The Making of Chinese
Foreign and Security Policy
in the Era of Reform,
1978-2000
DavidM. Lampton, Editor
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
ONE
China's Foreign and National
Security Policy-Making Process:
Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?
DAVID M. LAMPTON
When asked what he and other economic officials thought about the February
21, 2000, white paper on Taiwan that threatened a firestorm ofreaction in Washington
that mightaffect pending China-related legislation, a PRC [People's
Republic of China] economic official responded as follows: "We [economic
officials] said it would be bad for WTO [the World Trade Organization], but
we were not the leading group creating this policy so ours was just a voice in
a room. Nobody was going to listen to us.... Policies are created not by the
whole government, but by parts in the government. We often don't know what
the other side is doing."1
INTRODUCTION
The second halfofthe twentieth century witnessed a gradual and important
change in the Chinese foreign and national security policy-making process
as it successively moved through the eras of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping,
and Jiang Zemin. This shift is not only of theoretical importance; it also has
2 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
I
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
significant consequences for China's international behavior in the early
twenty-first century. The world involvement of the PRC is now much more
extensive than in the earlier period, particularly in the domains of economics,
culture, and multilateral organizations. Moreover, the role ofexpertise in
government is much greater, the bureaucracy is more differentiated and
complex, and therefore the way in which recurrent policy issues are handled
is different. Concisely, the process for making recurrent, noncrisis decisions
is more bureaucratic in character, with elite options constrained; decisions are
often harder to produce. Frequently, as the quote opening this chapter suggests,
the left hand does not know what the right is doing.
On the other hand, showing some continuity with the period ofMao, the
most senior political elite, headed by General Secretary Jiang Zemin, continues
to play the decisive role in establishing broad national strategy. It alone
determines policy on issues such as China's big power alignments, whether
or not to join the WTO, and whether or not to set a timetable for national
reunification with Taiwan, potentially jeopardizing other important national
goals.2 With regard to these strategic questions, it is essential to know the arena
in which decisions are made and who sits at the table.
The Chinese policy-making process, therefore, presents the analyst with
two faces. With regard to major issues ofstrategy, the setting of broad agendas,
and crisis management, the senior elite still has considerable latitude. As
Nathan and Ross observe, "Ofall the large countries, China has had the greatest
freedom to maneuver, act on grand strategy, shift alignments, and conduct
a strategic foreign policy in the rational pursuit of national interest."3
Dramatic changes in policy are, therefore, possible, although the personalized
authority ofJiang Zemin is dramatically less than that ofMao Zedong in the
earlier era, and (as Bates Gill points our in his contribution to this volume),
the elite is often hemmed in by the cumulative logic of previous, recurrent
decisions.
At the same time, in its myriad dealings with the rest ofthe world on routine
issues ranging from arms control to economic relations, Beijing increasingly
speaks, often with multiple voices, in terms familiar to the rest of the
world, and policy changes gradually. In this realm, decisions tend toward
global and professional norms, against the ever-present backdrop of realpolitik
and considerations of national interest.4 Those who deal with Beijing,
therefore, must be aware of the potential for abrupt changes arising from
a system that is compartmentalized and personalized at the very top. At the
same time, they may be reassured by the constraints that offer the prospect
of a China that eventually may fit more comfortably into the international
order.
Beyond change and continuity in China's foreign policy and national
security decision-making processes and how these alterations have affected Beijing's
declaratory policies and actual behavior, a number ofquestions animate
the chapters that follow: Do nations learn from prior experience, and, if so,
how? What is the relationship between bureaucratic structure and policymaking
behavior? To what degree and how do professionalism, pluralization,
decentralization, and globalization affect substantive Chinese policy and the
policy-making process? What is the relationship between domestic politics and
external action? How do foreign policy-making processes and behavior
change as systems move from the hands ofa charismatic, revolutionary leadership
to a more technocratic elite? Are global economic, information, security,
and technological interdependencies shaping the behavior offoreign policy
leaderships, and, if so, how? How do transnational communities of experts
("epistemic communities") affect policy? What role does "national interest"
play in the formation offoreign policy, and are state-centered (parochial) notions
giving way to broader concepts of "cooperative security"? Why do some
areas ofa nation's foreign policy and behavior see pronounced change and others
demonstrate great continuity? What factors account for the gaps between
declaratory foreign policy pronouncements and actual behavior? And to
what degree have China's foreign relations exceeded the capacity ofits foreign
policy apparatus to control such relations? In the latter respect, are we likely
to see the emergence of formal institutions of government that are more
dedicated to international cooperation just as the ability ofsuch institutions
to control society's behavior in the international context declines?
This volume explores these practical and theoretical issues by examining
several domains. Part I addresses the changing structures and roles ofinstitutions
and localities. Part Il assesses the changing patterns of elite and societal
opinion, while Part III examines the influences of the international system.
The volume concludes, in Part IV, by exploring how the preceding variables
(institutions and localities, elite and societal opinion, and the international
system) have played out in important cases: arms control, Taiwan policymaking,
WTO entry, and Chinese policy-making with regard to the volatile
Korean Peninsula. In short, this volume examines both the dimensions of
change in PRC foreign and national security policy-making processes and
the implications of those changes for system behavior in areas of substantive
policy-making.
4 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
THE PROCESSES OF PROFESSIONALIZATION,
CORPORATE PLURALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION,
AND GLOBALIZATION
Two broad changes in the Chinese policy-making process are documented in
the chapters that follow: First, the number of actors, though still comparatively
small, is increasing; in the words of Fewsmith and Rosen in their
contribution to this volume, the elite is thickening. As part ofthis expansion,
previously peripheral actors are becoming more numerous and more proximate
to the decision-making arenas, particularly with respect to routinized,
noncrisis categories ofpolicy choice. Second, individuals, organizations, and
localities not formally involved in the foreign and national security policymaking
process nonetheless have more space to act internationally. Beyond
changing the character ofmuch foreign interaction with the PRC, the actions
ofsomewhat autonomous Chinese individuals, groups, and localities increasingly
generate issues and problems and exert pressures to which the central
foreign policy elite must respond.
With respect to the latter dynamic, those not formally involved in the foreign
policy-making and implementation processes often act internationally
and thereby play a role (inadvertently perhaps) in setting the central elite's foreign
policy agenda and establishing some ofthe broad parameters within which
Beijing must make decisions. For example, somewhat autonomous exporters
can transfer technology and hardware that raise security problems for the United
States or others, thereby generating external pressure on Beijing to develop
export controls and clamp down on those actors.5 Similarly, local officials can
turn a blind eye to the illegal trade in human beings smuggled abroad because
the money remitted to their home locality by the emigrants (not to mention
initial bribes) have become important sources of local revenue and personal
income.6 This trade, in turn, produces foreign pressure on Beijing to stop the
illegal flow. Finally, as the chapters by Peter T Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang
and by Samuel S. Kim amply demonstrate, in the case ofpolicy-making related
to the Republic of Korea, provinces can nudge central policy-makers either
to move in directions in which they might not otherwise spontaneously
move or to change policy earlier than was anticipated.
Four "-izations" (si hua)-professionalization, corporate pluralization,
decentralization, and globalization-are driving the twin developments noted
earlier in this section. It is with respect to these transformations that the following
chapters are most illuminating. Using these chapters as my principal
data, in this chapter I address these changes, assess their impact on policy formulation
and implementation, and conclude with a discussion ofwhat they
mean for system behavior and our understanding of some basic theoretical
issues.
Proftssionalization
Professionalization, as used here, refers to a number ofrelated developments.
These include the trend toward a higher level of specialized knowledge
among Chinese elite and subelite foreign policy decision-makers; the proliferation
ofexpert-based bureaucracies in the decision-making process; and the
increased reliance by decision-makers on information provided by specialized
bureaucracies (and their attention to the quality and diversity ofsuch information).
The baseline for understanding what happened in this dimension
between 1978 and 2000 is presented in this volume in the chapters by Lu Ning,
H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, and Michael Swaine. Almost every
contribution to this volume, however, speaks to professionalism and its profound
effect on the Chinese foreign and national security policy-making process.
The character ofChina's elite has undergone a dramatic change in the postMao
Zedong era. This evolution is apparent when one examines the distinct
attributes ofthe leadership ranks at the Twelfth Congress ofthe Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in 1982, the first full-fledged congress with Deng Xiaoping
at the helm, and at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, the first at which
Jiang Zemin was preeminent. Comparing the respective Politburos elected by
each, the Jiang leadership was nearly a decade younger, on average, than that
ofthe 1982 Politburo; more than halfofthe Fifteenth Congress Politburo did
not join the CCP until after the PRC's founding in 1949; and, as Miller and
Liu report, although none ofthe members of the 1982 Politburo had a university
degree, 70 percent of the Fifteenth Congress Politburo did. Similarly,
Lu Ning notes that although past senior leaderships included very few persons
who spoke foreign languages, the Politburo selected by the Fifteenth Party
Congress consisted entirely ofmembers who could speak a foreign language,
save one person. If one examines local leadership in China, the trend toward
technocratic leadership is also apparent, suggesting that those in the promotion
pipeline will reinforce an already evident technocratic trend.7 As Cheung and
Tang explain in their chapter on provinces, "The training and backgrounds
ofFAO [provincial foreign affairs office] officials has gradually improved. Young
recruits tend to be graduates of foreign language universities or colleges,
with a specialty in international studies. Some of the senior officials, such as
those in Guangdong, have postgraduate degrees from Western countries or
have received overseas training."
There is not an easily demonstrable linkage berween aggregate attributes
of the elite and subsequent policy-making behavior. Nonetheless, such statistics
and generalizations take concrete form when one encounters central PRC
leaders and officials from China's provinces. To meet General Secretary Jiang
Zemin, for example, likely means that you will hear about the latest book he
is reading. One ofJiang's closest confidants is former Shanghai Mayor Wang
Daohan, who, beyond his many foreign policy-related responsibilities, periodically
provides the general secretary with a list of books and articles containing
new ideas. Indeed, a best-selling book entitled]iangZemin's Counselors
includes Wang Daohan as the subject ofthe first chapter, "The Red Dynasty's
Imperial Mentor Wang Daohan" (Hong chao di shi Wang Daohan}.8 As
Swaine observes in his chapter, "Wang is widely viewed as Jiang's most
trusted advisor on Taiwan affairs and a key channel for [expert] advice." From
the elite on down, expert knowledge and information are part of the legitimating
gestalt for leadership. The elite is in a constant search for information,
and such information has resulted in policy change. Nonetheless, just because
the elite seeks out information does not mean that it collects, processes, or
uses that information to which outsiders might attach importance.
In September 1998, Jiang Zemin set up a foreign policy group of"wise men"
composed of about rwenty-five former Chinese ambassadors. With limited
staff, this group discusses those foreign policy questions of most interest to
Jiang (who is not only general secretary of the CCP and state president and
chairman of the Central Military Commission, but also head of the Foreign
Affairs Leading Small Group and the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group),
conveying its conclusions back to the general secretary.9 Jiang also relies on
academic and policy advisors in Shanghai. Jiang's reliance on personal advisors,
his creation of the group ofwise men, and his close connections to the
Shanghai intellectual community all represent efforts to obtain a broad range
of information before issues are decided and to move beyond the perspectives
provided by Beijing's permanent bureaucracies. In his chapter, Lu Ning summarizes
the fundamental transition that has occurred in the elite in the
1990s; as Lu says, "The emergence ofJiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji
at the center ofpolitical power represents a transition ofChinese political leadership
from a generation of revolutionary politicians to a generation of technocrat
politicians."
Beyond the changing character of China's central (or "core") political and
foreign policy elite that Lu Ning describes, changes in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) are also important. The MFA, the agency with the dayto-day
responsibility for policy recommendation and implementation in the
area of foreign affairs, is singular among Chinese ministries. It has a deeply
ingrained professional culture that dates back to the late 1930s and 1940s,1O
when Zhou Enlai began to build the CCP cadre (many members of which
had had a Western education), first in Hubei, and later in Sichuan, during
the war against the Japanese.11 Even with this baseline, the movement ofthe
reform-era MFA toward greater professionalization and internal differentiation
during the eras ofDeng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin has been notable. This
increased professionalism can be seen in the number ofpersons the MFA sends
abroad for graduate-level training in international affairs and in the increasing
introduction offoreign materials and lecturers into training programs such
as those at the Foreign Affairs College. Increasing professionalization is also
apparent in the MFA's extensive information-gathering and dissemination
system, which is described in detail by Lu Ning in his contribution to this
volume and evidenced in the fact that the ministry itself increasingly seeks
outside expert advice.12
The MFA's professionalization and specialization is also reflected in the
agency's bureaucratic structure. For example, as Gill points out in his chapter,
the MFA has gradually created not only an arms control department (under
the leadership ofSha Zukang}) but has hired personnel who are increasingly
conversant with the technical dimensions ofarms control issues. This permits
the MFA to be more effective not only in dealing with foreign negotiators,
but also in acting as a counterweight to domestic constituencies in the military
and arms industry that have an interest in looser export controls. As Gill
:-vrites: "The MFA became a more important and institutionalized participant
III arms export decision-making, along with trade-related and military-related
organizations. In the case of highly advanced exports and exports to 'sensitive
regions,' the MFA takes part in a high-level interagency body ... that
was first established in 1989. If an export is expected to generate opposition
abroad, the MFA is to write up a justification for the transfer for the leadership
to consider.... Chinese export control regulations issued in the late 1990s
likewise describe a prominent role for the MFA in vetting military-related
exports." As the MFA has increased its capability to articulate its a;ms control
interests, it appears that the military has likewise supplemented its in-house
expertise to protect its equities. In short, there is something ofa bureaucratic
6 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
7
8 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
9
arms race going on in which the increasing specialization ofone bureaucratic
combatant requires others to increase their own expertise.
Professionalism and increasing bureaucratic specialization are apparent not
only in the MFA, but also in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC). With respect to proliferation and technology
concerns, for instance, MOFTEC's Bureau of Science and Technology has
become a pivotal control point for nuclear, dual-use, and chemical exports
(though not weapons). Indeed, in December 1998 an expert delegation led
by MOFTEC Director General Xu Fuxing visited Washington, D.e., to explain
the PRCs export control regulations to Capitol Hill staffers. Among the notable
characteristics ofthe delegation were its comparative youth and high professional
caliber. As the expertise and professionalism ofpersons and institutions in the
MFA, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and other bodies grow, their
advice is increasingly available to the upper reaches of the Chinese decisionmaking
structure. Gill's chapter suggests that the perspectives ofsuch bodies
are playing an increasing role in shaping policy.
Nor are professionalism and specialization limited to policy-making in the
areas oftechnical and economic issues; rather, they extend to regional and geographic
concerns as well. With respect to policy regardingTaiwan, for instance,
in his contribution to this volume Swaine points out that a number of new
organizations have been created to manage policy (the CCP Central Committee
Taiwan Affairs Office and the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group,
founded in 1979 and 1980, respectively). Moreover, such policy-making
and coordination organs have come to rely on both their own professional
research bureaus and outside research agencies. Among the latter are the Chinese
Academy ofSocial Sciences' Taiwan Affairs Research Office and the China
Institute for Contemporary International Relations, as well as Xiamen University's
Institute for Taiwan Studies and many other military and CCP research
and intelligence organs. According to Swaine, the foregoing entities "have
grown significantly in number and in importance to the policy-making
process. They have become particularly significant since the early 1990s, when
the third generation of party leaders came to the fore. The Jiang Zemin led
leadership has come to rely on a wide range of 'external' policy inputs,
including the expertise ofresearch institutes, staffoffices, and personal advisors,
to make strategic assessments and effective policy decisions."
This growing reliance on internal and external research has been driven by
the increasing complexity ofcontemporary technology transfer and arms control
issues, as well as the need to know more about circumstances in specific
localities such as Taiwan. Nonetheless, just because more-and more diverseinformation
is available to top decision-makers does not mean that basic strategic
decision-making will be insulated from other powerful considerations, such
as domestic political struggle, deeply embedded perceptions, or basic value
or interest commitments. Beijing's seemingly counterproductive Taiwan policy
of 1999-2000 may be a good case in point.
Another area offoreign policy that has required progressively greater personnel
specialization and bureaucratic differentiation has been China's international
economic relations and need to deal with international economic,
development, trade, and financial organizations such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade I World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, not to mention
the global private financial community. The trend in this area began in the
early 1970s with Beijing's efforts to develop the expertise it would need to be
effective in the United Nations. To this end, for example, Premier Zhou Enlai
sent Long Yongtu (who would later lead the negotiations on WTO entry) to
the London School ofEconomics (in 1973-1974) for training in Western international
economics. Premier Zhou realized that after its long years of isolation
from the Western economy, China had virtually no senior government
personnel who understood Western economics or international trade. 13
The institutional landscape of MOFTEC has also changed internally in
response to China's interaction with international economic organizations. As
Margaret M. Pearson writes in her chapter: "The GATT organization itself
gained a foothold in the bureaucracy when the GATT (now WTO) Division
was set up in MOFTEC to handle the relationship with the multilateral institution
and when the State Council created the GATT LSG [Leading Small
Group]." Similarly, the Ministry ofFinance had to create new internal organizations
and capabilities to deal with the World Bank once Beijing joined
the organization in 1980. According to Jacobson and Oksenberg, "Its [the
Ministry ofFinance's] External Finance Department grew to a fifty-member
bureau consisting of four divisions.... Also at the Ministry of Finance, the
Bureau of Education assumed responsibility for managing a major cadre
training program sponsored by the World Bank's Economic Development Institute."14
Discussing MOFTEC's GATT/WTO Division, Pearson says,
"Although it is not true ... that MOFTEC's GATT/WTO Division was 'in
the pocket' of the global institution (though it sometimes is accused of
such), the institutional norms ofMOFTEC became increasingly aligned with
the norms of the international regime, and its officials have become the
10 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
r! IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? Il
strongest advocates within the government for Chinas adoption ofinternational
practices."
In the economic arena, as with arms control and Taiwan policy, the need
for specialized research has become increasingly pronounced. As important,
this research is valued for its analytical independence, not its political correctness.
Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang note in their chapter, for example, that
with respect to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) "studies are also more frequently
commissioned without indicating the desired policy direction. One
interviewee, for example, cited cases where the MFA had requested analysis
without providing any information indicating prejudgment of the issue."
In the continual bureaucratic and personal struggle ofChinese politics, the
need for greater expertise naturally disadvantages some preexistent organizations
and favors other (often new) ones. As Lu Ning points out, for example, the
drive to deal effectively with the outside world (and the collapse of communist
regimes) has weakened the old propaganda and International Liaison
Department functions of the CCP. For example, the party's Central External
Propaganda Small Group was abolished in 1987 due to its "ineffectiveness."
In its place, the State Council and the party have substituted the State CouncilInformation
Office and the Party International Communication Office,
both ofwhich are headed (and have been since 1998) by Zhao Qizheng, the
cosmopolitan former vice mayor ofShanghai. In turn, Zhao is recruiting personnel
who have spent time abroad, speak foreign languages, and better
understand public relations. 15
Professionalism, specialization, and bureaucratic differentiation are important
to the development of Chinese foreign policy-making, as well as to the
larger issue ofhow China is fitting into the structures ofworld affairs. In Chinese
bureaucracy, one finds increasing interaction with specialists abroad
and in so-called epistemic communities-transnational groups oflike-minded
persons with common knowledge, concerns, and interests. In this way, expert
perspectives are becoming globalized. Elizabeth Economy most clearly
addresses this important development in her chapter. She describes how the
interaction ofexperts in China's National Environmental Protection Agency
(since 1998 the State Environmental Protection Agency) and State Science
and Technology Commission (SSTC) with counterparts abroad affected the
course of China's debates over accession to the Montreal Protocol (the agreement
to phase out owne-depleting substances) and the Framework Convention
on Climate Change. With respect to the Montreal Protocol, for instance, Economy
writes: "The relatively high degree of international attention, scientific
certainty, and interest ofthe Chinese scientific community persuaded the Chinese
leadership to establish a working group under the auspices of the
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to evaluate the costs and
benefits ofsigning the Protocol. ... According to one member of the working
group, strong scientific evidence and interactions with the international
scientific community were key components of the group's deliberations."
Epistemic communities introduce new perspectives into the system and create
peer standards against which the Chinese may judge their own behavior.
External expert communities also feed data and money into the system, providing
resources that were previously unavailable (as in the case of the PRC's
efforts to develop a research program on climate change). Economy points
out that the NEPA drew on research from the international community to
fight against the "outdated methodologies" and "conservative findings" ofthe
State Meteorological Administration. As she says, "The international community
thus expanded the range of environmental and economic scenarios
developed by the Chinese and even contributed to a radical reorientation in
the perspective ofsome officials." In this effort, the international scientific community,
the NEPA, and the SSTC were implicitly allied against more conservative,
domestically grounded agencies. In the economic area, Moore and
Yang similarly point out that "the transfer ofeconomic ideas and norms clearly
has been an important channel ofinfluence in areas such as customs law, trade
and investment policy, and accounting practices." The formation ofthese "epistemic
communities" or "cohorts" is evident in the arms control arena as
well. Gill's chapter provides a glimpse into the formation oflike-minded cohorts
that cut across organizational lines and reveals an increased willingness to solicit
and accept advice from outside-even foreign-institutional structures.
Although I examine the impact of this professionalizing trend on policy
outputs (formulated policy) and outcomes (the actual effects ofimplemented
policy) later in this chapter, a few words are necessary about what these
trends signify. First, professionalism is only one of many contributors to the
erosion in the role of the "preeminent leader," especially with respect to an
enlarging zone ofroutinized decisions. Second, leaders at all levels ofthe Chinese
system are beginning to look more like technical managers and less like
the strategic visionaries ofthe PRC's first- and second-generation elite. Third,
growing professionalization, mounting specialization, a more complex bureaucracy,
and more information have together created a setting in which persuasion
is an increasingly important tool ofleadership; compulsion has correspondingly
retreated as a leadership instrument, although it is never entirely absent.
12 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 13
As Swaine puts it when discussing the shift to post Deng Xiaoping foreign
policy and national security leadership, "This transition reinforced the trend
... toward a more extensive, bureaucratic, and consensus-oriented policymaking
process. This process therefore supplanted the largely top-down,
authoritarian, personalistic, and at times ideological pattern of decisionmaking
of the Deng era."
On the other hand, China's trend toward professionalism does not mean
that individual Chinese leaders, their policy preferences, and their personal
connections are unimportant, nor does it mean that strategic decisions are highly
participatory. Indeed, with respect to nonrecurrent, crisis, and strategic decisions,
the personal and power dimensions remain absolutely crucial because
these types ofdecisions are made in settings offewer participants, greater time
compression, less information, and they are decisions that demonstrably
affect the fundamental interests of the regime. Furthermore, increasing professionalism,
knowledge-based decision-making, and "epistemic community"
participation does not mean that Chinese and Western interests (and therefore
policies) will necessarily converge. Elizabeth Economy, for instance,
shows how China resisted participation in global greenhouse gas restrictions,
norwithstanding just such professionalism.
Corporate Pluralization
Corporate pluralization refers to the proliferation of organizations, groups,
and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process. In the PRC, although
there are tendencies that hold out the prospect that currently unsanctioned
social organizations may one day be part of a broader pluralization process,
today almost all of the central actors are "licensed" in corporatist fashion to
participate, and therefore their numbers are still comparatively small and their
participation contingent on elite decisions. Nonetheless, even this restricted,
corporatist pluralization has a number of effects. On the one hand, pluralization
can enhance system legitimacy and compliance with decisions inasmuch
as organizations and individuals come to feel that their interests are being
taken (even minimally) into account. Moreover, pluralization increases the
chances that decision-makers will have heard a greater number of the considerations
that will affect a policy's viability. As Moore and Yang point out:
"The foreign policy system is more open to expert input than in the past. ...
The result, by all accounts, is that a greater diversity ofviews on international
economic issues such as the AFC now reaches top decision-makers." Even more
hopeful with respect to nonproliferation and arms control policy, Gill asserts
that "the rwin trends of pluralization and institution building at home" are
impelling China toward policies that increasingly conform to widely accepted
international norms and practices.
This corporatist pluralization, however, can be a mixed blessing. The need
to solicit, digest, bargain, and balance a greater number ofviews slows down
the policy formulation process, as I have argued with respect to domestic policymaking.
16 Further, corporatist pluralization proliferates the points at which
implementation can be subverted. Finally, although the popular opinion
component ofpluralization is beneficial in many ways, one might also be apprehensive
about the nationalistic passions that may emerge, as Fewsmith and Rosen
suggest in their contribution to this volume. Concisely, as more and more actors
have become germane to the making and implementation ofChinese foreign
and national security policy, we see both the gains and pathologies of pluralization,
albeit a pluralization in which the societal component is still minimal.
What is the evidence that pluralization exists and is growing? At the most
abstract level, it can be seen in the occasional reference to the constraints that
"public opinion" places upon China's leaders. It is also apparent in the proliferation
ofinteragency coordination (that is, "small leading") groups. Such
coordination groups reconcile subordinate agencies experiencing bureaucratic
conflicts and seek to ensure that once the elite makes a decision its intent
is followed throughout the policy implementation process. These coordinating
groups are properly viewed as reflections ofbureaucratic pluralism, as do Hamrin
and Zhao.17 The need for an increasing number of coordinators, then,
arises from the creation ofnew agencies and the addition ofdivisions within
existing bureaucracies, with the resulting need to collect and process information
and to maintain the control of the central elite.
A broader, less corporatist, pluralization increasingly can be seen in the
nascent development of civic organizations, only a few of which are beginning
to touch upon foreign policy-making. For example, as Economy notes,
"Nongovernmental environmental organizations have also emerged, some of
which are now becoming involved in ensuring local implementation ofinternational
environmental commitments." Similarly, Pearson notes that local industries
and government authorities concerned about the impact ofWTO entry
on their interests have begun to draw on the work of local research organizations,
including the WTO Research Center of Shanghai, which draws
analysts from Shanghai-area universities and claims to be a nongovernmental
organization. Despite the fact that the emergence of civic organizations
14 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 15
may ultimately transform Chinese politics and policy-making, however, they
continue to develop only slowly and underthe watchful eye of Beijing.
Before discussing the third major trend, decentralization, a few more
words are appropriate on two of the ways in which pluralization has manifested
itself-public opinion and the need for interagency coordination.
Public Opinion. None ofthe authors whose work appears in this volume would
argue that public opinion is either measured or worshiped in China in the
same way it is in contemporary American society, although increasingly
sophisticated polling (both domestic and foreign) is occurring in the PRC.
Rather, public opinion helps demarcate space within which the leadership has
relatively wide latitude to operate, as Fewsmith and Rosen explain. Although
this space is large, it is not unlimited. Therefore, some issues and some
domestic circumstances allow the leadership less room to operate than others.
Leaders understand which issues are so sensitive that to mishandle them could
lead to social instability or could provide political competitors an avenue by
which to undermine them; there is a vague concept of"boundaries ofthe permissible."
In this vein, according to Fewsmith and Rosen, "One of the most
important ways in which public opinion has been expressed is through
nationalism." PRC leaders consequently understand that perceived weakness
in the face ofaJapan unrepentant about its pre-World War II invasion ofChina
and insistent on its territorial claims against the PRC is enough to bring nationalistic
students into the streets. Public opinion surveys in China validate the
wisdom of this view, though admittedly it is difficult to tell when methodologically
weak surveys are used to validate the elite's preferred policy or when
such presumed popular attitudes are driving elite decision-making. As Fewsmith
and Rosen report: "One survey of attitudes toward Japan, conducted
at the end of 1996, surprised even the surveyors. For example, the wordJapan
'most easily' made 83.9 percent ofthe [Chinese] youth surveyed think ofthe
Nanjing Massacre and made 81.3 percent think of 'Japanese denial' and the
'war ofresistance against Japanese aggression.' When asked which twentiethcentury
Japanese was most representative ofJapan, first place (28.7 percent)
went to Tojo Hideki ofWorld War II fame. When asked to place a label on
the Japanese, 56.1 percent chose 'cruel.'''
Therefore, after President Jiang Zemin's trip to Japan in November 1998,
there was severe popular and elite criticism ofForeign Minister Tang Jiaxuan
for not having secured concessions from Tokyo and for being insufficiently
strong in the face of what the Chinese widely interpreted as Tokyo's intransigence.
Indeed, for some time after the trip it was unclear whether the foreign
minister would survive politically.
Another illustration is useful here. In speaking with a member of the
Standing Committee ofthe Politburo in April 1993, a visiting American delegation
suggested that Beijing needed to make some concessions on human
rights or normal tariff treatment by the United States would be put at risk,
given President Clinton's pledge to link the PRCs individual rights behavior
to Washington's tariff treatment. The Politburo Standing Committee member
responded: "But I don't think I can report what you told me to the Chinese
people via television, because they would say that ... [I am] making China's
policy based on the American President, and they would overthrow me. So
aliI can say to the Chinese people is that the Sino-American relationship is
very important. Even though the United States is much richer and stronger,
nevertheless, our two countries are equal. We believe that Sino-American relations,
including MFN [most-favored-nation tarifftreatment], are all based on
equality and mutual benefit.... So while thanking you, I can only tell the
Chinese people what I have told you now."18
A similar state of affairs exists concerning the issue ofTaiwan. A Chinese
scholar explained why Chinese leaders, when in doubt, take a hard line
toward Taiwan in this way: "Our American friends talk about the pressure the
U.S. administration [faces] on the Taiwan issue, but no pressure can be
larger than the pressure Chinese leaders face on the Taiwan issue. Given this
pressure, they have very little latitude. Even ifwe suppose that there are two
options [hard and soft] and they use tough measures ... , and the leader fails
to resolve [the problem], he is justified. But, if [he] uses too much honey, and
he fails, you are regarded as guilty by all future generations."19
As Fewsmith and Rosen conclude: "A case can be made that public opinion
as that term is usually understood has begun to play a role, albeit one that
remains restricted and significant only under certain conditions." One reason
for this trend is that the current generation of Chinese leaders lacks the
revolutionary and charismatic authority that legitimized the rule ofMao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping. Consequently, the new elite must seek legitimacy elsewhere;
taking account ofpopular aspirations (including a desire for economic
growth) is one way to do so. Another reason for the growing role of public
opinion is the increasing number of institutional actors that have perceived
stakes in foreign policy decisions. As more groups are mobilized, the "space"
in which the political leadership must operate has narrowed. Further, Chinese
leaders can reference public opinion to resist foreign entreaties and
16 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
, IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
make their own policy positions more credible to foreigners. Inshort, public
opinion not only constrains Chinese foreign policy, but may occasionally
strengthen it as well.
Pearson raises an interesting paradox, noting that there is no evidence that
public opinion has been highly influential in shapingWTO policy. Nonetheless,
she observes that then-MOFTEC Minister Wu Yi and her principal vice
minister in charge of GATT/WTO negotiations "concluded that it was
important to educate Chinese citizens about GATT and its benefits for
China" and that "one former MOFTEC official reported that he flew all over
China, making at least two presentations a week on the subject."
There are a couple of hypotheses to explain why MOFTEC officials
would spend time trying to educate the public (or key organizational groups)
about the advantages ofWTO accession. One is that they may have been seeking
public support for their position and seeking to deny that support to bureaucratic,
social, and territorial opponents. Another possibiliry is that MOFTEC
officials sought to protect themselves against subsequent public criticism
once WTO accession occurred. Whatever the motive, it appears that people
in MOFTEC thought public, territorial, and organizational opinion was worth
influencing.
Pluralism is evidenced not only in public opinion, but also within the bureaucracy.
Bureaucratic pluralism, in turn, creates a need for interagency processes
both for developing policy and for ensuring subsequent implementation.
BuildingInteragenry Processes. As a nation's international involvement increases,
the number of agencies participating in the foreign policy-making process
increases, as does the number ofdomestic constituencies with a perceived stake
in decisions. These developments, in turn, require the central leadership
(and ministries like MOFTEC) to expend a greater amount of energy reconciling
divergent interests and seeking to coordinate, reconcile, harmonize,
or bring into line (xietiao) various governmental and social organizations. This
need is apparent in the creation ofnew coordinators or the empowerment of
existing agencies with this responsibiliry. As more Chinese agencies act
abroad, moreover, the central leaders will need the means to better supervise
subordinate agencies. Finally, as decisions become more c~mplex and technical,
increasingly specialized expertise will be necessary to formulate and evaluate
policy. Increasingly, this expertise may be available from economic and social
organizations that are somewhat or wholly autonomous with regard to the
government.
How organizational proliferation and heightened international activiry can
combine to exponentially increase the need for interagency coordination is
nowhere more evident than in the area of arms control in the 1980s. As Lu
Ning points out, in the early 1980s weapons sales were "regarded as a normal
trade issue with little need for oversight." As the military saw its budget decline2°
and began to cut back on procurement from domestic weapons manufacturers,
however, both the PLA and arms manufacturers developed an incentive to
increase arms sales abroad. The PLA was selling weapons out ofits inventory.
Indeed, arms makers and the military (particularly the PLA's General Staff
Department) became competitors in this trade in the 1980s and much ofthe
1990s.
As this occurred, the United States became increasingly concerned about
the character ofthe regimes that were purchasing Chinese arms and technologies.
With the United States applying increasing pressure on Beijing to curtail such
sales, the State Council and the CMC Military Products Trade Leading
Small Group (LSG) was created in September 1989. Its purpose was primarily
to ensure that the activities of the arms industry and military organizations
with weapons to sell were known to and coordinated by senior political
leaders so that any impact on foreign relations could be taken into account
before problems arose. Although the CMC Military Products Trade LSG was
abolished in a 1998 State Council restructuring, as Lu Ning documents in
his chapter, over time other export control coordinators have been created within
the MFA and MOFTEC as well.
The need for interagency coordination may also increase as a growing number
of Chinese actors with a perceived stake in foreign and national securiry
policy seek to advance their interests. As Moore and Yang explain, "The expanding
role of foreign trade corporations and provincial governments illustrates
how a broader range ofpolitical/economic/bureaucratic interests has been introduced
into the process." China's growing place in the international economy
and the increasing impact of international developments on domestic interests
has therefore mobilized new groups in the foreign policy-making process.
Pearson notes, "The incorporation of a greater number of interests was
accompanied by efforts to arrive at consensus among this diverse set of
actors."
More specifically, China's mounting international economic participation
has changed MOFTEC in two respects. First, the ministry has had to
expend increasing effort reconciling the various policy positions ofdifferent
domestic constituencies. Second, and more fundamentally, the role of
IS IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING1 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 19
MOFTEC in the overall foreign policy-making process has expanded. Generally,
as conflicts multiply among agencies, some entity (sometimes a ministry
like MOFTEC and sometimes an LSG like that on financial and
economic affairs) must be designated to help develop or implement a unified
policy. These are the "parts in the government" referred to in the chapter by
Moore and Yang. As Lu concludes in his chapter, ''As the dynamics ofChina's
domestic and foreign policy change, some CCP central LSGs assumed new
roles in foreign policy, whereas others have been abolished, and additional LSGs
have been set up to cope with changed circumstances and to handle new issues
that cut across vertical government, party, and military systems."
Mounting international economic involvement has not only increased the
need for ministerial-level coordination (and in the process made MOFTEC
a central foreign policy player), but it has also increased the need for supraministerial
coordination. This can be seen in the growing role ofthe Central Financial
and Economic Affairs Leading Small Group. As Lu Ning says, "The Central
Financial and Economic Affairs LSG has ... become an increasingly important
locus for the making ofChina's foreign economic decisions and for coordination
of their implementation." Swaine also speaks to the issue of
pluralization and interagency processes in his discussion ofTaiwan policy. In
that discussion we see how four policy arenas (formulation/oversight, administration/implementation,
coordination/supervision, and research/analysis) interact
in an intricate and "complex decision-making process marked by extensive
horizontal and vertical consultation, deliberation, and coordination." The
examples of the CMC Military Products Trade Leading Small Group,
MOFTEC, the Central Finance and Economics LSG, and the making of
Taiwan policy all reveal that pluralization requires coordination and that such
coordination can be provided either by newly created organizations (as in the
case ofthe Military Products Trade LSG) or by preexisting organizations (such
as MOFTEC and the Central Finance and Economics LSG). In either
event, the social and governmental pluralization that creates the need for coordination
itself spawns new organizations (or new divisions of existing
organizations) to provide such coordination. This, in turn, compounds
bureaucratic complexity.
Taken as a whole, pluralization is having a contradictory impact on the policymaking
process. To start, this trend enhances the chances that policy decisions
will be reached based on more varied input. At the same time, because many
of the new institutional actors are designed to bring China into conformity
with international norms and regimes (for instance, international arms control
and financial arrangements), as Gill says, "The pluralization and institution-building
process in China ... offers new opportunities for Beijing to
bring its practice more in line with international norms."
Nonetheless, there are downsides as well. To start, these changes almost guarantee
that it will take longer to reach decisions and that most ofthe time policy
will be more difficult to change and to effectively implement. Second, if
public opinion, for example, is gradually playing a greater role in the Chinese
foreign policy-making process, and if it has the increasingly nativist or populist
tinge that Fewsmith and Rosen describe, the "public opinion" aspect of
pluralization may introduce substantial volatility into Chinese foreign policy.
Nonetheless, as a whole, pluralization ofthe foreign and national security policymaking
process is a positive development. As Swaine argues, "On a broader
level, the increasingly pragmatic, bureaucratic, and consensus-oriented nature
of policy-making in the post-elder [post-Deng Xiaoping] era has increased
the overall influence ofpolicy-coordinating mechanisms such as the TALSG
[Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group]."
Finally, one other potentially problematic aspect of pluralization should
be highlighted and leads to the discussion of decentralization that immediately
follows. That is, as greater numbers ofsocietal and lower-level bureaucratic
and territorial actors interact with the world, particularly in the
context ofstill weak regulatory and oversight mechanisms, Chinese behavior
may occasionally be predatory or unmindful of international rules. The
PRC's inability to control smuggling and enforce its own tariffschedules, along
with the odious trade in human beings and drugs, reminds us of two sets of
examples.
Decentralization
Beyond professionalization and pluralization, a third major trend in policymaking
has been the gradual decentralization ofpower (occasionally in policy
formulation and more often in implementation) both within the central
bureaucracies and from Beijing to the rest of the country. Decentralization
has been most evident in the international economic arena and least so in the
handling of high-level diplomacy and national security strategy. Decentralization
and pluralization are, in fact, intimately related, inasmuch as the
delegation ofauthority to lower-level actors (for example, provinces), and the
toleration ofincreased initiative by them gives rise to the growing number of
actors that influence Chinese foreign policy.
20 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 21
Post-Mao decentralization offoreign and national security policy-making
has been manifest in various ways. There has been a gradual flow of authority
from the core leader to the broader central collective, from the centralleadership
to the supraministerial and ministerial levels, from the MFA to other
central bureaucracies, noticeably MOFTEC, and, particularly in the economic
arena, from Beijing gradually to the provinces, municipalities, and
corporations.
This pattern of decentralization reflects many converging developments.
Most important has been the PRC's increased interactions abroad. In 1978,
the PRC had relations with 113 countries, in 1999 with 161-a 42 percent
increase.21
In the 1970s, China belonged to twenty-one international governmental
organizations and 71 international nongovernmental organizations;
by 1997 the respective numbers were 52 and 1,163.22 In 1978, foreign trade
constituted 10 percent ofGDP; by 1995, it had reached 40.4 percent (on an
exchange rate basis, which may overstate the country's actual trade dependence).23
In the face of such a rapid growth of contacts, leaders at each
system level have had to delegate responsibility to lower levels ofthe system.
Decentralization also reflects the migration of economic power from the
government to society, as reflected in the decline of the percentage of GNP
represented by government revenues from about 35 percent in 1978 to about
11 percent by 1995 (a low from which it had risen to about 14 percent by
1999).24 Similarly, the proportion oftotal government expenditutes (including
extra-budgetary funds) controlled by Beijing had fallen from 47.4 percent
in 1978 to 27.1 percent in 1996, whereas provincial control increased
from 52.6 percent in 1978 to 72.9 percent in 1996.25 Finally, decentralization
has also been encouraged by the growing complexity offoreign and international
economic policy decisions.
The chapters ofthis volume that address the role ofprovinces and aspects
ofeconomic policy-making provide the greatest insight into decentralization.
For example, Moore and Yang argue that the central government, and Premier
Zhu Rongji in particular, maintained tight control over the broad parameters
of China's response to the Asian Financial Crisis from 1997 to 1999,
particularly the decision to keep the PRC's exchange rate stable. However, as
provinces (most notably Guangdong) saw their export growth in jeopardy and
their export targets unchanged, they made what amounted to new policy to
prevent the erosion of their own economic positions. As Moore and Yang
explain: '"In Guangdong several actions were taken by the provincial government
to cope with the effects ofdeclining growth in exports and foreign investment.
Some merely involved the implementation ofmeasures approved by the central
government (for example, raising the rates for export tax rebates). Others,
however, were defiantly creative, such as giving provincial assistance to
encourage private enterprises to engage in direct export.... According to some
interviewees, this policy was adopted without the authorization ofMOFTEC."
This example illustrates that although policy formulation authority may
not be expressly delegated to lower levels, it may nonetheless be exercised by
them. This relates to the concept of policy "space," to which we will return
shortly. Many more actors, at an increasing range oflevels in China, have more
space within which to affect policy, at least in implementation. As Cheung
and Tang put it, "[Provinces] sought to achieve these goals ... by exploiting
new opportunities and maximizing their interests within the broad framework
ofexisting policies ofthe central government. Hence, it would be misleading
to view provincial initiatives in external affairs as moves that are necessarily
in conflict with central policies." There is therefore both de jure and de facto
decentralization ofpolicy-making in China, which either serve the purposes
ofthe central government or run counter to them. Sometimes, the central government
may not even "know" what "it" wants.
Cheung and Tang discuss three examples ofprovincial involvement in foreign
policy-making. In each case, the localities involved had been left behind
in the coastal development strategy; each sought to influence the government
to permit the establishment ofeconomic, diplomatic, or project relationships
with neighboring countries or international agencies serving local interests.
As often as not, Beijing responded positively.
The first example was the 1984 convocation of a "southwest regional economic
coordination conference" (Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet,
and Chengdu and Chongqing), which was intended to help these areas compensate
for the greater advantage coastal provinces enjoyed in economic development
in a variety ofways, including that ofinfluencing the central government.
As Cheung and Tang report, "They formed this coalition not only to coordinate
their own external economic policy, foster interprovincial cooperation, and
attract foreign investment, but also to influence the policy-making ofthe central
government and to jointly lobby for more central investment." In response,
the central government actively supported some ofthese efforts, recognizing that
the desire of the southwestern inland provinces to establish stronger local economic
ties with neighbors to the south would serve Beijing's strategic interests
in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In China as in America, the game
ofpolitics often is to show one's superiors how one's agenda serves their purposes.
22 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
Another instance of provincial involvement in foreign policy involved
the northeastern province ofLiaoning and the eastern province ofShandong,
which are situated strategically adjacent to South Korea. Though Beijing and
Seoul did not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1992, according to
Cheung and Tang both "Liaoning and Shandong actively competed in opening
up contacts between the two countries in 1988, when both provinces
attempted to make arrangements for the first South Korean trade mission to
China." Indeed, contacts between the two provinces and South Korea received
central approval prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations. And one
can see why these two localities were so anxious, with more than 85 percent
ofSouth Korean investments in the 1990s going to the Bohai Sea area (Shandong,
Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang Provinces).
A final-and perhaps most revealing-example ofprovincial foreign policy
initiative involves Jilin Province in China's northeast, which borders both
Russia and North Korea. Jilin is an inland province whose only route to the
Pacific is the partially Pyongyang-controlled Tumen River. Consequently, as
Cheung and Tang explain, "Jilin has always been eager to get access to the sea.
Since the mid-1980s Jilin's efforts to promote a regional cooperative [development]
scheme around the Tumen River involving China, North and South
Korea, the former Soviet Union, Japan, and Mongolia clearly reflected strong
local desires to benefit from the country's coastal development strategy. In promoting
local provincial interests, Jilin tried to influence the country's foreign
relations to the province's benefit." Kim further shows how Jilin's desires resonated
with central purposes: the Tumen Project was another means by
which to stabilize the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin
Province, which was conceivably threatened by possible sociopolitical turmoil
in North Korea.
Jilin's efforts to influence Beijing were multifaceted, protracted, and effective.
They included undertaking research, drafting thoughtful recommendations
for central decision-makers to consider, lobbying the Foreign Ministry to put
sea access on the agenda with Moscow, and lobbying Huan Xiang (then director
of the State Council's Center for International Studies), who in turn mobilized
the head of the SSTC and Premier Li Peng. Through these efforts and
others, as Cheung and Tang say, "eventually the province secured the central
government's endorsement to negotiate for China's navigation rights on the
Tumen River." Jilin also secured United Nations (UN) sponsorship for several
conferences and UN Development Program involvement in some ofthe
Tumen Project planning efforts.
Each of these examples of provincial involvement in the foreign policymaking
process had its initial motivation in economic considerations.
Nonetheless, these economic motivations had diplomatic and strategic consequences,
inasmuch as the above provinces were proposing new relationships
with countries with which Beijing has historically dealt carefully-Vietnam,
Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. Therefore, provincial initiatives may
have called the attention ofthe central government to new opportunities and
encouraged policies that otherwise might never have been considered.
In her analysis ofthe WTO accession discussions, Pearson calls attention
to another way in which provinces affect policy. Provinces may not only affirmatively
seek permission for policy departures, but also seek to prevent the adoption
ofinternational economic policies they consider contrary to their interests.
For instance, Pearson notes that some provinces opposed WTO accession because
they perceived that they had nothing to gain, and much to lose, from global
competition. Moreover, some provinces did not want to see the recentralization
of power in MOFTEC that would come with China's commitments to
abide by WTO rules. As one Chinese scholar explained it, many provincial trade
corporations and local trade regulators believed that if Beijing adopted universal
rules of trade administration, they would lose their capacity to extract
"rents" for their required approvals. As he said, "Much of MOFTEC is
opposed, and provincial and municipal [trade entities] are monopolies, so they
are opposed" to universal rules and national treatment for foreign firms. 26
The effects of decentralization have also been apparent in the arms sales
and technology transfer area. As Gill reports, "For example, Chinas initial efforts
at trade liberalization included the decentralization of trade authority from
a handful ofcentrally controlled foreign trade companies to 'private' foreign
trade corporations operating independent of the government's foreign trade
plan." The entrepreneurship of these firms in the sale of arms to sensitive
countries, however, created foreign policy problems that the central government
has had, in turn, to address by exerting tighter control and oversight.
Nonetheless, although this problem has been addressed, it has by no means
been resolved. A 1999 Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center
report covering the first half of 1998 makes clear that entities in Russia and
China were still exporting chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons technology,
as well as missile technology, although there is some indication that
subsequently progress was made.27
All this brings us to the most important aspect of decentralization. Since
provinces and other local actors have more space in which to operate,
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING1
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING1 25
particularly in the international economic realm, these authorities and actors
are increasingly taking actions that create problems for the central government
to address. For instance, the smuggling ofhuman beings from Fujian Province
(in particular) has been a growing problem throughout the reform era.28 Such
trade in humans could not occur without the complicity oflocal officials, and
this practice brings repeated protests from foreign governments. Similarly, many
local governments and economic entities in the PRC feared Beijing would
devalue the renminbi (RMB) in response to the AFC. They therefore kept hard
currency outside the country or kept earnings in hard currency (often U.s.
dollars) rather than RMB. The cumulative effect of these actions was to further
weaken confidence in Beijing's pledge not to devalue the RMB; in turn,
these moves led Beijing to impose foreign exchange control regulations that
aggravated foreigners who now found it more difficult to exchange RMB for
U.S. dollars. As Moore and Yang put it, "Subnational actors typically have
greater input into policyftedback than into policyformulation."
Therefore, decentralization has had a number ofeffects on the Chinese foreign
and national security policy-making processes. Most important, it has
multiplied the points of initiative within the Chinese system and, according
to Moore and Yang, "increased the prospects for widespread learning from
China's participation in world markets." But these same beneficiaries of
decentralization are often attached to the previous arrangements from which
they have benefited; this can slow down the pace at which China conforms
to global standards. Finally, decentralization can mean that the influence of
lower-level participants comes primarily as policy is implemented, and thereafter
through feedback. This feedback, in turn, shapes the agenda ofcentral
decision-makers.
Globalization
The fourth "-ization" that has figured prominently in the evolving character
ofthe Chinese foreign and national security policy-making process since 1978
has been globalization, including economic globalization, information globalization,
and the increasing degree to which national security must be multilaterally
negotiated (not unilaterally secured). Because interdependence is a
by-product ofglobalization and interdependence is presumed to foster cooperation,
it is easy to assume that globalization will slowly erode Beijing's
dedication to its narrow national interest and practice ofrealpolitik. Although
there is plenty ofevidence ofincreasing Chinese cooperation and conformity
with international norms, there is little evidence that considerations of
national interest and realpolitik figure any less prominently in Chinese thinking
than they always have. As Thomas Moore remarked in 1998: "The Chinese
are receptive to globalization as a means to become modern-it is not
a goal, it is a means. Globalization is a limited, but positive, constraint on
Chinese foreign policy. Policy and behavior has changed more than their
[Beijing's] worldview."29 Globalization has modified the PRC's behavior;
because of it, China's leaders and citizens have developed a broader view of
where their interests lie. This broader view does not always foster cooperation,
however. Pearson, for example, points out that one ofthe principal effects
of the protracted fight over the terms ofthe PRC's accession to WTO was to
alert Chinese localities and industries to what they might lose if Beijing was
too accommodating.
With respect to globalization's promotion ofcooperation, there is no better
example than that found in the analysis ofMoore and Yang. In their case
study of Beijing's response to the AFC, they suggest how a variety of considerations
shaped China's policy and behavior. Ofall these factors, however,
China's integration into the world was primary. Take, for example, Beijing's
persistence in maintaining the value ofthe RMB from 1997 to 1999. Beijing
consistently characterized this decision as an example ofits good citizenship,
a move designed to avoid a spiral of competitive devaluations in the region
and beyond. Good citizenship aside, Beijing's integration into the world
economy made a devaluation of the RMB contrary to its own interests.
Considerations ofcooperative behavior and national interest thus coincided.
As Moore and Yang explain, "Increased import costs [which would have
occurred had there been a devaluation] were likely to inhibit the competitiveness
of Chinese goods on the world market. Although devaluation would make
finished Chinese goods cheaper on the world market, it would also raise the
price of imported inputs [for instance, oil and components for assembly].
According to most estimates, about 50 percent of China's total exports
depend on the processing ofimported raw materials.... In this sense China's
growing participation in TMNs [transnational manufacturing networks]
reduced the efficacy of currency policy as an instrument for improving the
competitiveness of 'Chinese' exports."
In short, China did not devalue the RMB because it was not in its interest
to do so (though many Chinese exporters, including shipbuilders and steelmakers,
vigorously called for it). Beijing defined its interests in the context
of China's position in the global economic system and recognized that its
26 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
rf
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 27
behavior could create systemic instabiliry contrary to its own overall interests.
Therefore, China was acting based on its interests, but those interests were
greatly influenced by China's role in the global manufacturing and trading
system. Moore and Yang also explain how China's participation in international
(largely private) capital markets and its incorporation into TMNs create
"private conditionaliry driven by market forces that operates similarly to the
ojJieialconditionaliry imposed on developing countries by foreign governments
and MEls [multilateral economic institutions]." Ifthe PRC and its subordinate
administrative units do not conform to norms acceptable to the broader
international system and observed by its economic competitors, the capital
available will flow to more congenial sites. As a result, because China has defined
economic and technological modernization as its primary goal, conformance
with international standards that put it in a favorable competitive position
to obtain capital is often in China's interests even ifinterests are narrowly construed.
According to Moore and Yang, the effect ofthis "global logic" is clear:
"China finds itself today, contrary to its original plans, increasingly market
oriented and deeply involved in the world economy." Market conditionaliry
may therefore prove more important than the kind of political conditionaliry
President Clinton tried (and failed) to impose by linking tariff treatment
and human rights behavior from 1993 to 1994.
Another illustration of globalization is China's decision to join the signers
ofthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treary (CTBT). From 1994 to 1996, while
negotiating over the terms ofthe CTBT, China joined France in not adhering
to the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing observed by the United
States, Britain, and Russia. Instead, Beijing conducted an accelerated testing
program to modernize its nuclear forces before the treary was to be signed in
late 1996. China's leadership made a double calculation on the CTBT, believing
that it could stand the international heat of continued testing for two years,
but that its overall national securiry and international standing required it to
ultimately sign the treary. As Gill explains, "this decision [to sign the CTBT]
was couched in the language of Chinese national interests, not an 'internationalist'
or 'cooperative securiry' perspective. China's more cooperative position
thus resulted from the limits imposed by the very processes ofintegration
that the decision-makers sought to preserve and enhance." When China
was faced with demands by both its Third World constituency and the other
nuclear powers that it sign the CTBT, "this critical decision appeared to be
driven largely by international pressures and a fractious internal debate that
in the end favored accession-for the sake ofChina's international image and
some possible relative gains in Chinese securiry." Therefore, Gill concludes
that "China's policy-making is constrained by an intricate web ofinternational
dependencies, status relationships, and securiry realities it faces."
Finally, as Economy explains, it is certainly true that China's scientists,
involved as they are in the international scientific communiry, have been progressively
persuaded that owne depletion is a problem affecting everyone, including
China. But it was not simply an understanding ofecological interdependence
or a sense of global obligation that resulted in Beijing's signing of the Montreal
Protocol and subsequent participation in the regime. Rather, it was the
combination of these considerations with more tangible interests-namely
the desire to export appliances in conformance with international refrigerant
codes and the promise of financial assistance as China adapted to the new
regime-that proved decisive. In short, Chinese cooperative behavior is most
likely when global interdependence creates a situation in which Beijing's
own economic, securiry, and prestige interests are served by cooperation. Globalization
often creates such circumstances, but not always.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY BEHAVIOR
What are the implications of the four "-izations" for the policy and behavior
of the PRC today? Of all the observations one can make, Fewsmith and
Rosen make the one most central: "As compared to Chinese foreign policy
in the Maoist era, the domestic context of Chinese foreign policy today has
become both more important and more complex." This is reflected in the fact
that the number of individuals and organizations at the Center that are
involved in making major decisions, the circle of those involved in consultation
and subsequent policy implementation, and the space in which "sociery"
and local systems can operate have all expanded since 1978.
The effects of these changes on the policy-making process and behavior
have already been significant and will become more so. As to process, the paramount
leader has become less paramount and has been forced to consult more
broadly. Lu Ning describes the evolution ofa situation in which there is more
equaliry among members ofthe decision-making bodies at the Center. Meanwhile,
power over all but the broadest and most strategic decisions has moved
from high-level central organs to government ministries. At the ministerial
level, power has been diffused from the MFA to other (often economic) ministries.
In turn, particularly in the economic realm, ministerial power has moved
28 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
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from Beijing to the provinces and industrial corporations. However, as
Swaine reminds us, actors at any level but the highest have very little influence
over grand strategy decisions.3D
Turning to look at sociery more broadly, much of China's interaction
with the world is no longer effectively controlled by the government at all.
"Epistemic communities"-diffuse transnational groupings of like-minded
individuals-are examples ofone ofthe many nongovernmental channels for
such interaction. Fewsmith and Rosen explain how "public opinion" can establish
a delimited space within which the Chinese leadership must operate. Looming
on the horizon, though still of scant importance except in the area of
environmental monitoring (see the chapter by Economy), is the emergence
ofcivic organizations that will advocate policies affecting China's behavior in
the world.
In examining China's late-twentieth-century foreign and national security
policy-making system, we are clearly faced with a system in transition. Its longterm
direction, however, is clear, despite short-term perturbations: more
constrained paramount leaders, more limited bureaucracies (constrained by
the very complexity of their processes), and a society that has progressively
more space within which to operate. Together, these put the formal policymaking
process in a position of often reacting to issues and challenges
imposed on it by society and the global system.
Because the Center has grown larger, the degree to which decisions are personalized
has diminished. Because China's leadership has become more educated
and cosmopolitan (technocratic), it tends to search ever more broadly
for information upon which to fashion decisions. The instruments ofthis search
are multiplying, as is the distance from the Center at which information is
being sought. Finally, as the bureaucracy has become more specialized, much
ofits added capacity has come in areas that permit China to better "fit" into
the international organizations and regimes in which it now participates. In
this vein, Economy notes the international property rights (IPR) tribunals being
created within China's judicial system. The policy-making process has therefore
become less personalized, more specialized, and more compatible with
global systems, notwithstanding the fact that issues ofbasic national strategy
are highly personalized, as are crisis and major nonroutine decision-making.
Turning from process to behavior, we must address these questions: What
changes have occurred? What is the direction ofthe changes? What have been
(and will be) the effects ofthese changes? First, economic objectives have become
the Chinese policy lodestone, although Taiwan could supersede it. Likewise,
as Gill suggests, PRC leaders are coming to recognize that security cannot always
be achieved unilaterally and will occasionally require multilateral cooperation.
Again demonstrating the dual character ofmany phenomena, however, multilateral
security cooperation is not simply an idealist conception, but rather
a means by which to promote "realist" national interests. China is not unusual
in this regard. The United States has also generally looked at multilateral cooperation
as a way to promote its interests rather than as a determinative goal
in and ofitself Similarly, China's increasing participation in the ASEAN (Association
ofSoutheast Asian Nations) Regional Forum and its commitment to
the United Nations Security Council are seen as ways to constrain the unilateralist
tendencies ofthe United States, Great Britain, and NATO in the postcold
war world.
The developments in the policy-making process described earlier also
have other implications. For one, foreign interlocutors will find it progressively
harder to observe senior members of the Chinese elite single-handedly
commit the PRC to a course of action without extensive prior domestic
consultation and exhaustive efforts to ensure subsequent implementation. Several
effects follow from this trend. First, policy innovation will likely be
harder to achieve.31 Second, stalemate on important issues-what Gill calls
"some policy paralysis"-will be increasingly frequent. Third, foreigners may
face mixed signals from an increasingly pluralized system. On the subject of
WTO entry, for example, during the long negotiations in 1998 and 1999 one
heard from some officials that Beijing was committed to entering the WTO
quickly, yet at the very same time other equally credible officials conveyed just
the opposite view. Similarly, in 1999 one could simultaneously hear from equally
authoritative sources in China that Beijing wanted to "resolve" the Taiwan issue
relatively quickly and that the PRC felt no particular urgency and could remain
patient for a considerable period. When Americans point out these discordant
voices to the Chinese, a frequent response is exasperation; the sentiment
is that Americans wanted increasing openness and freedom ofexpression and
should live with the consequences. Finally, it is becoming progressively more
difficult for foreign interlocutors to know when they have spoken to an
authoritative Chinese actor. As Pearson explains: "It is impossible to write about
the structure of WTO decision-making without reference to the decisionmakers
that on an organizational chart would appear peripheral, but in fact
exerted tremendous influence."
In sum, then, it is becoming progressively more difficult to know when one
has heard the "last word." In fact, even when Beijing has reached an agreement
30 IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
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IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING? 31
(for example, to observe international intellectual property protection norms,
WTO commitments, or the Missile Technology Control Reg~me), the pluralization
of the implementation process has often meant that the relevant
agreement has become the starting point for further negotiation and specification.
Likewise, as Economy points out with respect to international
environmental agreements, ensuring compliance with central commitments
is a huge task.
Pearson provides an excellent example ofhow complex negotiations with
a pluralizing China have become. China's WTO negotiating team from the
late 1980s "ballooned in size" as relevant industrial and bureaucratic interests
were incorporated. By March 1998, the team included "representatives
ofMOFTEC, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the SDPC [State Development
and Planning Commission]' the SETC [State Economic and Trade Commission],
the Ministry ofJustice, the Ministry ofAgriculture, and the Ministry
ofInformation Industry." In the face of this trend, the lead negotiator
ofthe "team," MOFTEC's Long Yongtu, reportedly felt that "to invite them
in was the same as inviting our enemies. They were just a drag on our legs."
Ultimately, to energize the negotiations in 1999, Long had to get Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji involved, thereby short-circuiting his own negotiating team.
Even with respect to the treatment ofTaiwan, a high-priority issue with
strong domestic and military overtones, the policy-making process has
become more consultative and diffuse, as Swaine explains in discussing Jiang
Zemin's role: "Despite his relative dominance over Taiwan policy, Jiang's
overall position as 'first among equals' in the post-Deng leadership as a whole
has meant that, in the formulation ofbasic policy, he must consult more extensively
than did Deng Xiaoping with a wider circle of senior leaders, including
individuals in the policy administration and implementation arena." In
explaining that this consensus-building process can take a long time,
Suisheng Zhao states, "Nonroutine decisions can be kicked around at
lower levels for years without being resolved if no consensus can be reached
or the top leaders do not want to take positions or do not know what position
to take."32
Until now, I have described what the changes discussed herein have meant
for Chinese foreign and national security policy-making behavior in the
clinical language of political science. But there are more straightforward
questions that dominate much ofthe policy and political discourse concerning
China to which this volume also speaks: Will China increasingly conform to
global norms? Is China becoming more or less expansionist, more or less cooperative?
Are irreconcilable conflicts between China and other big powers,
particularly the United States, growing? Is China gradually coming to recognize
that security can often be achieved only cooperatively? The authors of these
chapters would not all offer identical answers to these questions, but I believe
that the weight ofthe evidence provided herein leads in the direction ofcautious
optimism. Nonetheless, the pattern ofChina's policy-making behavior
remains highly reactive, grudging, based on national interest, and designed
to test international limits. From a Western perspective, the overall direction
is positive, but there is a substantial distance to go. The treatment ofTaiwan
remains a very dangerous issue regarding which the dangers of small group
decision-making driven by nationalist sentiment could easily come together
with tragic consequences.
WHAT DOES THIS RESEARCH ADD TO WHAT WE
KNOW, AND WHAT ARE ITS IMPLICATIONS?
The contributors to this volume have built upon several broad literatures: the
literature of the policy-making process; scholarship on China's bilateral and
multilateral relations, substantive areas ofpolicy, and the relationship between
domestic and foreign policies; and writings on China's integration into the
international order.
The landmark work on the foreign policy-making process was A. Doak Barnett's
The Making ofForeign Policy in China: Structure and Process (1985).33
Indeed, the present volume is dedicated to Barnett in recognition of his
signal contribution to thinking in this area, as in so many others. Through
exhaustive interviews with senior Chinese leaders in the mid-1980s, Barnett
pieced together an institutional picture ofthe Chinese foreign policy-making
process. In doing so, he threw light on how the various components of the
process interrelated and how the personalities ofspecific leaders, particularly
Zhao Ziyang, affected both the processes and outcomes.
Barnett's contribution was followed by two additions to our understanding
ofChinese foreign policy-making institutions and processes, the first ofwhich
was Lu Ning's The Dynamics ofForeign-Policy Decisionmaking in China.34
ArIother important contribution was Michael Swaine's The Role ofthe Chinese
Military in National Security Policymaking.35 Two other contributions to our
understanding of the Chinese foreign policy-making process (though principally
focused on domestic policy-making) have been Decision-Making in Dengs
IS CHINA'S POLICY-MAKING CHANGING?
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33
China, edited by Carol Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao,36 and Kenneth Lieberthal's
Governing China. 37
These works, along with a great deal ofother research, have provided much
greater detail about the foreign policy-making structure than Barnett was able
to unearth and have revealed a system with a dual character-a system in which
an increasingly professionalized, complex, and conflict-ridden bureaucracy has
coexisted with a still very powerful, personalized senior-dominated elite.
The present work by no means invalidates findings by scholars such as Christensen,38
Nathan and Ross,39 Alastair lain Johnston,40 Whiting,41 and others
who have been more impressed by the capacity ofthe central elite to control
policy, manipulate popular passions, and resist the "imperatives" ofinternational
integration and specialization. However, this work does draw analytic attention
to the tensions between the "new" forces and the old system.
A second body of literature from which this volume draws and to which
it adds is research addressing the PRC's bilatetal and multilateral relationships,
the perceptions and history that have shaped those ties,42 and Beijing's
behavior in various functional areas (for example, arms control, trade, human
rights, and international economic policy). Samuel Kim's China and the
World43 not only addresses China's bilateral relationships and specific policy
concerns, but even tackles (in its first chapter) the policy-making process. The
principal problem is that Chinese society and government, not to mention
the PRC's role in the world, has changed considerably since that volume's initial
publication.
Among the recent works ofnote in this more traditional foreign policy literature
have been Robinson and Shambaugh's Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory
and Practice44 and Nathan and Ross's The Great Wall andthe Empty Fortress.45
Contributions by John W Lewis and his team at Stanford University46 and
by Evan Feigenbaum,47 in turn, have greatly increased our understanding of
China's arms control and military modernization policies.
Another body ofliterature to which this volume addresses itself concerns
China's integration into the global community as well as its impact upon the
international system and the effect of this integration on China's own foreign
policy behavior. Here one of the earliest and most comprehensive works was
Jacobson and Oksenberg's Chinas Participation in the IMF, the World Bank,
and GATT Toward a Global Economic Order.48 More recently, Alastair lain
Johnston has written a seminal piece that asks whether Chinas participation
in international regimes and multilateral organizations is changing Beijing's
goals and patterns ofbehavior or whether its more cooperative behavior is merely
a tactical "adaptation" to be abandoned once China's realpolitik interests
change.49 In that piece Johnston ultimately concludes that Beijing's motivations
and goals have not enduringly changed in the course of reform.
There are three theoretical areas to which this volume significantly contributes.
The first concerns the relationship between domestic politics and foreign
policy. Collectively, the chapters that follow not only reveal that domestic
and foreign policy processes in China are similar (and appear to be gradually
converging), but also indicate how these processes influence one another. This
interpenetration has many origins, though two are key. The first is the fact
that Beijing has declared that domestic economic growth is its overriding objective
(if the Taiwan issue can continue to be set aside); foreign policy is
intended primarily to create a hospitable international environment for such
growth. To the degree that Beijing's foreign policy fails in this regard, it is a
domestic issue.
The second factor contributing to the close linkage and interplay between
foreign policy and domestic politics is the fact that Beijing's leaders are ultimately
playing "two-level games."50 How the Chinese leaders are perceived
to be handling foreign affairs affects their standing in the domestic political
struggle, and external perceptions of their domestic standing affect their
potency with foreign interlocutors. Further, a country's leaders can use the
specter of domestic opposition as a lever with foreign negotiators to extract
concessions from them. Finally, some domestic actors use foreign pressure as
an ally in their policy struggles at home, whereas others use it to discredit their
domestic opponents on nationalistic grounds.
Thus does Swaine explain how Jiang Zemin's handling ofTaiwan policy
issues was carefully designed to position him well in his struggle to become
Chinas preeminent leader after Deng Xiaoping's death. As Swaine puts it, ''Any
aspirant to supreme authority within the Chinese communist regime cannot
afford to permit another senior leader to control Taiwan policy." On the flip
side, one might note the example ofNew York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's refusal
to meet the man who was then mayor of Beijing, Li Qiyan, in part because
he had been told that Mayor Li would soon be relieved ofoffice. Giuliani did
not want to expend his limited political capital on a relationship destined to
be short-lived and controversial among his constituents.
These considerations, along with the increasing bureaucratization of the
foreign policy-making process as a whole, mean that the foreign and domestic
policy-making processes are intertwined and converging, though they will
likely never be identical.
34 I s CHI N A'S P 0 LIe Y - M A KIN G C H A N GIN G ?
Samuel Kim's chapter is a seminal contribution to our understanding of
Beijing's Korea policy in the reform era and to our understanding ofthe interpenetration
ofdomestic and foreign policy. As Kim writes: "The making and
implementing of Chinas Korea policy is best understood as an ongoing
process of choosing among competing options rather than any finalized
decision, even as Chinese central decision-makers, situated strategically
between domestic and international politics, are constrained simultaneously
by what the two Koreas will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify.
The making and execution of a foreign policy decision thus requires that
Chinas decision-makers engage in a 'double-edged' calculation ofconstraints
and opportunities in both domestic and international politics in order to achieve
international accord and secure domestic ratification."
Several other chapters in this volume also analyze the tight embrace ofdomestic
and international politics. Economy shows how the international scientific
community has used its resources to shape the PRC's internal debate concerning
Beijing's role in international environmental regimes and how Chinese advocates
of international environmental cooperation use external pressure to
strengthen their own positions in domestic battles. Similarly, Pearson clearly
shows, as has my own contact with MOFTEC's Long Yongtu, that Chinas
trade system reformers have promoted Beijing's accession to the GATTIWfO
in order to secure international allies and the backing of a multilateral organization
in their domestic battles over economic reform. Meanwhile, Chinese
politicians, when negotiating the terms ofChinas adherence to the WTO and
other global regimes, cited their domestic opposition in arguing for greater
concessions by the international community.
Finally, Moore and Yang demonstrate how Chinas leaders sought to use
their refusal to give in to domestic pressures to devalue the RMB to gain credit
abroad (and perhaps secure more lenient terms for WTO entry) at the same
time that they used the resulting prestige gained abroad to enhance their domestic
positions. Yet all the while Beijing did not devalue the RMB primarily because
ofa realistic assessment of its own interests, including Beijing's fear ofdomestic
bank runs, accelerated inflation, and loss of foreign investor confidence.
A second theoretical concern (although also a practical concern) addressed
in this volume speaks clearly to the issue raised by Alastair lain Johnston and
Thomas Christensen: is Beijing "learning" (that is, genuinely internalizing and
embracing) global norms and values, or is the PRC simply "adapting" to global
norms to derive tactical benefits while maintaining the flexibility to reject them
when they no longer serve PRC interests?51 The answer that this volume pro-
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vides is that such questions are misstated. The chapters that most clearly address
this topic are those by Gill, Moore and Yang, and Pearson. The conclusion
they suggest is that Beijing may initially be entering into encumbering international
relationships based on tactical considerations, bur that international
involvement is a slippery slope. As a nation seeks to derive maximum benefit
from the system, it becomes increasingly constrained. As it becomes increasingly
constrained, the costs ofwithdrawal become progressively greater. What
starts out as tactical adaptation may slowly change into "learning" (permanent
change). "Adaptive learning" may be the most appropriate conceptualization.
The very nature of international involvement creates new interests where
none previously existed. For example, with the reversion of Hong Kong to
China in 1997, the fear ofdestabilizing the city's economy in 1997 and 1998
provided Beijing one reason (among many) not to devalue its currency. Were
destabilization to occur, Beijing would naturally lose international prestige (and
money, given the tens ofbillions ofdollars the PRC has invested in Hong Kong).
Moreover, such destabilization would also diminish the (already minimal) attractiveness
of the "One Country, Two Systems" formula Beijing has used in the
hope of drawing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland. Similarly,
because the PRC had become so enmeshed in transnational manufacturing
networks, it made less sense to devalue the RMB, even though powerful domestic
interests vigorously argued that Beijing should do so. In short, the more
international involvement a nation has, the more interests it accumulates and
wishes to protect.
Further, in seeking to deal with the international community, the Chinese
have developed new organizations. These new bureaucratic implants, in
turn, have changed the nature ofdecision-making within the Chinese system
itself Therefore, the old argument about whether leadership composition, strategy,
and perception or institutional structure is more important may not be
as central a question as it may seem. Leadership decision-making shapes the
structure of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy, in turn, shapes the context
of perception and decision-making, especially in the process of making
routinized and noncrisis decisions.
Domestic policy and institutional changes have been reinforced by international
economic policy-making and globalization. All these forces combined
have tended to promote institutional and economic policy convergence
between China and her major trading partners.52 This brings us to the question
of whether China is likely to exhibit more cooperative behavior in the
future or to persist in state-centric, realpolitik patterns ofaction. The answer
36 I s CHI N A'S P 0 L ICY - M A KIN G C H A N GIN G ?
that this volume provides is clear: Beijing will persist in pursuing its interests,
as Kim makes clear in his discussion of the PRCs desire to keep North
Korea as a buffer against U.S. power. Nonetheless, Beijing's global and
regional interests are becoming progressively more complex, the struggles over
their definition are becoming more protracted, and, as China becomes more
interdependent, the costs of withdrawal are becoming progressively greater.
In short, China's elite will show no less dedication to the PRCs interests in
the future than in the past, but gradually, by fits and starts, even narrow calculations
ofnational interest may produce progressively more cooperative behavior.
A fitting conclusion to this introduction to the present volume is a quote
from Moore and Yang as they describe China's foreign policy predicament:
"What matters is the scope and degree of China's interdependence, not how
it became interdependent (that is, through adaptation, learning, or adaptive
learning). Whether Chinese leaders view interdependence mainly as a tool for
economic modernization or as an independently valued goal, the reality of
interdependence is the same. Indeed, the latter issue-whether interdependence
is valued as an end in itself-matters only if the costs China is likely
to incur in extracting itselffrom its current (increasingly) interdependent context
are low or nonexistent. If the exit costs are high, the issue of adaptation
versus learning arguably is less important. From this perspective, interdependence
is apredicament countries must deal with, not a world-view or a foreign policy
strategy."
PART ONE
Institutions and Localities