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MVZ-207
Chinese Foreign Policy
since 1949
Mgr. Jan Polišenský
Spring 2011
Week 3: Leaning to one side (1949 – 1958)
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People's Republic of China
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Lean to One Side
• In the early 1950s, the PRC undertook a massive
economic and social reconstruction
• Since the Opium Wars – China experienced
relative stability with the new political and
economic order modeled based on the Soviet
model
• Land reforms – (90 % of population farmers)
• Land was redistributed from landlords to
peasants
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Lean to One Side
• China and Soviet Union in the late 1940's and
1950's “brotherly solidarity” and “unbreakable”
and “eternal”
• China's alliance policy toward the Soviet Union
was always an integral part of Mao Zedong's
grand continuous revolution plans
• 30 June 1949 -Mao Zedong Issues famous
“lean to one side” statement in an article “On
People's Democratic Dictatorship”
• Special communist relationship with Soviet
Union
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Lean to One Side
• In 1949- fear of intervention by USA
• The lean to one side grew out of CCP's assessment
of the threat from the Western countries
• To enhance the dynamics of the Chinese
communist revolution
• Chinese model of “oppressed nation”
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Lean to One Side
• Revolutionary China must “unite in a common
struggle with those nations of the world that
treats us as equal and unite with the peoples of all
countries- that is with SU with the People's
Democratic Countries, and with the proletariat
and the broad masses of the people in all other
countries, and form an international united
front.... ”
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1949 - Mao Zedong
• “Sugar-coated bullet” – to shoot down weak-willed
communists with plots to sabotage the revolution
• “After the destruction of the enemies with guns,
the enemies without guns are still there, and they
are bound to struggle desperately against us.”
• New wave of patriotism further legitimized the new
regime
• China’s moral superiority in giving “selfless
assistance based on proletarian internationalism”
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New momentum for Chinese
revolution
• Zhou Enlai - “making a fresh start”
• “cleaning the house before entertaining the
guests”
• “lean to one side”
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Sino-Soviet Alliance
• The world situation: two camps
• Three principles of New China’s foreign relations:
1. Make a fresh start
2. Cleaning the house before “entertaining
guests”
3. Leaning to one side
• They were consistent with Mao’s domestic policies
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1953 – 1957 - First 5-year plan
• Based on the Soviet model of 5-year plans
• Transformation
• Nationalization of Industry In 1955
• State controlled economy
• Mao – emphasized heavy industry, however
lacked the skills and foundations from light
industry
• The plan did not include any accurate indicators
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Political target
• In major industrial outputs, to catch up with
Britain in 10-15 years, with America in 15-20
years
• Euphoria in 1958 led to more unrealistic goals
for 1959 (to leave one-third of the arable land
fallow …)
• Officials conspired to inflate production figures
• Disasters, disorganizations
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Mao Zedong
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Mao Zedong
• There were no meaningful diplomatic or
economic relations with the West
• The PRC was politically isolated
• militarily contained
• economically maintained relations with the
Soviet bloc
• “The Republic of China” on Taiwan was
representing China in the United Nations and
other international organizations
• Japan was under US military occupation
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Mao Zedong
• Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union (December 1949February
1950) and the Sino-Soviet Treaty
• Mao’s uneasy meetings with Stalin sowed seeds
of future friction
• Soviets to maintain privileges in Northeast China
and Xinjiang in exchange for military and other
support (air-defense installations)
• “To bring about something that not only looked
nice but also tasted delicious” – New Sino-Soviet
Treaty
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• The Soviets’ substantial aid and Sino-Soviet
cooperation
• Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing (Sept.-Oct.
1954)
• Lushun (Port Arthur) returned to China
• Soviets’ 156 industrial projects
• Chinese endorsed Soviet political changes
• Joint pressure on Hanoi to accept the 17th
parallel division at the Geneva Conference of
1954
Drift from Soviet Union
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Gao Gang Affair
• Gao Gang was a CCP politburo member and vice
chairman of the PRC Central People’s Gov’t
• Beginning of December 1953 – escalating attacks
• Marked the first disagreement between SU/PRC
• Showed the risk of splits within the Chinese
Communist Party
• Gao Gang close links to SU
• “Conspirator who intended to split party”
Trade between SU and PRC
• It would be impossible for China to engage in
Korean War without the strategic alliance with
the Soviet Union
• Military support, industry, modernization
• In 1950 – 30 %
• In 1953 – 56.3 %
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1950 – 1953 - Korean War
• June 25, 1950 – Kim Il-Sung Crossed 38th
parallel and quickly advanced to the Busan
vicinity
• Stalin did not want to enter to war, due to the
fear of eventual war with the USA
• China – responsible for Korea's assistance
• Chinese forces invaded and annexed Tibet in
October 1950
• Tibet had been nominally subject to the
emperors
• Tibet declared its independence in 1912
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Korean War
• First test of the Sino-Soviet alliance
• War – China's national security
• Opportunity to test the alliance
• January 1950 – U.S. Secretary of state Dean
Acheson “Korea would be excluded from
America's western Pacific defence perimeter”
• CCP effort to “liberate Taiwan”
• Mao supported the Korean Revolution but hoped
that in invasion to South Korea will not begin
before the PLA seized Taiwan
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Korean War
• Korean War 25 June 1950
• Harry Truman and 7th fleet dispatch to Taiwan
Strait
• Stalin supported “Northeast Border Defence
Army” and stated “try to provide air cover for
these units”
• “Chinese People's Volunteers”
• Mao – in order to defeat American troops in
Korea, China needs substantial military support
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Great Movement to Resist
America and Assist Korea
• Slogan “beating American arrogance”
• Mao – used Korean War as a new source of
domestic political mobilization
• Patriotism, Continuous revolution
• All important decision consulted with Stalin
• Mao gave moral support to Kim (plus 50,000-
70,000 troops of “Korean origin”) - (PLA soldiers
with guns)
• Northeast Border Defence Army 250,000 soldiers
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Sino-Soviet relations – Korean
War
• Chinese troops successfully forced US/UN forces
to retreat from China/Korean border to 38th
parallel
• Seen as great victory for China
• Mao believed that they won a powerful position
from which to claim that international society
(friends/foe) had to accept China as Great Power
• Thankful to Soviet for the support
• Crisis – failure to support Soviet air-support
during the key weeks of October 1950
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1950-1953 - The Korean War
• Soviet request that China would pay for the
military support that Beijing received (Long-term
economic challenges)
• Moral superiority in relation to the Soviet
comrade
• Statements by Harry Truman and Dean Acheson
in January 1950
• Kim Il-sung’s judgment (and Mao’s and Stalin’s)
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Mao Zedong & Kim Il Sung
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1950-1953 - Korean War
• Beijing’s surprise
• North Korea’s advance and debacle
• China prepared to intervene militarily and
expected Soviet aid
• Chinese hesitation, Soviet reluctance to commit
itself, Zhou Enlai’s negotiation
• Failure of communication with Washington
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1950-1953 - Korean War
• China crossed the Yalu River
• A quarter million Chinese “Volunteers”
• Douglas McArthur miscalculated
• Mao’s overconfidence buried cease-fire proposals
• Setbacks for China/North Korea in April 1951
• Coming to the negotiation table
• The complicated POW issue
• Armistice finally signed in July 1953
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1950-1953 - Korean War
• On October 26, 1950, the CCP central
leadership instructed the Party to conduct antiAmerican
propaganda
• It called for a “unified understanding and
position on U.S. imperialism” and a thorough,
resolute political campaign
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1950-1953 - Korean War
The document described the United States in three
images.
• First, the US was the Chinese nation’s enemy.
• Second, three reasons were given to explain why
the United States was also an enemy of the
whole world:
• (1) the United States was the headquarters of
launching wars of international aggression, and it made
profits by killing people with advanced weapons;
• (2) the United States was the headquarters of opposing
democracy and fostering fascism in other parts of the
world
• (3) it was an enemy of civilization and the headquarters
of human spiritual degeneration. 30
1950-1953 - Korean War
• Finally, the document depicted the United States
as a “paper tiger.”
• According to the propaganda
• Americans were not only politically isolated
but also militarily weakened by overstretching,
and they were no longer monopolizing the
atom bomb (the Soviets had also obtained
nuclear power in 1950)
• Therefore, the Korean War served the CCP’s
political purposes at home
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1950-1953 - Korean War
• Significance and Aftermath of the Korean War
• China claimed to win the war
• Boosted international status
• Strengthened ally with the Soviet Union but
disillusioned about Stalin’s internationalism
• Had to pay for much of the Soviet military
supplies
• Alliances on the Peninsula were solidified
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1950-1953 - Korean War
Chinese official perceptions today:
(1) The Korean War as a verdict is not to be
reversed; It was necessary without regret;
considered Mao’s courageous and correct
decision
(2) The U.S. was the archenemy
(3) The enemy image is invoked at times when
China-U.S. relations are tense
(4) “Militant friendship with North Korea cemented
with blood”
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Alliance's Golden Years
• Soviet support during the economic reconstruction
• Promotion of international status
• Soviet agreed to return military bases in Port
Lushun
• Upgrading 156 key industrial projects for the first
5 year plan
• April 1955 – SU/ China signed an agreement
under which Moscow will provide Beijing with
Nuclear Technology (peaceful purposes)
• Mao – respected Stalin when he was alive, after his
death, Mao was reluctant to acknowledge Nikita
Khrushchev authority
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Tension between SU/CCP
• 1956 - 20th Congress CPSU (Communist party of
Soviet Union)
• Khrushchev – criticize Stalin and his personality
cult
• Mao – Khrushchev's shattered myth of Stalin
• Mao – did not want to copy “Stalin model”, they
found Soviet strategies and tactics useful
• Ke Qingshi - CCP politburo member - “it is all
right to worship Chairman Mao to the extent of
having blind faith in him”
Tension between SU/CCP
• Mao – distinguished between “correct” and
“incorrect” personal cult
• Mao – Stalin failed to treat China as equals
• Stalin committed many mistakes in Chinese
revolution
• Mao – speech about Stalin mistakes – He, not
Soviet Leaders now occupied the morally
paramount position to dominate the cause of the
world proletarian revolution
• Mao's criticism – In Yugoslavia
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• Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin (1956) shocked
the Chinese
• Mao judged Stalin in a seventy-thirty ratio
• Articles to oppose de-Stalinization
• Sensitivity to personality cult
• “It is all right to worship Chairman Mao to the
extent of having a blind faith in him”
Reflections on the turbulence
in Eastern Europe – guarding
against “peaceful evolution”
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1956 - Polish and Hungarian
crises
• Riots or revolution ?
• Chinese saw:
• Poland as anti-Soviet
• Hungary as anti-Communist
1956 - Polish and Hungarian
crises
• Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in Moscow
persuaded Soviet leaders not to use force in
Poland and accused them of conducting “bigpower
chauvinism”
• The Chinese were alarmed to see antiCommunist
“reactionary riots” in Hungary;
advised Moscow to use force
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•Lessons learned by the Chinese
•Soviet big-power policies
•Imperialists’ most serious attack against the
socialist camp since the Korean War
•Necessary to wage class struggle
•Anti-Rightist Movement in summer 1957, in which
over 500,000 cadres and intellectuals were
persecuted and silenced
1956 - Polish and Hungarian
crises
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1956 - Polish and
Hungarian crises
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1956 - Poland
• China against Soviet intervention - “Poland's
Internal affairs”
• 23-31 October – Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping
meeting in Moscow
• Where decided not to use force to solve Poland
• But also agreed on “Declaration on Developing
and Enhancing the Friendship and Cooperation
between the Soviet Union and other Socialist
Countries”
• Mao regarded this as victory
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1956 - Hungary
• Mao believed in the beginning that the origins of
the Crisis lay in Moscow's failure to treat
Hungarians as Equals
• Mao was alarmed when the anti-Communist
“riots” began to spread all over Hungary
• Mao – withdrawing would be betrayal of
Hungarian People
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1956 - Hungary
• Four days later, the Soviet Red Army attacked
Budapest
• 1957 – Premiere Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet
Union, Poland and Hungary
• Reported that the Soviet leadership lacked
sophistication in managing the complicated
situations both within SU and in Eastern
Europe.
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Anti-rightist movement in
China
• In the wake of the Hungarian crises, in summer
1957 anti-rightist movement swept across China
• More then 300,000 (500,000) Chinese
intellectuals were branded as “rightist”
• "re-education through labour"
• Mao control over the public opinion
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From Tension to Crises
• Zhou Enlai criticized “rash advance”
• Mao warned Zhou that he was only “fifty meters
of becoming rightist”
• Mao – to bring revolution to a higher stage
“Great Leap Forward”
• China radicalized domestic and external policies
• Zhou Enlai – on the verge of political defeat,
self-criticism, neglected necessary struggle with
dealing countries (japan, USA)
• - To learn from the experience of the SU, it was
mistake to copy it completely
• Great Leap Forward – radicalized external policy
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Military cooperation
November 1957 - China's defense minister Peng
Dehuai visited Moscow, and agreed on cooperate
closely on developing Naval and air forces in East
Asia
1958 – Long Range radio transmitters.
SU would cover 70 % of construction costs
Mao – saw it as threaten to the Chinese sovereignty
and integrity
Mao would agreed, only if China would pay all
expanses, retain exclusive ownership
China, would be responsible for construction,
purchase of the technology from SU
Owned by China, but operated jointly with SU
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Military cooperation
• 1957 – Soviet military advisers in china indicated
to China that they should purchase new naval
equipment from SU
• 28 june 1958 – Zhou Enlai/ Khrushchev –
technological assistance
• 21 July – Ambs. Yudin met Mao
• China should create the submarine fleet with SU
assistance?
• Jointly create the fleet? (no assistance) Mao
stated that he is not interested in creating SinoSoviet
“military cooperative”
• Radio transmitter+ submarine fleet = control of
China
1954-1955 - Taiwan Strait
crisis
•America’s “Two-China” plot
•Aborted plans to attack Taiwan in summer 1950
•Jiang Jieshi’s consolidation in Taiwan and pledge
to fight back to the mainland
•US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty
•Mao’ s call (July 1954) to “highlight the Taiwan
issue” – again, the need to emphasize the existence
of outside threats
•We must liberate Taiwan!
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• Momentum for Mao's Continuous revolution
• Domestic mobilization
• July 1958 – Nationalist stage Coup in Iraq.
• In response U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon,
British troops in Jordan
• Numerous postponing of shelling
• Main goal – to isolate GMD troops on Jinmen,
cutting them off from supplies
• Considered of using nuclear weapons
• Mao decided to bring China into the crisis primary
for the purpuse of creating environment for the
Great Leap Forward
Beijing's Taiwan Policy
• First Phase: Preparation to Liberate Taiwan
• GMD in Mainland
• In 1949 – 2 defeats in attempting to occupy
Jinmen 1949-1950
• Second Phase: Korea, Not Taiwan 1950-1953
• Third Phase: First Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-195
• Fourth Phase: Peace Initiative – mid 1955-1957
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Taiwan Strait
• Bombardment of Jinmen (September 1954) and
the landing in Dachen, Yijiangshan, and other
offshore islands in Zhejiang province (JanuaryFebruary
1955)
• Signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between
Washington and Taibei (December 1954)
• Soviet reservations with China’s policy toward
Taiwan
• Washington’s dilemma
1954-1955- Taiwan Strait
crisis
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• Anti-China propaganda: “Slavic Manchukuo” and
an aggressive post-imperial power
• The overseas Chinese issue
• The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
• Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (April 1955)
• Zhou Enlai offered bilateral talks with the US to
discuss the relaxation of tension in Asia and
especially in the Taiwan area
1955-1957 - Moderation of
foreign policy
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1959-1960 – Sino-Soviet
relationship
• Soviets started to restrict the flow of scientific
and technological information to China
• 1959 - Nikita Khrushchev decided to stop
helping the Chinese with their nuclear program
• Soviets withdrew all of their personnel from
China by August 1960.
• the Soviets and the Chinese began to have
disputes openly in international forums.
• 1969 with the Sino-Soviet border conflict
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• Mao in waging class struggle
• Mao’s visit to Moscow in November 1957
• Recognizing Soviet leadership but uttering strong
anti-imperialist rhetoric than the Soviets
Great Leap Forward
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• Soviet aid for 1958 did not meet Chinese
expectations
• Features of the Great Leap Forward:
• Ideological, experimentation, mass mobilization,
to accomplish technologically impossible goals
• Ignore or despise expertise
• (steel, coal, cotton, and grain; backyard steel
furnaces; fly, mosquito, rat, and sparrow)
Great Leap Forward Great Leap Forward
• Mao announced the goal of surpassing the steel
production output of Great Britain by 1968
• Rather than build steel mills, small "backyard
furnaces" would be used.
• People’s communes – large, centralized
organizations in rural areas
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Great Leap Forward
• 1950's - Mao's social and cultural programs,
including collectivization
• Mao declared that despite some faults, Stalin
had basically been a good, well-meaning Marxist
• Soviets were not treating China as an equal
partner
• Mao broke off the Soviet model and announced a
new economic program
• In 1958, rapidly raising industrial and
agricultural production
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Great Leap Forward
• The results =disaster
• Normal market mechanisms were disrupted
• Agricultural production fell behind
• Distributing food and resources
• Rapid depletion due to poor planning
• Starvation appeared even in fertile agricultural
areas
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Great Leap Forward
• Widespread famine – 20-40 million deaths
• The steel produced in backyard furnaces at low
temperatures proved to be useless
• unusual weather patterns and natural disasters
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Criticism of Great Leap
Forward
• Defense Minister Peng Dehuai - orthodox Sovietstyle
economic planning
• He accused Mao of being responsible for this
disaster
• Peng then lived retired in disgrace
• Peng was arrested by Red Guards during the
Cultural Revolution
• Peng died 1974, after Mao's Death he was
posthumously rehabilitated with full honors
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