MVZ-207
Chinese Foreign Policy since
1949
Mgr. Jan Polišenský
Spring 2011
Week 12: People's Liberation Army
Army around the world
State Active Reserve Paramilitary
PRC 2285000 800000 1500000
USA 1580255 864547 11035
India 1325000 2142821 1300586
DPRKorea 1106000 8200000 189000
Russia 1027000 20000000 449000
State Total
PRC 4585000
USA 2455837
India 4768407
DPRKorea 9495000
Russia 21476000
Troops per Capita
Total per Activeper
1000 Capita 1000Capita
PRC 3,4 1,7
USA 7,9 5,1
India 4,1 1,1
DPRKorea 418,9 48,8
Russia 153,4 7,3
Troops in Population
Total Population Troops %
PRC 4585 000 1337724852 0,34
USA 2455 837 311373000 0,79
India 4768 407 1210933422 0,39
DPRKorea 9495 000 24346000 39,00
Russia 21476 000 142905200 15,03
Defence Budget
USA 687,105,000,000 4.70
India 34,816,000,000 2.80
DPR Korea N/A N/A
Russia 52,586,000,000 4.30
State Troops Total $ per troop
PRC 4,585,000 24,929.117
USA 2,455,837 279,784.448
India 4,768,407 7,301.390
DPR Korea 9,495,000 N/A
Russia 21,476,000 2,448.594
The size of the PLA (611=6.11 million)
Percentage of Defense budget in
overall government budget
Comparison ????
• Problems of relevant sources
• Problems of the items in the budgets
• Secret funding
• Space program
• Veterans aid/care
• Extra funding
• Procurement
• Research
Military strategies
1. People’s War (1935–79)
2. People’s War Under Modern Conditions (1979–85)
3. Limited War (1985–91)
4. Limited War Under High Technology Conditions (1991
to the present)
People’s War
• Protracted people's war invented by Mao Zedong
• Maintain the support of the population
• Draw enemy deep into the interior where the population
will fight in guerrilla warfare
• in order to overcome the enemy’s technological
superiority by playing to the strengths of geography and
the civilian population
• (ambushes, sabotage, raids surprise attacks, has
mobility which uses against less-mobile army)
1. revolutionary war starts in difficult terrain
2. gains support from countryside
3. movement has enough strength to capture small cities,
then larger cities
People’s War Under Modern
Conditions
• Active Defence
• Forward defence to prevent attack on Chinese cities
and industrial cities
• Emphasized operations using combined-arms tactics
• Reforms in educating and training
• One of Deng’s more important doctrinal revisions was
the increased emphasis on weaponry and technology
instead of the human factor in war
Limited War
• Deng argued that with the U.S. defense buildup during
the Reagan administration, superpowers was essentially
in equilibrium, and that neither was likely to start a
world war.
• December 1985, Deng Xiaoping told them what to
expect: future conflicts were likely to be localized yet
intensive.
• Deng also argued that China’s military base could only
be modernized gradually, with the overall development of
the economy and a strong defense scientific and
technological establishment.
• Chinese defence analysts characterized local or limited
wars as conflicts that were geographically localized, did
not spread to regional or global proportions, and usually
involved only two combatants.
• Use of air power was minimal.
Limited War Under High
Technology Conditions
• Yugoslav War
• Air superiority
• High technology
• Information dominance
• Air strikes
• In-flight refuelling
• Smaller Army but better equiped
Modernization of army
• There are multiple drivers of China’s military
modernization. The PLA, along with the People’s Armed
Police and the People’s Militia, helps maintain domestic
stability and ensure regime security.
• Modernization is expected to enhance China’s
international prestige.
• The PLA is acquiring military capabilities designed to
defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial interests and
to pose a credible threat to Taiwan
PLA Modernization in political
context – Domestic Goals
• Ensuring a smooth political succession;
• Nonperforming loans and a potential banking crisis
• Curbing rising unemployment
• The primary domestic goals of China’s leaders are
maintaining the rule and survival of the Chinese
Communist Party, promoting economic development,
ensuring national unity, and preventing domestic
unrest.
PLA Modernization in political
context – External goals
• Gain respect and influence within the established
institutions of the international system
• China’s full integration into the global economy; and
the promotion of a peaceful regional and international
environment supportive of domestic economic growth.
• Gain regional power
• Regional security
• Secure natural resources,
PLA Modernization
• The elements of PLA modernization fit loosely into three
categories:
1.The development, procurement, acquisition, and
fielding of new weapon technologies
2.The development of new operational concepts and joint
war-fighting doctrines for weapons deployment and
“employment” (i.e., the use of these new weapons);
3.An array of institutional reforms necessary to
underwrite the first two categories
Personnel
• PLA has substantially reduced its size, and its
personnel system has undergone major reforms.
• Downsizing the army, deactivating some units with outdated
equipment and shifting some to the People’s
Armed Police, restructuring the naval and air units,
and dismantling and merging internal organs of units
PLA Ground Forces
• Reforms have created smaller, more flexible ground
forces, all better motivated, trained, and equipped.
These forces will be cantered in rapid-reaction units
possessing limited, yet increasing, airborne-drop and
amphibious power-projection capabilities.
• Downsizing and restructuring are designed to create a
standardized combined-arms force that has
• more modern weapons and equipment, greater mobility
and firepower, and, most important, a higher state of
readiness.
PLA Ground Forces
• PLA ground forces are primarily armed with equipment
from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Chinese defense
industries still suffer from serious shortcomings in
research and development
• (R&D) as well as manufacturing technology, and
overseas arms
• purchases primarily supply the air force, navy, and the
Second Artillery.
PLA NAVY
• In the mid-1980s, the PLAN abandoned its “coastal
defense” strategy and adopted an “offshore defense”
one.
• In Chinese articulations of this strategy, “offshore” is
variously defined as 150–600 nautical miles.
• NAVY - Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines,
Nuclear-powered attack submarines, Conventionally
powered attack submarines, Surface ships
• The PLAN accounts for approximately one-third of total
PLA expenses but makes up only 11 percent of total
manpower. The PLAN accounts for approximately onethird
of total PLA expenses but makes up only 11
percent of total manpower.
PLA NAVY
• China’s most advanced destroyer is the Russian
Sovremenny class destroyer. The Sovremenny,
specifically designed to counter U.S. Aegis-class
destroyers.
• The PLAN is limited by a lack of integration in its
command, control, and communication systems;
targeting; air defense; and antisubmarine warfare
capabilities. PLAN ships are vulnerable to attack by
aircraft, torpedoes, and antiship missiles
• Aircraft carrier
PLA Air Force
• PLAAF – 100+ fourth generation fighters (SU-27, and
SU-30)
• SU-27 comparison to F-15C
• SU-27 and gives the PLAAF for the first time the
• capability to fly missions far from the coastline.
• The PLAAF has had difficulty integrating the new
fourth-generation aircraft
• The PLAAF has difficulty with joint operations
• Stealth airplane, refuelling, long distance bombers,
reconnaissance aircraft, UAV
PLA Air Force
• In the past, the mission of the People’s Liberation Army
Air Force was primarily limited to defending China’s
borders against invasion, largely by air-to-air
interception
• PLAAF leaders are now seeking to build a more versatile
and modern air force, with longer-range
interceptor/strike aircraft, improved electronic warfare
and air defense, extended and close air support, and
longer-range transport, lift, and midair refueling; a
joint-service
Second Artillery: Nuclear and
Conventional Missile Forces
• The best estimates based on a range of official and open
sources place China’s current nuclear weapons arsenal
at about 410–440 weapons.
• These weapons fall roughly into three categories.
1.About 140 are warheads deployed with China’s
medium- and long-range land and sea-based missile
forces.
2.About the same number (approximately 150) are
designated for use with China’s nuclear-capable
aircraft.
3.Another third of China’s nuclear weapons (about 120–
150) may be for low-yield tactical bombardment,
artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions, and
possibly short-range missiles such as the DF-15 and
DF-11.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9A9e1hlv1ro
The End :)