I International
Organization
Polity, Politics and Policies
Volker Rittberger and Bernard Zangl
with Matthias Staisch
Translated by Antoinette Groom
Translation consultant John Groom
REVilE 2008
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© VSVerlag fur Sozialwissenschaften IGWV Fachverlage GmbH. Wiesbaden 2003
New material included in the English edition © Volker Rittberger and Bernhard
Zangl2006
English language translation © Antoinette Groom, 2006
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Contents
Preface
List of Figures and Tables
List of Acronyms
PART I THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
1 Introduction
Defining international organizations
Distinctions between international organizations
Analytical classification of international organizations
Overview of the book
2 Theories of International Organizations
The realist school
The institutionalist school
The idealist school
Theories of international organizations
Conclusion
3 History of International Organizations
War and power politics
Industrial expansion
Transportation
Communication
Social regulation
Intellectual property
World economic crises
Trade relations
Monetary relations
Human rights violations
Protection of universal human rights
Regional protection of human rights
Developmental disparities
Financing development
Development and trade
Environmental degradation
Conclusion
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Chapter 8
Security
The so-called security dilemma that results from the anarchic structure of
the international system sets the fundamental conditions under which
international cooperation takes place in the field of security (see Chapter
2). Due to this anarchic structure no state can rely on others to provide for
its security; all states have to provide for their own security themselves.
Since their security can always be undermined by the threat or use of force
by others, all states have to be prepared to protect themselves and deter
others from threatening or actually using force against them. This preparation
entails the strengthening of a state's own relative power position and
the building of powerful alliances. In turn this power is likely to be conceived
by others as undermining their security, which then leads to further
attempts to prepare for the threat or use of force. The distrust inherent in
the security dilemma therefore entails the risk of threats and of the use of
force even among states that agree cooperatively to renounce such activities
against each other (Herz 1950). In short, this distrust may be regarded
as the most fundamental obstacle to international cooperation in the security
field.
However, there are four further conditions which render international
cooperation in the security field particularly difficult to achieve. First,
states tend to assess not only their absolute gains from international cooperation
but also their gains relative to others, because a relative loss from
cooperation can result in a relative decrease of power which then undermines
security for a particular state. This may result in conflicts over the
distribution of gains, thus making cooperation especially elusive (Efinger,
Rittberger & Ziirn 1988: 92-8; Efinger & Zurn 1990). Second, in the
security field states are particularly reluctant to trust others, because once
their security, that is their physical existence and autonomy, is lost the
chances of re-establishing it are almost nil. For this reason states prefer to
protect themselves against a possible worst case, which makes international
cooperation highly unlikely (Jervis 1983: 359). Third, this mistrust
is further exacerbated by the low degree of transparency inherent in the
security field. Arms programmes and military planning are usually subject
to strict secrecy. This practice of secrecy, of actively disguising programmes
and plans and even misleading others, makes it all the more difficult for
states to trust in the cooperation of others, thus further diminishing the
prospects for cooperation (Jervis 1983: 359). Finally, domestic interest
123
._-----~---
]24 International Organizations
Violent self-help
Security 125
Policy programme of the UN
The principal aim of the United Nations is 'to maintain international peace
and security' (Article 1 of UN Charter). To achieve this the UN Charter
already contains a programme which has since been complemented by
further detailed acts such as resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council and also agreements reached by international conferences
organized by the UN. The result is a regulative programme which although
incomplete - attempts to curb the threat and use of force. In fact,
the Charter lays down, for the first time in history, a general ban on the
threat or use of force between states. Article 2, paragraph 4 states that 'all
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.' This general ban on the threat or use of force is complemented
by Article 2, paragraph 3 whereby 'all Members shal1 settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.' Thus, not only does
the Charter prohibit wars of aggression but also any other use of force and
even the threat thereof. Moreover, the Charter prohibits the threat or use
of force even to enforce international agreements and requires that disputes
about these agreements be settled peaceful1y.
Since the UN Charter also recognizes the 'inherent right of individual or
col1ective self-defence' (Article 51) the use of military force is usually justified
as an act of self-defence. Although the right to self-defence is safeguarded,
this should not be open to abuse as a cover for aggressive behaviour. The UN
General Assembly was asked to define the concept of aggression. This
proved to be difficult and the General Assembly only decided on a definition
in 1974 after lengthy and rough negotiations (Resolution 3314 (XXIX)). An
act of aggression is committed when a state uses military force first, but to be
able to prove such an act of aggression according to the Resolution requires
casuistic definitions of actions which encompass the notion of aggression.
The security policy programme of the UN also forbids interference in
the domestic affairs of states. Initial1y, in this context, the Charter only
refers to the activities of the UN itself. Apart from enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter, it excludes intervention 'in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state' (Article
2, paragraph 7). However, the matters which are considered as being
within the domestic jurisdiction of states have been subject to change. The
General Assembly judged that questions of decolonialization, racism and
apartheid are not essentially within domestic jurisdiction. The Security
Council has intervened in the domestic affairs of member states if they represent
a threat to international peace and security in certain situations.
Conditions for cooperation in the field ofsecurityTable 8.1
However, neither the security dilemma itself nor the other conditions that
account for the limited probability of international cooperation in the security
field are unalterable. International organizations can help to change
the structural conditions in order to facilitate cooperation in the security
field. In this the activities of the United Nations, as the most significant
international security organization in two issue areas, those of 'violent selfhelp'
and of the 'dynamics of arms procurement', are important.
Security dilemma
Conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods
Inability to recoup the loss of physical existence
Limited transparency of measures; secrecy
Cooperation blocked by domestic interest groups
~ Limited probability of cooperation
Inherent in the security dilemma is the latent danger of the threat or use of
force by each individual actor, independently of the good or bad intentions
of the actors concerned. Thus even actors who prefer mutual non-aggressive
behaviour can be tempted to threaten or use force in order to guarantee
their own security. The fundamental security problem therefore
consists in stabilizing actors' expectations about the non-violent behaviour
of others in order to make it possible for them reciprocally to desist from
the threat or use of force. International organizations can contribute to
stabilizing expectations through their political programmes and operational
and information activities. We shall focus on the United Nations as
the most significant international security organization.
groups might be against international cooperation in security matters. If
they have a large influence within society, as in the case of the militaryindustrial
complex in the United States and the former Soviet Union during
the Cold War, they can inhibit states from participating in international
cooperative efforts. See Table 8.1.
Operations of the UN
To help states to conform with the ban on the threat or use of force, the
United Nations has embraced three types of operation: enforcement (collective
security), peaceful settlement of disputes (consensual security), and
peacekeeping (consensual security).
Collective security: enforcement
The United Nations has devoted the smallest part of its operations in the
security field to enforcement, under the rubric of collective security. This
gives member states a guarantee against the threat or use of force by other
member states. Unlike collective defence based on an alliance, collective
security is not aimed at threats from outside but at threats from within. It
provides for collective enforcement, by military or non-military means, by
the community of member states against any aggression on the part of one
or more of its members. Collective security is, in effect, an alliance which
deals with any aggressor from within its own ranks.
The UN Charter allocates far-reaching competencies to the Security
Council in order to implement collective security. The Security Council can
authorize collective enforcement measures by the community of states in
the event of a breach of or acute threat to international peace. Only the
Security Council can determine whether an infringement of the ban on the
Security 127
. --------_. - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - Soviet
Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Indeed, in many small,
mostly local conflicts it may not be clear which political group in the war
zone has legitimate state power and is therefore entitled to request intervention
in accordance with international law (Bothe & Martenczuk 1999:
129; Woyke 2000: 226).
Apart from this loophole the UN Charter also stipulates circumstances
under which the threat and use of force are allowed (Ebock 2000: 305;
Gareis & Varwick 2005: 68-73). Thus the Charter (Article 51) confirms
the right of states to individual and collective self-defence in case of aggression
by others. Furthermore, military enforcement measures decided by the
Security Council under Chapter VII do not come under the general ban on
the use of force. The 'enemy state' clauses of Articles 53 and 107 of the
Charter, while exceptions to the general ban on the use of force, have
become obsolete (Gareis & Varwick 2005: 78).
All in all the United Nations requires states to solve their disputes peacefully,
prohibits the threat as well as the use of force between states and,
with the exception of intervention on request and the right to self-defence,
gives a monopoly to the Security Council in legitimizing the use of force.
The first such situation is that of internal wars and of conflicts dealt
with by force. Thus in 1991 the Iraqi state's action against its Kurdish
population in the north (not forgetting the actions against the Shi'ites in
the south) was condemned by the Security Council as a threat to. peace in
Resolution 688. Of course the cross-border effects of the conflict, with the
massive outflow of refugees blocked at the Turkish border and the actual
movement of refugees into Iran, played a considerable role. Unambiguous
in this respect was the determination by the Security Council of a threat to
peace in the case of the Angolan civil war in 1993 (Resolution 864). The
Council based its conclusion entirely on the situation inside the country
(Chesterman 2003: 137, 138). Following these precedents the Security
Council also considered the internal wars in, for instance, Somalia, Bosnia,
Kosovo and East Timor as threats to peace.
The second such situation was given far greater consideration. The
Security Council increasingly viewed continued serious human rights violations
within states as a threat to international peace and security and
declared them to be a basis for intervention (for more details see Chapter
10). Despite strengthening the protection of human rights through the
Security Council's actual practice since the 1990s, it seems premature to
conclude that the principle of non-intervention has been replaced by a
right or even a duty of the Security Council to authorize humanitarian
interventions in case of serious human rights violations. At this stage we
can merely note a trend in the Security Council's actual practice in that
direction (Ebock 2000: 295-8). The fact that all relevant Security Council
resolutions in which enforcement measures were decided upon in response
to massive human rights violations referred to the uniqueness of the prevailing
circumstances leads us to conclude that decision makers have so far
refrained from recognizing a generally valid principle of humanitarian
intervention (Chesterman 2003: 160-2).
The UN Charter does not explicitly ban the intervention of states in the
domestic jurisdiction of other states. Nevertheless, the General Assembly
has created such a ban through a series of resolutions: Res. 290 (IV), Res.
1236 (XII), Res. 2131 (XX) and Res. 2625 (XXV), according to which
military as well as economic, political or other actions which impair
another state's sovereign rights are forbidden (Czernpiel 2000: 510).
Having been confirmed by several General Assembly resolutions the ban
on intervention between states can by now claim the status of international
customary law, despite repeated breaches in practice (Chesterman 2003:
57ff.).
Very controversial is intervention by one state upon the request of
another state. While this does not infringe international law it does
provide a loophole to circumvent the general ban on the threat or use of
force, as in the case of the US intervention in Grenada in 1983 and the
126 International Organizations
128 International Organizations
threat or use of force has occurred. In the first instance threatened or
attacked states themselves inform the Security Council of any aggression
against their territorial integrity or political independence, In addition
other states or the UN Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in their opinion may threaten international
peace and security (Article 99). The Security Council has to determine
'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression' (Article 39). Only such a conclusion by the Security Council
legitimizes further measures of collective enforcement within the framework
of the UN system of collective security.
In view of the number of wars waged since 1945, the number of
breaches of and threats to the peace or acts of aggression determined by
the Security Council has been modest. We must, however, point out that
the number of international wars in comparison with internal wars has
also been modest. During the Cold War, only in the case of pariahs like
South Africa and Rhodesia did the Security Council - normally hamstrung
by a veto of one or other of the main contenders in the East-West conflict
- repeatedly determine that there was a breach of or threat to the peace or
an act of aggression. In addition, North Korea was condemned for its
attack on South Korea (1950) and Argentina for its occupation of the
Falkland Islands (1982). Since 1990 the number of condemnations by the
Security Council has increased noticeably (see Chapter 10). While the end
of the Cold War accounts for much of this, there has also been a broadening
of the concept of a threat to peace. Thus the condemnation of Iraq
after its aggression against Kuwait (Resolution 660 (1990)) determined a
traditional act of aggression, namely the violation of the territorial
integrity of a member state. The same holds for the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia: the clashes between the states were decisive in determining a
threat to international peace and security by the rump of Yugoslavia, that
is Serbia and Montenegro (Resolution 713 (1991)). The cases of Somalia
(Resolution 746 (1992)) and Rwanda (Resolution 918 (1994)) were different.
Here the Security Council saw the threat to peace in humanitarian
crises resulting from internal armed struggles.
Once the Security Council has determined the existence of a breach of or
threat to the peace or an act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 it
can decide on binding recommendations to states. Thus the Security
Council condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate
and unconditional withdrawal of its armed forces (Resolution 660
(1990)). It simultaneously called on Iraq and Kuwait to settle their differences
through negotiations. In the Kosovo crisis the Security Council condemned
the acts of aggression by the Serb police forces in Kosovo as well
as acts of terror by the Kosovo Liberation Army (Resolution 1160 (1998)).
It linked the demand for the start of a political dialogue with concrete proSecurity
129
posals such as the re-establishment of the Kosovo region's autonomous
status. The Security Council can demand cessation of military action, withdrawal
from occupied territories, respecting of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of a state, destruction of nuclear weapons or cessation of
human rights violations. In short, the Security Council imposes clear limits
to the freedom of action of the parties concerned and prescribes behavioural
guidelines aimed at maintaining or restoring international peace and
security.
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly can condemn the
behaviour of states in the form of resolutions, thus exerting moral pressure.
A further sanction by the United Nations is suspension (Article 5) or
expulsion of a member who 'persistently violates the Principles contained
in the present Charter' (Article 6) by the General Assembly upon the recommendation
of the Security Council. However, since the expulsion of a
member state robs the organization of the possibility of influencing the
behaviour of the state concerned this form of sanction is a double-edged
affair and so far the UN has not made use of it. However, the temporary
freezing of Serbia's membership in connection with the military clashes in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was tantamount to suspension.
Should the parties concerned not follow its recommendations the
Security Council can decide what measures of collective enforcement 'are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions' (Article 41). In other words
the Security Council has the power to impose more far-reaching sanctions
in case of non-compliance with its resolutions. First of all, it can decide on
non-military enforcement measures. The Charter foresees 'complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations' (Article 41). The Security Council, which needs the
cooperation of member states, can make a legally binding request for them
to implement its decisions.
During the Cold War the Security Council only twice used Article 41 of
the Charter to enforce the general ban on the use of force. In the first case
it imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia in 1966 (Resolution 232),
having determined that the declaration of independence by the White
minority regime constituted a threat to peace (in accordance with Article
39). Subsequently the Security Council intensified its enforcement measures
through a series of additional resolutions until 1979, when these
were lifted following Rhodesia's attainment of independence as Zimbabwe
under a Black majority government. In the second case, that of the
Apartheid regime in South Africa, the Security Council imposed an arms
embargo (Resolution 418 (1977)) following the bloody unrest in the black
townships in 1976. Legally binding economic sanctions were not imposed
and the Security Council chose instead to recommend to member states a
states 'undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces ... '.
In reality no such special agreements have been reached and the United
Nations does not have any armed forces permanently at its disposal
(Kuhne 2000a: 295). Although the permanent members of the Security
Council had passed a resolution in 1946 asking the Military Staff
Committee to debate the availability of UN troops, the principal powers
were unable to agree on the modalities of such a UN force in the context
of the East-West conflict. Thus one of the conditions for an effective collective
security system has remained unfulfilled. The United Nations has to
rely on the case-by-case supply of armed forces from member states (in
accordance with Article 48) or of regional arrangements (in accordance
with Article 53, paragraph 1).
During the Cold War the Security Council could not agree in a single
instance on measures of military enforcement. The measures decided in
relation to the Korean War in 1950 came close to enforcement as stipulated
by the UN Charter only because there was the exceptional situation
that the USSR at the time was boycotting Security Council meetings and
thereby losing the possibility of using its veto. Thus in accordance with
Article 48, UN members were recommended to provide assistance to the
Republic of Korea. However, since the United States was asked to form the
UN supreme command, rather than the Military Staff Committee, the
deployment had the character of a US-led military action rather than that
of a UN deployment in the spirit of collective security.
Since the Cold War measures of military enforcement decided upon - or
at least authorized - by the Security Council have become more common.
However, in many of these instances the Security Council has not mandated
military enforcement in clear terms, but resorted to circumvention. The Gulf
War of 1991 is a case in point. In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
the Security Council did not take military action itself (in accordance with
Article 42), nor did it call upon its members to take military enforcement
measures (in accordance with Article 48). It only gave its consent 'to use all
means necessary', thereby in effect authorizing member states collaborating
with Kuwait to employ military force against the Iraqi occupation. Thus the
liberation of Kuwait can be seen as an act 'of individual or collective selfdefence'
(Article 51), albeit explicitly supported by the Security Council.
The first time in UN history that the Security Council really called for
military enforcement measures was in 1994 when it asked NATO to
implement the no-fly zone above Bosnia-Herzegovina (Resolution 816
(1993)). The massive air strikes by NATO against positions of the Bosnian
Serbs were also based on a Security Council resolution (Resolution 836
(1993)) which empowered member states and regional agencies to provide
support for the United Nations protection force (UNPROFOR) through
Security 131
- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - .-------------- -------
voluntary imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions against South
Africa. These were lifted in 1994 after the end of the Apartheid regime.
Since 1990 the Security Council has imposed sanctions through non-military
enforcement measures in numerous instances: Afghanistan, Angola,
Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and
Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan
and the former Yugoslavia. For example, only four days after the invasion
of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 a comprehensive trade embargo was imposed
(Resolution 661). To stem the fighting in the former Yugoslavia the
Security Council decided on a total arms embargo (Resolution 713 (1991))
which extended to the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia. In addition
economic sanctions were imposed upon Serbia and Montenegro
(Resolution 757 (1992)), specifically the interruption of trade in raw materials
and manufactured products as well as air traffic. The Security Council
lifted the sanctions in 1996 (Resolution 1074) but imposed an arms
embargo only two years later in the context of the Kosovo conflict
(Resolution 1160 (1998)) which was then lifted in September 2001
(Resolution 1367 (2001)). More recently, the Security Council extended
sanctions against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to all al-Qaeda members
worldwide (Resolutions 1333 (2001) and 1363 (2001)) and imposed sanctions
against Cote d'Ivoire (1572 (2004)).
When deciding on non-military sanctions after the Cold War the
Security Council has also used the possibility of asking UN members (in
accordance with Article 48) to enforce these non-military sanctions
through the use of armed force. In relation to Iraq the Security Council
called 'upon those Member States cooperating with the Government of
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations
and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such
shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990)'. The arms embargo against
former Yugoslavia was policed by the maritime forces of NATO and the
WEU in the Adriatic Sea on behalf of the United Nations.
Where non-military enforcement measures have proved inadequate to
implement the Security Council's decisions, it can resort to measures of
military enforcement. According to the Charter it can take 'such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security' (Article 42). To allow the Security Council to
apply military enforcement measures, the Charter provides for the establishment
of a Military Staff Committee, responsible for the strategic direction
of armed forces (Article 47). Its role is to assist the Security Council in
the implementation of military action. Article 43 stipulates that member
130 International Organizations
132 International Organizations
the use of force. By contrast, the NATO operation 'Allied Force' in the
Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999 was carried out without the
approval of the Security Council. Despite Resolution 1244 of 10 June
1999, passed by the Security Council after the cessation of military hostilities,
the NATO strikes against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
were not authorized according to the UN Charter (Bothe & Martenczuk
1999) and took place outside its collective security system (Brock 2000:
136; Chesterman 2003: 213 ff).
Consensual security I: peaceful settlement of disputes
The relative ineffectiveness and rarity of collective security action within
the UN framework has led to a concentration on activities of a consensual
nature. Systems of consensual security, like those of collective security, are
inward-looking. The aim is to pacify violence-prone relationships between
members. Unlike a system of collective security which envisages collective
enforcement measures against individual member states, the measures in a
system of consensual security always require a consensus of all the parties
involved. Thus the United Nations system of consensual security provides
operational measures aimed at fulfilling the obligation to see to the
peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI of the Charter).
The United Nations seeks to enhance the possibilities of peaceful settlement
of disputes through the use of a variety of different techniques. Such
techniques include good offices, usually undertaken by the UN SecretaryGeneral
or their representative, whereby the Secretary-General offers communication
channels to the disputing parties. The parties concerned can
make use of the good offices to agree on conditions for starting negotiations.
They can communicate in this way without officially entering into
negotiations, that is to say, without recognizing the other side as a negotiating
partner. The Secretary-General lowers the costs of communication
and thus contributes to the initiation of negotiations which can lead to the
peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Secretary-General has repeatedly
offered his good offices in disputes, for instance between the US and Iraq.
For example, in 1998 Kofi Annan helped to settle the dispute over arms
inspections in Iraq. Using the prestige of his office he convinced Saddam
Hussein to allow the continuation of UN inspections.
Another technique of peaceful dispute settlement is the conduct of investigations
through the United Nations, often conducted by commissions
which are given the task of clarifying the facts behind a dispute. This provides
the disputing parties with reliable information established by a
neutral third party. Although the disputing parties are not bound by these
findings, they can be helpful in reaching a settlement. Article 34 of the
Charter specifically authorizes the Security Council to establish cornrnisSecurity
133
sions of inquiry. It has used this possibility in a series of cases although
only in two situations (1946 in relation to Greece and 1948 in relation to
Kashmir) with specific reference to Article 34.
Mediation also involves a third party. The mediator plays an active role
in the negotiations and can contribute to a negotiated settlement by suggesting
solutions. Mediation clearly goes beyond the possibility of good
offices and investigation since it is concerned with procedures, factual
information and the specific content of a peaceful settlement. The
Secretary-General has repeatedly been charged by the Security Council
with mediating in conflicts between states or with naming a representative
as mediator. The latter was the case in the wars in former Yugoslavia
where UN representatives (Vance and Stoltenberg), in conjunction with EU
mediators (Owen and Bildr}, strove to secure a peace plan. The mediation
efforts, however, only led to the ending of hostilities under the leadership
of the United States with the Dayton Accord of 1995 (Holbrooke 1999).
In the case of legal disputes between member states there is the option of
a judicial decision through the International Court of Justice. An appeal to
the Court, whose Statute is part of the UN Charter, can be an effective
means of peaceful settlement of a dispute since its judgments are binding.
However this presupposes a declaration by the parties that they recognize
the jurisdiction of the Court. By the end of 2004 only 65 UN member
states had declared their general submission to the jurisdiction of the
Court. The remaining states have to declare their acceptance for each specific
case where the Court is asked for a judgment. For this reason a multitude
of international legal disputes did not reach the Court. Since 1946 the
Court has delivered only 89 judgments (as of the end of 2004).
Consensual security II: peacekeeping
Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter but it has been a major
UN activity in the security field (Weiss, Forsythe & Coate 2004: 29f£.).
Peacekeeping activities were first developed at the time of the Cold War
and - like the techniques of peaceful dispute settlement under Chapter VI
of the Charter - required the consensus of all the parties involved. Since
the classic form of peacekeeping is based on the agreement of the parties to
the dispute to deploy UN observers or a UN force ('blue helmets'), it
belongs to the system of consensual security (Chapter VI) and not to the
system of collective security (Chapter VII). Admittedly it assumes the
deployment of military personnel, which is why peacekeeping has also
been called Chapter six-and-a-half of the Charter (Dag Hammarskjold,
cited in Weiss, Forsythe & Coate 2004: 37). The repeated recourse to
peacekeeping and its recognition by the community of states has become
part of customary international law.
134 International Organizations
- - - - - - - - - - - - Security
135
---------- The
Security Council authorizes all peacekeeping operations (Article
24). Not only does it specify the deployment of UN observers or a peacekeeping
force in the relevant mandate and deployment resolutions, it also
decides upon the material conditions for deployment, adapting them to the.
requirements of the specific conflict. In addition to the Security Council,
the Secretary-General, the parties to the dispute and the countries supplying
the peacekeeping force play an important role in the definition and
content of a peacekeeping operation. The Secretary-General must determine
with the parties the area of deployment, the objectives, the competencies
of UN personnel and similar matters in a Memorandum of
Understanding which must then be confirmed by the Security Council.
Furthermore the Secretary-General must request all civilian personnel
(police, administrative and technical specialists) and the troop contingents
necessary from the member states and must coordinate their deployment
with all the participating states.
Peacekeeping operations have a variety of functions, which have
expanded progressively over time. Traditionally, such operations dealt
above all with monitoring. The United Nations sends observer groups or a
peacekeeping force with the aim of observing and supervising adherence to
a ceasefire agreed between the parties to the dispute. UNIIMOG, the 400strong
UN force charged with supervising the ceasefire between Iraq and
Iran after the first Gulf War of 1988 to 1991, is a classic example of an
observer mission. The observer group or peacekeeping force also determines
which party to the conflict is responsible in the case of a breach of
the ceasefire. Thus the party violating a ceasefire agreement is subjected to
international pressure and perhaps even to pressure from its own population.
This helps to create a minimum expectation of trust in a ceasefire situation.
The presence of witnesses also reduces the risk to the parties of
being at a disadvantage in the case of an unequal respect for the ceasefire.
An interesting innovation more recently is the preventive deployment of
UN military observers in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia
(UNPREDEP 1995-99) where a mission was deployed to deter the outbreak
of hostilities.
Under the aegis of peacekeeping more operations have taken place in
recent years which have gone beyond the original tasks. Those conducting
peacekeeping operations are increasingly given the task of creating
the conditions in which a peaceful settlement of the dispute can
emerge. Thus UN observers or peacekeeping forces supervise elections;
are involved in the democratization process (for example UNMIBH in
Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995); deal with or supervise the disarmament
of the parties in a civil war (for example UNMOT in Tajikistan after
extending the mandate from 1997 to 2000); assume the role of state
bureaucracies (for example UNOSCOM I and II in Somalia 1992-95); or
provide humanitarian aid (for example UNPREDEP in Macedonia
1995-99).
These new tasks are also reflected in An Agenda for Peace of 1992 (UNdocument
AJ47/2 77; S/24111) proposed by former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-96). In this document Boutros-Chali pleaded
for a strengthened UN involvement in connection with civil-war situations
and the onset of the breakup of states. This led to a further broadening of
peacekeeping operations. Since the mandates of traditional and multidimensional
peacekeeping can only be fulfilled if there is a ceasefire in the
area, which is often not the case in civil-war zones, peace missions were
now authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create a secure
environment - if necessary by force - to enable them to fulfil their mission.
The peacekeeping operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II 1993-95) and in
the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR 1992-95) thus represent another
peacekeeping innovation called 'robust peacekeeping'. However, this
broadening of the mandate is not entirely new: it had already been tried
out in the mission to the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, almost 30 years before
the multidimensional peacekeeping which began in 1989 with UNTAG in
Namibia (Doyle 1999: 456, fn. 3). Missions which belong to the category
of robust peacekeeping have entered the system of collective security since
the consensus of one or more parties to the conflict is no longer a condition
for sending a mission (Doyle 1999: 448).
Lastly, the mandates of the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo
(UNMIK, since June 1999) and East Timor (1999-2002) lead to the conclusion
that we have witnessed the emergence of yet another category of
peacekeeping. These complex mandates combine securing the peace
through the deployment of armed forces with consolidating the peace
through deployment of civilian personnel (Kuhne 2000b: 1357). The latter
is characterized by the taking of substantial political and administrative
responsibility; civilian personnel assume government responsibility in trust
until local or regional self-government can be put in place.
The system of consensual security, with its further development in the
area of UN peacekeeping, provides at least in part a suitable example of
cooperation in the area of security. For example, the peace missions to
Namibia (1989-90), El Salvador (1991-95) and Cambodia (1991-93) are
repeatedly cited as success stories (Gareis & Varwick 2005: 104-5; Weiss,
Forsythe & Coate 2004: 51--4). As to robust peacekeeping under Chapter
VII of the Charter, the organization recognized the necessity to get
involved, even against the will of at least one of the parties to a conflict.
Yet it failed - as is painfully exemplified by the missions to Somalia
(1992-95), the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and Rwanda (1993-96) because
of insufficient operational capacity and ultimately also because of
the indecision, mainly of the Western members, in providing timely and
136 International Organizations
adequate financial, material and personnel resources (Gareis & Varwick
2005: 105-8).
Nevertheless, complex peace missions, as well as' the considerable
capacity of the UN to reassess its own role, have seen the great disappointment
of the mid 19905 transformed into guarded optimism. However,
despite the increased use of peacekeeping - 59 such operations (as of
2004) have taken place since 1990 - continuing discussions about fundamental
reform of the peacekeeping apparatus make clear that such operations
in their present form cannot provide a decisive answer to specific
problems in the field.
Information activities of the UN
International cooperation always depends on the availability of reliable
information. The United Nations can exert some influence on this in the
security field. First and foremost it represents a forum for the exchange of
information between states and also between non-governmental organizations.
In the meetings, negotiations and discussions taking place in the
various organs and bodies of the United Nations, states share with one
another their understanding of the international situation, their ability to
react, their proposed action policies and so forth. Thus, they supply one
another with information which helps to shape their own behaviour
(Dicke 1988: 2, 6). To obtain reliable information about certain conflict
hotspots, government representatives increasingly make use of humanitarian
NGOs like Oxfam and Medicins sans Frontieres.
Especially significant in this context is the Secretary-General's Annual
Report. This receives considerable publicity and enables the SecretaryGeneral
to exert a real influence on the agenda of international politics.
This is especially so if they are able to marshal public opinion using the
information supplied and so exert pressure on state representatives. United
Nations information activities contribute at least indirectly to world public
opinion, despite the lack of democracy in their formulation.
Evaluation of the organizations outputs
Does the United Nations make a relevant contribution to overcoming the
threat or use of force in international relations and to stabilizing the
peace? Simply by banning the use or threat of force between member states
the United Nations creates a minimum trust concerning expected behaviour.
Operations within the framework of collective security ensure the
maintenance of the physical existence of political entities and can disSecurity
137
mantle the mistrust between states inherent in the security dilemma.
During the Cold War, however, only exceptionally could the UN impose
collective enforcement measures. The end of the East-West conflict gave
the Security Council a new ability to make better use of the available
options, but these do not constitute a panacea.
There are two principal reasons for the ineffectiveness of collective security
even following the end of the Cold War. First, continuation of selective
authorization of measures by the Security Council hindered the creation of
an expectation of reliability for both aggressors and victims (Rittberger,
Mogler & Zangl 1997: 39ff., 60). Secondly, the 1990s showed that the
system of collective security was insufficiently adapted to threats stemming
from conflicts within states. The Security Council reacted by continuously
broadening the interpretation of Article 39 of the Charter (Chesterman
2003: 127ff.; Forsythe 2000: 57ff.) by widening the preconditions for the
existence of a threat to the peace beyond that of armed conflict within
states, to encompass continuing and serious violations of human rights and
humanitarian emergencies within states. These measures constituted a
change in the concept of security, going beyond the territorial inviolability
of states to consider the physical integrity of individuals and peoples as
worthy of protection (Miller 1999: 325). Thus it is concerned not only
with states' security but also with human security. However, there is certainly
not an unconditional acceptance of this new interpretation of threats
by the permanent members of the Security Council, as can be seen by the
selective nature of the measures taken. Moreover, codification has not yet
happened. Thus it remains unclear which actions by which agents (states
or even units within states such as liberation movements) necessarily
require measures to be taken by the community of states within the framework
of a system of collective security.
The increased use of peacekeeping and the broadening of its mandate
led to a gap between the demand for and the supply of resources by
member states. This is now recognized and forms the basis for fundamental
reforms. The Brahimi Report of 2000 contains far-reaching suggestions
for reform of the peacekeeping machinery (UN-document A55/305;
S/2000/809). The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the
General Assembly presented its final report in time for the 56th General
Assembly in which some - though by no means all - recommendations of
the Brahimi Report were proposed for implementation (Kuhne 2001). The
lengthy negotiating process of the Special Committee, as well as the continuing
uncertainty about the readiness of member states to support the
reform process financially and organizationally, point to an uncertain
future. Yet more recently another attempt to reform peacekeeping has been
made with the establishment in September 2003 of a High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change. Its report, presented in December 2004,
Resolution 1665 (XVI). In Resolution 2028 (XX) (1965) it demanded that
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had been
founded in 1961 and which met in Geneva, should concentrate on negotiating
a nuclear-weapon non-proliferation treaty. The Committee, consisting
of five states each from the Western and Eastern blocs as well as
eight representatives of the non-aligned states, entered into a concrete
intergovernmental negotiating process that is typical for reaching policy
programme decisions (see Chapter 6). As the model of intergovernmental
negotiating processes leads us to assume, the negotiations were dominated
by the most powerful states, especially the USA and USSR, which
attempted to make the renunciation of nuclear weapons more acceptable
to the weaker states through concessions in the area of the civilian use of
nuclear energy and in the form of promises of disarmament. In the end
members of the Committee were able in 1968 to agree on a text which was
accepted by the General Assembly in that same year (Resolution 2373
(XXII)) by a large majority with the recommendation that the member
states should sign and ratify it speedily (Muller, Fischer & Kotter 1994).
The basically regulative programme of the Treaty on the NonProliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) largely mirrors the factual
inequality of states in its distribution of rights and duties (Muller 1989:
282-7; Muller, Fischer & Kotter 1994). While it contains a broad limitation
of options for non-nuclear-weapon states, those with nuclear weapons
(for these purposes the USA, USSR, UK, France and China) were far less
restricted. The non-nuclear-weapon states were required 'not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices' (NPT, Article II). Thus the treaty meant a loss of
the nuclear-weapon option for those states which did not already possess
these weapons, whereas the nuclear-weapon states were only required 'not
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly' (Article I). At the same time the nuclear-weapon
states that signed and ratified the treaty undertook 'to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control' (Article VI). This linkage of the ban on horizontal proliferation
with the limit on vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons (nuclear arms
race of the superpowers), however, remained very tenuous. In reality,
despite repeated reminders by the non-nuclear-weapon states, and espeJ38
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contains inter alia recommendations that aim at increasing the efficiency of
peacekeeping. For example, the Panel recommends establishing a Peace
Building Commission that should coordinate the whole range of measures
running from early warning through preventive action' to post-conflict.
peace building (www.un.org/secureworldl).
Dynamics of arms procurement
By using the term 'dynamics of arms procurement' rather than that of the
'arms race' we want to emphasize that arms may be procured not only for
external but also for internal reasons. As noted above, the security
dilemma may result in the stimulation of arms procurement despite the
fact that the states involved would prefer an arms-control agreement
rather than an arms race. But here, too, matters are exacerbated by the
problem of limited transparency about armaments and the difficulty of
restoring one's physical existence once it is lost. What, and how, can international
organizations contribute to overcoming these obstacles to security
cooperation and therefore to the advent and stabilization of arms control?
To clarify these questions as precisely as possible we shall concentrate on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Policy programme of the UN
The UN is rather vague on how to limit the armaments dynamic. Precise
instructions about the size of arsenals, the legality of specific types of arms
or even the implementation of possible arms limitations are not referred to
in the Charter. A definition of disarmament and arms control programmes
is required. In Article 26 the Charter states that 'the Security Council shall
be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the Members of
the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of
armaments.' Due to the Security Council's blockage during the Cold War
the General Assembly assumed this task in its place, in accordance with
Article 11 of the Charter, by discussing the principles for disarmament and
the regulation of armaments and by making recommendations.
As early as 1945 an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy as
well as on complete nuclear disarmament was requested and discussed
within the United Nations. The first initiative to create norms and rules to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was taken to the General
Assembly in 1958 by Ireland, but met with no support. Following a
further Irish initiative in 1961, the General Assembly unanimously
endorsed the goal of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 111
--------------~._--~---_ ... - - - Security
139
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -----~------
140 International Organizations
cially the developing countries of the South, the ban on vertical proliferation
was only realized in part (for example in the SALT and START treaties
as well as in the INF treaty) (Marin Bosch 1999: 381ff.).In this sense the
commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to concrete arid verifiable steps
to disarmament, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) negotiated
in 1996, represented an important precondition for the unlimited
extension of the NPT in May 1995 (Muller 2002: 169ft). However, the
test-ban treaty has still not entered into force since two recognized nuclear
powers, the USA and China, stubbornly refuse to ratify it. The same holds
for the unofficial nuclear powers - Israel, India and Pakistan.
Besides the promise to disarm, nuclear-weapon states were able to tie
non-nuclear-weapon states to the NPT with the promise to drop the policy
of refusing to transfer nuclear technology as a weapons-non-proliferation
strategy. They guaranteed the nuclear have-riots participation in the international
civilian nuclear trade on the basis of equal opportunity (Article
IV). However, the treaty requires safeguards for the civilian nuclear trade
'with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' (Article III, paragraph
1). For their part the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves
only to trade in nuclear matters with those non-nuclear-weapon states
which have accepted the supervision measures (Article III, paragraph 2).
Operations of the IAEA
To avoid the norms and rules of the NPT remammg a dead letter, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was given the task of
assuming the operational activities necessary for implementation. To
implement the policy programme, its content needed to be specified.
In order to specify which nuclear source materials and installations
could be exported by states, a list of nuclear goods, the export of which
presupposed supervision measures by the IAEA in the importing country,
was negotiated in the NPT Exporters Committee of the IAEA, the
'Zangger Committee' (named after its first chairman, the Swiss, Claude
Zangger). The Zangger Committee was composed of the main exporters of
nuclear technology and was supposed to lead to a harmonization of their
export practices to prevent goods suitable for the production of nuclear
weapons from being passed on without safeguards (Inventory of
International Non-proliferation Organizations and Regimes 2000: 36ff.).
However, it was not until 1974 that the nuclear supplier states reached the
first, very general and limited agreement about their nuclear export policy
(the 'trigger' list, published as IAEA document INFCIRCl209). In the same
year India detonated a nuclear device. In 1975 strict export guidelines and
Security 141
the need for greater care in exporting nuclear technology were agreed
upon. However, coordination took place outside the framework of the
IAEA in an export cartel of supplier countries of nuclear technologies, 'the
London Suppliers Club' (Spector 2002: 127-8). Their strategy of refusing
technology transfer to potential nuclear states among the developing countries
of the South had its basic weaknesses. On the one hand, it led to open
discrimination between the countries importing nuclear technologies. On
the other hand, adherence to these agreements was left to the discretion of
the supplying countries since they had not decided on any supervision of
export practices.
Due to this tack of control the nuclear supplier states could keep
exporting nuclear technologies without running the risk of discovery. This
practice became evident with the disclosure of the clandestine nuclear
weapons programme of Iraq (Spector 2002: 128-9) that had obtained
from abroad a large part of the installation materials required, by purchasing
them from states that dispose of nuclear technology. The discovery
of Iraq's nuclear-weapons programme led members of the London
Suppliers Club to renegotiate the obsolete export guidelines. They gave
special consideration to those regulations concerning the export of dualuse
technology, that is nuclear installations and materials suitable for both
military and civilian application.
The specification and implementation of the export-control norms of the
NPT, enjoying limited success and neglected for a long time, stand in contrast
to the largely successful specification and implementation of the safeguard
norms by the IAEA. Unlike the negotiations for export-control
guidelines, the elaboration of the safeguards, the core of the operational
implementation of the programme of non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, proceeded relatively quickly (Chellaney 1999: 380ft). Even
before the coming into force of the NPT, the IAEA had safeguards at its
disposal in the form of the model safeguards agreements INFCIRCl26 and
INFCIRCl66, adopted by its Board of Governors in 1961 and 1966
respectively. A new model safeguards agreement INFCIRC/153 was
worked out only one year after the signing of the NPT in 1968. Coming
into force in 1970, the treaty retained its validity until the decision was
taken to proceed to a fundamental reform of the safeguards regime in
1995 and 1997.
According to INFCIRCl153 every non-nuclear-weapon state which has
concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA is obliged to notify the
IAEA of all facilities and materials deployed in the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. Furthermore, it must keep a record of nuclear materials for the
declared facilities, which enables verification of whether nuclear material
for peaceful uses has been diverted to military purposes. The new and so
far unique character of the safeguards is that the system of accounting for
142 International Organizations
.~-_._------ .~~~~
and control of all nuclear materials is being supervised by an international
organization, the IAEA. To this end the IAEA inspectors have the right to
check the declared facilities on site. Furthermore the IAEA has the right to
install instruments and surveillance equipment, such as cameras, at key
measurement points (den Dekker 2001: 274-97).
Despite these far-reaching control mechanisms, the safeguards system of
the IAEA did not provide complete protection against diversion of nuclear
fuel suitable for weapons. In practice the IAEA was not in a position to
verify whether a state had really declared all its facilities and the entire
nuclear source material of its nuclear activities. The loopholes in the safeguards
system of the IAEA became obvious in 1991 when a United
Nations Special Commission encountered signs of a substantial nuclear
weapons programme in Iraq. The country had made false declarations to
the IAEA concerning both its facilities and the available nuclear source
material (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 181).
In 1991 the Director-General of the IAEA formulated a reform programme
having three points. First, the organization was to gain unhindered
access to all suspicious facilities. Second, its inspectors should be
able to share their knowledge with the secret services. Third, the UN
Security Council was to cooperate with the IAEA to strengthen the sanctions
process. In 1997 the Board of Governors adopted a new model safeguards
agreement INFCIRCl540. Although the Director-General's wish for
unhindered access was not granted, the new model safeguards agreement
contains a substantial extension of member states' duty to report as well as
of the IAEA's inspection rights (Colijn 1998: 95-7; den Dekker 2001:
297-305; Loosch 2000).
The IAEA safeguards system can be seen as an important contribution to
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It represents a transparency rare
in the field of security. Supervision by the IAEA provides some guarantee
to the non-nuclear-weapon states that other non-nuclear-weapon states will
not gain an advantage in arms technology and procurement by diverting
nuclear energy from peaceful uses. Thus the safeguards system encourages
the expectation that there will not be a danger of being overtaken by other
states by renouncing one's own nuclear-weapon capacity (Beckman et al.
2000: 223). Only with such mutual expectations of security does the
option of renouncing nuclear weapons appear possible.
However, in the case of a breach of the NPT there is only a small chance
of imposing sanctions even if the Board of Governors of the IAEA can pass
this information to the UN Security Council. If the Security Council sees
the breach of contract as a threat to international peace and security, it has
the right to impose collective enforcement measures against the respective
state (Muller, Fischer & Kotter 1994). Yet this path has never been followed.
Even the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facilities in the wake of its
Security 143
defeat in the 1991 Gulf War was not a consequence of the sanctions
process of the NPT but a result of the outcome of the war and the related
ceasefire conditions as decreed by the UN Security Council (Resolution
687 (1991)).
Information activities of the IAEA
A central obstacle to cooperation in the field of security is the tendency of
states to keep secret such measures as are meant to guarantee their own
security. Where states are prepared to exchange sensitive information they
generally do this on the condition of confidentiality. Thus those international
organizations active in addressing arms-procurement questions tend
to serve as non-public exchange markets for confidential information. This
holds in particular for the 44 members (2005) of the London Suppliers
Club which has been criticized because of its extreme levels of secrecy. In
contrast to the London Suppliers Club, the IAEA functions as a public
information platform. Its annual Activity Report and the quarterly IAEA
Bulletin give information about the organization's programme and operations
concerning nuclear non-proliferation. Numerous information
brochures complement its publicity (www.iaea.org). In addition the organization
is at the centre of a worldwide network of researchers and experts
in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and of the peaceful uses of
nuclear technology. With the help of research institutes all over the world
and other international organizations, the IAEA maintains a multitude of
numerical, bibliographical and other databases. Finally, through its own
three laboratories and research institutes, the organization contributes to
the independent generation of information in the area of nuclear safety
and nuclear technologies. The results of research projects funded by the
IAEA are published.
Evaluation of the organizations outputs
The analysis of the outputs of the United Nations and the IAEA has shown
that these international organizations participate in the creation of cooperative
networks in the field of international security. They make an important
contribution on questions of arms procurement, especially in
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons between states (horizontal
proliferation). By concentrating on generating policy programmes, their
specification and implementation, and supervising adherence to rules with
the possibility of sanctions, the United Nations and the IAEA seek to
reduce the structural mistrust inherent in the security dilemma. It would be
144 International Organizations
---------------------
difficult to overestimate the value of the safeguards. They create an essen- tial
minimum transparency, thus strengthening international trust that
agreed norms and rules will be respected and followed. The discovery of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme raised doubts about the reliability of
the IAEA safeguards and led to a tightening of the rules. Yet the reform
remains incomplete in the face of the refusal of states like North Korea to
cooperate with the IAEA on the basis of the new model agreement
INFCIRC/540. Thus the strengthening of the sanctions mechanism is a
pressing task for the future. Although India, Israel and Pakistan have a
nuclear-weapons capability, the effectiveness of the United Nations' and
IAEA's non-proliferation regimes has to be recognized. Without their policy
programmes and their operational activities we would have to confront a
far greater number of nuclear-weapon states (Beckman er al. 2000: 222f£.).
However successful non-proliferation policy may have been regarding
horizontal proliferation, it was unable to halt the nuclear arms race of the
superpowers (vertical proliferation) (Beckman et al. 2000: 222). It was not
until the end of the Cold War that progress was made in this area.
However, any agreement about nuclear disarmament between the USSR
(and later Russia) and the USA was negotiated and reached outside the
United Nations. Furthermore, we must note that limitation of the proliferation
of nuclear weapons so far represents an exception in international
arms control. Efforts by the United Nations to put in place a system of
arms control for non-nuclear weapons had already failed at the stage of
policy programming. Only in the negotiations for a general treaty banning
chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWe), presented
for signature in 1993, was the United Nations able to give an important
forward impulse. The Convention came into force in April 1997, bringing
to life at the same time the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons which was intended to supervise the implementation of the treaty
regulations, including the destruction of existing chemical arsenals,
according to a fixed time plan. By the end of 2004 the organization had
undertaken over 1,800 inspections (www.opcw.org) and first evaluations
of its activities are positive (Zanders et al. 2001: 548).
Conclusion
Summarizing, we can say that the question of the dynamics of arms procurement,
with the exception of a few agreements, has been left largely to
a policy of self-help by states. Yet the few areas where regulation became
possible show, as in the case of nuclear non-proliferation, that international
organizations can and do make an important contribution to arms
control.
Chapter 9
Welfare and Economic Relations
In welfare and economic relations, as in security, there is a dilemma which
sets the parameters for cooperation. The welfare dilemma arises in an
international economy in which each state can, without the intervention of
a central authority, decide on its own trade and monetary policies. Thus
each state may try to increase its share of the economic pie by raising
tariffs, imposing import restrictions, or devaluing its currency. If, however,
all or most states seek to increase their share of the economic pie through a
policy of 'beggar thy neighbour', some may achieve a degree of short-term
success; in the long term, however, the shares will remain equal but the
overall pie will shrink. The welfare dilemma describes a social trap in
which trade or monetary policies aimed at increasing welfare for individual
states place both the community of states collectively and also each
state individually in a worse situation than would have been the case with
effective international cooperation.
Although there are structural similarities between the welfare and the
security dilemmas, nevertheless the conditions for international cooperation
are much better in the welfare and economic relations field. First, the
tendency of states to assess their own gains from cooperation in comparison
with those of others is less important. States usually assess whether
they gain in absolute terms and are less concerned that others might gain
even more than they do. While conflicts over the distribution of gains from
cooperation can be an obstacle to such cooperation, they are easier to
resolve than conflicts arising out of concerns over relative gains (Efinger,
Rittberger & Ziirn 1988: 92-7; Efinger & Ziirn 1990). Second, states are
more willing to trust in each other in the welfare and economic relations
field because it is easier to recoup losses than in the security field since
damage to material well-being is easier to correct. A third advantage in
international cooperation is the relatively high degree of transparency
inherent in this field. Since raising tariffs or the devaluation of a currency
are difficult to hide, states can trust in each other's cooperation more easily
than in the security field. Fourth, as in the field of security, special interest
groups, such as industry lobbies, can prevent states from engaging in international
cooperation. See Table 9.1.
Thus on the whole, the structural elements of the welfare and economic
relations field are characterized by a relatively limited element of distrust
when compared with the field of security. However, conflicts about the dis-
145