1
MVZ-207
Chinese Foreign Policy
since 1949
Mgr. Jan Polišenský
Spring 2011
Week 8: Commitment to Peaceful
Development (1999 – 2009)
1995-96 – Taiwan Strait
• 1994 – Lee Tenghui – Honolulu – Visa problem
• 1995 – Lee Visits, Cornell University - “Taiwan's
Democratization Experience” missile tests conducted
by China
• send a strong signal to Taiwan (Lee Teng-hui) due
to more independent rhetorics
• 1996 tests – before the presidential elections in
Taiwan
• 1996 - US response- President Clinton ordered
USS Nimitz into the Taiwan Strait
Accession to WTO
• Asian financial crisis, 1997-98
• China resisted devaluation of renminbi
• Zhu Rongji’s US visit, April 1999, failed to reach
WTO agreement
• Domestic opposition to his visit
• US-China accord reached in November 1999
• Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) solved
in May 2000
Hong Kong 1997
• The Sino-British Joint Declaration - 19
December 1984 in Beijing
• basic policies regarding Hong Kong
• One Country, Two Systems
• Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR)
• Basic policies shall be stipulated in the Hong
Kong Basic Law
• Capitalistic system unchanged for a 50 years
Embassy bombing in BelgradeMay
8, 1999
• The diplomatic background
• Lee Wen-ho - a “spy case”; the Cox Report
• Regarding Yugoslavia under the leadership of
Slobodan Milošević as the last “red stronghold” in
Eastern Europe in resisting Western pressure
• China and Russia (concerned about Chechnya)
opposed any political solution without
Yugoslavia’s agreement
• NATO air bombing in March 1999 condemned
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
• Domestic background
• Zhu Rongji’s trip to the US was controversial
without progress on WTO
• Falungong demonstrated on April 25, causing
apprehensions and later on leading to a serious
crackdown
• NATO intervention reminded China of the
vulnerabilities in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang
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Embassy bombing
Crisis on May 8
• Two US B-2 bombers, 3 deaths and over 20
Chinese injured
• Afternoon of 8th, strongest protest by Beijing
• Massive demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere,
officially permitted to protect the students’
patriotic passions
• Clamors to boycott American products
• Popular resentment and indignation turned
inward
• Diplomatic interaction
US initial response: “mistake” and “regret”
expressed by working level officials like James
Sasser, Kenneth Lieberthal and Susan Shirk
May 9 morning (Beijing time), Madeleine Albright
formally apologized, followed by Bill Clinton to
describe the event as a “tragic mistake”
Chinese responses were also delayed, adding to US
misunderstanding that China wanted to send a
hostile signal
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
• Inadequate communication
• Jiang refused to answer any phone call from
Clinton until May 14
• China suspended high level military contacts and
talks on nonproliferation and human rights
• US explanations not facilitated until mid-June,
and China did not accept them
• $4.5 million for the deaths and $28 million to
compensate for the damage of Chinese embassy
in Belgrade; 2.8 million Chinese payment for the
damage of US facilities
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
Vice President Hu Jintao made a broadcast TV
speech on the evening of May 10, 60 hours after
the bombing
(In addition to harsh criticism of NATO action and
approval of strong patriotism) Hu guarded
against overreactions
Discussions among analysts and scholars about
“peace and development as the main theme” and
US policy toward China; “conspiracy theory” was
prevalent
Public opinions showed the “victim mentality” and
demand for a harsher policy toward the US
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
• Aftermath
• Most Chinese still believe today that the Belgrade
bombing was an intentional act
• Conspiracy theories more popular
• US military’s hostility
• Many of the practices repeated themselves in the
EP-3 incident
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
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• Bombing Directed By CIA (the only one mission)
• NATO – had no authority
• flying directly out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri
• CIA described the target as a warehouse for a
Yugoslav government agency suspected of arms
proliferation activities.
• Chinese Embassy = new address (three years)
• Chinese Embassy and the radio transmitters
• By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually
improve
Embassy bombing in
Belgrade-May 8, 1999
2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of
Friendship
• Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly
Cooperation Between the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation
• Cooperation Arms sells
• Establishing Defence pact
• Energy security
Article 9 of the Treaty
When a situation arises in which one of the
contracting parties deems that peace is being
threatened and undermined or its security interests
are involved or when it is confronted with the threat
of aggression, the contracting parties shall
immediately hold contacts and consultations in
order to eliminate such threats.
The EP-3 Incident – April 1, 2001
• G.W. Bush, who had called for a high-handed
approach
• Missile defense system and upgraded US military
presence in Western Pacific
• Qian Qichen’s successful visit to the US in late
March, meeting Bush, Cheney, Powel, Rumsfeld,
Rice, and Congressional leaders, regaining
Chinese confidence
• Already mutual dissatisfactions over US
surveillance activities with China in the previous
months before the crash.
• Beijing complained about more frequent US
flights close to it territory, while Washington
focused on the technical level, stressing the
distance between Chinese monitoring planes and
US craft was too close to ensure aerial safety
• The memories of Belgrade bombing was still
fresh with China as the victim
• The EP-3 reconnaissance plane collided with the
F-8 fighter 104km southeast to Hainan, Sunday,
April 1, 2001 (no April Fools’ Day, but China’s
Arbor Day)
• Chinese pilot was ejected but disappeared, and
the seriously damaged EP-3 made a forced
landing in Lingshui
The EP-3 Incident
• Chinese leaders planting trees, and Powell wanted
to call them and find out about the crew; US
Pacific Command issued a statement on the
website, and China had to respond publicly; MFA
coordinated
• Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong
protested and stated the US plane caused the
crash by making a sudden turn and the US should
take all the responsibilities; Amb. Joseph Prueher
disagreed and requested a meeting with the crew
• Bush and Jiang statements – who should be held
responsible and apologize? Bush’s attitude
hardened in a second statement
The EP-3 Incident
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• Propaganda Department issued internal
guidelines on media coverage
• Difference views of the incident:
• Chinese fighter too close, lost control?
• Was the surveillance flights legitimate?
• PC-3 landing an infringement on Chinese
sovereignty or an emergency action?
• China wanted investigation but the US asked
for releasing the crew first, who otherwise
would be seen as hostages
The EP-3 Incident
• Return of the crew
• FM Tang Jiaxuan and Amb. Yang Jiechi: the US
must apologize before the crew members were
sent home
• On April 4, Colin Powell expressed “regret,”
• Bush did so on April 5 and used “sorrow;” Jiang
requested “apology,” and US drafts said “sorry”
and “very sorry;” Prueher said “very sorry” for the
loss of the pilot.
The EP-3 Incident
• People’s Daily article entitled “Channeling
Patriotism to Nation-Building Efforts” declared
success
• April 12, 2 days before Easter, crew headed back
home (but who paid the costs of their stay?)
• Domestic pressures and nationalistic emotions
on both sides continued
• Both governments were cautious later and made
compromises (“sorry” and the question of
“responsibility,” MFA vs. State Department)
The EP-3 Incident The return of EP-3
• Jiang was visiting Latin America, Hu Jintao in
charge in Beijing
• Bush got tougher after the crew came back;
Powell and Rumsfeld claimed that “sorry” did not
mean an apology
• Beijing got upset and working level negotiations
beginning on April 17 came to a deadlock;
Pentagon involved
• America resumed spy flights, China continued to
tail them
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The return of EP-3
• China did not allow EP-3 to fly back after repair;
Instead, the two agreed to disassemble it and ship
it back aboard a commercial cargo (Russian An-
124)
• EP-3 parts shipped back by July 3
• Restoration of normal relations
• Jiang-Bush phone talks on July 5, Powell visit to
China on July 28-29
• But China refused to accept the payment
Consequences of the EP-3
crisis
• Military contacts suspended until 2003
• Mutual suspicions and negative images at popular
levels (enemy image would be invoked again)
• New US Arms deals with Taiwan
• Chinese Review of US relations in summer 2001
Lessons to learn
• Negative aspects: lack of accurate information in
the initial stage
• Initial response was sluggish
• Media was inflammatory
• Positive aspects: public demonstrations were not
permitted (as compared to May 1999)
• Policy coordination was improved under the top
leadership, principles clarified, and the official
management consistent
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Chinese Response to the
September 11
• Top leadership immediately expressed sympathy,
and Bush came to Shanghai in October for APEC
• Quiet cooperation and friction with the US in
counter-terrorism
• Public reactions were contradictory
• Reservations and multilateral consultations
about a war against Saddam Hussein
China and Terrorism
• CCP’s 16th Party Congress, November 2002,
reaffirmed moderate foreign policy and elected Hu
Jintao as Party leader and Jiang Zemin retained
the position as chairman of the Military
Commission
• The nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
and the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group
Relations with US/EU
• Is China going to be a “responsible stakeholder”?
• President Hu’s STATE VISIT to the United States:
one visit, two different definitions
• Addressing the issues of Renminbi evaluation,
trade friction, product safety, intellectual property
rights, and financial stability
• Chinese missile destroyed a satellite
• China’s participation in G8
• China-US relations now better than China-EU
relations?
Chinese relations with
Japan
• Prime Minister Junichiro Koisumi repeatedly
visited the Yasukuni Shrine where the Japanese
Class-A criminals of World War II are remembered
• Alleged harassments of Japanese citizens in China
• The East China Sea disputes
• Japanese connections and sympathies with
Taiwan and Lee Teng-hui in particular
• Japanese bid for a permanent membership in the
UN Security Council was resented
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• Anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of
2005 were sparked off by a number of issues,
including the approval of a Japanese history
textbook and the proposal that Japan be
granted a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council.
• Across China businesses with connections to
Japan were vandalized by protesters
• Several Japanese nationals residing in China
reported being injured, though there were no
fatalities.
Chinese relations with
Japan
• Strained relations improved after Shinzo Abe
became prime minister and visited China in
October 2006
• Yasuo Fukuda succeeded Abe in September 2007
and visited China in December
• Premier Wen and President Hu visited Japan in
April 2007 and May 2008 respectively
• A relationship of “strategic mutual benefit”
• Complicated issues like food safety and
environmental protection
Chinese relations with
Japan
China and the third World
• BRICs, China and India, and VISTA, with their
fast growing economies
• Market access to and investment in the
developing countries
• Oil supplies and other natural resources
• Seeking political support
• UN peacekeeping operations
• Non-interference and friendly advice
• Security concerns - from Turkey to Pakistan
• Chinese engagement in Africa
• Gulf of Aden
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From SARS in 2003 to the
earthquake in Sichuan in
2008
• non-traditional challenges increased
• SARS
• Water pollution in Songhuajiang River, 2005
• Winter storms in South China, 2007-08
• Wenchuan earthquake
• Implications for foreign affairs
The tragedy in Urumqi on
July 5, 2009
• The tragedy in Urumqi (capital city of Xinjiang) on
July 5, 2009, and its implications for foreign
relations
• Hu Jintao cut short his trip in Europe and
skipped the G-8 meeting due to the situations in
Xinjiang
The government will "firmly crack down on serious
crimes including assaults, vandalism, looting and
arson" to maintain social stability in Xinjiang