Conflict resolution in South Cuacasus

Mgr. Zinaida Shevchuk 9.3.2011

Ethnic conflict – resolution

- Asymmetric relation,
- Uncontrolled armed groups,
- Extinction of one ethnic group to be overwhelmed by another ethnic group.
- No straightforward answer to the question of how to resolve ethnic conflicts.

Two main issues



- Troop withdrawal from the seven occupied disticts of Azerbaijan.
- Nagorno-Karabakh status.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- The so-called 'primordial' Armenian-Azerbaijani enmity, is a reflection of two overlapping security dilemmas and historic sense of insecurity of Armenians and Azeris toward Turks and Russians respectively, and so should be examined in the larger regional context.
- A crucial deficiency of all peace initiatives until now has been their inability to address this underlying security concerns.

Minsk group

- Since 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been the primary forum for mediation efforts - Minsk Group.
- A co-chairmanship system
- developed in 1994 was revised in 1997 to include France, Russia and the U.S., whose representatives work together, facilitating the negotiations, drafting discussion documents and conducting shuttle diplomacy.



Nagorno-Karabakh

- Within the context of OSCE, each side is able to point to a principle enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act to underscore its position:
- Azerbaijan points to Principle IV, guaranteeing each member's territorial integrity,
- Armenians of Karabakh point to Principle VIII, proclaiming the right to self-determination.
- Even the framework for negotiating highly problematic.
 Azerbaijan refused to deal with Nagorno-Karabakh as a full party to any talks, demanding instead to negotiate only with Armenia directly.
- Armenia has insisted it had nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh's struggle for independence and that the latter should have a place at the negotiating table.
- "Two plus one" strategy of negotiations, with the Karabakh Armenians present but not an official party to the talks.

Nagorno-Karabakh

 The Armenians will not discuss the withdrawal of their troops from Azeri territories until Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as independent; Azerbaijan insists on its complete territorial integrity and demands the withdrawal of Armenian troops before it will discuss any other matters, including the eventual status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Package or step by step solution?

- Kocharian, as President of Armenia, has strongly favoured a package solution because it would mean the withdrawal of troops from Azerbaijanioccupied territories would only begin after a guarantee had been secured that Nagorno-Karabakh would never be subordinated to Baku.
- When Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003, he categorically rejected the package approach, saying that confidence building would be needed after an Armenian withdrawal and before Nagorno-Karabakh's status could be determined.

Neither war nor peace


 "Despite our endless talk about all these factors, diplomatic, economic and other political achievements, the issue remains unsettled. What should Azerbaijan do in this situation? Azerbaijan has conducted and expressed its peaceful policy for many years, but the issue remains unsettled. For this reason, it is natural that we are increasing our military potential", President Ilham Aliyev, 2005.

Sochi talks



- Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serge Sargisyan agreed in Sochi summit over the following concrete agreements:
- to conclude in the shortest possible period of time the exchange of prisoners of war,
- to strive to solve all contentious issues through peaceful means and
- to investigate possible incidents along the ceasefire line with the participation of the parties under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and with the assistance of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

- Political status of Abkhazia
- the return of IDPs.



- Insufficient acknowledgemnt of interdependence
- Failure to recognize and act upon the opponent s underlying position and
- The absecence of an emergent political formula.

- The first round of negotiations took place on 1 and 2
 December 1993 in Geneva. The parties assumed obligations not to use force, to exchange prisoners and repatriate refugees.
- During the second round, January 1994, the parties agreed to establish a demilitarised zone along the frontline and deploy UN peacekeeping troops to the area.
- However, during the third round Geneva, February 1994, differences emerged that remain unresolved until today.
 In July 1997 when Vladislav Ardzinba visited Tbilisi.
 However, no binding decisions were taken at the time.




- Mikheil Saakashvili
- 2006 peace plan for Abkhazia.



- Sergei Bagapsh
- Peace plan

South Ossetia

- A Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries ostensibly promoted a settlement of the conflict, with the OSCE as facilitator.
- Totally around 1,100 troops, including about 530 Russians, a 300-member North Ossetian brigade (which was actually composed of South Ossetians and headed by a North Ossetian), and about 300 Georgians.



South Ossetia




- In July 2005, President Saakashvili announced a new peace plan for South Ossetia that offered substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement.
- South Ossetian "president" Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan.

Six-Point Ceasefire Plan

- 1. Not to resort to force;
- 2. To end hostilities definitively;
- 3. To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
- 4. Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
- 5. Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures;
- 6. Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

South Ossetia

- In March 2007, President Saakashvili proposed another peace plan for South Ossetia that involved creating "transitional" administrative districts throughout the region.
- In July 2007, President Saakashvili decreed the establishment of a commission to work out South Ossetia's "status" as a part of Georgia.
- The JCC finally held a meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, in October 2007, but the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the Georgian emissaries made unacceptable demands in order to deliberately sabotage the results of the meeting. No further meetings were held.



Russian forces in Goergia





 In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) called for the establishment of a mediation forum aimed at security and stability in the South Caucasus. The initiative goes back to the "Six-Point Ceasefire Plan" reached by French (and then EU) President Nikolas Sarkozy and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, which brought to an end themilitary confrontation between Moscow and Tbilisi.





- Initially Georgia urged the forum to include also the replacement of Russian military forces with international peacekeepers, EU monitoring within the separatist entities (i.e. an extension of EUMM); and the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.
- By contrast, Russia insisted on modifyingthe mandates of the OSCE and UN missions in the region. The parties failed to reach an agreement and the OSCE as well as the UN were forced to leave.

