


Figure 1.6: Average percentages\* of respondents who are members of or volunteers in selected organisations by type, 1990–1993 and 2000



security of civil society at the national, regional and global level, as discussed in chapter 9.


### Participation in global civil society


Across the western world, the value changes of the latter half of the twentieth century consequently implied a greater mobilisation of society around issues advocated by the new social movements: human rights, gender equality, environmental protection, third world development, peace, and democratisation—issues typically outside the realm of established party politics. By the very nature of the issues involved, these movements implied greater internationalism and linked value changes in the West to developments in Latin America or Africa and vice versa. The new movement of international solidarity was less linked to the workers' movement and the traditional political left. It was far more about human rights and democracy, more about equity than social equality, and more about self-determination of the individual and society than about power politics and the state. Activists for democratisation in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, or

those fighting apartheid and neo-colonialism in Africa, were frequently either part of or linked to the emerging and highly educated post-material middle class of the Western world.

The mobilisation effect of the ideas of 1989, which spread westwards from central Europe, is perhaps the clearest expression of this 'marriage' between changes in value patterns, social movements, and transnationalism (Kaldor 2003). Other are the re-democratisation of many countries in Latin America, the South African resistance to apartheid, the women's and environmental movements, or the human rights movement generally.

Unfortunately, little systematic comparative data exist for membership and participation in the types of associations and groups linked to social movements and transnationalism that would allow us to explore changes for the 1970–2000 period, although very useful case studies exist that show how movements began to cross borders more frequently and more widely than in the past (see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cohen and Rai 2000). However, with the help of the 1990 and 2000 European and World Value Surveys, it is possible to examine possible changes during the





previous decade. Indeed, we find, as Figure 1.6 illustrates, that during the 1990s people were more likely to join voluntary associations in the fields of Third World development, environmental protection, community organising, peace, and human rights than in the past, as both members and volunteers.

The greater participation in NGOs coincided with favourable political opportunity structures throughout the 1990s, with the political opening in central and eastern Europe and the re-democratisation of Latin America as perhaps the best examples. At the same time, many other parts of the world become more open and accessible for transnational organisations, such as Japan, South Korea, or South Africa. Of course, there were exceptions in the Balkans, the Middle East and in Central Asia, but generally it seemed that the world was on a course for greater political openness that welcomed citizen participation and involvement to an extent unknown in the past. It remains an open question, however, to what extent the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath changed the opportunity structure for global civil society organisations—an issue to which we will return.

Evidence of growing participation is also suggested by our data on parallel summits and by our annual chronology. Record 28 shows the steady growth of parallel summits during the 1990s and the growth of participation in those summits, particularly in Europe and Latin America. The chronology of global civil society events illustrates the richness of global civil society activities in different parts of the world.

## New Trends and Developments

In our overview of the contours of global civil society we have taken a comparative historical perspective and looked at the different dimensions of global civil society, with an emphasis on developments in recent decades. We discussed the trend towards cosmopolitan values associated with the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and the political opening and economic conditions of the 1990s that favoured the institutional expansion of global civil society into a large

and growing infrastructure. Of course, the continued development of global civil society is unlikely to stop there and revert to some pre-1990 pattern. The value change that facilitated the growth of global civil society over the last few decades is also the source of its medium- and long-term resilience. Values change less frequently than political agendas. Yet the new regressive climate that follows the events of 11 September and their aftermath implies a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism and the values it represents and builds on.

### The explosion of social forums

One way in which global civil society activists have responded is in finding new forms of mobilising and coming together: social forums. In a sense, it could be


Values change less frequently than political agendas. Yet the new regressive climate that follows the events of 11 September and their aftermath implies a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism


argued that the social forums represent a new political opportunity structure for a new generation of social movements more concerned with social justice than were the movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

In many ways, these forums are a new way of organising in global civil society; they are an innovation that establishes an intermediary step between traditional ways of mobilisation (INGOs) and dot.cause anonymity. They seem to combine the advantages associated with person-to-person interactions, as with community building and leadership, with the efficiency of


web-based organising in terms of information dissemination and management. It is perhaps too early to say whether social forums are the characteristic form of organising in the first decade of this century, just as sit-ins were in the 1960s, demonstrations in the 1970s, the NGO proliferation in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the dot.causes in the brief period between 1999 and 2002. Yet much speaks in favour of this assumption, in particular the low cost of organising and the flexibility and mobility this form allows. At the very least, we expect social forums to evolve as a complementary form of global civil society infrastructure alongside the vast and highly institutionalised network of INGOs described above.

In the 2002 Yearbook we gave an account of the first two World Social Forums (WSF) in Porto Allegre,





### Map 1.1: Social Forums, 2001–2004







**Type of summit**

- ✓ World
- ⊕ Thematic
- Regional
- △ National
- ⊙ Local

**Year**

- 2001–2002
- 2003–2004






Europe



South America








Table 1.4: List of world, regional, and thematic social forums as of May 2003

Name	Place	Dates	Comments
<i>World social forums</i>			
World SF I <a href="http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp">http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp</a>	Porto Alegre, Brazil	25–30 Jan. 2001	Born as counter-summit to the Davos World Economic Forum
World SF II <a href="http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp">http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp</a>	Porto Alegre, Brazil	31 Jan.– 5 Feb. 2002	68,000 participants; incl. 12,000 young people; 5,000 organisations; 3,000 journalists; 800 MPs
World SF III <a href="http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp">http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/home.asp</a>	Porto Alegre, Brazil	23–28 Jan. 2003	100,000 participants from 156 countries; 1,286 workshops, seminars and round tables
World SF IV <a href="http://www.wsfindia.org/event_description.php">http://www.wsfindia.org/event_description.php</a>	Mumbai, India	16–21 Jan. 2004	Preceded by Indian and Asian consultation rounds
<i>Regional social forums</i>			
African SF I	Bamako, Mali	5–9 Jan. 2002	Over 200 people, from 43 countries
African SF II <a href="http://www.enda.sn/objectifs.htm">http://www.enda.sn/objectifs.htm</a>	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	5–9 Jan. 2003	Remains small with c. 200 people.
Americas SF <a href="http://www.forosocialamericas.org/">http://www.forosocialamericas.org/</a>	Quito, Ecuador	8–13 March 2004	Postponed by one year to avoid narrow anti- FTAA focus
Asian SF <a href="http://www.wsfindia.org/">http://www.wsfindia.org/</a>	Hyderabad, India	2–7 Jan. 2003	Transforms from Indian into Asia SF at a late stage. Attracts an unexpected 14,000 participants
European SF <a href="http://www.2002.fse-esf.org/">http://www.2002.fse-esf.org/</a>	Florence, Italy	6–10 Nov. 2002	Defeats media scare by being peaceful. 40,000 participants; 1 million in closing anti-war march
European SF II <a href="http://www.fse-esf.org/">http://www.fse-esf.org/</a>	Paris/St Denis, France	12–16 Nov. 2003	
Mediterranean SF <a href="http://www.fsmed.info/">http://www.fsmed.info/</a>	Barcelona, Spain	March 2004	
North-American SF <a href="http://www.northamerican-socialforum.org/">http://www.northamerican-socialforum.org/</a>	Vancouver, Canada	15–22 Aug. 2003	
Oceania SF <a href="http://oceanasocialforum.org.nz/">http://oceanasocialforum.org.nz/</a>	Wellington, New Zealand	Oct.–Nov. 2003	Postponed to attract wider participation
Pan-Amazon SF II <a href="http://www.fspanamazonico.com.br/pagina/iiforum.html">http://www.fspanamazonico.com.br/pagina/iiforum.html</a>	Belém, Brazil	16–19 Jan. 2003	Also organising a number of 'meetings without borders' in Amazonian border towns
Pan-Amazon SF III <a href="http://www.fspanamazonico.com.br/">http://www.fspanamazonico.com.br/</a>	Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela	4–8 Feb. 2004	







Name	Place	Dates	Comments
Transatlantic SF <a href="http://www.lahaine.org/global/madrid/programa_fst_eng.htm">http://www.lahaine.org/global/madrid/programa_fst_eng.htm</a>	Madrid, Spain	9–19 May 2002	Specifically against Spanish neo-imperialism in Latin-America
<i>Thematic social forums</i>			
Argentina Thematic SF <a href="http://www.forosocialargentino.org/foro2002.htm">http://www.forosocialargentino.org/foro2002.htm</a>	Buenos Aires, Argentina	22–25 Aug. 2002	Focused on debt crisis and IMF policies. Over 20,000 people
Colombia Thematic SF <a href="http://www.mamacoca.org/foro_legal/fsmt_presentacion_en.htm">http://www.mamacoca.org/foro_legal/fsmt_presentacion_en.htm</a>	Cartagena, Colombia	16–20 June 2003	Theme: Democracy, human rights, wars and crops used for illicit purposes
Health Social Forum II	Porto Alegre, Brazil	20–23 Jan. 2003	First forum started as part of Argentina thematic forum; second convenes separately just before WSF III
Health Social Forum III <a href="http://www.cicop.org.ar/forosalud/">http://www.cicop.org.ar/forosalud/</a>	Buenos Aires, Argentina	7–9 Nov. 2003	Third health forum returns to Argentina
Palestine Thematic SF <a href="http://www.pngo.net/wsf/index.htm">http://www.pngo.net/wsf/index.htm</a>	Ramallah, Palestine	27–30 Dec. 2002	250 internationals and 500 locals meet in Arafat's compound; also visit Gaza
Women SF	France	Nov. 2003	To take place just before Paris ESF
World Education Forum II <a href="http://www.forummundialdeeducacao.com.br">http://www.forummundialdeeducacao.com.br</a>	Porto Allegre, Brazil	19–22 Jan 2003	Just before WSF III, 15,000 teachers from 100 countries
World Education Forum III <a href="http://www.forummundialdeeducacao.com.br">http://www.forummundialdeeducacao.com.br</a>	Porto Allegre, Brazil	29–31 July 2004	Preceded by regional education forums in Sao Paolo, Brazil; Guadalajara, Mexico; and Barcelona, Spain
This list is based primarily on web searches undertaken between January and May 2003. Inclusion in the list therefore does not guarantee that the social forum in question definitely did, or will, take place on the date in question. For a more comprehensive list, including national and local social forums, consult our web site at < <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/yearbook">http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/yearbook</a> >.			

the number of participants they attracted, and the enthusiasm they inspired. At the second World Social Forum, held in Porto Allegre in early 2002, the decision was taken to disperse the idea of the social forum, organising regional and thematic forums, the ideas and conclusions of which would feed back into the WSF. Even before this decision was taken, there had been a first regional Social Forum in Africa and a national Social Forum in Costa Rica, and an angry counter-meeting of Durban citizens during the World

Conference Against Racism decided to call itself Durban Social Forum (Desai 2002). But, especially in Italy, the social forum phenomenon has taken off like nowhere else. When the first WSF decided to postpone regional social forums (national or local social forums do not appear to have been considered), the large group of Italians present, which met frequently as a delegation, decided nevertheless to frame their planned counter-summit to the Genoa G8 meeting as a 'social forum', a format capable of





unifying the Italian left (Cannavo 2001; Sullo 2001a; 2001b). More than 200,000 people, mainly Italians, united in Genoa, and many carried away the idea of a social forum. There are now at least 170 (some say many more) local social forums in Italy.<sup>2</sup>

Since the second World Social Forum, Social Forums have mushroomed (see Map 1.1; Table 1.4). While most simply adopt the format of the WSF, organising a one to three day event with workshops, panels, and plenary discussions on a wide number of topics, other organisational forms are also being experimented with: the Brisbane SF operates on an 'open space' principle, which means the agenda is determined by participants on the day of the meeting; the Ottawa SF emphasises that 'this is not a conference' but rather a carnivalesque manifestation, and the Tarnet (France) SF tries to make its web site function as an interactive virtual social forum. Some social forums, including those of Colombia, Madrid, and Limousin (France), have become permanent organisations, while others, such as Tuebingen (Germany) and Philadelphia, have regular events they refer to as 'social forums'. Many of the social forums in Europe are organised to coincide with EU Summits of Heads of State and Government. The European Social Forum in Florence has been the biggest, with 40,000 participants; the Philadelphia SF must be one of the smallest, meeting in a bookshop once a month.

We think that the explosion of social forums can be seen as a new stage in the development of what was initially termed the 'anti-globalisation movement', what Desai and Said (2001; Chapter 4) refer to as the 'anti-capitalist movement', but what is now also increasingly referred to as the 'global justice movement'. The initial phase was one of protest, in Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Quebec, and many other cities. Some of this protest involved direct action, a small proportion of it was violent. There is no doubt that the media's focus on violence, along with the sense that the protesters were expressing a more widely felt sense of unease, helped to put the movement on the map. Apart from the violence, the

main criticism levelled at the movement was that it was just 'anti', that it protested but proposed no alternatives. But there are many strands within the social forums. ATTAC groups in 35 countries study proposals to restructure financial markets. The transnational peasants' network Via Campesina in collaboration with NGOs has developed ideas such as 'food sovereignty' in order to confront the corporatisation of farming and food processing (see Chapter 8). Above all, the social forum has emerged

as the space for 'reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action' for global civil society (WSF Charter of Principles 2001).


One of the most noteworthy features of the move to social forums is that, while there still are marches and protest actions, they avoid the violence that sparked both media attention and much controversy within the movement in the earlier demonstrations. Again, this shift is most evident in Italy, where, after the black bloc activities in Genoa in July 2001,


the Berlusconi-controlled media had been warning Florentine shopkeepers to board up their shops and flee the city. Instead, the European Social Forum was entirely peaceful; most shops stayed open, did good business, and cheered the march on the last day of the Forum (Longhi 2002).

The decline in violent action might be attributable to three related causes: while initially the non-violent majority would not condemn the violent minority, there was a mounting sense of frustration which culminated in Genoa, where the possibly police-infiltrated black blocs formed the excuse to crack down on peaceful activists. Second, while violence may seem appropriate in direct confrontation with the power-holders, the G8, the World Bank, or the WTO, it has no similar logic in a civil society-only forum, where internal debate is the main item on the menu. Third, as will be described below, many anti-capitalist protestors have focused in recent months on anti-war activities and these have mobilised very large, often non-political, sections of the population who would be deterred by violence.

One of the most noteworthy features of social forums is that, while there still are marches and protest actions, they avoid the violence that sparked both media attention and much controversy within the movement

<sup>2</sup> <<http://www.forisociali.org>>.





Another feature of the social forums is that debates are not a means to an end, but the end itself. Social forums discuss proposals and strategies, but they do not produce unified 'final statements'. As Stuart Hodgkinson put it, the fact that trade unionists, NGO representatives, and movement activists cannot agree on how to respond to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 'seems less important than their willingness to talk openly about the constraints they face' (Hodgkinson 2003). This emphasis on debate lends new strength to our suggestion in *Global Civil Society 2001* (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 10) that 'one way of defining or understanding global civil society is as a debate about the future direction of globalisation and perhaps humankind itself. The conscious emphasis on debate as a value in itself is particularly important in the post-September 11 world, where Al-Qaeda, other terrorists, and the Bush Administration are successfully promoting violent confrontation instead of debate.

Related to the emphasis on debate is the fact that social forums promote new ways of organising. This does not apply to the plenaries, which are dominated by old-left luminaries like Noam Chomsky, Walden Bello and Susan George. However, the smaller workshops seem to foster the growth of horizontal transnational networks on particular issues, one of the most prominent being water. While the network form predates the social forums, of course, it is still a discovery to members of more traditional organisations, such as trade unions, which have played an important role in many social forums. It remains to be seen how long the debate-for-its-own-sake formula of the social forums can continue to generate the mobilisation and enthusiasm that it does at present. There continues to be a clear split between those we have earlier called 'Reformists', who believe that global capitalism can be harnessed as a force for good but the playing field must be levelled, and those 'Rejectionists' who believe global capitalism itself is the problem, and seek the solution in statist socialism or revolution. At the 2003 WSF, this divide was symbolised by the split between those who applauded the journey of Brazilian President Luis Inacio da Silva ('Lula') from Porto Alegre to Davos and those who condemned

it. Indeed, some argue that the social forums have been made possible by the involvement of Third World states like Brazil, and this has tended to strengthen the traditional rejectionist strand of social forum activity.

However, disagreements on global capitalism, and indeed most 'anti-capitalist' activity, have been overshadowed in 2003 by anti-war activism. There appears to have been widespread agreement amongst anti-capitalist activists that, first, the war on terror and the war on Iraq in particular were linked to capitalist interests, and second, that resisting the war was the more urgent matter.


### The global anti-war movement

While the anti-war movement in 2002 and early 2003 was much wider than the participation in social forums, there is an intimate connection between the two. It was at the European Social Forum in Florence that activists from eleven EU countries agreed to organise protests on the same day, 15 February 2003. As the threat of war continued to linger, activists in North America and elsewhere decided to join in. Eventually, there were demonstrations in almost 800 cities, attracting 11 million people according to one estimate (United for Peace 2003; A. Anderson 2003).


But the influence is deeper than just a decision on a date. The activist networks built at the social forums provide both an organisational base and an ideological alternative to the world view of 'Blair and Bush'. However, that alternative world view is at the same time a problem. In their case against the war on Iraq, the dominant figures in the new global movement tended to lump together corporate capitalism and social inequality, US hegemony, and the plight of the Palestinian people. A declaration of the International

Campaign against US Aggression on Iraq, endorsed by the British Stop the War Coalition, for instance, calls the war against Iraq 'part of a U.S. project of global domination and subjugation', and their own opposition 'integral to the internationalist struggle against neo-liberal globalisation'. It goes on to denounce the 'Zionist perpetrators of genocidal crimes against the Palestinians' (Cairo Declaration 2002). Many of the


**A general feature of the 15 February demonstrations everywhere was that no particular profile of 'the marcher' could be given, they were of all generations, classes, and races, and many had never demonstrated before**










**Map 1.2: Global day of protest against war in Iraq, 15 February 2003**








Table 1.5: Changing contours of global civil society

Decade	Infrastructure growth	Composition/ fields	Form innovation	Value changes	Participation
1970s	Medium growth	Economic, research & science	Humanitarian membership-based INGOs	Rise of post-materialism	Slow increase
1980s	Acceleration of growth	Value-based	INGOs linked to international social movements	Cosmopolitan values	Mobilisation
1990s	Medium growth	Value-based; service-provision	Corporate and public management INGOs	Consolidation	Slow increase
2000s	Acceleration of growth	Social justice and opposition to war	Social forums, dot.causes	Resilience	Renewed mobilisation


spokespeople of the anti-war movement appeared to ignore the character of the Iraqi, and indeed Afghan, regimes. Some, such as UK veteran activist Tony Benn, have even gone so far as to visit Saddam Hussein, associating themselves with the genocidal dictator in their campaign against the war.


The anti-war movement is wider, however. Church leaders, including the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of Bush's own United Methodist Church, have declared themselves against the war. One of the biggest organisations against the war is the US-based Moveon Peace (URL), founded by 21-year-old Eli Pariser, who collected more than half a million electronic signatures within one week after the 11 September attacks on a petition pleading for a non-violent response. His voice is very different from that of the declaration quoted above: 'We support President Bush's resolve to end terrorism, but not his military agenda for doing it.' More than a hundred Hollywood stars, including Martin Sheen, Matt Damon, Susan Sarandon, and Samuel Jackson have joined in with their 'Win Without War' appeal (which does raise the question: what are they hoping to win?).

A general feature of the 15 February demonstrations everywhere was that no particular profile of 'the marcher' could be given, they were of all generations, classes, and races, and many had never been on a demonstration before. In particular, the anti-war movement brought together North and

South, Western and Islamic communities, offering the potential for a new cosmopolitan approach which integrated immigrant and developing-country communities into the global political process for the first time. The biggest demonstrations took place precisely in the places where governments were in favour of the war: London, Rome, Madrid, and New York.

In the post-September 11 world, global civil society does continue to claim space to contest government policies and peacefully debate alternatives. In the marches as in the social forums, the value of this stance is recognised by the people in civil society themselves: the slogan 'Not In My Name', carried in many countries, signals that the expression of dissent matters, even if the war against Iraq could not be stopped. The central role of chemical and biological weapons in the case for war against Iraq suggests that in order to counter the 'Axis of Evil' logic, the anti-war movement ought to pay more attention to these weapons, which are still primarily the preserve of a small group of academic experts (see chapter 5). It is too early to assess whether the new anti-war movement will be a lasting force in global civil society. It may lie dormant, as it did after the war in Afghanistan, until the next US threat to go to war, or it may continue to oppose what it sees as the occupation of Iraq. Even if it can transcend conjunctural upsurges in response to actual warfare, there is still the risk is that the anti-war movement will be dominated by Rejectionists, who oppose the





**Table 1.6: Possible future scenarios**


	1990s	Scenarios for the 2000s			
		Unilateralist	Bargain	Division	Utopian
<i>Governments</i>	Coalition of Supporters and Reformers	Predominantly Regressive	Alliance of Regressives and Reformers	Division between Regressives, Reformers and Rejectionists	Dominance of Reformers
<i>Global Civil Society</i>	Reformers and Rejectionists	Predominantly Rejectionist	Dominance of Reformers	Contest between Rejectionist and Reformers	Dominance of Reformers


US role in the world but offer no alternative multilateralist mechanism for responding to repression, human rights abuses, or even genocide. Whether the potential of the anti-war movement to provide a new underpinning for the global institutional framework can be realised will depend on whether the reformist cosmopolitan positions within the movement can be heard more loudly.

## Conclusion

In this introductory chapter, we have sounded a slightly upbeat if cautionary note about global civil society, a more optimistic note than in the immediate shadows of the September 11 attacks in 2001. We arrived at this view by taking a step back, examining the course of global civil society over the last quarter century, thus taking as much account of what the French historian Ferdinand Braudel called the *longue durée* as the data situation would allow. As summarised in Table 1.5, the development of global civil society over the last three decades has shown a remarkably consistent trajectory. Specifically, we suggest that:

- The growth and expansion of global civil society seems closely associated with a major shift in cultural and social values that took hold in most developed market economies in the 1970s. This shift saw a change in emphasis from material security to concerns about democracy, participation, and meaning, and involved, among other things, a formation towards cosmopolitan values such as tolerance and respect for human rights (see Inglehart 1990).
- These values facilitated the cross-national spread of social movements around common issues that escaped conventional party politics, particularly in Europe and Latin America, and led to a broad-based mobilisation with the women's, peace, democracy, and environmental movements as the best examples of an increasingly international 'movement industry' (Diani and McAdam 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).
- The 1990s brought a political opening and a broad-based consolidation of unknown proportion and scale ( Kaldor 2003), which coincided with the reappraisal of the role of the state in most developed countries, and growing disillusionment with state-led multilateralism in the Third World among counter-elites (Edwards 1999).
- In addition to this broadened political space, favourable economic conditions throughout the 1990s and the vastly reduced costs of communication and greater ease of organising facilitated the institutional expansion of global civil society in organisational terms (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Clark 2003);
- By 2002, the changed geo-political environment and the economic downturn challenged both the (by now) relatively large infrastructure of global civil society organisations and the broad value base of cosmopolitanism in many countries across the world, in particular among the middle classes and elites.
- As a result, new organisational forms and ways of organising and communications have gained in importance, with social forums and Internet-





based mobilisation as prominent examples, as have frictions between 'American' and 'European' visions of the world's future.

In the 1990s, the predominant political force behind globalisation was a coalition between Supporters and Reformers, in transnational corporations as well as in governments and intergovernmental organisations, and in global civil society. The Davos World Economic Forum represented an annual expression of this coalition. It was the combination of Supporters and Reformers that pressed for the globalisation of the rule of law and of technology as well as the economy, although there was disagreement on the globalisation of people. This combination, mainly associated with the corporate and the new public management manifestations of global civil society discussed above, came to be seen by many as depoliticising and co-opting global civil society. However, it also contributed to the growth and solidification of its infrastructure.

In the brief era from Seattle to the war on Afghanistan, we saw a huge upsurge in civil society mobilisation, in effect a coalition between Reformers and Rejecters of globalisation. In contrast to the groups that dominated the 1990s, they are more associated with self-organisation and activism. Their protests sent out powerful warning signals, which were just beginning to get picked up in the 'global governance' world where Reformers and Supporters coincided when the Twin Towers came down.

Since September 11, Regressive globalisers have been in the ascendancy. This includes both the unilateralists of the Bush Administration and the growing militant religious and nationalist groups and parties, for instance in the Middle East, India, and many countries in eastern and western Europe. They are Regressive globalisers rather than Rejectionists because they aim to impose their vision on the rest of the world and because of the way in which they make use of the infrastructure of globalisation. At the same time, Rejectionists, generally on the left, have become increasingly powerful within global civil society partly because many activists have not yet come to terms with the rise of regressive globalism

and believe they are still fighting against the powerful Supporters of globalisation.


Another factor that we emphasise in this chapter is that forms as well as positions matter. Because the social forums and the anti-war movements have emphasised self-organisation and/or minimal structure, it has been relatively easy for those on the traditional organised left to capture dominant positions and to be allowed to act as spokespeople. Indeed, the anti-war movement was a coming together of individuals whose views were not


necessarily reflected by those who acted as their spokespeople. The social forums are meant to be an experiment in democratic form, yet the lack of structure often allowed old left leaders to grab the limelight and give the impression of speaking 'on behalf of'. Hence the form or lack of form submerged genuine debate and alternative thinking. And it is the traditional left that sees the 'pure' globalisers as its main adversary.

Yet 'pure' globalisers, probably always overrated, have been marginalised in recent years. Instead, we fear that a (in many cases unconscious) combination of the

We could see the retreat of globalisation in the areas of law and especially people, combined with a lawless and 'unfair' globalisation in the areas of the economy and technology

Rejecters of globalisation and Regressive globalisers will lead to a polarisation of positions, for instance between Bush and Bin Laden, but also between many of the groups described in Chapter 7, which treat each other as implacable enemies. This is a polarisation, however, that benefits both poles, as they need to sustain fear and hatred as their power base, squeezing the middle. If this combination does come to dominate, we could see the retreat of globalisation in the areas of law and especially people, combined with a lawless and 'unfair' globalisation in the areas of the economy and technology. The apportioning of contracts in Iraq to corporations associated with the Bush Administration is a foretaste of what such globalisation might look like. Precisely because the Regressives propose a radical vision of the world, the Reformers come to be seen as the status quo position and not the progressive position. Thus it is the combination of Regressives and Rejectionists that could lead to the unilateralist scenario we described in the 2002 yearbook, characterised by polarisation and violence.





In the aftermath of September 11, one possibility we envisaged was a bargain between Regressives and Reformers. Tony Blair talked about the need for a new framework of global justice to combat the causes of terrorism. There were some new initiatives: increased development aid promised at the Monterrey Summit, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); increased US funding for the global AIDS fund. But in retrospect these initiatives seem marginal in relation to the scale of the problem and, in the context of the Bush tax cuts, seem very different from the kind of generosity that was offered by the United States to its allies during the Cold War period.

In the period leading up to the war in Iraq, the anti-war movement did find some allies in government. Some of these governments have, at least in rhetorical terms, embraced a Reformist agenda—France and Germany, for example. Others are Regressive or Rejectionist, like Russia, China, Iran, or Egypt, for example. The emergence of new governmental champions of the Reformers, however, at present only leads to division. The British government lost perhaps the most important opportunity of this decade to build a system of global governance by siding with the United States. Had the British and Spanish governments, like the French and the German governments, opposed the war and refused to legitimise American actions, a broad European government coalition could have seized the moment of public mobilisation in favour of multilateral institutions and alternative ways of confronting dictators. It might not have been able to prevent the war but it would have left the European Union united and in a position to greatly strengthen global institutions. Now the division only further weakens multilateral institutions.


Perhaps the most positive conclusion of our chapter is that, by any number of measures, global civil society has been strengthened over the last decade. The most hopeful possibility is that there will continue to be serious space for the reformist strand of activism so that global civil society will be able to offer a radical emancipatory vision that can compete with the Regressives and Rejectionists and eventually have some influence on American politics. Thus it is possible to summarise the scenarios that we described in the 2002 Yearbook in terms of the positions that we have elaborated in this chapter (Table 1.6).


Since we do believe in agency, what happens will depend on choices that are being made now about

positions and values as well as forms of organisation. This Yearbook is offered in a reflexive spirit, as a way for readers to help us think about these various possibilities and, by developing new ideas and ways of thinking, we hope this will, in turn, contribute to more constructive choices about the future direction of our globalised world.


## References


- Abramson, P. and R. Inglehart (1995). *Value Change in Global Perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Anderson, Arthur (2003). 'Global Count of Protestors Hits Eleven Million'. 15 February. <<http://www.indymedia.org/archive/features/2003/02/2003-02.html>>.
- Anderson, Kenneth (2000). 'The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society'. *European Journal of International Law*, 11/1: 91–120.
- Anheier, Helmut (forthcoming 2004). 'The United States as the "True Expression" of Civil Society'. In Marlies Glasius, David Lewis, and Hakan Seckinelgin (eds), *Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts* London: Routledge.
- , Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds) (2001). 'Introducing Global Civil Society'. In Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds), *Global Civil Society 2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- and J. Kendall (2002). 'Trust and the Voluntary Sector'. *British Journal of Sociology*, 53: 343–62.
- and L. Salamon (2003). 'The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective'. In W.W. Powell and R. Steinberg (eds), *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- and N. Themudo (2002). 'Organisational Forms of Global Civil Society: Implications of Going Global'. In Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier (eds), *Global Civil Society 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Archambault, E., Gariazzo, M., Anheier, H., and Salamon, L. (1999). 'From Jacobin Tradition to Decentralization'. In L. Salamon et al., *Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Beck, Ulrich. (2000). 'The Postnational Society and its Enemies'. Public lecture, London School of Economics and Political Science, 24 February.
- Braudel, F. (1980). *On History* (trans. Sarah Matthews). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.





- Cairo Declaration Against U.S. Hegemony and War on Iraq and In Solidarity with Palestine (2002). December.  
<[http://www.cairocampaign.com/html/cairo\\_declaration.html](http://www.cairocampaign.com/html/cairo_declaration.html)>.
- Cannavo, Salvatore (2001). 'Porto Allegre, Un Altra Strada per l'Umanita'. *Carta*. 5 February.
- Chandhoke, Neera (2002). 'The Limits of Global Civil Society'. In Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier (eds), *Global Civil Society 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, J. (1991). *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Agencies*. London: Earthscan.
- (2003). *Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization*. London: Earthscan/Kumarian.
- Cohen, Robin and S. Rai (eds) (2000). *Global Social Movements*. London: Athlone Press.
- Commission of the European Community (1997). *Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in Europe*. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Dasgupta, P. and I. Serageldin. (2000). *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Deacon, Bob, M. Hulse, and P. Stubbs (1997). *Global Social Policy: International Organisations and the Future of Welfare*. London: Sage.
- Desai, Ashwin (2002). *We Are the Poors. Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press Books.
- Desai, Meghnad and Yahia Said (2001). 'The New Anti-Capitalist Movement: Money and Global Civil Society'. In Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds), *Global Civil Society 2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Diani, Mario and Doug McAdam (eds) (2003). *Social Movements and Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, B., E. Foley, and M. Diani (eds) (2001). *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*. Hanover, NH : University Press of New England. .
- Edwards, M. (1999). *Future Positive: International Co-operation in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. London: Earthscan.
- and John Gaventa (eds) (2001). *Global Citizen Action*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- European Values Surveys 1981, 1990, and 2000 (2003). *Cologne, Tilburg: Central Archive for Social Research, University of Cologne (distributor); Tilburg University (coordinator)*.
- Fowler, Alan (2000). *Civil Society, NGOs and Social Development*. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Giddens, A. (1999). *The Third Way and its Critics*. London: Polity Press.
- Halpern, D. (1999). *Social Capital. The New Golden Goose?* London: Nexus/IPPR.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hodkinson, Stuart (2003). 'Custard Pies Are Off the Menu'. *Red Pepper*. March: 36–7.
- Howell, Jude and Jenny Pearce (2001). *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration*. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- and W. Baker (2000). 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'. *American Sociological Review*, 65: 19–51.
- Kaldor, M. (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Keane, J. (2001). 'Global Civil Society?' In Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds), *Global Civil Society 2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (1998). *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kendall, J. and S. Almond (1999). 'United Kingdom'. In L. Salamon et al., *Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Kettl, Donald (2000). *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Klingemann, H. and D. Fuchs (eds) (1995). *Citizens and the State*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lindenberg, M. and C. Bryant (2001). *Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumerian Press.
- Longhi, Vittorio (2002). 'Where Another Europe Seemed Possible'. *Red Pepper*. 15 December.
- McAdam, Doug (ed.) (1996). *Opportunities, Mobilization Structures and Framing Processes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McLaughlin, Kate, Stephen Osborne, and Ewan Ferlie (eds) (2002). *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*. London: Routledge..





- Mokhiber, Russell and Robert Weissman (2001). 'American Imperialism in Latin America'. *San Francisco Bay Guardian*. 2 November.
- Moveon Peace <<http://peace.moveon.org/peace.php3>>.
- New Yorker* (2003). 'Marches and Parades'. 19 May.
- Offe, C. and S. Fuchs (2002). 'A Decline of Social Capital?'. In R. Putnam (ed), *Democracies in Flux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oliviero, Melanie Beth and Adele Simmons (2002). 'Who's Minding the Store? Global Civil Society and Corporate Responsibility'. In Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier (eds), *Global Civil Society 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Otlet, Paul (1924). *Tableau de l'Organisation Internationale. Rapport général à la Conférence des Associations Internationales*. Geneva: Union of International Associations (publication no. 114).
- Perrow, C. (2001). 'The Rise of Nonprofits and the Decline of Civil Society'. In H. Anheier (ed.), *Organizational Theory and the Nonprofit Form* (Report No. 2). London: Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics.
- Perrow, Charles (2002). *Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. .
- Priller, E. et al (1999). 'Germany'. In L. Salamon et al. *Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Survival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- (ed.) (2002). *Democracies in Flux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Putzel, James (1997). 'Accounting for the "Dark Side" of Social Capital: Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy'. *Journal of International Development*, 9: 939–49.
- Randall, David, Severin Carrell, Andrew Johnson, and Jonathan Thompson. (2003). 'Million Britons Turn Out to Vote with their Feet'. *The Independent on Sunday*. 16 February.
- Salamon, L., Sokolowski, S.W., and List, R. (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Overview*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Salamon, L. and H. Anheier (1996). *The Emerging Nonprofit Sector*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Scholte, Jan-Aart (1999). 'Globalisation: Prospects for a Paradigm Shift'. In M. Shaw (ed.), *Politics and Globalisation*. London: Routledge.
- Shaw, Martin (2000). *Theory of the Global State: Global Reality as an Unfinished Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Siriani, C. and L. Friedland (2000). *Civic Innovation in America: Community Empowerment, Public Policy, and the Movement for Civic Renewal*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schiller, Herbert I. (1998). 'Towards a New Century of American Imperialism'. *Le Monde Diplo*. September.
- Sullo, Pierluigi (2001a). 'Allegri Saluti, Cartoline dal Nuovo Mondo'. *Manifesto*. 31 January.
- (2001b). 'Note Allegre Dopo Il Forum'. *Manifesto*. 4 February.
- Tew, E. (1963). 'Location of International Organizations'. *International Organizations*, 8: 492–93.
- Tyler, Patrick (2003). 'Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A New Power In The Streets'. *New York Times*. 17 February.
- UIA (Union of International Associations) (1990). *Yearbook of International Associations*. Brussels: Union of International Associations.
- (2000) *Yearbook of International Associations. Guide to Global Civil Society Networks*. Brussels: Union of International Associations.
- (2002/3). *Yearbook of International Associations. Guide to Global Civil Society Networks*. Munich: Saur.
- UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2001). *World Investment Report* <[http://www.unctad.org/wir/pdfs/wir\\_tnc\\_top100.en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/wir/pdfs/wir_tnc_top100.en.pdf)>.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2002). *Human Development Report 2002*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- United for Peace (2003)'Feb. 15 Protests Around the World' <<http://unitedforpeace.org/article.php?id=725>>.
- Van Deth, J. and E. Scarbrough (eds) (1995). *The Impact of Values*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- World Values Survey Study Group (1999–2000). *World Values Survey, 1981–1984, 1990–1993, and 1995–97*. CD Rom, cumulative file for the first 3 waves. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research (producer); Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
- (2003). 'World Values Survey 2000! Unpublished, by permission.
- WSF (World Social Forum) Charter of Principles (2001) <<http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/>>

