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DOI: 10.1177/0047117806066710
2006 20: 328International Relations
Mark Imber
The Reform of the UN Security Council
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328 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20(3)
The Reform of the UN Security Council
Mark Imber, University of St Andrews, UK
Abstract
This article focuses on the United Nations’ reform debates, particularly those surrounding
changes to the Security Council. These debates are largely about rules, both formal and
informal, that shape the roles of the veto powers and the ways in which other memberstates
can attain a seat on the Council. In order to implement the largely rule-governed
system of collective security, it is necessary to have a Security Council that reflects a
legitimate structure of authority. As the current debate demonstrates, however, the rules
governing the powers of the Security Council raise numerous questions of legitimacy and
authority, questions that are at the heart of a rule-governed order.
Keywords: institutions, Security Council reform, United Nations
The rules that determine membership of the United Nations Security Council,
(UNSC) were originally determined in 1945 and have not changed since 1965.
Despite numerous challenges to its relevance and competence, the Council retains
an extraordinary capacity to dramatize and polarize attitudes to those rules on the
use of force which govern our expectations of state behaviour. Although certain
major powers may act without its support, all seek to justify their behaviour by reference
to some superior rule, or interpretation of other UN Charter rules, such as
claims to be acting in self-defence.
This article will discuss some of the contemporary debates about reform of the
Security Council which came to dominate the September 2005 World Summit.
Five permanent members with veto powers sit with ten other member-states which
are elected by a regional formula for a two-year term.1
These arrangements have
been subject to demands for change for many years. They were given renewed
focus by the 2003 disputes in the Council over Iraq. During 2005 Secretary General
Annan insisted on including debate on the membership issue in preparations for the
September World Summit, originally called to debate the Millennium Development
Goals.2
Some critics focused on the regional imbalances which historically advantage
North over South. Others focused upon the exclusion from permanent member
status of several leading regional powers. More radically, some have sought to limit
the concept of veto powers as inappropriate in a post-Cold War era. Opponents of reform
cited the pre-eminent need for effective decision-making over representative
principles.3
Why should this matter? Most obviously because the Council is charged by the
UN’s 191 members with ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility
International Relations Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 20(3):328–334
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REFORM OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 329
the Council acts on their behalf’.4
These rules therefore confer effective decisionmaking
power on a small minority of the member-states, partly elected and partly
self-selected. The Charter reinforces the point by requiring that the members ‘agree
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter’.5
The importance of these rules of selection is fundamental to legitimating the
idea that the use of force between states might be subject to rules. This is after all
one of the most enduring, and perhaps endearing, projects of the liberal view of
international relations. There is a domestic analogy to the rule of law. Wilsonian
principles of collective security attempt to create, for all states, an expectation that
the sovereignty and independence of each is essential to the security of the whole.
Collective security seeks to overcome the individual insecurity of states by replicating
at the international level a version of domestic ‘freedom under the law’. The
Concert of Europe of the period 1815–1914 attempted to manage potential conflict
by elaborate consultation between the plurality of major powers during the long
peace between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. Wars still occurred
between the European powers, such as the Crimean War of 1854 and the FrancoPrussian
War of 1871, but these were not general or systemic wars in the manner of
the eighteenth or twentieth centuries.6
The twentieth century saw two formal institutional
attempts to regulate war by law, and to deter aggressive behaviour through
commitment to the doctrine of collective security: the League of Nations, which
operated between 1919 and 1946, and the United Nations created in 1945.
The failures of the League are well known. The governing League Council included
two revisionist powers, Japan and Italy, victors in 1919 but still unsatisfied
in their claims. Britain and France, two status-quo powers, were both committed
to appease rather than resist aggression. However, certain major powers were not
present. The USA never joined; the USSR was excluded for many years and then
expelled. The appeasement by Britain and France of Japan, Italy and Germany in
the period 1931–8 disenchanted an entire generation. The earlier successes of the
League, in the 1920s in Vilnius, Mosul, Corfu and the Aland Islands, are, quite
literally, footnotes in history.
The Charter of the UN had its origins in Churchill and Roosevelt’s planning for
the post-war settlement, and can trace elements as far back as the Atlantic Charter
of 1941. The Charter was negotiated during 1944–5 at Dumbarton Oaks, not a leafy
glade near Glasgow, but a mansion-house in Washington DC. Its prime architects
– the US, the UK and the USSR – were joined by De Gaulle and Chiang Kaishek.
Its provisions reflect this: one great liberal, one sentimental imperialist, one
murderous dictator, an exile and a losing civil-war faction crafted the text. Given
these antecedents it is perhaps curious that subsequent generations have looked
to the Charter to provide legitimation as opposed to an expedient rationale for
the use, or non-use, of force. It is a testament to the enduring and flexible language
of the Charter that a document with such diverse origins has attained this
transcendent status. The United Nations reconstructed the League’s unworkable
unanimity procedures around a more vigorous recognition and deference to the
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330 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20(3)
great powers’ roles. The five powers which wrote the Charter not only granted
themselves permanent seats with veto powers, they also granted themselves a veto
over the amendment of the Charter, a process which initially requires a two-thirds
majority vote in the General Assembly.7
Only one amendment has disturbed these
61-year-old provisions. Although the UN has adopted numerous informal and administrative
changes in its conduct, the only change to its written Charter was a
one-off enlargement of the Security Council from 11 to 15 by the addition of four
non-permanent seats in 1965. The Charter is explicit in its insistence on individual
states renouncing not only aggression but also intimidation. ‘States shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or the political independence of other states.’8
Collective security is not a pacifist doctrine, but a deterrent system; it offers the
threat of overwhelming military retaliation against any member-state that breaches
the peace: ‘effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression’.9
These include both
economic sanctions and military force.10
Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the
Security Council to determine just which acts do and do not constitute a threat to
international peace and security. Article 39 allows the Security Council to operate in
self-justification. Any action not subject to UNSC condemnation goes unremarked.
The provisions of the veto in Article 27 therefore confer upon any one of the five
permanent members the right to deny that a violation of the Charter has occurred.
One member can overrule the views of the other 14. The political significance of
membership of the Security Council is startlingly clear: the opportunity to confer
or to withhold approval of acts of violence, including one’s own and those of one’s
allies.11
The subsequent ideological division of the world system into two hostile blocs
from 1950 to 1990 paralysed the ability of the UN to apply its comprehensive economic
sanctions and formidable collective security provisions. Only limited peacekeeping
missions, developed ad hoc and having no basis in the Charter, were effected
in the period between the Korean War and 1990. After a 40-year hiatus, the end of
the Cold War suggested that an opportunity for comprehensive institutional reform
was opportune. The consensus reached on the prosecution of the war to restore
Kuwait’s sovereignty in 1990 presented a near textbook example of the great powers
working through all the stages outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter to reach the
final ultimatum on the use of force against Iraq. Thereafter the extraordinary extension
of UN peacekeeping mandates and activities in the period 1990–5 from El
Salvador to Cambodia created hard evidence of a revived utility for the UNSC.
After 1994 this record of Security Council cohesion faltered. The selectivity of
the members’ actions was revealed by their inaction in Rwanda. Controversial errors
in a series of high-profile peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions
from Somalia to Bosnia foundered in grandiloquent claims to have created ‘safe
havens’, one of which, Srebrenica, was the site in 1995 of the worst act of genocide
in Europe since 1945.12
At the close of the century the prosecution of NATO’s war
against Serbia and Montenegro in March–June 1999 was only possible because the
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REFORM OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 331
USA, the UK, Germany and France expressly avoided the Council for authorization,
in advance knowledge of the imminent Russian and Chinese vetoes.
In March 2003 the US and the UK, with the support of Spain and Italy and
other minor powers, launched a second war upon Iraq, on the ostensible grounds of
Saddam’s continuing non-compliance with 12 years of UN weapons inspections in
search of WMD, the most recent example being the unanimously agreed Resolution
1441 of the previous November. Dispute centred on whether 1441 itself authorized
force, as argued by the US and the UK, or whether it required a so-called second
resolution, as argued by France, Germany and Russia.13
As Berdal puts it, ‘the great illusion of the late 1980s and early 1990s was that
the end of the Cold War would automatically translate into an effective’ UN.14
Kosovo and Iraq had both confronted the UN membership with situations in which
the Security Council could not act in concert due to fundamental differences in
attitudes to the use of force by its permanent members. For those wanting support
for an extended mandate to use force, the Charter proved too restrictive. For those
members opposed to force, the Charter did not constrain those willing to act outside
it. The question of who makes the rules had returned to centre stage.
Kofi Annan spoke of a stark choice for the UN between reform and irrelevance
as a ‘fork in the road’.15
The High Level Panel (HLP) report of December 2004 was
adapted by Annan to produce his own reform agenda, In Larger Freedom (ILF),
published in March 2005. Both were novel in explicitly linking two sets of demands
into one comprehensive analysis. This not only promoted the long-standing issue
of the enlargement of the Security Council by an expanded and more equitable regional
representation, but also attempted to confront the Charter’s inadequacies in
respect to self-defence, terrorism, domestic human rights abuses and a variety of
threats without borders such as HIV/AIDS and other pandemic diseases. Annan,
aware of the need to balance simple representational arguments with efficiency and
effectiveness stated: ‘those that contribute most to the organization financially, militarily
and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making’.16
His
conviction was that the UNSC could not act effectively unless its decisions ‘command
world-wide respect’.17
Annan curiously suggested a timetable during 2005
to tackle the question of UNSC enlargement first, prior to the September Summit.
This high-risk strategy set deadlines that are always false in the UN system, and
raised expectations on the part of reformists that were unrealistic. It was much more
than ‘the game of tiddly-winks’ that some suggested.18
Annan’s In Larger Freedom offered a choice between two models, dubbed A
and B, which shadowed the claims of the G4 major regional powers and G11 minor
powers respectively, with additional African representation. Model A suggested
six additional permanent seats, two for Africa, two for the Asia/Pacific region, and
one each for Latin America and Europe, with a further three non-permanent seats
creating a Council of 24. Model B proposed to add eight non-permanent seats with
a four-year term, each renewable, and just one additional two-year seat, also creating
a Council of 24.19
ILF suggested three criteria of effectiveness by which to
judge the potential candidates’ credentials: the top three regional contributors to
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332 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20(3)
each of three categories – the assessed budget, voluntary contributions to the UN
and troop contributions to peacekeeping.20
The report also suggested that amongst
developed country candidates, their progress towards implementing the 0.7 per cent
GDP target for Overseas Development Aid (ODA) should also be a consideration.21
The HLP also recommended that no decisions implemented on the UNSC should
be regarded as final, but should be reviewed again in 2020.22
Both the Charter and In Larger Freedom emphasized the Charter’s connection
between admission to the Council and the ‘contribution of Members of the United
Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other
purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical representation’.23
Whilst the first two conditions may be interpreted qualitatively, they clearly imply
a willingness to undertake enforcement measures. They may also be measured
against financial contributions, most clearly in the German and Japanese cases for
permanent seats. Each currently contributes very nearly 9 per cent and 19 per cent
respectively of the assessed budget contributions.24
Among non-permanent members
the OPEC members, large less-developed countries and newly industrializing countries
have the scope to make enlarged financial contributions. Of the permanent
members China and Russia are embarrassingly under-assessed for their status, at
2 per cent and 1 per cent respectively, making further grounds for their discomfort.
In the words of the former Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, the UK seeks, by
‘punching above its weight’ in the UN, to legitimate its privileged position within
the Security Council.25
The UK’s support for the G4, Brazil, India, Germany and
Japan, also reflects a preference for dependable and predictable relations. It allows
the practice of overlapping or interlocking multilaterally, as these countries also
operate in existing, familiar groupings: Germany and Japan in the G8, Germany in
the EU, India in the Commonwealth.
Japan and Germany have the most obvious claims. Both countries are large
and still growing contributors to the assessed budget of the UN. Japan is currently
assessed at 18.8 per cent and Germany at 8.36 per cent.26
They also make their
payments in full and on time, and have not used debate or blocking in the Diet and
Bundestag to achieve UN or UN-related reform goals. However, both Germany and
Japan have very substantial but almost wholly unused defence capabilities. Both
electorates harbour major reservations concerning the use of that potential. Both
were constitutionally barred from contributing to military operations abroad, including
peacekeeping, until the mid-1990s. Extensive domestic debates concerning
the German contribution to UNPROFOR in Bosnia, and in Japan on Cambodia,
were necessary.27
Japan’s case was challenged in 2005 by China’s evocation of still
unresolved public atonement by Japan for conduct in the occupation of China in
the 1930s.28
Despite much adverse publicity for US Ambassador Bolton’s hostility to the
September Summit draft document, the US did not have to use or even threaten
its veto on the membership issue. Bolton’s preferred deletions from the Summit
draft included references to nuclear disarmament, the 0.7 per cent aid target and
‘corporate responsibility’, and favourable references to the International Criminal
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REFORM OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 333
Court.29
Later the US eased their position, relenting on references to Kyoto, the
ICC and the aid target on the simple grounds that the US has never ratified these
agreements in their original form and could not be bound by this declaration.30
The US did not need to use the stick on the membership issue because the aspirants
and claimants among the membership managed to self-destruct.
No package was agreed either before or subsequent to the September 2005
Summit. Annan’s attempts to resolve the issue in advance of the September 2005
Summit were doomed. In practice all such negotiating deadlines in the UN are false.
The G4 brought Western supporters on board by dropping the veto requirement.
The 53 Africans for their part still wanted two permanent seats, bringing the total
Council membership to 26, and the Africans also wanted to retain the veto. Both
earlier concessions by the G4 to gain Western support would have been undone by
reinstating these African demands. Finally, the Africans could not agree among
themselves on which of them would take these two seats. South Africa, Nigeria,
Egypt, Libya and Senegal each advanced claims. Annan’s vocabulary of ‘reform
or irrelevance’ was always exaggerated. Since the debacle on Iraq the resumed
cohesion of the Security Council has been clearly demonstrated on the creation and
expansion of massive peacekeeping initiatives in Liberia, Haiti and Sierra Leone.
Also, the Council endorsed arrangements for transitional government and elections
in Iraq itself.
Formally, the members are committed to continue to seek accommodation on
this issue. The final text of the World Summit outcome, adopted on 20 September
2005, attempted to summarize the position thus:
We support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our
overall effort to reform the United Nations in order to make it more broadly
representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness
and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.31
However, the division between the G4 and G11 camps runs deep and symbolizes
the tension between regional powers’ interests and representative principles in
international organization. Even if those parties in competition for new Council
seats were able to compromise on this, and establish the two-thirds majority vote
necessary in the General Assembly, at least two of the veto-holding permanent
members have signalled their displeasure during 2005. Thus rule-making, or more
precisely who gets to make the rules, is in this instance clearly a political not a
legal process.
Notes
1 China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA sit with five members elected from a
combined African and Asian group, two members from Latin America, two from Western Europe
and one East European member. UN Charter, Article 23.
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334 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20(3)
2 The particular stimulus was provided by the publication of the final report of the Secretary General’s
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility (New York: United Nations Publications, 2004). The key recommendations of this
report were consolidated in Secretary General Annan’s follow-up: Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom
(New York: United Nations Publications, 2005).
3 The debates are summarized in Mats Berdal, ‘The UN after Iraq’, Survival, 46(3), 2004, pp.
83–102. Also ‘The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable’, Survival, 45(2), 2003,
pp. 7–30. Also Gwynn Prins, ‘Lord Castlereagh’s Return: The Significance of Kofi Annan’s High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, International Affairs, 81(2), 2005, pp. 373–92.
Also Mark Imber, Security Council Reform: From Here To Eternity? (London: Foreign Policy
Centre, 2005), pp. 1–17.
4 UN Charter, Article 24.
5 UN Charter, Article 25.
6 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
7 UN Charter, Articles 108–9.
8 UN Charter, Article 2, 4.
9 UN Charter, Article 1, 1.
10 UN Charter, Articles, 41 and 42.
11 UN Charter, Article 27, 3 requires members of the Security Council not to vote on disputes in
which they are involved. This provision has never been enforced.
12 On Rwanda see L. Polman, We Did Nothing (London: Viking, 2000). On Bosnia see David Rohde,
A Safe Area (London: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
13 See Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalex-Palaez, ‘International Community After Iraq’, International
Affairs, 81(1), 2005, pp. 46–7.
14 Berdal, ‘The UN after Iraq’, p. 9.
15 UN Press Office, 24 September 2003.
16 ILF, para. 169.
17 ILF, para. 167.
18 Prins, ‘Lord Castlereagh’s Return’, p. 373.
19 HLP, A/59/565 paras 252–3.
20 ILF, para. 169.
21 ILF, para. 169.
22 UN, A59/565, para. 255.
23 UN Charter, Article 23.
24 See Global Policy Forum, ‘Assessed Contributions to Regular Budget of the 15 Largest Assessed
Contributors’, March 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org (accessed 12 January 2006).
25 Remark attributed to Douglas Hurd, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1993.
26 Global Policy Forum, ‘Assessed Contributions’.
27 See L. Varma (ed.), The UN in a Changing World (London: Sangam Books, 1997).
28 Rioting and attacks on Japanese property in China were reported in April 2005 in response to the
publication of a school text in Japan, which, it was claimed, failed to fully account for Japanese
actions in the occupation of Nanking. The Scotsman, 13 April 2005.
29 Julian Berger, The Guardian, 27 August 2005.
30 The Economist, 10 September 2005, p. 29.
31 UN, A/60/L.1 World Summit Outcome, 20 September 2005, para. 153.
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