THE NEW COLD WAR HISTORY
John Lewis Gaddis, editor
CHEN JIAN
The University of North Carolina Press
Chapel Hill & London
arly endeavor by conducting a more comprehensive study on how Mao's China
encountered the world.3! To what extent the new project will be successful
will depend, again, upon further opening of Chinese archival sources. Indeed,
only when scholars- both Chinese and non-Chinese - are able to conduct free
academic inquiries with the support of unrestricted archival access will more
authentic and a deeper understanding about China become possible.
16 INTRODUCTION
Jiang Jieshi claims that there never exist two suns in the heaven, and
there should never be two masters on the earth. I do not believe him.
I am going to make another sun appear in the heaven fir him to see.
- Mao Zedong (I946)
The diversification ofpower did more to shape the course ofthe Cold 117ar
than did the balancing ofpower.
-John Lewis Gaddis
China's "War ofResistance againstJapan" ended in August 1945 when
Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Peace, however, did not come
to China's war-torn land. Almost immediately after Japan's defeat, in the context
of the emerging global confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union, the long-accumulated tensions between the Chinese Communist
Party (ccp) and the Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (GMD), intensified,
bringing the country to the verge of another civil war. From late 1945 to early
1946, the Communists and Nationalists, with the mediation and intervention
of the United States and the Soviet Union, conducted a series of negotiations
on different levels to solve the problems between them, but they failed to reach
an overall agreement that would allow peace to prevail. By mid-I946, a nationwide
civil war finally erupted, which resulted in the victory of the Chinese
Communist revolution in 1949. From an international perspective, the ccpGMD
confrontation intensified the conflict between the two superpowers, thus
contributing to the escalation and, eventually, crystallization of the Cold War
in East Asia. An examination of China's transition from the anti-Japanese war
to a revolutionary civil war in 1945-46 thus will shed new light on a crucial
juncture in the development of the Chinese revolution, as well as offer fresh
insights into the connections between China's internal development and the
origins of the Cold War. This will be the focus of discussion of this chapter.
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The Origins of the CCP-GMD Confrontation
China's movement toward a civil war began in 1945-46, when the profound
hostilities between the Communists and the Nationalists that had accumulated
during the war years reached a climax. Given the deep historical origins
ofthe tensions between the two parties, indeed, civil war was almost inevitable.
In retrospect, Japan's invasion of China in the 1930S changed decisively the
course of China's internal development. From 1927, after the success of the
anti-Communist coup in Shanghai led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), to
1936, when the Xi'an incident occurred, the GMD and the ccp were engaged
in a bloody civil war. The Communists established revolutionary base areas in
the countryside (especially in the South) to wage a "land revolution." While
making every effort to suppress the Communist rebellion, Jiang's government
encountered a series of difficulties from the outset. In particular, Jiang's
leadership role within the GMD needed to be consolidated and the anti-Jiang
provincial warlords had to be dealt with. But Jiang's biggest dilemma emerged
after September 1931, when Japan occupied China's Northeast (Manchuria)
and continued to put pressure on the Chinese government through its intrusion
into North China. Jiang had to decide who should be treated as his primary
enemy-the Japanese or the cCP. Perceiving that "the Japanese were the
disease of the skin and the Communists were the threat to the heart," Jiang
risked losing his status as China's national leader to focus his efforts on suppressing
the ccp and the Red Army.1 By 1936, this strategy looked promising:
under Jiang's military pressure, the cCP gave up its main base area in Jiangxi
province in the South, to endure the "Long March" (during which the Chinese
Red Army lost 90 percent of its strength), and was restricted to a small,
barren area in northern Shaanxi province in northwestern China.2 However,
Jiang underestimated the impact Japan's continuous aggression in China had
on Chinese national consciousness and popular mentality. In December 1936,
Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, two ofJiang's generals who opposed his
policy of "putting the suppression of the ccp ahead of the resistance against
Japan," kidnapped him in Xi'an. Jiang was forced to stop the civil war against
the cCP so that the whole nation would be united to cope with the threat from
Japan.3
With the outbreak ofthe War ofResistance againstJapan the next year,
the GMD and the ccp formally established an anti-Japanese "united front."
During China's eight years of the war with Japan, Jiang's gains seemed
significant. By serving as China's paramount leader at a time of profound
national crisis, he effectively consolidated the legitimacy of the rule of his
party and himself in China, which, after 1942 and 1943, was further reinforced
by American-British recognition of China under his leadership as one of the
20 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
"Big Four." In the meantime, however, the foundation of Jiang's government
had started to crumble. In fact, in having to focus on dealing with the Japanese
invasion, Jiang failed to develop effective plans to cope with the profound
social and political problems China had been facing throughout the modern
age. Consequently, corruption spread further in Jiang's government and army
during the war years, which significantly damaged his reputation as China's
indisputable nationalleader.4
The most serious potential challenge to Jiang's government, however, came
from the ccp. China's deepening national crisis in the 193os, and the outbreak
of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, saved the ccp and the Chinese Red Army
from imminent final destruction. Holding high the banner of resisting Japan
during the war years, the ccp sent its military forces into areas behind the
Japanese lines to fight a guerrilla war.5 Although Mao Zedong, the ccp leader,
made it clear to his commanders that, rather than engaging in major battles
against the Japanese, they should use most of their energy to maintain and develop
their own forceS,6 the simple fact that the Communists were fighting in
the enemy's rear had created an image of the ccp as a major contributor to the
war against Japan.? Throughout the war years, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders
were always aware that after the war they would need to compete with the GMD
for control of China.
Not surprisingly, relations between the GMD and the ccp quickly deteriorated
as the war against Japan continued. Early in 1941, the Communist-led
New Fourth Army, while moving its headquarters from south to north of the
Yangzi (Yangtze) River, was attacked and wiped out by GMD troops in Wannan
(southern Anhui province).8 The "Wannan incident" (also known as the
New Fourth Army incident) immediately caused a serious crisis in the ccpGMD
wartime alliance. In response to the incident, Mao Zedong even asserted
that the cCP should begin a direct confrontation with Jiang and prepare to
overthrow his government.9
And Jiang ordered the use of both military and
political means to restrict the ccp's movements.IO
Pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, however, helped prevent
the G MD and the ccp from resuming a civil war at this moment. After the
New Fourth Army incident, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Lauchlin
Currie as his special envoy to China to meet Jiang and other Chinese leaders.
Currie expressed Washington's concerns over a renewed civil war between
the GMD and the ccp, warning that it would only benefit the Japanese.II On
25 January 1941, Georgi M. Dimitrov, the Comintern's secretary-general, sent
an urgent telegram to Mao Zedong, warning the ccp leaders that they should
not abandon the party's cooperation with the GMD lest they "fall into the trap
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 21
prepared by the Japanese and the puppets." 12 Consequently, a CCP-GMD showdown
was temporarily avoided.
Neither the ccp nor the GMD, though, would trust the other. In the ensuing
four years, until the end of the war againstJapan in 1945, both parties put preparing
for a showdown between them after the war at the top of their agenda.
In 1943, Jiang published a pamphlet titled China's Destiny, in which he claimed
that the Communists would have no position in postwar China.B The ccp angrily
criticized Jiang's "plot to establish his own dictatorship by destroying the
ccp and other progressive forces in China," calling for the Chinese people to
struggle resolutely against the emergence ofa "fascist China." 14 Both GMD and
ccp leaders realized that when the war ended, a life-or-death battle between
the two parties was probably inevitable.
The ((P'S Diplomatic Initiative in Late 19411 and Early 19115
By the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, the balance of strength between
the GMD and the cCP had swung further in the latter's favor. The widespread
corruption within Jiang's government, the runaway inflation in the
Nationalist-controlled areas,15 and the major military defeats of Nationalist
troops in the face ofthe Japanese Ichi-go campaign 16 combined to weaken significantlyJiangJieshi's
stature as China's wartime national leader. In comparison,
the ccp had reached a level ofstrength and influence unprecedented since
its establishment in 1921. By late 1944 and early 1945, the party claimed that it
commanded a powerful military force of 900,000 regular troops and 900,000
militiamen, and that party membership had reached over one millionP In the
meantime, the party had gained valuable administrative experience through
the buildup of base areas in central and northern China, and Mao Zedong,
through the "Rectification Campaign," had consolidated his control over the
party's strategy and policymaking.I8
Under these circumstances, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that
with the continuous development of the party's strength, it would occupy a
stronger position to compete for political power in China at the end of the
war againstJapan. On several occasions, Mao asserted that "this time, we must
take over China." 19 To this end, the party adopted a series of new strategies
in late 1944. In a political maneuver designed to challenge Jiang's claim to a
monopoly of political power in China, the ccp formally introduced the idea
of replacing Jiang's one-party dictatorship with a new coalition government
including the ccp and other democratic parties.20 On the military side, the ccp
leadership decided to dispatch the party's best units to penetrate into the areas
south of the Yangzi River, with the task of creating new base areas in south-
22 THE RISE OF TilE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
ern China. In several inner-party directives, Mao Zedong made it clear that if
dIe cCP could expand its "liberated zones" from the North to the South, the
party would occupy a more favorable position in confronting the GMD after
the warP But the ccp adopted the most important initiative in the diplomatic
field: perceiving that the United States would play an increasingly important
role in China and East Asia, the party leadership decided to pursue a closer
relationship with Washington.22
Since the early days of the war in the Pacific, the ccp had been pursuing
an "international united front" with the United States for two main objectives:
first, to "improve China's War of Resistance," and second, to enable the
cCP to use the United States to check the power of the Guomindang governmentP
Not until late 1944 and early 1945, however, when policymakers in
Washington were actively considering using China as a base for landing operations
in Japan, did the ccp find a real opportunity to approach the Americans.
cCP leaders realized that by offering the party's assistance to American landing
operations, it would not only reduce American suspicion of the Chinese
Communists but also allow them to use America's influence to check Jiang's
power.24 The ccp thus made every effort to expose the "darkness" of Jiang's
government, while taking every opportunity to convince the Americans that
the Chinese Communists were nationalists at the core, and that they favored
"democratic reforms" in China.25 In July 1944, the "Dixie Mission:' a group of
American military observers, arrived in Yan'an, marking the first direct official
contact between the U.S. government and the ccp.26
At first, the ccp's new diplomatic strategy appeared to be working well. In
June 1944, Roosevelt sent his vice president, Henry Wallace, to visit China
to press Jiang toward conducting democratic reformsP In September 1944,
a controversy erupted between Jiang and Joseph Stilwell, Jiang's American
chief of staff, leading President Roosevelt to request that Jiang turn over "unrestricted
command" of China's military forces to Stilwell. Thus a crisis developed
in the relationship between Chongqing, Jiang's wartime capital, and
Washington.28
The ccp's "diplomatic victory," however, was short-lived. Realizing that his
controversy with General Stilwell threatened the very foundation of his authority
and power, Jiang rebuffed President Roosevelt's request, and, consequently,
General Stilwell was recalled in October. In dIe meantime, in order to
prevent the CCP-GMD friction from compromising China's war effort against
Japan, President Roosevelt sent Patrick Hurley to China to help mediate the
problems between the two parties. In early November, Hurley reached a fivepoint
draft agreement with the ccp leaders in Yan'an that favored the establishTHE
RISE OF TilE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 23
ment of a coalition government.29 But when Hurley learned that Jiang firmly
rejected the five-point agreement, especially the part concerning the coalition
government, he agreed to a three-point plan proposed by Jiang. According to
the plan, the ccp would need to earn its legal status by turning over control
of its military forces to the GMD government.3D
cCP leaders were genuinely offended by Hurley's "deceptive abandonment"
of the five-point agreement. They rejected the three-point plan and angrily
denounced Hurley as untrustworthy.31 Early in 1945, Mao personally directed
a ccp propaganda campaign to criticize Washington's policy toward China.
In April 1945, Hurley announced in Washington that the US. government
fully supported the GMD and would not cooperate with the ccp. In an innerparty
directive issued on 7July 1945, the ccp leadership made it clear that the
party would adopt a position of "opposing the mistaken US. China policy (a
policy of supporting Jiang, opposing the Communists, and guarding against
the Soviet Union)" and "challenging those imperialists within the US. government
(such as Hurley)." 32
Underlying the ccp's harsh attitude toward the United States was a profound
belief that the international situation was turning increasingly in the
party's favor. With the Soviet Red Army's rapid advance in Europe early in
1945, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union would
soon become a central actor in East Asian politics. Early in February 1945,
Stalin informed Mao of the convening of the Yalta Conference, which convinced
the cCP chairman that "the possibility of the Soviet Union's voice in
determining important Eastern affairs has increased." Mao thus judged that
"under such circumstances, both the United States and Jiang would try to
reach political compromises with us." 33 Furthermore, Mao and his comrades
believed that the Americans still needed the ccp's help, both logistical and
operational, in conducting the counteroffensive against Japan from northern
China.34 As a result, cCP leaders felt that the party was in a position to challenge
America's pro-Jiang policy.
In the Vortex of Big-Power Politics
Big-power politics, however, were much more complicated than Mao and
his comrades perceived them to be. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin gained
Roosevelt's promise that all former Russian rights and privileges lost to Japan
during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, including those in Manchuria, would be
restored to the Soviet Union, and, in return, Stalin agreed to enter the war
in Asia within two to three months of Germany's defeat. As part of the Yalta
compromises, Stalin also promised Roosevelt that he would not support the
24 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
cCP in China's internal conflict.35 Roosevelt informed Jiang of the main contents
of the Yalta agreement after the meeting,36 but Stalin did not brief the
ccP leaders on the deal he had made with Roosevelt. For the Russian dictator,
the strategic interests of the Soviet Union were more important than those of
his Chinese·Communist comrades.
Since ccp leaders did not know the details of the Yalta agreement, they continued
to base their strategies for preparing for a showdown with the GMD
on the assumption that the Soviets' entry into the anti-Japanese war would
enhance the party's position in China. On 18 April 1945, two weeks afterMoscow
announced the abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, Mao
signed an important inner-party directive. The document pointed out that
since the date of Soviet entry into the anti-Japanese war was approaching, the
international situation in the Far East was undergoing fundamental changes.
The main task of the ccp military forces would soon be to cooperate with the
military operations of the Soviet Red Army.37 From 23 April to II June 1945,
the cCP convened its Seventh Congress in Yan'an. In his speech to the congress,
titled "On the Coalition Government," Mao argued that only the Soviet
Union's direct entry into the anti-Japanese war would bring about "the final
and thorough solution of the Pacific problem." He warned the British and
American governments "not to follow a China policy that violated the Chinese
people's will." Reviewing the cCP's development in political influence and
military strength during the war years, Mao announced that the cCP "had already
become the center of the Chinese people's cause of liberation." 38 In his
concluding remarks to the congress, Mao further emphasized that the international
aid (the Soviet aid) to the Chinese revolution would come, and he
even joked that "if it fails to come, I will let you have my head." 39
At almost the same time that the CCP was holding its Seventh Congress, the
GMD was convening its Sixth National Congress from 5 to 21 May in Chongqing.
Jiang asserted at the congress that "Japan is our enemy abroad, and the
ccp is our enemy at home" and that "our central problem today is how to destroy
the CCP."40 In order to cope with the ccp's increasing military strength
and political influence, Jiang planned to convene a national affairs conference
and a national assembly to confound the ccp's plans for a coalition government.41
In the meantime, he ordered GMD forces to strengthen the blockade of
the ccp's "liberated areas." 42 Anticipating that the Soviet Union would soon
enter the war in the Far East, Jiang made great efforts to reach agreements
with Stalin. Early in July, Jiang sent T. V. Soong, his brother-in-law, to Moscow
to meet Stalin. Stalin agreed to support Jiang as China's only leader and
not to aid the ccp, but he also asked for several vital concessions from the GMD
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 25
government, including the recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia
and Soviet privileges in Manchuria. Jiang had sincerely hoped to reach
an agreement with Stalin, but he now found the price too high. The meeting
adjourned in mid-July since Stalin had to attend the Potsdam Conference.43
Even at this late stage of the war, neither the ccp nor the GMD foresaw that
the war against Japan would end soon. In a telegram dated 15 June 1945, Mao
and the ccp Central Committee predicted that "the War of Resistance against
Japan will not reach its final stage this year, and dramatic changes are likely the
next year." 44 As late as 4 August, the ccp leadership still claimed in an innerparty
directive that "our estimate is that the Japanese bandits will be defeated
by the winter of 1946." Accordingly, the ccp leaders believed that the party
"would have about one year's time to make preparations" for an "inevitable
civil war" after Japan's defeat.45
Japan's Surrender and Stalin's "Betrayal" of the ccp
On 6 and 9 August, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. On 8 August, the Soviet Red Army entered the war in the
East, and on IQ August, Japan first offered to surrender to the Allies. It was apparent
that China's war against Japan had come to its conclusion, and the GCP
leadership acted immediately to deal with this new situation. On 9 August, one
day after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, Mao Zedong ordered the
Communist forces to go all out to "cooperatewith the Soviet Red Army" in the
final battle to liberate China's lost territory from Japanese occupation.46 Two
days later, Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the ccp's military forces, ordered
ccp troops to occupy important cities and transportation links in central and
northern China and, particularly, in the Northeast.47
In an inner-party directive dated 11 August, Mao emphasized that the end
of the war against Japan would most probably be followed by a civil war with
the Nationalists. He anticipated that after destroying the Japanese and puppet
troops, "the GMD would start an overall offensive against our party and our
troops," and that the outcome of the civil war would be determined by the extent
to which the ccp had prepared for it. He therefore instructed ccp cadres
and military commanders to abandon any illusion of peace between the ccp
and the GMD and to "gather our forces in order to prepare for the civil war." 48
Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union's entry into
the war had created favorable conditions for the ccp to fight a renewed civil
war. Although they knew that representatives from the GMD and the Soviet
Union were conducting negotiations in Moscow, and that the negotiations
might lead to a treaty between the GMD and Soviet governments, they tended
26 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
to believe that "(I) the Soviet Union would not allow the emergence of an
American-backed fascist China in the East after the end ofthe war, and (2) Stalin,
as a Marxist, would not sign a treaty with the GMD government that would
restrict the development of the Chinese revolution."49 In ordering the ccp
troops to take aggressive actions in northern China and the Northeast, Mao's
fundamental estimation was that the Soviet Red Army might not offer direct
support to CCP forces but would adopt a cooperative attitude toward the ccp's
military maneuvers.50 Further, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that
the Soviet entry into the war would restrict the aggressiveness of U. S. policy
toward China, forcing "the United States not to support []iang] in China's
civil war." 51 Although the ccp chairman, following his longtime revolutionary
experience, suggested that the cCP and its forces should never give up "selfreliance"
as a guiding principle, he did regard the international situation created
by the Soviet entry into the war in the East and support from the Soviet
Red Army as two decisive conditions for the party to win a showdown with
the GMD.52
Jiang fully understood that he could ill afford to lose the competition with
the ccp over the lost territory, as he, too, anticipated a civil war would come
sooner or later. On 12 August, Jiang used his authority as the leader of China's
legal government to order the ccp forces to stay where they were and not to
accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops, a directive the ccp
rejected angrily.53 Jiang knew that since most of his troops were still in the
remote "Great Rear," 54 he needed to take extraordinary steps to win the competition
with the Communists. He thus authorized T. V. Soong to sign the
"Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance," in which Jiang acknowledged
the independence of Outer Mongolia, the Soviet military occupation
of Liishun (Port Arthur), and Soviet privileges regarding the Chinese
Changchun Railroad. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to respect Jiang's
position as the leader of China's legal government and acknowledged that
Jiang's troops had the right to take over China's lost territory, especially that
in the Northeast.55 On 14 August, the same day that the Sino-Soviet treaty was
signed, Jiang telegraphed Mao to invite him to come to Chongqing to "discuss
questions related to reestablishing peace in China." 56
The Jiang-Stalin compromise undermined the optimism that had dominated
the ccp leaders' strategic thinking, which was further diminished when
the Soviet dictator directly pressured his Chinese Communist comrades to
negotiate with Jiang. On 20 and 22 August, respectively, Stalin sent two urgent
telegrams to the ccp leaders, advising them that with the surrender ofJapan,
the ccp should enter discussions with the GMD about the restoration of peace
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 27
and the reconstruction of the country. "If a civil war were to break out,"
warned Stalin, "the Chinese nation would face self-destruction." 57
Stalin's attitude reflected his understanding ofhow Soviet interests in China
would best be served. He not only lacked confidence in the ccp's ability to
win a civil war against the GMD, but he also was extremely reluctant to commit
the strength of the Soviet Union to supporting his Chinese comrades by risking
a direct conflict with the Americans, who were then planning large-scale
landing operations in northern China. He had gained much through signing
a treaty with the Chinese GMD government and was eager to retain those advancements.
However, for Mao and his fellow ccp leaders, Stalin's policy was
a cruel betrayal.58 It had shaken the very foundation of the party's strategy to
pursue the Chinese revolution's victory through a head-to-head confrontation
with the GMD.59
Under these circumstances, the ccp leadership made fundamental adjustments
to the party's aggressive strategy vis-a-vis the GMD. On 23 August, the
ccp politburo met to discuss the party's response to Stalin's telegrams. Mao
made a long speech at the meeting, telling the participants that the Soviet
Union had signed a treaty with the GMD government allowing the GMD to take
over the Northeast. "Confined by the need to maintain international peace, as
well as by the Sino-Soviet treaty," Mao told his comrades, "the Soviet Union
is not in a position to act freely to support us ... because if the Soviet Union
were to assist us, the United States would certainly support Jiang, and, as a
result, the cause of international peace would suffer and a world war might
follow." Mao believed that the ccp had to adjust its strategies in accordance
with this situation and "acknowledge that Jiang Jieshi has the legitimate right
to accept Japan's surrender" and "to occupy the big cities." The party, Mao
suggested, should adopt "peace, democracy, and unity" as the central slogan.
Accordingly, Mao believed that he should accept Jiang's invitation to visit
Chongqing to discuss how to maintain peace in China. Most of the participants
agreed,60 and on 26 August, the ccp politburo formally authorized Mao
to meet with Jiang in Chongqing.61 In an inner-party circular, the cCP Central
Committee made it clear that the main reason for Mao's meeting with Jiang
was that "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States favors a civil war in
China," and that "the party therefore has to make major concessions" in order
to achieve a "new scenario of democracy and peace in China."62
On 28 August, Mao Zedong, accompanied by Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei,
two top CCP leaders, arrived in Chongqing. In the following forty days,
Mao and Jiang discussed how to democratize China's politics and nationalize
the GMD'S and ccp's troops. However, the negotiations proved extremely dif-
28 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
ficult. The central issue was whether the ccp would be allowed to maintain an
independent army. While Jiang insisted that the ccp should place its military
forces under the command of the government, Mao was willing only to cut
the size of the Communist troops and would do so only on the condition that
the GMD would also reduce its forces. The two sides also failed to reach an
agreement on how China's government and politics would be "democratized."
On IQ October, Jiang and Mao issued a communique asserting that they had
agreed on convening a political consultative conference as the first step toward
constructing peace and democracy in China, but the Jiang-Mao meetings as
a whole failed to produce an agreement that would allow peace to prevai1.63
The lack of concrete results from the negotiations in Chongqing was by
no means surprising given that neither the GMD nor the cCP had any confidence
in reaching peace through compromise. Indeed, the only reason either
party entered the negotiations at all was to demonstrate publicly its own desire
for peace. At the same time that Jiang and Mao were meeting in Chongqing,
military clashes between GMD and ccp troops escalated in northern and
northeastern China. The Americans helped transport large numbers of GMD
troops from the "Great Rear" to northern China, and the forces immediately
entered into competition with the Communists to recover the "lost territory."
In some areas of Shandong, Shanxi, Hebei, and Suiyuan provinces, several
major battles took place between GMD and ccp forces. It appeared that the
better equipped and more numerous GMD forces generally held the upper hand
overall, especially in northern China.
How Manchuria Became the ccp's Revolutionary Base
Under great pressure from the GMD forces, the ccp leaders were determined
to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. However, they had to find the best geographic
location to carry out their plans. Their vision quickly focused on the Northeast.
As discussed earlier, after Soviet entry into the war, the ccp leadership
decided to control the Northeast with the support of the Soviet forces there.
Stalin's cautious attitude and the Sino-Soviet treaty made it difficult for the
ccp to carry out this decision as originally intended.64 But the ccp did not
give up the plan. Late in August and early in September, the party leadership
received several reports from the commanders of cCP military units in the
Northeast that the Soviet army was willing to accept the ccp's cooperation.65
In the meantime, the party also noted that Moscow sharply criticized "China's
reactionary forces" for their attempt to drag China backward.66 The party
leadership realized that there was room for maneuver in pursuit of its own objectives
in the Northeast within the framework of the Sino-Soviet treaty. On
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 29
Soviet Red Army soldiers with Chinese Communist soldiers in Manchuria, August 1945.
Xinhua News Agency.
29 August,~n an inner-party directive, the ccp Central Committee stated that
while the Soviet Red Army, restricted by the Sino-Soviet treaty, would not
offer direct support to the ccp forces in the Northeast, it was also true that the
SovietUnion still supported China's "cause ofprogressive democracy." Therefore,
so long as the ccp's actions in the Northeast did not force the Soviets to
violate their obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Soviets would allow
the cCP to develop its influence and strength in the NortheastP
In the next three weeks, ccp troops entered the Northeast in large numbers,
and they found that the Soviet Red Army's attitude was generally cooperative.
On 14 September, Lieutenant Colonel Belunosov, a representative
of Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, commander of the Soviet forces in the Far
East, arrived at Yan'an. The meetings between him and the top CCP leaders
resulted in a series of agreements: While the ccp troops in the Northeast
would not enter big cities there, the Soviets would allow them to occupy the
countryside and some small and midsize cities. When the Soviet troops had
withdrawn from the Northeast, they would not automatically hand over areas
under their occupation to the GMD, but would "let the Chinese solve the matter
by themselves."68 Under these circumstances, on 19 September, the ccp
30 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
leadership formally adopted a grand strategy of "maintaining a defensive posture
in the south while waging an offensive in the north" in the confrontation
with the GMD.69
Jiang Jieshi and the GMD high command also understood the Northeast's
strategic importance and decided to send the GMD'S best units there. With the
help ofthe Americans, large numbers of GMD troops were transported by air or
sea to several Northeast ports. Late in September, U.S. Marines began largescale
landing operations in Tianjin and several other northern ports. Their
role, as the ccp perceived it, was essentially to check the movements of ccp
troops and to support the actions of the GMD forcesJo
The cooperative nature of American-GMD military actions in northern
China and the Northeast sent a warning signal to Moscow, producing further
conflict between American and Soviet policies in East Asia. Almost at
the same time that the CCP-GMD conflict over control of the Northeast was
escalating, the foreign ministers from the United States, the Soviet Union,
Britain, France, and China met in London to discuss important Far Eastern
issues, especially the question of military control ofJapan. When the Americans
made it clear that they would exercise exclusive control of the occupation
of Japan, the Soviets immediately decided to harden their policy toward the
United States in East Asia and the GMD in ChinaJl
The Soviets were now willing to break their obligation under the SinoSoviet
treaty. Beginning in early October their attitude toward the Northeast
issue changed further in the ccp's favor. The Soviet Red Army began to
create barriers against the GMD troops' movement into the Northeast, claiming
that until an overall solution of the Northeast issue had been worked
out, they would not allow GMD troops to enter the areas they occupied.72 In
the meantime, the Soviets increased their support for the ccp. On 4 October,
the Soviets advised the ccp Northeast Bureau that the Chinese Communists
should move as many as 300,000 troops into the Northeast in one
month's time, and that the Soviets would provide them with large numbers of
weapons.73 On 19 October, the ccp leadership decided to"go all out to control
the entire Northeast." 74
The new Soviet policy toward the Northeast resulted in a serious crisis
between the Soviet Union and the GMD government. When the Soviets refused
to observe the Sino-Soviet treaty, the GMD government took dramatic
action. It informed the Soviet Union on 15 November that because the GMD'S
takeover of the Northeast had been hindered by the Soviet forces there, the
GMD'S Northeast administration headquarters would move out of the Northeast
on 17 November.75 At the same time, Jiang Jieshi telegraphed President
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 3'
Harry Truman, informing him that as the result of the Soviet Union's vio~
lation of the Sino-Soviet treaty in the Northeast, "there has emerged a serious
threat to peace and order in East Asia." He asked the United States to
offer "active mediation, so that the continuous deterioration of the situation
could be avoided." 76 Meanwhile, the GMD accelerated the transportation of
troops into the Northeast. Starting on 3 November, the GMD forces began to
attack the Communist-controlled Shanhaiguan Pass, a strategically important
link between northern China and the Northeast. In the meantime, American
naval vessels repeatedly appeared off Soviet-controlled Port Arthur, which the
Soviets interpreted as a demonstration of America's military strength.?7 The
danger of a nationwide CCP-GMD civil war, as well as a Soviet-American military
showdown, increased dramatically.
Under these circumstances, the Soviets found that, in order to avoid a direct
confrontation with the GMD government as well as with the United States,
they had to make some concessions. On 17 November, Appolon Petrov, the
Soviet ambassador to China, informed the GMD government that the Soviet
Red Army had not provided ccp troops with any substantial support, and
that it was not the purpose of the Soviets to hinder the GMD'S takeover of the
NortheastJ8 Three days later, the Soviet military command in the Northeast
formally requested that cCP troops withdraw from areas along the Chinese
Changchun Railroad. The ccp leadership agreedJ9 The Soviet command still
allowed ccp troops to control areas 20 kilometers from the Changchun Railroad,
however, and Soviet troops continued to deliver military equipment and
ammunition to the ccP.80 With the changing Soviet attitude, the ccp leadership
now realized that to control the entire Northeast was too aggressive
an objective. Late in November 1945, the cCP again adjusted its Northeast
strategy, adopting a policy focusing on occupying the countryside and small
and midsize cities.81
The Failure of the Marshall Mission and the Outbreak of the Civil War
The escalation of the CCP-GMD confrontation presented a deepening dilemma
to the Americans. On the one hand, both for checking the expansion
of Soviet influences in East Asia and for maintaining stable order in China,
it was necessary for the United States to provide aid to the GMD government
(although many Americans disliked Jiang and his regime) and to help promote
China's political democratization. On the other hand, America's intervention
(especially military intervention) could, in the worst-case scenario, result in its
involvement in China's civil war, risking a direct confrontation with the Soviet
Union. From October to December 1945, General Albert Weydemeyer, who
32 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
had replaced Stilwell as commander in chief of U. S. forces in China, repeatedly
outlined this dilemma in reports to top policymakers in Washington.82
After weighing the pros and cons, President Truman made a crucial decision,
announcing on IS December that the United States would continue to support
the GMD government but would avoid using American military forces to
intervene in China's internal affairs.83 He also decided to send General George
Marshall to China to mediate the conflict between the two Chinese adver-
saries.84
The Marshall mission proved extremely difficult from the outset because of
the fundamental differences existing between the ccp and the G MD. In postwar
China, the achievement of a peaceful solution to the CCP-GMD conflict would
have required both parties to cooperate and share power in a way neither could
have accepted. The CCP, as mentioned earlier, had created a powerful military
force during the war against Japan. The political influence of the ccp had
also grown enormously during and after the war. Compared to the GMD, the
ccP appeared full of vitality, and the party thus refused to surrender its hardwon
advantages, especially the control over its military forces, for the dubious
prospects of a recognized position in the GMD government.85 Indeed, the
first thing that the ccp had noticed about Truman's IS December 1945 statement
was that the United States "had decided not to participate directly in
China's civil war on Jiang's side." The ccp leadership decided that they would
"take this favorable opportunity to further develop our own strength" in the
Northeast while "treating American personnel in China cordially" in order to
influence American policy toward China.86
Jiang and the GMD were unwilling to compromise with the Communists,
believing that any substantial concession to the ccp on the GMD'S part would
weaken its rule in China. Jiang, a nationalist and an authoritarian ruler, would
allow no one, least of all the Communists, to share his political power. Thus
Jiang also used Marshall's mediation more as an opportunity to deploy the
GMD'S military forces for an inevitable military showdown with the Communists
than as a preliminary step toward a permanent peace in China.87
Marshall sincerely hoped to find a solution acceptable to both sides, and
he acted impartially. In the initial stage of his mission, he seemed to have
made some progress. The ccp and the GMD agreed to an armistice on 10 January
1946. The same day, representatives from the GMD, the CCP, and other
political parties in China convened the Political Consultative Conference to
discuss problems concerning the establishment of a coalition government in
China. Nevertheless, when Marshall's mediation touched upon the most sensitive
problem-the distribution of military and political power in China-he
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 33
encountered an insurmountable obstacle. Jiang clearly expressed his position
that unless the ccp submitted its military forces to the "unified leadership" of
his government, he would not allow the Communists to share any ofhis power.
Confident of his own military superiority, Jiang was determined to adopt a
policy of force.88 The CCP, on the other hand, argued that the "democratization"
of Jiang's regime should come before the nationalization of China's
armed forces. The Communists were ready for a head-to-head confrontation
with Jiang.89 Neither the GMD nor the ccp was willing to make substantial
conceSSIOns.
Marshall's prospects of success were further weakened by the intensifying
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the world
in general and in East Asia and China in particular. In order to reduce Soviet
influence in East Asia, early in February 1946, Washington expressed strong
opposition to the Soviet-GMD negotiations on economic cooperation in the
Northeast.90 Meanwhile, the United States intentionally publicized the contents
of the secret agreements on China between Roosevelt and Stalin at the
Yalta Conference, which triggered a tide ofanti-Soviet protest among the Chinese
people. The Soviets decided to strike back. Late in February, Marshal
Malinovskii and other Soviet representatives asserted on several occasions that
the Soviet Union would not allow the Americans to control the Northeast.91 In
early March 1946, the Soviet Union suddenly announced that its forces would
withdraw from the Northeast. At the same time, the Soviet commanders in the
Northeast suggested that the ccp send its troops there to control all large and
midsize cities and important transportation lines between Harbin and Shen-
yang.92
In other words, the Soviets were now ready to hand the areas in the
Northeast under their control to the cCP.
This development greatly encouraged the ccp leaders, who decided immediately
that ccp forces "would occupy the areas north of Shenyang as soon
as possible."9l On 24 March, the ccp Central Committee summarized the
party's new strategy in a telegram to the party's Northeast Bureau: "Our
party's policy is to go all out to control Changchun and Harbin, and the entire
Changchun Railroad. We should prevent Jiang's troops from advancing there
at any price." 94
Jiang fully realized that if the Communist forces were allowed to control
areas north of Shenyang, the ccp would occupy an extremely favorable position
in the forthcoming civil war. He therefore ordered the GMD troops to start
a large-scale offensive aimed at occupying Changchun. In early April, a fierce
battle began between ccp and GMD troops at Siping, a strategically important
small city in southern Manchuria. This battle, as it turned out, became the
34 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
prelude to an overall CCP-GMD civil war, which finally broke out in June 1946.
Although Marshall would not leave China until August, his mission had failed
long before the date of his departure.
Conclusion
The period from late 1944 to early 1946 represented a time of grand transition
in China's modern history, as well as in the history of East Asian international
relations. An outstanding feature of the transition was that during
this period the ccp not only survived serious challenges brought about by the
complex domestic and international situations at the end ofWorld War Il, but
also, and more importantly, gathered strength and momentum through both
military and diplomatic maneuvers in preparing to wage a revolutionary war
that would finally enable the party to seize China. As a result, in the late 1940s,
Communist China emerged as a revolutionary power in East Asia, adopting
a series of ambitious state and societal transformation programs at home and
challenging the Western-dominated international order both in East Asia and
in the world. Indeed, as Chinese scholar Niu Jun puts it, this period served as
a key juncture in the ccp's "march from Yan'an to the world." 95
From a larger historical perspective, the ccp's tremendous gains during
this transitional period have to be understood in the context of the extreme
tensions that had developed in China's state and society during the previous
decades. China's modern history, as viewed from a Chinese perspective, is
characterized by the humiliation caused by Western incursions. The repeated
failure on the part of the Chinese to deal with Western and, after the end of
the nineteenth century, Japanese challenges, or indeed to reform China's premodern
political, military, and economic institutions, left the Chinese people
frustrated and angry. This frustration was further intensified by the unsuccessful
outcome ofthe 19II revolution, which destroyed an empire but failed to
establish a true republic. The desire for rapid and radical changes thus gained
tremendous momentum among the Chinese people. In the wake ofthe Russian
Bolshevik revolution, the ccp emerged as the force of radical and revolutionary
change in China, embodying defiance of the relatively conservative reign
of the GMD, now increasingly perceived by many Chinese, especially radical
intellectuals, as a force representing the status quo.
The war against Japan forced the Chinese people to concentrate on "saving
China from destructive crises," delaying their efforts to cope with the nation's
political, social, and cultural problems. But the momentum for fundamental
changes remained. The ccp's dramatic development during the war years can
be interpreted in terms of the changing balance of power between the ccp
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 35
and the GMD-for the first time in the CCP-GMD confrontation the former had
possessed the strength to challenge the latter nationwide. However, it is"also
important to note that on a deeper level, the CCP, as the most radical political
force in China, found at the end of the war a highly favorable environment
in Chinese society because China's victory "suddenly" released the longaccumulated
popular momentum for revolutionary internal changes. For the
ccp this was the ideal situation in which to compete for China's political power.
But it would have been more difficult for Mao and his comrades to copewith
the tremendous challenges facing the cCP at the end of the war againstJapan if
Moscow had not provided the party with military and other support (although
the support was always short of the cCP's expectations). Indeed, China's gradual
movement toward a civil war in 1945-46 occurred in the context of the
escalating conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States. As already
argued, the orientation of the cCP's strategies and policies had been
strongly influenced by the changes in Soviet and American policies toward
East Asia and China. It was because of Stalin's interference that late in August
1945 the ccp leadership made the decision to negotiate with the GMD.
Then, however, in September-October 1945 and March 1946, as its confrontation
with the United States intensified, Moscow twice changed its policy in
theNortheast and became more willing to support the Chinese Communists.
The Soviet Red Army's covert and overt support to the Chinese Communist
military operations in the Northeast made it feasible for the cCP to confront
the GMD nationwide. On the other side, Jiang Jieshi also counted on American
support from the beginning, and it was with the assistance of the Americans
that the GMD transported large numbers ofmilitary forces and equipment
to northern and northeastern China. With the escalation of the Cold War,
policymakers in Washington found themselves with no other choice but to
backJiang in China's civil war. It is apparent that big-power politics, especially
the Soviet-American confrontation, had a profound effect on China's internal
development. Therefore, we must regard the conflict between the cCP and
the GMD as an integral part of the emerging Cold War in East Asia and in the
world; or, as historian Odd Arne Westad puts it, "[T]he civil war in China
(1946-1949) originated with the emergence of the Cold War." 96
Developments in China in 1945-46 were by no means merely negative responses
to the international environment or the intensifying Soviet-American
confrontation, however. Not only had the policies and strategies of the two
superpowers influenced the process and consequences of political change in
China, but also, and more relevant from an East Asian perspective, China's
political development had influenced and, in a sense, defined the particular
36 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
shape of the Soviet-American rivalry. Indeed, the most important impact of
the intensifying conflict between the ccp and the GMD is that it virtually nullified
the Soviet-AmericanYalta agreement on China and EastAsia. While Moscow
found in the ccp's struggle against the GMD an instrument to counter
American influence in East Asia (especially after the Americans had demonstrated
the desire to monopolize the control over Japan), the Americans
also used the GMD to counterbalance the impact of the perceived Soviet challenge.
During this process, a "ccp-Moscow versus GMD-Washington" alignment
along ideological lines-as historian Michael M. Sheng puts it97
-increasingly
became a reality. Consequently, the escalation of the CCP-GMD
confrontation exacerbated the conflict between the two superpowers, thus
formalizing a Cold War environment in East Asia, as well as in the world.
THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 37
Did there exist any chance in 1949-50 for the Chinese Communist
Party and the United States to reach an accommodation or, at least, to avoid a
confrontation? Scholars who believe that Washington "lost a chance" to pursue
a nonconfrontational relationship with the ccp generally base their argument
on two assumptions-that the Chinese Communists earnestly sought
U. S. recognition to expedite their country's postwar economic reconstruction,
and that the relationship between the ccp and the Soviet Union was vulnerable
because of Moscow's failure to offer sufficient support to the Communists
during the Chinese civil war. These scholars thus claim that it was
Washington's anti-Communist and pro-Guomindang policy that forced the
ccp to treat the United States as an enemy.I This claim, though ostensibly
critical of Washington's management of relations with China, is ironically
American-centered on the methodological level, implying that the Chinese
Communist policy toward the United States was simply passive reaction to
Washington's policy toward China.
This chapter, with insights gained from newly accessible Chinese and, in
some places, Russian materials, argues that the ccp's confrontation with the
United States reflected the revolutionary essence of the party's perception and
management of China's external relations, and that the ccp's alliance with the
Soviet Union and confrontation with the United States must be understood
in relation to the party's need to enhance the inner dynamics of the Chinese
revolution after its nationwide victory. In the environment in which the Chinese
Communists and the Americans found themselves in 1948-49, it was next
to impossible for the two sides to establish a normal working relationship, let
alone for them to reach an accommodation.
"Squeezing the Americans out of the Liberated Zone"
Contrary to the assumptions of the "lost chance" thesis, Chinese materials
now available demonstrate that in 1949-50, Mao Zedong and the ccp leadership
were unwilling to pursueWestern recognition or to establish diplomatic
relations with Western countries. This attitude was most clearly demonstrated
by the ccP leadership's handling of the Ward case.
In early November 1948, Chinese Communist troops occupied Shenyang
(Mukden), the largest city in China's northeast. U. S. consul general Angus
Ward, together with his consulate staff, remained in the city after the Communist
takeover.2 In the first two weeks of November, Ward actively pursued
establishing official contacts with the new Communist municipal authorities.3
Local Chinese Communist officials demonstrated some interest in dealing
with Ward,4 but the attitude of the cCP central leadership was intransigent.
After a short waiting period, ccp leaders decided to adopt a policy of "squeezing"
American and other Western diplomats out ofthe "liberated zone" in the
Northeast, renderingWard's efforts hopeless. A cCP Central Committee telegram
(drafted by Zhou Enlai) to the party's Northeast Bureau on 10 November
maintained that because the British, American, and French governments
had not recognized Chinese Communist authorities, the cCP in turn would
not grant official status to their diplomats either, but would treat them as common
foreign residents without diplomatic immunity. The telegram further instructed
the Northeast Bureau to take "certain measures" to confine the "freedom
of action" of the Western diplomats, so that "they will have to withdraw
from Shenyang." 5
By mid-November, Shenyang's situation had worsened dramatically for
Ward and his staff. On 15 November, the Communist Shenyang Municipal
Military Control Commission informed "former" British, French, and American
consulates in Shenyang that they should hand over their radio transmitters
to the commission within thirty-six hours.6 In reality, this order was particularly
targeted at the Americans since the British and French usually relied
upon regular Chinese communication services. As it soon turned out, the purpose
of this order was to create another excuse for the Communists to force
Western diplomats, and the Americans in particular, from the city.7
In a few days, when the Americans refused to hand over their radio transmitters,
the pressure from the Chinese Communists escalated. On 17 November,
Mao Zedong instructed Gao Gang, secretary of the ccp Northeast Bureau,
to "act resolutely" to force the British, American, and French diplomats
out of Shenyang. The ccp chairman also criticized Zhu Qiwen, the Communist
Shenyang mayor, for his unauthorized reception ofWard during the early
days after Shenyang's liberation.8 The next day, Mao authorized the Communists
in Shenyang to seize the radio transmitters in the Western consulates
and instructed them to isolate the American, British, and French consulates,
THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA 39
so that they "would evacuate in the face of difficulties and our purpose of
squeezing them out could be reached." 9 On 20 November, when the Americans
persistently refused to hand over their radio equipment to Communist
authorities, the Communists followed the advice of Soviet representatives in
the Northeast and, without advance warning, placed Ward and his staff under
house detention.lO Ward and the other American diplomats were not allowed
to leave China until December 1949.11
The cCP's challenge to Western presence in Shenyang resulted in part from
immediate concerns that Western diplomats might use their radio transmitters
to convey military intelligence to the GMD in the ongoing Chinese civil
war.12
The advice from Soviet representatives in Shenyang that the cCP should
not permit Western diplomats to remain in the liberated zone also played an
important role.13 Mao, eager to maintain solidarity with Moscow, instructed
cCP leaders in the Northeast to inform the Soviets that "in so far as our foreign
policy in the Northeast and the whole country is concerned, we will certainly
consultwith the Soviet Union in order to maintain an identical stand with it." 14
In a deeper sense, though, the cCP's action against Ward and his staff
in Shenyang reflected the party leadership's determination to "make a fresh
start" in China's external relations, which required the party to "clean the
house before entertaining guests," as well as to "lean to one side" (the side of
the Soviet Union).J5 Indeed, these three principles constituted the guidelines
of Communist China's early diplomacy. In a telegram to the Northeast Bureau
on 23 November 1948, the ccp Central Committee expounded its view
that the partywould refuse to recognize diplomatic relations between the GMD
government and the West.16 In the Central Committee's "Directive on Diplomatic
Affairs," a key ccp foreign policy document issued on 19 January 1949,
Mao Zedong declared that "with no exception we will not recognize any of
those embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as
the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them accredited to
the GMD." The directive also made it clear that the cCP would treat American
and Soviet diplomats differently since "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union
and the other new democratic countries has differed totally from that of the
capitalist countries." 17 At the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session in
March 1949, the ccp leadership further reached the consensus that the new
Chinese Communist regime should neither hastily seek recognition from, nor
pursue diplomatic relations with, the United States or other Western countries.
"As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist
countries," asserted Mao, "we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and
need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after nationwide
40 THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA
victory." 18 During 1949-50, ccp leaders repeatedly emphasized that the party
would go all out to pursue strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union, and
that establishing diplomatic relations with the United States or other Western
countries was not a priority.J9
Behind the Huang-Stuart Contacts
After the Chinese Communists occupied Nanjing, the capital of Nationalist
China, in late April 1949, John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador
to China, remained in the city. In May and June, Stuart held a series of meetings
with Huang Hua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the Communist
Nanjing Municipal Military Control Commission. They discussed,
among other things, conditions under which relations between the ccp and the
United States might be established.20
In the meantime, CCP leaders asserted on
several occasions that if Western capitalist countries cut off their connections
with the GMD and treated China and the Chinese people as "equals," the ccp
would be willing to consider establishing relations with them.21 Advocates of
the "lost chance" thesis have used these exchanges and statements to support
their position.
It is true that for a short period in the spring of 1949, Mao and the ccp
leadership showed some interest in establishing contacts with the United
States. In a telegram to the front-line headquarters of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) on 28 April, Mao mentioned that the Americans were "now contacting
us through a third party to inquire into the possibility of establishing
diplomatic relations with us." A previously unknown memorandum kept at the
Chinese Central Archives indicates that the "third party" was Chen Mingshu,
a pro-Communist "democratic figure" who was also a longtime friend
of Stuart. On 25 and 26 March, Stuart had two secret meetings with Chen
in Shanghai. The American ambassador, according to the memorandum, expressed
two major concerns on the part of the United States: "(1) that the ccp
might ally with the Soviet Union in a confrontation with the United States ... ,
and (2) that the ccp, after unifying China by force, would stop its cooperation
with the democratic figures and give up a democratic coalition government."
Stuart promised that "if a genuine coalition government committed to
peace, independence, democracy and freedom was to be established in China
and if the ccp would change its attitude toward the United States by, among
other things, stopping the anti-American campaign," the United States would
be willing to "maintain friendly relations with the cCP and would provide the
new government with assistance in new China's economic recovery and reconstruction."
22
THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA 41
After receiving Chen Mingshu's report on his meetings with Stuart, Mao
and the ccp leadership speculated that the Americans were simply forced to
change their position because the old US. policy of supporting the GMD had
failed. They also asserted that "if the United States (and Great Britain) cut
off relations with the GMD, we could consider the question of establishing
diplomatic relations with them." 23 As longtime players of the "united front"
strategy, Mao and his comrades were determined to stick to their principles,
but they would never ignore an opportunity to weaken the threat from enemies
and potential enemies.24 On 30 April, Mao, speaking on behalf of the
PLA headquarters, publicly announced that the ccp would be "willing to consider
establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries" if such relations
could be placed "on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity and, most importantly, no help being
given to the Guomindang reactionaries." 25
In a telegram dated IQ May 1949, the ccp chairman authorized Huang Hua
to contact Stuart, instructing him "to listen more and talk less" in the meeting.
In response to the ccp NanjingMunicipal Committee's suggestion ofasking
"the United States to do more to help the Chinese people" as part of the
ccp's conditions to establish relations with the United States, Mao rebutted
that this "implied that the US. government had done something beneficial for
the Chinese people in the past" and that it would "leave the Americans with
an impression that the ccp was willing to accept American aid." The chairman
particularly ordered Huang Hua to make it clear to Stuart that unless the
Americans were willing to sever relations with the GMD regime and to treat
China "equally," the Chinese Communists would not consider having relations
with the United States.26
In retrospect, these two conditions were impossible for the Americans to
meet. Cutting off connections with the GMD would require the complete reversal
of America's China policy, which had been in place since the end of
World War n. And treating the Chinese as "equals" presented the Americans
with a profound challenge in a historical-cultural sense. Indeed, reflected in
Mao's perception of "equality" was a profound Chinese "victim mentality."
When Mao pointed out that Sino-American relations had been dominated by
a series of unequal treaties since China's defeat in the Opium War of 1839-42,
he revealed a deep-rooted belief that in a moral sense the United States and
other Western powers owed the Chinese a heavy historical debt. As the first
step toward establishing an equal relationship, he argued, the United States
had to end, as well as apologize for, its "unequal" treatment of China. Only
when the historical phenomenon of unequal exchanges between China and
42 THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA
the West ended would it be possible for the new Chinese Communist regime
to establish relations with Western countries. Therefore, Mao's definition of
"equality" meant a total negation of America's role in China's modern history
and posed a crucial challenge to the existing principles of international
relations to which the United States and other Western countries adhered.
In Mao's opinion, America's willingness to change its attitude toward China
represented a pass-or-fail test for policymakers in Washington; and he simply
did not believe that they would pass the testP
Thus, the Huang-Stuart meetings failed to bring the ccp and the United
States any closer. Stuart emphasized the legitimacy of American interests in
China and tried to convince the Chinese Communists that they had to accept
widely recognized international regulations and principles. Huang, on
the other hand, stressed that the ccp's two conditions were the prerequisites
for any further discussion of establishing relations.28
Consequently, the more
Stuart and Huang Hua negotiated, the wider they found the distance between
them and the two political cultures they represented.
Not surprisingly, while the Huang-Stuart contacts were still under way, the
cCP dramatically escalated its charges against Ward and his staff. On 19 June
1949, the ccp media alleged that the American consulate in Shenyang had
close links with an espionage ring directed by an American "Army Liaison
Group." The Xinhua News Agency published a long article about this "espionage
case," claiming that "many pieces of captured evidence show clearly
that the so-called Consulate General of the United States in Shenyang and the
Army Liaison Group are in fact American espionage organizations, whose aim
is to utilize Japanese special service as well as Chinese and Mongols in a plot
against the Chinese people and the Chinese people's revolutionary cause." 29
On 22 June, Mao instructed the ccp Northeast Bureau not to allow any member
of the American consulate in Shenyang to leave the city before the espionage
case had been settled.3D Two days later, the cCP chairman ordered the
party's media to use this espionage case to initiate a new wave ofanti-American
propaganda.31
Late in July and early in August, when Stuart, after the failure of his contacts
with Huang Hua, returned to the United States and the US. State Department
published the China White Paper, the anti-American propaganda
campaign reached its peak. Mao wrote five articles criticizing America's China
policy, claiming that, from both historical and current perspectives, the United
States was the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people and the Chinese
revolution.32
THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA 43
The ccp's "Lean-to-One-Side" Decision
As the ccp's relations with the United States reached an impasse, its dealings
with the Soviet Union grew closer. Indeed, new Chinese and Russian evidence
reveals that the relationship between the ccp and Moscowin 1949 was
much more intimate and substantial than many Western scholars previously
realized. While it is true that problems and disagreements (sometimes even
serious ones) existed between the Chinese and Soviet Communists, as well
as between Mao Zedong and Stalin (as in any partnership), the new evidence
clearly points out that cooperation, or the willingness to cooperate, was the
dominant aspect of cCP-Soviet relations in 1949.
During China's civil war in 1946-49, the ccp's relations with Moscow were
close but not harmonious.33 When it became clear that the Chinese Communists
were going to win the civil war, both the ccp and the Soviet Union felt the
need to strengthen their relationship. From late 1947, Mao actively prepared
to visit the Soviet Union to "discuss important domestic and international
issues" with Stalin.34 The extensive telegraphic exchanges between Mao and
Stalin culminated in two important secret missions in 1949. From 31 January
to 7 February, Anastas Mikoyan, a politburo member of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, visited Xibaipo, the ccp headquarters at that time. Mao
and other ccp leaders had extensive discussions with him, introducing to him
the ccp's strategies and policies. In particular, Mao explained to Mikoyan the
ccp's foreign policy of "making a fresh start" and "cleaning the house before
entertaining guests." 35 From late June to mid-August, Liu Shaoqi, the ccp's
second in command, visited Moscow. During the visit, Stalin apologized for
failing to give sufficient assistance to the ccp during the civil war and promised
that the Soviet Union would give the Chinese Communists political support
and substantial assistance in military and other areas. Moreover, the Soviets
and the Chinese discussed a "division of labor" to promote the world revolution,
and they reached a general consensus: the Soviet Union would remain the
center of the international proletarian revolution, and promoting revolution
in the East would become primarily China's duty. Liu left Moscow in midAugust,
accompanied by ninety-six Russian experts who were to assist China's
military buildup and economic reconstruction.36 Mikoyan's mission to China
and Liu's visit to Moscow, as the first formal contacts between the ccp leadership
and the Soviet Communist leaders in many years, served as two important
steps toward cooperation and a new mutual understanding between the ccp
and the Soviet Union.J7
During this period, the ccp frequently exchanged opinions with Moscow
on how to evaluate the "American threat" and how to deal with the United
44 THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA
Soviet politburo member Anastas Mikoyan with Mao Zedong in Xibaipo, early February
1949. From left to right, Soviet intelligence officer Doctor Orlov, Mikoyan, Chinese
interpreter Shi Zhe, and Mao. Courtesy Shi Zhe personal collection.
States. In November 1948, as discussed previously, the ccp Northeast Bureau
accepted Soviet advice to seize the radio transmitters of the American consulate
in Shenyang. Early in January 1949, when JiangJieshi and the GMD regime
started a "peace initiative" to end the civil war, Mao originally intended to rebuffit
completely. But Stalin advised Mao and his comrades that the Americans
were behind Jiang and that it would better serve the ccp's interests if, instead
of simply rebuffing Jiang's proposals, it proposed its own conditions for ending
the war through nonmilitary means (Stalin emphasized that the ccp should
make these conditions unacceptable to Jiang). After a few exchanges, Mao Zeclong
"completely agreed with" Stalin's opinions and acted accordingly.38 In
the spring of 1949, Stalin warned the cCP about possible American landing
operations in the People's Liberation Army's rear, convincing the ccp leadership
to maintain a strategic reserve force in northern coastal China while the
PLA'S main force was engaged in the campaign of crossing the Yangzi River.39
During Liu Shaoqi's visit to the Soviet Union in June-August 1949, the cCP
THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA 45
presented to Stalin a detailed memorandum, summarizing the party's domestic
and, particularly, international policies (including the policy toward the
United States).40
Particularly revealing are Mao's communications with Stalin on how the
ccp should handle Huang Hua's contacts with Stuart. After receiving Chen
Mingshu's report about his secret meetings with Stuart in Shanghai, the ccp
immediately informed Moscow of the contact.41 Mao Zedong met with I. v:
Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China, on 9 April 1949, asking him to report
to Stalin that the ccp was preparing to make minor adjustments in its
foreign policy by conducting some "limited contacts" with Western capitalist
countries, including the United States. But Mao also promised that the
ccp would not formalize these contacts; nor would it legalize the relationship
emerging from them. On 19 April, Stalin instructed Kovalev to advise
Mao: "(I) We believe that China's democratic government should not refuse
to establish formal relations with capitalist countries, including the United
States, provided that these countries formally abandon military, economic,
and political support to Jiang and the GMD government ... and (2) We believe
that, under some conditions, [the cCP] should not refuse to accept foreign
loans or to do business with capitalist countries." 42 During the Huang-Stuart
meetings, Mao informed Stalin about the substance of the meetings, emphasizing
that "it is unfavorable that the embassies of the United States and other
[capitalist] countries remain in Nanjing, and we will be happy to see that the
embassies of all capitalist countries get out of China." Stalin, while expressing
his gratitude to Mao for informing him about the meetings, advised him
that for tactical considerations, "we do not think this is the proper time for the
Soviet Union and Democratic China to demonstrate extensively the friendship
between them."43
One may argue that when Mao informed Stalin of the contacts between
the ccp and the United States, he might have been trying to pressure Stalin to
strengthen the Soviet Union's support to the ccp. But this interpretation cannot
explain the extensive and substantive exchanges between the two Communist
leaders concerning ccp-U S. contacts. Judging from the contents of the
Mao-Stalin exchanges, it is more logical to regard them as a means for the two
countries to reinforce the foundation of their relationship. From a Chinese
perspective, the ccp's "lean-to-one-side" policy was more than lip service.
America's "Lost Chance" in China Is a Myth
There is no doubt that Washington's continuous support of the GMD during
China's civil war played an important role in the ccp's adoption of an anti-
46 THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA
American policy. But America's pro-Jiang policy alone does not offer a comprehensive
explanation of the origins of the ccp-American crisis. In order to
comprehend the ccp's policy toward the United States, we must explore the
historical-cultural environment in which it emerged, thus revealing the dynamics
and logic underlying it.
The Chinese Communist revolution emerged in a land that was historically
known as the Central Kingdom.44 The Chinese during traditional times
viewed China as civilization in toto. In modern times, this worldview had been
severely challenged when China had to face the cruel reality that its door was
opened by the superior forces ofWestern powers, and that the very survival of
the Chinese nation was at stake. Mao's and his comrades' generation became
indignant when they saw the West, including the United States, treat the "old,"
declining China with arrogance and a strong sense of superiority. They also
despised the Chinese governments from the Manchu dynasty to the regimes
of the warlords, which had failed to protect China's national integrity and sovereignty.
An emotional commitment to national liberation provided the crucial
momentum in Mao's and his comrades' choice of a Marxist-Leninist-style
revolution.45 For Mao and his comrades, the final goal of their revolution was
not only the total transformation of the old Chinese state and society they
saw as corrupt and unjust; they also wanted to change China's weak power
status, proving to the world the strength and influence of Chinese culture. In
the process, they would redefine the values and rules underlying the international
system. In short, they wanted to restore China's central position in the
international community.
Mao and his comrades never regarded the Communist seizure of power in
China in 1949 as the revolution's conclusion. Rather, Mao was very much concerned
about how to maintain and enhance the revolution's momentum after
its nationwide victory. Indeed, this concern dominated Mao's thinking during
the formation of the People's Republic and would be a preoccupation during
the latter half of his life.46 Consequently, Mao's approach toward China's
external relations in general and his policy toward the United States in particular
became heavily influenced by this primary concern. Throughout 1949-
50, the Maoist political discourse challenged the values and codes of behavior
attached to "uS. imperialism," pointing out that they belonged to the "old
world," which the ccp was determined to destroy. While defining the "American
threat," Mao and his fellow ccp leaders never limited their vision merely to
the possibility ofdirect American military intervention in China; theyemphasized
long-range American hostility toward the victorious Chinese revolution,
especially the US. imperialist attempt to isolate the revolution from without
THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA 47
and sabotage it from within.47 Indeed, when Mao justified the ccp's decision
not to pursue relations with the United States, his most consistent andpowerful
argument was that the decision would deprive the Americans of a means
of sabotaging the Chinese revolution.48
It is also important to point out that whileWashington's hostility toward the
Chinese revolution offended Mao and his comrades, the perceived American
disdain for China as weak and the Chinese as inferior made them angry. In the
anti-American propaganda campaign following the publication of the China
White Paper, Mao sought to expose the "reactionary" and "vulnerable" nature
of U. S. imperialism and to encourage ordinary Chinese people's national selfrespect.
In other words, Mao used anti-American discourse as a means of mobilizing
the masses for his continuous revolution, a practice that would reach
its first peak in 1950-53, during the "Great War of Resisting America and
Assisting Korea" (the Chinese name for China's participation in the Korean
War).49
The ccp's adoption of an anti-American policy in 1949-50 had deep roots
in both China's history and its modern experiences. Sharp divergences in
political ideology (communism versus capitalism) and perceived national interests
contributed to the shaping of the Sino-American confrontation; and
suspicion and hostility were further crystallized as the result of Washington's
continuous support to the GMD and the cCP's handling of events such as the
Ward case. But, from a Chinese perspective, the most profound reason underlying
the ccp's anti-American policy was Mao's grand plans for transforming
China's state, society, and international outlook. Even though it might
have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China
policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy's complicated background),
it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the course and
goals of the Chinese revolution, let alone the historical-cultural environment
that gave birth to the event. America's "lost chance" in China must therefore
be regarded as a myth.
48 THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S LOST CHANCE IN CHINA
Fluttering high are the banners ofvictory,
shaking the earth and mountain is the singing ofmillions;
Mao Zedong-Stalin,
like the sun(s) shining in the heaven.
- "Song ofSino-Soviet Solidarity"
Never are there two suns in the heaven,
Never should there be two emperors on the earth.
-Age-old Chinese proverb
No other event during the Cold War contributed more to changes in
perceptions of the Communist powers than the rise and demise of the SinoSoviet
alliance. Emerging in the late 1940S and early 1950S, the "brotherly
solidarity" between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was
claimed to be "unbreakable" and "eternal." But by the latter part of the decade,
serious disputes began to develop between Chinese and Soviet leaders,
causing the alliance to crumble and then, in the mid-1960s, to collapse. In the
years that followed, the hostility between the two countries grew so intense
that it led to a bloody border war in 1969.1 In the 1960s and 1970S, the complete
break in the two Communist giants' alliance became a basic element of
international affairs.
What, then, were the causes underlying the rise and demise of the SinoSoviet
alliance? Scholars may answer this question in many ways. This chapter
adopts a domestic-politics-centered approach. Without ignoring the merits of
other interpretations, especially those emphasizing the role played by China's
security concerns and international ideological commitments, this chapter argues
that China's alliance policy toward the Soviet Union was always an integral
part of Mao Zedong's grand continuous revolution plans designed to
transform China's state, society, and international outlook. While security