

MVZ-207 Chinese Foreign Policy since 1949

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Spring 2011**

**Week 8: Commitment to Peaceful
Development (1999 - 2009)**

1995-96 – Taiwan Strait

- 1994 – Lee Tenghui – Honolulu – Visa problem
- 1995 – Lee Visits, Cornell University - “Taiwan’s Democratization Experience” missile tests - conducted by China
- send a strong signal to Taiwan (Lee Teng-hui) due to more independent rhetorics
- 1996 tests – before the presidential elections in Taiwan
- 1996 - US response- President Clinton ordered USS Nimitz into the Taiwan Strait

Accession to WTO

- Asian financial crisis, 1997-98
- China resisted devaluation of *renminbi*
- Zhu Rongji’s US visit, April 1999, failed to reach WTO agreement
- Domestic opposition to his visit
- US-China accord reached in November 1999
- Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) solved in May 2000

Hong Kong 1997

- The Sino-British Joint Declaration - 19 December 1984 in Beijing
- basic policies regarding Hong Kong
- One Country, Two Systems
- Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
- Basic policies shall be stipulated in the Hong Kong Basic Law
- Capitalistic system unchanged for a 50 years

Embassy bombing in Belgrade- May 8, 1999

- The diplomatic background
- Lee Wen-ho - a “spy case”; the Cox Report
- Regarding Yugoslavia under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević as the last “red stronghold” in Eastern Europe in resisting Western pressure
- China and Russia (concerned about Chechnya) opposed any political solution without Yugoslavia’s agreement
- NATO air bombing in March 1999 condemned

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

- Domestic background
- Zhu Rongji’s trip to the US was controversial without progress on WTO
- Falungong demonstrated on April 25, causing apprehensions and later on leading to a serious crackdown
- NATO intervention reminded China of the vulnerabilities in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang

Embassy bombing



Crisis on May 8

- Two US B-2 bombers, 3 deaths and over 20 Chinese injured
- Afternoon of 8th, strongest protest by Beijing
- Massive demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere, officially permitted to protect the students' patriotic passions
- Clamors to boycott American products
- Popular resentment and indignation turned inward

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

- Diplomatic interaction
- US initial response: "mistake" and "regret" expressed by working level officials like James Sasser, Kenneth Lieberthal and Susan Shirk
- May 9 morning (Beijing time), Madeleine Albright formally apologized, followed by Bill Clinton to describe the event as a "tragic mistake"
- Chinese responses were also delayed, adding to US misunderstanding that China wanted to send a hostile signal

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

- Inadequate communication
- Jiang refused to answer any phone call from Clinton until May 14
- China suspended high level military contacts and talks on nonproliferation and human rights
- US explanations not facilitated until mid-June, and China did not accept them
- \$4.5 million for the deaths and \$28 million to compensate for the damage of Chinese embassy in Belgrade; 2.8 million Chinese payment for the damage of US facilities

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

Vice President Hu Jintao made a broadcast TV speech on the evening of May 10, 60 hours after the bombing

(In addition to harsh criticism of NATO action and approval of strong patriotism) Hu guarded against overreactions

Discussions among analysts and scholars about "peace and development as the main theme" and US policy toward China; "conspiracy theory" was prevalent

Public opinions showed the "victim mentality" and demand for a harsher policy toward the US

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

- Aftermath
- Most Chinese still believe today that the Belgrade bombing was an intentional act
- Conspiracy theories more popular
- US military's hostility
- Many of the practices repeated themselves in the EP-3 incident

Embassy bombing in Belgrade-May 8, 1999

- Bombing Directed By CIA (the only one mission)
- NATO – had no authority
- flying directly out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri
- CIA described the target as a warehouse for a Yugoslav government agency suspected of arms proliferation activities.
- Chinese Embassy = new address (three years)
- Chinese Embassy and the radio transmitters
- By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually improve

2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship

- Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation
- Cooperation Arms sells
- Establishing Defence pact
- Energy security

Article 9 of the Treaty

When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.

The EP-3 Incident – April 1, 2001


- G.W. Bush, who had called for a high-handed approach
- Missile defense system and upgraded US military presence in Western Pacific
- Qian Qichen's successful visit to the US in late March, meeting Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, and Congressional leaders, regaining Chinese confidence
- Already mutual dissatisfactions over US surveillance activities with China in the previous months before the crash.

The EP-3 Incident

- Beijing complained about more frequent US flights close to its territory, while Washington focused on the technical level, stressing the distance between Chinese monitoring planes and US craft was too close to ensure aerial safety
- The memories of Belgrade bombing was still fresh with China as the victim
- The EP-3 reconnaissance plane collided with the F-8 fighter 104km southeast of Hainan, Sunday, April 1, 2001 (no April Fools' Day, but China's Arbor Day)
- Chinese pilot was ejected but disappeared, and the seriously damaged EP-3 made a forced landing in Lingshui

The EP-3 Incident

- Chinese leaders planting trees, and Powell wanted to call them and find out about the crew; US Pacific Command issued a statement on the website, and China had to respond publicly; MFA coordinated
- Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong protested and stated the US plane caused the crash by making a sudden turn and the US should take all the responsibilities; Amb. Joseph Prueher disagreed and requested a meeting with the crew
- Bush and Jiang statements – who should be held responsible and apologize? Bush's attitude hardened in a second statement



The EP-3 Incident

- Propaganda Department issued internal guidelines on media coverage
- Difference views of the incident:
- Chinese fighter too close, lost control?
- Was the surveillance flights legitimate?
- PC-3 landing an infringement on Chinese sovereignty or an emergency action?
- China wanted investigation but the US asked for releasing the crew first, who otherwise would be seen as hostages

The EP-3 Incident

- Return of the crew
- FM Tang Jiaxuan and Amb. Yang Jiechi: the US must apologize before the crew members were sent home
- On April 4, Colin Powell expressed “regret,”
- Bush did so on April 5 and used “sorrow;” Jiang requested “apology,” and US drafts said “sorry” and “very sorry;” Prueher said “very sorry” for the loss of the pilot.

The EP-3 Incident

- *People’s Daily* article entitled “Channeling Patriotism to Nation-Building Efforts” declared success
- April 12, 2 days before Easter, crew headed back home (but who paid the costs of their stay?)
- Domestic pressures and nationalistic emotions on both sides continued
- Both governments were cautious later and made compromises (“sorry” and the question of “responsibility,” MFA vs. State Department)

The return of EP-3

- Jiang was visiting Latin America, Hu Jintao in charge in Beijing
- Bush got tougher after the crew came back; Powell and Rumsfeld claimed that “sorry” did not mean an apology
- Beijing got upset and working level negotiations beginning on April 17 came to a deadlock; Pentagon involved
- America resumed spy flights, China continued to tail them

The return of EP-3

- China did not allow EP-3 to fly back after repair; Instead, the two agreed to disassemble it and ship it back aboard a commercial cargo (Russian An-124)
- EP-3 parts shipped back by July 3
- Restoration of normal relations
- Jiang-Bush phone talks on July 5, Powell visit to China on July 28-29
- But China refused to accept the payment



Consequences of the EP-3 crisis

- Military contacts suspended until 2003
- Mutual suspicions and negative images at popular levels (enemy image would be invoked again)
- New US Arms deals with Taiwan
- Chinese Review of US relations in summer 2001

Lessons to learn

- Negative aspects: lack of accurate information in the initial stage
- Initial response was sluggish
- Media was inflammatory
- Positive aspects: public demonstrations were not permitted (as compared to May 1999)
- Policy coordination was improved under the top leadership, principles clarified, and the official management consistent

Chinese Response to the September 11


- Top leadership immediately expressed sympathy, and Bush came to Shanghai in October for APEC
- Quiet cooperation and friction with the US in counter-terrorism
- Public reactions were contradictory
- Reservations and multilateral consultations about a war against Saddam Hussein

China and Terrorism

- CCP's 16th Party Congress, November 2002, reaffirmed moderate foreign policy and elected Hu Jintao as Party leader and Jiang Zemin retained the position as chairman of the Military Commission
- The nine-member Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group

Relations with US/EU

- Is China going to be a “responsible stakeholder”?
- President Hu's STATE VISIT to the United States: one visit, two different definitions
- Addressing the issues of *Renminbi* evaluation, trade friction, product safety, intellectual property rights, and financial stability
- Chinese missile destroyed a satellite
- China's participation in G8
- China-US relations now better than China-EU relations?



Chinese relations with Japan

- Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine where the Japanese Class-A criminals of World War II are remembered
- Alleged harassments of Japanese citizens in China
- The East China Sea disputes
- Japanese connections and sympathies with Taiwan and Lee Teng-hui in particular
- Japanese bid for a permanent membership in the UN Security Council was resented

Chinese relations with Japan

- Anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 2005 were sparked off by a number of issues, including the approval of a Japanese history textbook and the proposal that Japan be granted a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
- Across China businesses with connections to Japan were vandalized by protesters
- Several Japanese nationals residing in China reported being injured, though there were no fatalities.



Chinese relations with Japan

- Strained relations improved after Shinzo Abe became prime minister and visited China in October 2006
- Yasuo Fukuda succeeded Abe in September 2007 and visited China in December
- Premier Wen and President Hu visited Japan in April 2007 and May 2008 respectively
- A relationship of “strategic mutual benefit”
- Complicated issues like food safety and environmental protection


China and the third World

- BRICs, China and India, and VISTA, with their fast growing economies
- Market access to and investment in the developing countries
- Oil supplies and other natural resources
- Seeking political support
- UN peacekeeping operations
- Non-interference and friendly advice
- Security concerns - from Turkey to Pakistan
- Chinese engagement in Africa
- Gulf of Aden



From SARS in 2003 to the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008

- non-traditional challenges increased
- SARS
- Water pollution in Songhuajiang River, 2005
- Winter storms in South China, 2007-08
- Wenchuan earthquake
- Implications for foreign affairs



The tragedy in Urumqi on July 5, 2009

- The tragedy in Urumqi (capital city of Xinjiang) on July 5, 2009, and its implications for foreign relations
- Hu Jintao cut short his trip in Europe and skipped the G-8 meeting due to the situations in Xinjiang
The government will "firmly crack down on serious crimes including assaults, vandalism, looting and arson" to maintain social stability in Xinjiang