatives Recalls Legislative j represention /. ,. a } indirect Pressure t politics J Elections Referenda Initiatives Recalls Rule of law judicial review Legislative scrutiny Ombudsman systems direct indirect Figure 4.3 Democracy: consent and control mechanisms. used to elicit consent and exert control. There are also indirect means of consent and control in that they may operate through intermediaries, in the form of organisations (such as the legislature or the judicial system), individuals (such as legislative representatives or an ombudsman), principles (such as the rule of law), or devices (such as judicial review. It is therefore misleading to define modern democracy simply in terms of majority rule-JThe^Anierican-^ounding^Fathers, precisely because they were not democrats, deliberately built a number_of anti-majoritarian devicesjnto the United States Constitution by iríčorpô7ännga~separation of powers to prevent any one individual or group of individuals from dominating all three branches of government - the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary - and various checks and balances, such as Senate_approval of presidential appointments and the President'sjegislative veto. A particular problem arises when a permanent or quasi-permanent majority exists based, for instance, on religion or ethnicity, leading to significant discrimination by the majority against one or more minorities. This was the situation which prevailed in Northern Ireland between 1920 and 1972 with a Protestant/Unionist majority using its numerical advantage to discriminate against the Catholic/Nationalist minority. Using de Tocgueville's famous phrase, John Stuart Mill wrote of his fear of the 'tyranny of the majority' (de Tocqueville 1966 [1835-40], pp. 23I-47T^ěci^yThirťOTthe 'ignorant' or less 81 Politics and Society well-informed majority prevailing over an enlightened or better-informed minority (Mill 1887 [1840]). Public opinion will be discussed in Chapter 9, but at this point it should be noted that in practice democracy is complicated by the very nature of public opinion, which can vary in intensity and in the extent to which it affects various individuals or sections of the public, as well as in relation to levels of information and socioeconomic characteristics. Modern democracy therefore demands tolerance of others' opinions and in particular of the existence and opinions of minorities. Furthermore, it is widely argued that various rights, including the. iigfouiuLoje„andJ^dpm.of speechjmd as&ocmtign^are-oí^littíe-use if individuals or groups of individuals are suffering from high levels of social or economic inequality. Such individuals may care little x about democracy or their rights and be far more concerned about '^y survival and their material needs. LipsetX1960,1983), for example, ■■y has argued strongly that there is a causal relationship between eco-nomic devdapmentjmd-democracy. Using levels of incomejjndus-trialisation^urbanisation.and^education, he sought to dempjisirate that: dempcratic-regimesdeveloped and weref sustained in-tiiose-soci-eUes which had essentially met the material needs of their members. Lii^ng^.the4egitimacy_of regimes with their mätenäTefficiency, "Ty IJesetjmdJ3ok.kan (1967) suggested that a major factor in the politi-s cal stability of such societies was solving what they termed 'non-bargainable' issues, such as those relating to language, religion and culture before basic economic matters are addressed. An important criticism of this view is that it is really theorising about the conditions conducive to stability rather that democracy and that it is therefore stability which is the key variable. Stability, however, is historically and contemporaneously more widespread than democracy and it is therefore more logical to suggest that stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. The same applies to the political, ^social and economic rights widely associated with democracy: even where various rights are widely available in practice, they are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy (see Benn and Peters 1959; Finer 1970; Held 1987). Nor is it a matter of appropriate mechanisms, necessary as they are: ^^gtejy^mocracxxejgie^jp^^ue^ jind attitudes andJs therefore a matter of judgement not objective fact. As Edmund Burke (1883, vol. II, p. 29) wrote in the eighteenth 82 The distribution of power century: 'Ifanyjiskjwhatji^ej^^ .anx. practical purpose, it is what people think so.' THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: AN OVERVIEW Only elite theory and Marxist theory purport to offer a universal description and explanation of the distribution of power. Totalitarianism and democracy offer descriptions and explanations only for particular societies. Both elite and Mai^ttíieone^havesomedmig to say about totalitarianism and democracy. Mosca lent support to Mussolini's Fascist regimeand the ideas of both Mosca and Pareto have been associated with the concept of the totalitarian state. Some Marxists not only readily identified Mussolini's Italy and Hider's Germany as totalitarian, but also similarly regarded the USSR under Stalin. Elite theorists are often contemptuous of democracy, but some see it as a means of rejuvenating the elite and making it responsive to the needs of the non-elite. Schumpeter (1943, p. 269) adopts the position of a democratic elitist by defining democracy as an 'institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'. Marxists also tend to be contemptuous of democracy, at least of what is termed 'bourgeois-democracy'. Marx himself did not believe that democracy was compatible with a capitalist society and envisaged a RousseauJJke^rect_demo^racy, using the example of the Paris Commune of 1871 to expound his vision of a communist society which would, by definition, be democratic. In a communist society the state would be replaced by direct popular control, involving elected officials (who would be paid proletarian wages and be subject to recall) and the abolition of the police, a standing army and a distinct judiciary (all of which would be replaced by citizens who would enforce law, order and justice). Private property would be abolished, the social division of labour would end, the market and monetary economies would disappear, and a classless society would emerge. The ideal of the communist society was 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' (Marx 1989 [1875], pp. 24-87). Marx never spelled out how a communist society would come about, other than through an ill-defined 'dictatorship of the proletariat', nor how it would be sustained. However, he did 83 Politics and Society acknowledge that there would be a lower or earlier phase of communism, and a later or higher stage. Subsequently, Lenin in The State and Revolution argued that these two stages were socialism and communism. Lenin's view of democracy stemmed directly from his experience of practising politics: he stressed the dictatorship of the proletariat, essentially in the form of domination by the Communist Party as the 'vanguard of the proletariat'. A crucial Leninist doctrine was that of 'democratic centralism', based on the principles of 'freedom of discussion, unity of action', so that once the Party had decided on a course of action, all should work unequivocally to realise it. In practice, democratic centralism meant the overwhelming dominance of the Party leadership, epitomised by the Stalinist period, but still applicable to the post-Stalinist communist parties of the USSR and Eastern Europe until their position was undermined by perestroika in the Soviet Union and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Democratic centralism could be said to continue to prevail in the People's Republic of China, but not without noting that the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party was severely disrupted by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969, the experience of which still reverberated well after Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Elite theorists regard the practice of communist parties in power as indisputable evidence of a ruling class or elite in the 'socialist' societies in the USSR, the PRC and Eastern Europe. Certainly the oligarcjy^l j^turec^ and the material privileges accor- ded to party apparatchiks and senior officials gives much credence to the claim. Although Marxists agree that the inherent contradictions of capitalist societies will inevitably cause a redistribution of power, some theorists argue that only a democratically organised but revolutionary mass movement can bring about a shift in power from the dominant capitalist class to the proletariat, others that a transformation to communism can be brought about by working within the liberal-democratic state. The pluralist view of the distribution of power has been the subject of much criticism, but some of its leading proponents have sought to respond positively to that criticism, especially by acknowledging that the state develops its own interests and should not be seen as a neutral arbiter between competing interests. It is also accepted that the distribution of resources between competing 84 The distribution of power interests is far from equal and that social and economic inequalities may restrict political equality and therefore the operation of democracy (see Lindblom 1977 and Dahl 1985). In addition, it can be argued that the pluralist contribution has been further enriched by the recognition of what have become known as new social movements (NSMs). These are pressure or interest groups concerned with issues such as feminism and the environment, cutting across traditional socio-economic cleavages, less formally organised, and emphasising protest rather than operating through traditional political machinery. NSMs will be discussed further in the context of political participation in Chapter 6. One attempt to link all four sets of ideas about the distribution of power was made by Kornhauser (1959). He posited four Weberian ideal types of society, each depending on the relationship between elites and non-elites. Kornhauser argued that the form of society depended, on the one hand, on the extent to which elites were accessible, that is, open to ideas and influence from the non-elite, and, on the other, the extent to which non-elites were available for manipulation by the elite. From this relationship four types of society emerged. The first was a communal society - a traditional society with a closed elite and non-elites bound together by ties of kinship and community and therefore not available for manipulation. The second was pluralist society, characterised by competing elites, open to ideas and influence, and non-elites with diverse commitments and therefore unavailable for manipulation. The. tjrurdjwag,jpjajitarian society, which Kornhauser called 'a state of totaljnahüisation^ of the non-elite bythe eífteVBůt in which the elite is not open to ideas and influence by the non-elites. The fourth type was mass society, characterised by a lack of communal or societal ties, enabling the elite to manipulate non-elites and the non-elites to manipulate elites. Kornhauser gives as examples of societies showing tendencies towards the mass society the United States during various populist movements in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the depression years after 1929, and the McCarthy period in the 1950s, and the Poujadists in France in the 1950s, but his classic example is the Weimar Republic, which, he argues, shows all the characteristics of the mass society. Kornhauser's analysis provides one particular way of looking broadly at the distribution of power under different conditions. In general, he argues that most societies exhibit a mixture of two or 85 Politics and Society more of his ideal types. What he demonstrates principally, however, is the value of an eclectic view rather than attempting to take a single, uniform view of how power is distributed in societies in general. There is thus a need to recognise that different models of the distribution of power fit different societies, that more than one model may be applicable, and that the applicability of a particular model is likely to vary significantly over time. This last point is vividly illustrated by the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 and since: what often seemed immutable changed so rapidly that few foresaw it and only the bold feel able to predict with any certainty what new distribution of power will emerge. Nor should it be assumed that a pluralist or a democratic model will become the norm, nor that the capitalist societies of the West will be the economic role models for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Those capitalist societies themselves face significant change, especially from the growing economic, social and political influences of the EC and the consequences of the free-trade agreement between the United States and Canada, quite apart from the potential impact of relations with the Third World and environmental factors, such as global warming and the exploitation of the earth's natural resources. Power and its distribution are not static but dynamic concepts and any analysis of political behaviour within societies, which is the subject of Part III, must take account of that. 86 PART ill POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIETY