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ethical mission. Lagerkvist (1971) had
God reply to a question regarding his intention
in creating human beings with, "I
only intended that you need never be
content with nothing" (p. 65).
REFERENCES
Donagan. A. (1977). The theory of morality. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Hampshire, S. (1983). Morality and conflict. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hartshorne. H., & May, M. (1928). Studies in the
nature of character: Vol. I. Studies in deceit.
New York: Macmillan.
James, W. (1981). Principles of psychology (Vol. 2).
Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press.
(Original work published 1890)
Kochanska, G. (1991). Socialization and temperament
in the development of guilt and conscience.
Child Development, 62, 1379-1392.
Lagerqvist, P. (1971). The eternal smite. New York:
Hill & Wang,
Moore, G.E. (1959). Philosophical papers. London:
Allen & Unwin. (Original work published
1922)
Peirce, C.S. (1992). Reasoning and the logic of
things (K.L. Ketner, Ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Quine, W.V. (1981). Theories and things. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Shweder, R.A. (1985). Menstrual pollution, soul loss
and the comparative study of emotions. In A.
Kleinman & B. Goode (Eds.), Culture and depression
(pp. 182.-215). Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Commentary to Feature Review
THE FUTURE OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
Truth, Intuition, and the Pluralist Way
Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt
Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago
What are the recent theoretical developments in the
study of moral psychology? The publication of the Handbook
of Moral Behavior and Development (Kurtines &
Gewirtz, 1991) provides us with an excuse to assess the
state of the art. It also provides us with a chance to
engage in some augury (and perhaps influence the future)
by making an educated guess about where the discipline
is heading. We assess the current state of moral psychology
in the light of a history of conflicts along three theoretical
fronts: cognitivism versus emotivism, pluralism
versus monism, and intuitionism versus rationalism. We
foresee the consolidation of a cognitive-pluralistintuitionist
theory of moral psychology whose main tenet
is that moral appraisals (this is good, that is right) are
grounded in self-evident truths (intuitions), saturated
with local cultural meanings, and activated by means of
the emotions.
SOME PRINCIPALS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE ART
The 40 chapters contained in the Handbook make it
clear that the voice of Lawrence Kohlberg still dominates
the current scene. The reference lists contain 143 references
to Kohlberg's work, more than twice the number
for any other author. A survey of all entries in the
PsycLit data base under the descriptor "moral developAddress
correspondence to Richard A. Shweder, University of Chicago,
Cotntnittee on Human Development, 5730 South Woodlawn
Ave., Chicago, IL 60637.
ment" confirms this picture: Sixty percent of the entries
for 1991 either employ or criticize Kohlberg's theory and
methods.
Kohlberg's preeminence derives from the fact that in
the wake of the "cognitive revolution" of the 1960s, he
temporarily gained the upper hand over psychoanalysts,
radical relativists, and social learning theorists in the battle
between cognitivism and emotivism. Moral cognitivism
is the position that qualities such as goodness, rightness,
justice, or beneficence are real and knowable and
that moral statements can therefore be either true or false
(see Gewirth, 1984). A cognitivist approach to moral development
tries to identify the particular mix of intellectual
skills (e.g., perspective taking) and interpersonal experiences
(e.g., caretaking) that makes it possible to
apprehend or figure out moral truth. The basic point of
cognitivist theories of moral psychology is that everyday
moral appraisals (e.g., that the police officers in the Rodney
King video behaved in a morally repulsive way) can
be right or wrong; they are not subjective or inculcated
tastes, opinions, or attitudes, as emotivism would have it.
Kohlberg succeeded at driving home the cognitivist's
point about the objective reality of justice, which he
viewed as the supreme moral truth.
The most influential and widely cited critic of Kohlberg's
theory is Carol Gilligan. Gilligan's importance derives
from the fact that in the wake of the feminist revolution
of the 1970s, she temporarily gained the upper
hand over Kohlberg in the battle between pluralism and
monism. She can be credited with the claim that the
realm of moral truth is diverse, not homogeneous, and
consists of an ethics of care as well as an ethics ofjustice.
360 VOL. 4, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1993
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt
Finally, research on the importance of moral emotions
flourished during the 1980s, as the cognitive revolution
branched out into multiple skirmishes, including the battle
of intuitionism versus rationalism. Cognitive intuitionists
(e.g., Kagan, 1984; Lazarus, 1991) assume that moral
appraisals are generated rapidly and automatically, without
deliberate reflection or deductive or inductive reasoning.
They assume that verbaljudgments about actions
and goals (this is right, that is good) and morally relevant
emotional appraisals (pride, disgust, empathy, shame,
guilt, anger, dread) are grounded in a base set of nondeducible
and noninducible self-evident truths, for example,
that it is wrong to inflict pain arbitrarily, that it is
right to treat like cases alike, that it is right that wrongs
should be repaired.
Ironically, if the cognitive intuitionists win the day, the
emotions (reinterpreted as a rapid system of cognitive
appraisal) may well be restored to their rightful place in
the study of moral development. It is not just emotivists
who believe that "emotions may be the gatekeeper to the
moral world." Cognitive intuitionists believe it as well
(see Lucas, 1971; Moore, 1903/1966; Ross, 1930; Seung,
1993; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; also Strawson, 1949, p.
24, from whom the "gatekeeper" quote is drawn).
SOME PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
EMOTIVIST LEGACY OF DAVID HUME
Hume described the state of the art in moral philosophy
in 1777 (1777/1960). His description is astonishingly
accurate for moral psychology in 1993: "There has been
a controversy started of late . . . concerning the general
foundation of Morals; whether they be derived from Reason,
or from Sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge
of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and flner internal sense; whether like
all sound judgments of truth and falsehood, they should
be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether
like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be
found entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of
the human species" (p. 2). Hume believed there were
only two possible resolutions to this controversy concerning
the foundation of morals.
The first possible resolution is the cognitivist resolution,
that moral qualities are objective and universal qualities
of events in the world and can be apprehended by
means of reason through a "chain of argument and induction,"
and that moral appraisals can reasonably be
judged to be true or false.
The second possible resolution is the emotivist resolution,
that the moral qualities of events in the world do
not exist aside from people's sentimental reactions to
those events, including their feelings of approval and disapproval.
For emotivists, morality (like beauty) is in the
mind of the arbiter. Moral appraisals are not subject to
determinations of truth and falsehood, and cannot be
judged against rational standards. They are simply declarations
of preferences and values.
Given those two choices, Hume opted for emotivism.
Having ceded to reason nothing more than the instrumental
capacity to calculate the most efficient means for
achieving a given end, he argued that appraisals about
which ends in life are bad and which ones are good must
be rooted entirely in people's passions, interests, and
will. This led Hume to a series of breathtaking emotivist
conclusions, from which he had the intellectual courage
not to shrink: "Reason is and ought to only be the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office
than to serve and obey." "Reason alone can never be a
motive to any action of the will." "Tis not contrary to
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of my finger." (See Hume, 1739-1740/1969,
pp. 460-463.) In Hume's emotivism, ends may provide
the rational justiflcation of means, but nothing can provide
a rational justification of ends.
One can develop a cognitivist theory or an emotivist
theory about any kind of mental state. The distinction
between cognitivism and emotivism is not peculiar to the
study of moral appraisals. There are cognitivist theories
of the emotions and emotivist theories of inductive reasoning.
The mark of a cognitivist theory is the assumption
that mental states serve primarily a representational
function. The mark of an emotivist theory is the assumption
that mental states serve primarily nonrepresentational
functions. Cognitivist theories explain a mental
state by reference to facts or truths about the objects and
events which that mental state "re-presents" (sometimes
inaccurately), on the assumption that such objects and
events exist and can be invoked as extemal standards for
explaining and judging (as rational or irrational) mental
states. Emotivist theories explain the occurrence and
character of a mental state without assessing the veracity
of the mental state vis-a-vis the objects or events it represents,
on the assumption that no such objects and
events exist aside from the mental representation of
them.
Prior to the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, emotivist
theories of moral psychology flourished and were used
to explain the apparent diversity of moral appraisals
across history and culture (e.g., why eating beef isjudged
a sin in Delhi but not in Dallas). It was widely recognized
that moral disagreements are interminable. Emotivist
theories offered a simple explanation for why moral disputes
go on forever: There are no moral facts. Morality is
nothing more than a system of inculcated, reinforced, or
introjected values, evolved to serve some pragmatic
(nonrepresentational) function such as influencing people
to do what you want, coordinating social activities, or
balancing intrapsychic conflict anxiety.
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THE COGNITIVIST LEGACY OF
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG
It is a striking fact of intellectual history that emotivist
theories have nearly disappeared from the intellectual
landscape of moral psychology. This disappearance is
due largely to the bold formulations and fortunate timing
of Kohiberg (1969). Kohiberg argued that judgments
about the moral world could be true or false, better or
worse, just like judgments about the physical world.
When children learn to conserve mass in Piagetian tasks,
we do not hesitate to say they are developing a more
correct, adequate, and true understanding ofthe physical
world. Kohlberg's cognitivism employed the same logic
for moral judgments. Kohiberg drew on Rawls (1971) to
make philosophical claims about the superiority ofjustice
reasoning. He backed up these claims with longitudinal
and cross-cultural evidence that justice reasoning was in
fact the endpoint of moral development. Kohiberg made
the world safe for cognitivism.
Hume (and Kohiberg) saw only two possible resolutions
to the "controversy started of late . . . concerning
the general foundation of Morals." The cognitivist resolution
implied that morals "should be the same to every
rational intelligent being," at least upon sufficient reflection,
and "we attain the knowledge of [morals] by a chain
of argument and induction." Kohiberg endorsed both of
these propositions. But cognitivist theories come in many
varieties. Much of the recent work in moral psychology
can be seen as a challenge to one or the other of the two
propositions, from within the framework of a cognitivist
theory. Pluralists like GiUigan disagree with monists like
Kohiberg about the first proposition, and intuitionists like
Kagan disagree with rationalists like Kohiberg about the
second.
PLURALISM VERSUS MONISM
Moral appraisals seem to differ widely across people,
cultures, and historical periods. They differ at the level of
actions deemed morally obnoxious; in India, for example,
among Brahmans, it is highly immoral for a son to eat
meat or cut his hair during the 10 days that follow the
death of his father (see Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller,
1987/1990). Moral appraisals also differ in terms of the
moral qualities (e.g., rights, duty, care, sanctity) that are
salient injudging the rightness or goodness of an action or
goal.
Shweder (1984) described three strategies for dealing
with this apparent diversity across time and space. The
universalist strategy (exemplified by Elliot Turiel) is to
interpret apparent difference as superficial, and to seek
commonality in a more universal deep structure. The developmentalist
strategy (exemplified by Kohiberg) is to
acknowledge the existence of differences and to rank
them as stages, from primitive to advanced. Both of these
strategies are forms of moral monism, asserting that there
is only one correct or mature morality. In contrast, the
third strategy, moderate relativism, is a form of moral
pluralism, accepting that there can be more than one correct
and mature morality. GiUigan (1982) argued against
the prevailing monism of morality research in the 1970s,
which seemed to rank women as deficient in the one true
morality of justice.
Kohiberg and others have pointed out that the mere
existence of difference between groups is not evidence
that a measuring instrument is biased. We do not throw
out our measuring tapes when they tell us that women
are, on average, shorter than men. But Gilligan's (1982)
now-famous critique of her ex-advisor said more than
this. GiUigan asserted that people have two moral
"voices," or ways of talking and thinking about moral
issues. Kohiberg measured only the development of the
justice voice, ignoring (or missing the sophistication of)
the care voice. GiUigan found in narrative analyses that
American women use the care voice more than the justice
voice, while American men do the reverse, yet she noted
that both genders use both voices. However, studies of
moral reasoning in hypothetical dilemmas have generaUy
failed to find gender differences (Walker, 1991). Some
scholars think GiUigan misread the difference between
justice and care as a gender issue.
Whether the two moral voices are associated with the
two sexes or not, GiUigan has, by common consensus,
won the argument for pluraUsm. Kohiberg, Levine, and
Hewer (1983) acknowledged that there is more to the
moral domain than justice reasoning, and they specifically
cited an additional cluster of virtues including
"charity, love, caring, brotherhood, or community" (p.
19). This cluster is not homogeneous, however, and there
is ambiguity about how the ethics of care is to be conceptualized:
as a sensitivity to other people's needs? as
the particularistic side ofjustice in its guise as mercy? as
the role obligation of guardianship?
More recently, cultural psychologists have been exploring
forms of limited pluralism. The moral value of
justice may be recognized in some form in all cultures,
yet there are additional moral goods that are often used in
sophisticated (or "postconventional") ways to resolve
moral dilemmas. Japanese see a moral value in preserving
group harmony, even in some cases when justice
might be compromised (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Indians see a moral value in meeting one's social role
obligations, even when these may conflict with the demands
of justice (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Shweder &
Much, 1991; Snarey & Keljo, 1991; for a powerful theory
of limited pluraUsm, see Fiske, 1991, 1992).
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (in press; see
also Shweder, 1990) find that moral discourse tends.
362 VOL. 4, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1993
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Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt
cross-culturally, to make use of three distinct but coherent
clusters of moral concerns. These three ways of talking
about morality are labeled the ethics of autonomy
(concerns about freedom, rights, harm, and justice),
community (concerns about duty and the collective enterprise),
and divinity (concerns about purity, sanctity,
and the realization of one's spiritual nature). Haidt, Koller,
and Dias (in press) found that people of high and low
social class in Brazil and North America made differential
use of these three ethics when judging acts that were
harmless yet offensive (such as eating one's dead pet dog
or cleaning one's toilet with the national flag). And BalleJensen
(1993) has confirmed that North American college
students are unusual in their almost exclusive reliance on
the ethics of autonomy. Older Americans of the same
social class are more willing to talk about the moral issues
of community and divinity.
INTUITIONISM VERSUS RATIONALISM
(AND NATURALISM)
How exactly does one discover or figure out moral
truths? Hume described cognitivists as relying on a
"chain of argument and induction." But in fact one can
be a cognitivist yet hold any of three views on how people
acquire moral knowledge. One can be a cognitive rationalist,
a cognitive naturalist, or a cognitive intuitionist.
Theories of cognitive rationalism argue that knowledge
of moral truth comes from a process of argumentation
and deductive reasoning. Kant, for example, was a
cognitive rationalist. So was Kohiberg, who was a Kantian
as well. Both Kant and Kohiberg tried to counter
Hume's emotivism by grounding a cognitivist theory of
morals not in the instrumental means-ends reasoning that
Hume parodied so effectively, but rather in the principle
of consistency inherent in deductive reasoning. They proposed
a method for deducing right conduct from the logic
of noncontradiction, as in Kant's categorical imperative.
(The critiques of this famous and failed attempt to derive
substantive moral conclusions from a purely formal logical
principle are voluminous; see Seung, 1993).
Theories of cognitive naturalism, in contrast, argue
that the methods for acquiring knowledge of the moral
world are similar to the methods for acquiring knowledge
about the natural world: observation and inductive reasoning.
The idea is that actions that are right and outcomes
that are good exhibit certain defining properties,
which can be observed directly with the senses, much the
way one can observe the defining properties of a tiger.
Turiel is an eminent contemporary cognitive naturalist.
He argues that moral violations, such as murder, contain
intrinsic features, such as harm, which are directly observable
(Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987).
Most philosophers, however, are uncomfortable with
the idea that goodness or rightness or even harm is a
natural property (like redness) that anyone with a normal
sensory apparatus can see. Yet almost everyone allows
that appraisals of rightness and goodness are unavoidably
made about almost all of the actions that one does see.
How is this done? Cognitive intuitionists offer a third
kind of account.
Theories of cognitive intuitionism assume that moral
properties (e.g., rightness, goodness, gratitude, beneficence,
justice, sanctity, fraternity) are objective and
knowable but apprehended as self-evident truths. Such
theories assume that moral knowledge is distinct from
other forms of knowledge (knowledge of geometry,
knowledge of minerals, knowledge of how to build a
house) in that it cannot be derived solely from deductive
reason (e.g., a principle of consistency or universalizability)
or instrumental reason (e.g., knowledge of the most
efficient use of means to accomplish a given end) or inductive
reason (e.g., systematic observation ofthe natural
properties of objects and events in the world).
Theories of cognitive intuitionism assume that the
project of grounding moral appraisals in deductive, inductive,
or instrumental reason has failed. Such theories
assume that what this failure implies is not that emotivism
is right and objective moral qualities do not exist, but
rather that objective moral qualities are neither logical
properties nor observable properties. Theories of cognitive
intuitionism assume that moral qualities are objective
properties of a different kind, properties that are open to
the rational intuitive capacities of the human mind or
nervous system. They can be activated without refiection.
They are not dependent on deliberative reason or
argumentation to bring them on-line.
One attractive feature of cognitive intuitionism is that
it makes it possible to tell the following kind of story
about moral pluralism. Following Ross (1930), imagine
that the human mind has intuitive access to a plethora of
self-evident, abstract moral truths (e.g., fidelity, gratitude,
reciprocity, justice, beneficence, self-improvement).
These truths are so self-evident that if someone
were to deny that, for example, it is right to treat like
cases alike and different cases differently, you would suspect
either that they did not understand the meaning of
those words or that they were not sincere in their denial.
Yet there are too many such truths. They cannot all be
activated at once. They cannot be institutionalized simultaneously
in social practices. Some cultures specialize in
the truths of justice and fidelity, others in the truths of
duty and care, others in the truths of purity and pollution,
and so on.
Moreover, the various objective moral qualities open
to apprehension by the intuitive mind are only the abstract
"frames" or the "gross architecture" within which
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societies historically implement and develop their local
and quite divergent moral practices. Thus, for example,
although moral appraisals are grounded in an original
multiplicity of self-evident moral truths, it is not, on first
glance, immediately obvious to an Anglo-American observer
precisely why it is morally obnoxious for a Brahman
male in India to eat chicken or have a haircut in the
days immediately following the death of his father. The
case does become self-evident, however, once one recognizes
it for what it is: a powerful combination of reciprocity,
care, duty, nonmaifeasance, and other intuitively
available moral qualities.
To recognize the case for what it is, however, one
must know the kinds of things orthodox Hindus in India
know about death pollution. One must know about the
difficulties faced by a reincarnating soul in its attempt to
escape from the bondage of the corpse. One must know
about the ascetic techniques employed by living relatives
(abstaining from sex; fasting from all "hot" foods, such
as chicken) to facilitate the absorption of death pollution
into their own bodies as a form of assistance to the spirit
of the dead. One must know about the migration of pollutions
to the extremities of the body. One must know
how to remove the pollution by cutting off all head hair,
which is done only after the soul is on its way, typically
12 days after the death. In other words, historical and
cultural understanding is essential for moral appraisal,
yet there is always more to a moral appraisal (the intuition
of an abstract moral truth) than only historical and
cultural understanding can provide. Taken together,
however, moral intuitions and cultural-historical understanding
work hand in hand to turn the reality of a cognitive
moral pluralism into a credible theoretical possibil-
ity.
According to this cognitive-pluralist-intuitionist view,
there is such a thing as moral truth, and it is a heterogeneous
collection of goods, known through culturally assisted
intuition. The base set of abstract, self-evident
moral truths is universal but accessed differentially and
with particularizing substance.
A second attractive feature of cognitive intuitionism is
that it makes it possible to acknowledge the difference
between fast and slow cognitive processes, without assimilating
this difference to the distinction between "affect"
and "cognition." Moral reasoning, like any other
kind of explicit and conscious problem solving, is slow.
Yet moral intuition, like all intuitive knowledge, is rapid
and introspectively opaque. Margolis (1987) argued that
most of cognition consists of rapid, intuitive pattern
matching, followed (when people are called upon to explain
themselves) by slow, ex post facto propositional
reasoning. Applying this view to the study of moral development
suggests that cognitive rationalists such as
Kohiberg focused their attention on the slow, ex post
facto processes. These processes depend on verbal, deductive,
and inductive abilities, which improve throughout
childhood, accounting for Kohlberg's age trends. Yet
studies of moral intuition find few age trends. Turiel's
(1983) method can be reinterpreted as a way to probe
children about their moral intuitions (using a series of
yes/no questions), and studies that have used this method
typically find that 5-year-old children have intuitions similar
to those of adults within their own communities.
According to cognitive intuitionism, emotions are the
"gatekeeper to the moral world." Emotions "tell us how
the world is in a very vivid way" (D'Andrade, 1981, p.
191; also see Shweder, 1993). Emotional responses, it is
now generally thought, involve rapid, automatic, and unconscious
cognitive appraisals of the significance of
events for personal well-being. Lazarus (1991), for example,
has proposed a cognitive theory of the emotions in
which emotions serve a representational function. In
Lazarus's view, the emotions are mental maps of certain
kinds of truths. The experience of anger is a representation
of a certain kind of interpersonal event (e.g., a demeaning
personal insult) that exists both inside and outside
the anger, in the mental state and in the state of the
world that is represented emotionally.
Crucially, many ofthe cognitive appraisals that have
been postulated as causal conditions for an emotional
experience are quite similar to the self-evident truths of
morality. Anger is about injustice and the perception of a
demeaning personal insult. Sympathy is about harm and
suffering. Shame and guilt are about the right and the
good. Disgust is about degradation and human dignity.
(For more on the emotional basis of morality, see Haidt,
Koller, & Dias, in press; Hoffman, 1991; Kagan, 1984;
Solomon, 1976).
Kagan (1984) has long argued that moral psychology
should pay more attention to the emotions: "Beneath the
extraordinary variety of surface behavior and consciously
articulated ideals, there is a set of emotional
states that form the bases for a limited number of universal
moral categories that transcend time and locality" (p.
119). In other words, if cognitive intuitionism gains the
upper hand over cognitive rationalism, we will soon recognize
what many peoples of the world have been telling
anthropologists for a long time: The mind ofthe moralist
is located in the heart, which is, paradoxically, a cognitive
organ, and it is through the heart that we come to
know moral truth(s). That is our augury.
Acknowledgments—This essay was developed with support from the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Health Program
Research Network for Successful Midlife Development
(MIDMAC).
364 VOL. 4, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1993
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt
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