

MVZ-207 Chinese Foreign Policy since 1949

Mgr. Jan Polišenský
Spring 2011
Week 3: Leaning to one side (1949 – 1958)

1

People's Republic of China



2

Lean to One Side

- In the early 1950s, the PRC undertook a massive economic and social reconstruction
- Since the Opium Wars – China experienced relative stability with the new political and economic order modeled based on the Soviet model
- Land reforms – (90 % of population farmers)
- Land was redistributed from landlords to peasants

3

Lean to One Side

- China and Soviet Union in the late 1940's and 1950's "brotherly solidarity" and "unbreakable" and "eternal"
- China's alliance policy toward the Soviet Union was always an integral part of Mao Zedong's grand continuous revolution plans
- 30 June 1949 -Mao Zedong Issues famous "lean to one side" statement in an article "On People's Democratic Dictatorship"
- Special communist relationship with Soviet Union

4

Lean to One Side

- In 1949- fear of intervention by USA
- The lean to one side grew out of CCP's assessment of the threat from the Western countries
- To enhance the dynamics of the Chinese communist revolution
- Chinese model of "oppressed nation"

5

Lean to One Side

- Revolutionary China must "unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world that treats us as equal and unite with the peoples of all countries- that is with SU with the People's Democratic Countries, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front...."

6

1949 - Mao Zedong

- “Sugar-coated bullet” – to shoot down weak-willed communists with plots to sabotage the revolution
- “After the destruction of the enemies with guns, the enemies without guns are still there, and they are bound to struggle desperately against us.”
- New wave of patriotism further legitimized the new regime
- China’s moral superiority in giving “selfless assistance based on proletarian internationalism”

7

New momentum for Chinese revolution

- Zhou Enlai - “making a fresh start”
- “cleaning the house before entertaining the guests”
- “lean to one side”

8

Sino-Soviet Alliance

- The world situation: two camps
- Three principles of New China’s foreign relations:
 1. Make a fresh start
 2. Cleaning the house before “entertaining guests”
 3. Leaning to one side
- They were consistent with Mao’s domestic policies

9

1953 – 1957 - First 5-year plan

- Based on the Soviet model of 5-year plans
- Transformation
- Nationalization of Industry In 1955
- State controlled economy
- Mao – emphasized heavy industry, however lacked the skills and foundations from light industry
- The plan did not include any accurate indicators

10

Political target

- In major industrial outputs, to catch up with Britain in 10-15 years, with America in 15-20 years
- Euphoria in 1958 led to more unrealistic goals for 1959 (to leave one-third of the arable land fallow ...)
- Officials conspired to inflate production figures
- Disasters, disorganizations

11

Mao Zedong



Mao Zedong

- There were no meaningful diplomatic or economic relations with the West
- The PRC was politically isolated
- militarily contained
- economically maintained relations with the Soviet bloc
- “The Republic of China” on Taiwan was representing China in the United Nations and other international organizations
- Japan was under US military occupation

13

Mao Zedong

- Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union (December 1949-February 1950) and the Sino-Soviet Treaty
- Mao’s uneasy meetings with Stalin sowed seeds of future friction
- Soviets to maintain privileges in Northeast China and Xinjiang in exchange for military and other support (air-defense installations)
- “To bring about something that not only looked nice but also tasted delicious” – New Sino-Soviet Treaty

14

Drift from Soviet Union

- The Soviets’ substantial aid and Sino-Soviet cooperation
- Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing (Sept.-Oct. 1954)
- Lushun (Port Arthur) returned to China
- Soviets’ 156 industrial projects
- Chinese endorsed Soviet political changes
- Joint pressure on Hanoi to accept the 17th parallel division at the Geneva Conference of 1954

15

Gao Gang Affair

- Gao Gang was a CCP politburo member and vice chairman of the PRC Central People’s Gov’t
- Beginning of December 1953 – escalating attacks
- Marked the first disagreement between SU/PRC
- Showed the risk of splits within the Chinese Communist Party
- Gao Gang close links to SU
- “Conspirator who intended to split party”

16

Trade between SU and PRC


- It would be impossible for China to engage in Korean War without the strategic alliance with the Soviet Union
- Military support, industry, modernization
- In 1950 – 30 %
- In 1953 – 56.3 %

17

1950 – 1953 - Korean War

- June 25, 1950 – Kim Il-Sung Crossed 38th parallel and quickly advanced to the Busan vicinity
- Stalin did not want to enter to war, due to the fear of eventual war with the USA
- China – responsible for Korea’s assistance
- Chinese forces invaded and annexed Tibet in October 1950
- Tibet had been nominally subject to the emperors
- Tibet declared its independence in 1912

18



Korean War

- First test of the Sino-Soviet alliance
- War – China's national security
- Opportunity to test the alliance
- January 1950 – U.S. Secretary of state Dean Acheson “Korea would be excluded from America's western Pacific defence perimeter”
- CCP effort to “liberate Taiwan”
- Mao supported the Korean Revolution but hoped that in invasion to South Korea will not begin before the PLA seized Taiwan

20

Korean War

- Korean War 25 June 1950
- Harry Truman and 7th fleet dispatch to Taiwan Strait
- Stalin supported “Northeast Border Defence Army” and stated “try to provide air cover for these units”
- “Chinese People's Volunteers”
- Mao – in order to defeat American troops in Korea, China needs substantial military support

21

Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea

- Slogan “beating American arrogance”
- Mao – used Korean War as a new source of domestic political mobilization
- Patriotism, Continuous revolution
- All important decision consulted with Stalin
- Mao gave moral support to Kim (plus 50,000-70,000 troops of “Korean origin”) - (PLA soldiers with guns)
- Northeast Border Defence Army 250,000 soldiers

22

Sino-Soviet relations – Korean War

- Chinese troops successfully forced US/UN forces to retreat from China/Korean border to 38th parallel
- Seen as great victory for China
- Mao believed that they won a powerful position from which to claim that international society (friends/foe) had to accept China as Great Power
- Thankful to Soviet for the support
- Crisis – failure to support Soviet air-support during the key weeks of October 1950

23

1950-1953 - The Korean War

- Soviet request that China would pay for the military support that Beijing received (Long-term economic challenges)
- Moral superiority in relation to the Soviet comrade
- Statements by Harry Truman and Dean Acheson in January 1950
- Kim Il-sung's judgment (and Mao's and Stalin's)

24

Mao Zedong & Kim Il Sung



25

1950-1953 - Korean War

- Beijing's surprise
- North Korea's advance and debacle
- China prepared to intervene militarily and expected Soviet aid
- Chinese hesitation, Soviet reluctance to commit itself, Zhou Enlai's negotiation
- Failure of communication with Washington

26

1950-1953 - Korean War

- China crossed the Yalu River
- A quarter million Chinese "Volunteers"
- Douglas MacArthur miscalculated
- Mao's overconfidence buried cease-fire proposals
- Setbacks for China/North Korea in April 1951
- Coming to the negotiation table
- The complicated POW issue
- Armistice finally signed in July 1953

27

1950-1953 - Korean War

- On October 26, 1950, the CCP central leadership instructed the Party to conduct anti-American propaganda
- It called for a "unified understanding and position on U.S. imperialism" and a thorough, resolute political campaign

28

1950-1953 - Korean War

The document described the United States in three images.

- First, the US was the Chinese nation's enemy.
- Second, three reasons were given to explain why the United States was also an enemy of the whole world:
 - (1) the United States was the headquarters of launching wars of international aggression, and it made profits by killing people with advanced weapons;
 - (2) the United States was the headquarters of opposing democracy and fostering fascism in other parts of the world
 - (3) it was an enemy of civilization and the headquarters of human spiritual degeneration.

29

1950-1953 - Korean War

- Finally, the document depicted the United States as a "paper tiger."
- According to the propaganda
 - Americans were not only politically isolated but also militarily weakened by overstretching, and they were no longer monopolizing the atom bomb (the Soviets had also obtained nuclear power in 1950)
- Therefore, the Korean War served the CCP's political purposes at home

30

1950-1953 - Korean War

- Significance and Aftermath of the Korean War
- China claimed to win the war
- Boosted international status
- Strengthened ally with the Soviet Union but disillusioned about Stalin's internationalism
- Had to pay for much of the Soviet military supplies
- Alliances on the Peninsula were solidified

31

1950-1953 - Korean War

Chinese official perceptions today:

- (1) The Korean War as a verdict is not to be reversed; It was necessary without regret; considered Mao's courageous and correct decision
- (2) The U.S. was the archenemy
- (3) The enemy image is invoked at times when China-U.S. relations are tense
- (4) "Militant friendship with North Korea cemented with blood"

32

Alliance's Golden Years

- Soviet support during the economic reconstruction
- Promotion of international status
- Soviet agreed to return military bases in Port Lushun
- Upgrading 156 key industrial projects for the first 5 year plan
- April 1955 – SU/ China signed an agreement under which Moscow will provide Beijing with Nuclear Technology (peaceful purposes)
- Mao – respected Stalin when he was alive, after his death, Mao was reluctant to acknowledge Nikita Khrushchev authority

33

Tension between SU/CCP

- 1956 - 20th Congress CPSU (Communist party of Soviet Union)
- Khrushchev – criticize Stalin and his personality cult
- Mao – Khrushchev's shattered myth of Stalin
- Mao – did not want to copy "Stalin model", they found Soviet strategies and tactics useful
- Ke Qingshi - CCP politburo member - "it is all right to worship Chairman Mao to the extent of having blind faith in him"

34

Tension between SU/CCP

- Mao – distinguished between "correct" and "incorrect" personal cult
- Mao – Stalin failed to treat China as equals
 - Stalin committed many mistakes in Chinese revolution
- Mao – speech about Stalin mistakes – He, not Soviet Leaders now occupied the morally paramount position to dominate the cause of the world proletarian revolution
- Mao's criticism – In Yugoslavia

35

Reflections on the turbulence in Eastern Europe – guarding against "peaceful evolution"

- Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin (1956) shocked the Chinese
- Mao judged Stalin in a seventy-thirty ratio
- Articles to oppose de-Stalinization
- Sensitivity to personality cult
- "It is all right to worship Chairman Mao to the extent of having a blind faith in him"

36

1956 - Polish and Hungarian crises

- Riots or revolution ?
- Chinese saw:
- Poland as anti-Soviet
- Hungary as anti-Communist

37

1956 - Polish and Hungarian crises

- Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in Moscow persuaded Soviet leaders not to use force in Poland and accused them of conducting “big-power chauvinism”
- The Chinese were alarmed to see anti-Communist “reactionary riots” in Hungary; advised Moscow to use force

38

1956 - Polish and Hungarian crises

- Lessons learned by the Chinese
- Soviet big-power policies
- Imperialists’ most serious attack against the socialist camp since the Korean War
- Necessary to wage class struggle
- Anti-Rightist Movement in summer 1957, in which over 500,000 cadres and intellectuals were persecuted and silenced

39

1956 - Polish and Hungarian crises



40

1956 - Poland

- China against Soviet intervention - “Poland’s Internal affairs”
- 23-31 October – Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping meeting in Moscow
- Where decided not to use force to solve Poland
- But also agreed on “Declaration on Developing and Enhancing the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries”
- Mao regarded this as victory

41

1956 - Hungary

- Mao believed in the beginning that the origins of the Crisis lay in Moscow’s failure to treat Hungarians as Equals
- Mao was alarmed when the anti-Communist “riots” began to spread all over Hungary
- Mao – withdrawing would be betrayal of Hungarian People

42

1956 - Hungary

- Four days later, the Soviet Red Army attacked Budapest
- 1957 – Premier Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary
- Reported that the Soviet leadership lacked sophistication in managing the complicated situations both within SU and in Eastern Europe.

43

Anti-rightist movement in China

- In the wake of the Hungarian crises, in summer 1957 anti-rightist movement swept across China
- More than 300,000 (500,000) Chinese intellectuals were branded as “rightist”
- "re-education through labour"
- Mao control over the public opinion

44

From Tension to Crises

- Zhou Enlai criticized “rash advance”
- Mao warned Zhou that he was only “fifty meters of becoming rightist”
- Mao – to bring revolution to a higher stage “Great Leap Forward”
- China radicalized domestic and external policies
- Zhou Enlai – on the verge of political defeat, self-criticism, neglected necessary struggle with dealing countries (Japan, USA)
- - To learn from the experience of the SU, it was mistake to copy it completely
- Great Leap Forward – radicalized external policy

45

Military cooperation

November 1957 - China's defense minister Peng Dehuai visited Moscow, and agreed on cooperate closely on developing Naval and air forces in East Asia

1958 – Long Range radio transmitters.

SU would cover 70 % of construction costs

Mao – saw it as threaten to the Chinese sovereignty and integrity

Mao would agreed, only if China would pay all expenses, retain exclusive ownership

China, would be responsible for construction, purchase of the technology from SU

Owned by China, but operated jointly with SU

46

Military cooperation

- 1957 – Soviet military advisers in China indicated to China that they should purchase new naval equipment from SU
- 28 June 1958 – Zhou Enlai/ Khrushchev – technological assistance
- 21 July – Amb. Yudin met Mao
- China should create the submarine fleet with SU assistance?
- Jointly create the fleet? (no assistance) Mao stated that he is not interested in creating Sino-Soviet “military cooperative”
- Radio transmitter+ submarine fleet = control of China

47

1954-1955 - Taiwan Strait crisis


- America's “Two-China” plot
- Aborted plans to attack Taiwan in summer 1950
- Jiang Jieshi's consolidation in Taiwan and pledge to fight back to the mainland
- US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty
- Mao's call (July 1954) to “highlight the Taiwan issue” – again, the need to emphasize the existence of outside threats
- We must liberate Taiwan!

48

- Momentum for Mao's Continuous revolution
- Domestic mobilization
- July 1958 – Nationalist stage Coup in Iraq.
- In response U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon, British troops in Jordan
- Numerous postponing of shelling
- Main goal – to isolate GMD troops on Jinmen, cutting them off from supplies
- Considered of using nuclear weapons
- Mao decided to bring China into the crisis primary for the purpose of creating environment for the Great Leap Forward

Beijing's Taiwan Policy

- First Phase: Preparation to Liberate Taiwan
- GMD in Mainland
- In 1949 – 2 defeats in attempting to occupy Jinmen 1949-1950
- Second Phase: Korea, Not Taiwan 1950-1953
- Third Phase: First Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-1955
- Fourth Phase: Peace Initiative – mid 1955-1957



Taiwan Strait

- Bombardment of Jinmen (September 1954) and the landing in Dachen, Yijiangshan, and other offshore islands in Zhejiang province (January-February 1955)
- Signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei (December 1954)
- Soviet reservations with China's policy toward Taiwan
- Washington's dilemma

53

1954-1955- Taiwan Strait crisis



54

1955-1957 - Moderation of foreign policy

- Anti-China propaganda: "Slavic Manchukuo" and an aggressive post-imperial power
- The overseas Chinese issue
- The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
- Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (April 1955)
- Zhou Enlai offered bilateral talks with the US to discuss the relaxation of tension in Asia and especially in the Taiwan area

55

1959-1960 - Sino-Soviet relationship

- Soviets started to restrict the flow of scientific and technological information to China
- 1959 - Nikita Khrushchev decided to stop helping the Chinese with their nuclear program
- Soviets withdrew all of their personnel from China by August 1960.
- the Soviets and the Chinese began to have disputes openly in international forums.
- 1969 with the Sino-Soviet border conflict

56



Great Leap Forward

- Mao in waging class struggle
- Mao's visit to Moscow in November 1957
- Recognizing Soviet leadership but uttering strong anti-imperialist rhetoric than the Soviets

58

Great Leap Forward

- Soviet aid for 1958 did not meet Chinese expectations
- Features of the Great Leap Forward:
- Ideological, experimentation, mass mobilization, to accomplish technologically impossible goals
- Ignore or despise expertise
- (steel, coal, cotton, and grain; backyard steel furnaces; fly, mosquito, rat, and sparrow)

59

Great Leap Forward

- Mao announced the goal of surpassing the steel production output of Great Britain by 1968
- Rather than build steel mills, small "backyard furnaces" would be used.
- People's communes - large, centralized organizations in rural areas

60

Great Leap Forward

- 1950's - Mao's social and cultural programs, including collectivization
- Mao declared that despite some faults, Stalin had basically been a good, well-meaning Marxist
- Soviets were not treating China as an equal partner
- Mao broke off the Soviet model and announced a new economic program
- In 1958, rapidly raising industrial and agricultural production

61

Great Leap Forward

- The results =disaster
- Normal market mechanisms were disrupted
- Agricultural production fell behind
- Distributing food and resources
- Rapid depletion due to poor planning
- Starvation appeared even in fertile agricultural areas

62

Great Leap Forward


- Widespread famine – 20-40 million deaths
- The steel produced in backyard furnaces at low temperatures proved to be useless
- unusual weather patterns and natural disasters

63

Criticism of Great Leap Forward

- Defense Minister Peng Dehuai - orthodox Soviet-style economic planning
- He accused Mao of being responsible for this disaster
- Peng then lived retired in disgrace
- Peng was arrested by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution
- Peng died 1974, after Mao's Death he was posthumously rehabilitated with full honors

64



65



66

