 
AS A MATTER OF
FACT: EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON
ETHICS
 .  
 . 
Too many moral philosophers and commentators on moral philosophy . . . have
been content to invent their psychology or anthropology from scratch. . . .
(S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice)
. Introduction
Regarding the assessment of Darwall and colleagues, we couldn’t agree more: Far
too many moral philosophers have been content to invent the psychology or
anthropology on which their theories depend, advancing or disputing empirical
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
claims with little concern for empirical evidence. We also believe—and we expect
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton would agree—that this empirical complacency has
impeded progress in ethical theory and discouraged investigators in the biological,
behavioural, and social sciences from undertaking philosophically informed
research on ethical issues.
We realize that some moral philosophers have taken there to be good reasons for
shunning empirical inquiry. For much of the twentieth century, many working in
analytic ethics—variously inspired by Hume’s (: ) pithy injunction against
inferring ought from is and the seductive mysteries of Moore’s (, esp. –)
‘Open Question Argument’—maintained that descriptive considerations of the
sort adduced in the natural and social sciences cannot constrain ethical reflection
without vitiating its prescriptive or normative character (e.g. Stevenson :
–; R. M. Hare : –). The plausibility of such claims is both debated and
debatable, but it is clear that they have helped engender suspicion regarding ‘naturalism’
in ethics, which we understand, broadly, as the view that ethical theorizing
should be an (in part) a posteriori inquiry richly informed by relevant empirical
considerations.¹ Relatedly, this anti-naturalist suspicion enables disciplinary xenophobia
in philosophical ethics, a reluctance to engage research beyond the philosophical
literature. The methodology we advocate here—a resolutely naturalistic
approach to ethical theory squarely engaging the relevant biological, behavioural,
and social sciences—flouts both of these anxieties.
Perhaps those lacking our equanimity suspect that approaches of the sort we
endorse fail to heed Stevenson’s (: ) advice that ‘Ethics must not be psychology’,
and thereby lapse into a noxious ‘scientism’ or ‘eliminativism’. Notoriously,
Quine (: ) advocated eliminativism in his rendering of naturalized epistemology,
urging philosophical ‘surrender of the epistemological burden to psychology’.
Quine was sharply rebuked for slighting the normative character of epistemology
(e.g. Kim ; Stich a), but we are not suggesting, in a rambunctiously Quinean
spirit,‘surrender of the ethical burden to psychology’. And so far as we know, neither
is anyone else. Ethics must not—indeed cannot—be psychology, but it does not
follow that ethics should ignore psychology.
The most obvious, and most compelling, motivation for our perspective is simply
this: It is not possible to step far into the ethics literature without stubbing one’s toe
on empirical claims. The thought that moral philosophy can proceed unencumbered
by facts seems to us an unlikely one: There are just too many places where answers to
important ethical questions require—and have very often presupposed—answers to
empirical questions.
A small but growing number of philosophers, ourselves included, have become
convinced that answers to these empirical questions should be informed by systematic
¹ Compare Railton’s (: –) ‘methodological naturalism’.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
empirical research.² This is not to say that relevant information is easy to come by: the
science is not always packaged in forms that are easy on the philosophical digestion.As
Darwall et al. (:  ff.) caution, one won’t often find ‘a well-developed literature in
the social sciences simply awaiting philosophical discovery and exploitation’. Still, we
are more optimistic than Darwall and colleagues about the help philosophers can
expect from empirical literatures: science has produced much experimental and theoretical
work that appears importantly relevant to ongoing debates in ethical theory,
and some moral philosophers have lately begun to pursue empirical investigations. To
explore the issues fully requires far more space than is available here; we must content
ourselves with developing a few rather programmatic examples of how an empirically
sensitive philosophical ethics might proceed.
Our point is not that reference to empirical literatures can be expected, by itself,
to resolve debates in moral theory. Rather, we hope to convince the reader that these
literatures are often deeply relevant to important debates, and it is therefore intellectually
irresponsible to ignore them. Sometimes empirical findings seem to
contradict what particular disputing parties assert or presuppose, while in other
cases, they appear to reconfigure the philosophical topography, revealing that
certain lines of argument must traverse empirically difficult terrain. Often, philosophers
who follow these challenging routes will be forced to make additional empirical
conjectures, and these conjectures, in their turn, must be subject to empirical
scrutiny. The upshot, we conclude, is that an intellectually responsible philosophical
ethics is one that continuously engages the relevant empirical literature.
. Character
In the second half of the twentieth century the‘ethics of virtue’became an increasingly
popular alternative to the Kantian and utilitarian theories that had for some time
dominated normative ethics. In contrast to Kantianism and utilitarianism, which
despite marked differences share an emphasis on identifying morally obligatory
actions, virtue-centred approaches emphasize the psychological constitution, or
character, of actors. The central question for virtue ethics, so the slogan goes, is not
what sort of action to do, but what sort of person to be.³ As Bernard Williams
² See Gibbard (: –); Flanagan (); Goldman (); Johnson (); Stich (b);
Railton (); Blackburn (: –); Bok (); Doris (, , ); Becker (); Campbell
(); Harman (, ); Merritt (, ); Doris and Stich (); Woolfolk and Doris ().
³ The notion that character is evaluatively independent of or prior to action is sometimes thought
to be the distinctive emphasis of virtue ethics (see Louden : ; Watson : –). But this is
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
(: ) has eloquently reminded us, the ‘aims of moral philosophy, and any hopes
it may have of being worth serious attention, are bound up with the fate of
Socrates’ question’ How should one live?, and it has seemed to many philosophers,
not least due to Williams’s influence, that any prospects for a satisfying answer
rest with the ethics of character. Allegedly, if ethical reflection is to help people
understand and improve themselves and their relations to others, it must be
reflection focused on the condition and cultivation of character (see Williams
: –).
Virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian guises that dominate the field,
typically presupposes a distinctive account of human psychology. Nussbaum (:
), although she insists that the moniker ‘virtue ethics’ has been used to tag such
a variety of projects that it represents a ‘misleading category’, observes that
approaches so titled are concerned with the ‘settled patterns of motive, emotion,
and reasoning that lead us to call someone a person of a certain sort (courageous,
generous, moderate, just, etc.)’. If this is a fair characterization—and we think it
is—then virtue ethics is marked by a particular interest in moral psychology, an
interest in the cognitive, affective, and emotional patterns that are associated with
the attribution of character traits.⁴ This interest looks to be an empirical interest,
and it’s natural to ask how successfully virtue ethics addresses it.
The central empirical issue concerns, to borrow Nussbaum’s phrase, ‘settled
patterns’ of functioning. According to Aristotle, genuinely virtuous action proceeds
from ‘firm and unchangeable character’ rather than from transient motives (:
a
–b
); while the good person may suffer misfortune that impairs his activities
and diminishes happiness, he ‘will never (oudepote) do the acts that are hateful and
mean’ (: b
–; cf. b
; cf. Cooper :  ff.).⁵ In an influential contemporary
exposition, McDowell (: –) argued that considerations favouring
vicious behaviour are ‘silenced’ in the virtuous person; although such an individual
may recognize inducements to vice, she will not count them as reasons for action.
As we understand the tradition, virtues are supposed to be robust traits; if a person
has a robust trait, she can be confidently (although perhaps not with absolute
certainty) expected to display trait-relevant behaviour across a wide variety of
not plausibly understood to mean that virtue ethics is indifferent regarding questions of what to do;
the question of conduct should be of substantial importance on both virtue- and action-centred
approaches (see Sher : –).
⁴ Nussbaum (: ) observes that Kantian and utilitarian approaches may share virtue ethics’
interest in character. Space prohibits discussion, but if Nussbaum were right, our argument would
have more sweeping implications than we contemplate here.
⁵ In Aristotle’s view, the virtues are hexeis (: a
–), and a hexis is a disposition that is ‘permanent
and hard to change’ (: b
–a
). This feature of Aristotle’s account is emphasized by
commentators: Sherman (: ) says that for Aristotle (as well as for us) character traits explain why
‘someone can be counted on to act in certain ways’ (cf. Woods : ; Annas : ; Audi : ;
Cooper : ).
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
trait-relevant situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally
conducive to such behaviour (Doris : ).⁶
Additionally, some philosophers have supposed that character will be evaluatively
integrated—traits with associated evaluative valences are expected to co-occur in
personality (see Doris : ; Flanagan : –). As Aristotle (:
b
–a
; cf. Irwin : –) has it, the virtues are inseparable; given the
qualities of practical reason sufficient for the possession of one virtue, one can
expect to find the qualities of practical reason sufficient for them all.
While understandings of character and personality akin to those just described
have been hotly contested in psychology departments at least since the critiques
of Vernon (), Mischel (), and Peterson (), moral philosophers
have not been especially quick in taking the matter up. Flanagan’s () careful
discussion broached the issue in contemporary analytic ethics, while Doris (,
) and Harman (, ) have lately pressed the point less temperately:
although they manifest some fraternal disagreements, Harman and Doris both
insist that the conception of character presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically
inadequate.
The evidence for this contention, often united under the theoretical heading of
‘situationism’, has been developed over a period of some seventy years, and includes
some of the most striking research in the human sciences.
G Mathews and Canon (: –) found subjects were five times more likely
to help an apparently injured man who had dropped some books when ambient
noise was at normal levels than when a power lawnmower was running nearby
( per cent v.  per cent).
G Darley and Batson (: ) report that passers-by not in a hurry were six
times more likely to help an unfortunate who appeared to be in significant
distress than were passers-by in a hurry ( per cent v.  per cent).
G Isen and Levin (: ) discovered that people who had just found a dime
were twenty-two times more likely to help a woman who had dropped some
papers than those who did not find a dime ( per cent v.  per cent).
G Milgram () found that subjects would repeatedly ‘punish’ a screaming
‘victim’ with realistic (but simulated) electric shocks at the polite request of an
experimenter.
G Haney et al. () describe how college students role-playing in a simulated
prison rapidly descended to Lord of the Flies barbarism.
There apparently exists an alarming disproportion between situational input and
morally disquieting output; it takes surprisingly little to get people behaving in
⁶ This follows quite a standard theme in philosophical writings on virtue and character. For example,
Blum (: –) understands compassion as a trait of character typified by an altruistic attitude
of ‘strength and duration’, which should be ‘stable and consistent’ in prompting beneficent action
(cf. Brandt : ; Dent : ; McDowell : –; Larmore : ).
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
morally undesirable ways. The point is not that circumstances influence behaviour,
or even that seemingly good people sometimes do lousy things. No need to stop the
presses for that. Rather, the telling difficulty is just how insubstantial the situational
influences effecting troubling moral failures seem to be; it is not that people fall short
of ideals of virtue and fortitude, but that they can be readily induced to radically fail
such ideals.
The argument suggested by this difficulty can be outlined as follows: A large body
of research indicates that cognition and behaviour are extraordinarily sensitive to
the situations in which people are embedded. The implication is that individuals—
on the altogether plausible assumption that most people will be found in a range
of situations involving widely disparate cognitive and behavioural demands—are
typically highly variable in their behaviour, relative to the behavioural expectations
associated with familiar trait categories such as honesty, compassion, courage, and
the like. But if people’s behaviour were typically structured by robust traits,
one would expect quite the opposite: namely, behaviour consistent with a given
trait—e.g. behaviour that is appropriately and reliably honest, compassionate, or
courageous—across a diversity of situations. It follows, according to the argument,
that behaviour is not typically structured by the robust traits that figure centrally in
virtue-theoretic moral psychology. Analogous considerations are supposed to make
trouble for notions of evaluative integration; the endemic lack of uniformity in behaviour
adduced from the empirical literature undermines expectations of integrated
character structures.
The situationist argument has sometimes been construed by philosophers as
asserting that character traits ‘do not exist’ (Flanagan : ; Athanassoulis :
–; Kupperman : ), but this is a misleading formulation of the issue.7
In
so far as to deny the existence of traits is to deny the existence of persisting dispositional
differences among persons, the claim that traits do not exist seems unsustainable,
and the exercise of refuting such a claim idle. (Indeed, it is a claim that even
psychologists with strong situationist sympathies, e.g. Mischel : –, seem at
pains to disavow.) The real issue dividing the virtue theorist and the situationist
concerns the appropriate characterization of traits, not their existence or nonexistence.
The situationist argument that needs to be taken seriously, and which to
our mind stands unrefuted, holds that the Aristotelian conception of traits as
robust dispositions—the sort which lead to trait-relevant behaviour across a wide
variety of trait-relevant situations—is radically empirically undersupported. To
⁷ Part of the reason for this error may be some spirited rhetoric of Harman’s (e.g. the title of
Harman : ‘The Nonexistence of Character Traits’). But Harman repeatedly offers qualifications
that caution against it; he voices scepticism about the existence of ‘ordinary character traits of the sort
people think there are’ (: ) and ‘character traits as ordinarily conceived’ (: ; our italics).
This is to reject a particular conception of character traits, not to deny that character traits exist. For
his part, Doris (: ; : –) quite explicitly acknowledges the existence of traits, albeit traits
with less generalized effects on behaviour than is often supposed.
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put the ethical implications of this a bit aggressively, it looks as though attribution
of robust traits like virtues may very well be unwarranted in most instances,⁸ programmes
of moral education aimed at inculcating virtues may very well be futile,
and modes of ethical reflection focusing moral aspirations on the cultivation of
virtue may very well be misguided.
At this point, the virtue theorist may offer one of two responses. She can accept
the critics’ interpretation of the empirical evidence while denying that her
approach makes empirical commitments of the sort the evidence indicates is
problematic. Or she can allow that her approach makes commitments in empirical
psychology of the sort that would be problematic if the critics’ interpretations of
the evidence were sustainable, but deny that the critics have interpreted the
evidence aright. The first option, we might say, is ‘empirically modest’ (see Doris
: –): because such renderings make only minimal claims in empirical psychology,
they are insulated from empirical threat. The second option, conversely, is
‘empirically vulnerable’ (see Railton : –): it makes empirical claims with
enough substance to invite empirically motivated criticism.
We shall first discuss empirically modest rejoinders to the situationist critique.
Numerous defenders of virtue ethics insist that virtue is not expected to be widely
instantiated, but is found in only a few extraordinary individuals, and these writers
further observe that this minimal empirical commitment is quite compatible with
the disturbing, but not exceptionlessly disturbing, behaviour in experiments like
Milgram’s (see Athanassoulis : –; DePaul ; Kupperman : –).
The critics are bound to concede the point, since the empirical evidence cannot
show that the instantiation of virtue in actual human psychologies is impossible; no
empirical evidence could secure so strong a result. But so construed, the aspirations
of virtue ethics are not entirely clear; if virtue is expected to be rare, it is not obvious
what role virtue theory could have in a (generally applicable) programme of moral
education.⁹ This rings a bit odd, given that moral education—construed as aiming
for the development of the good character necessary for a good life—has traditionally
been a distinctive emphasis in writing on virtue, from Aristotle (:
b
–, b
–) to Bennett (: –; cf. Williams : ). Of course, the
rarity of virtue might be thought a contingent matter; given the appropriate
modalities of moral education, the virtue ethicist might say, virtue can be widely
inculcated. But philosophers, psychologists, and educators alike have tended to be a
bit hazy regarding particulars of the requisite educational processes; theories of moral
⁸ The difficulty is not limited to rival academic theories; there is a large body of empirical evidence
indicating that everyday ‘lay’ habits of person perception seriously overestimate the impact of individual
dispositional differences on behavioural outcomes. For summaries, see Jones (); Ross and
Nisbett (: –); Gilbert and Malone (); Doris (: –).
⁹ Of course, if the virtue theorist is an elitist, this need not trouble her. But while historical writers
on the virtues have at times manifested elitist sympathies (Aristotle : a
–, a
–b
; Hume
: –), this is not a sensibility that is typically celebrated by contemporary philosophers.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
education, and character education in particular, are typically not supported by large
bodies of systematic research adducing behavioural differences corresponding to
differing educational modalities (Leming a,b; Hart and Killen : ; Doris
: –).
It is tempting to put the situationist point a bit more sharply. It is true that the
evidence does not show that the instantiation of virtue in actual human psychologies
is impossible. But it also looks to be the case that the available systematic
empirical evidence is compatible with virtue being psychologically impossible (or
at least wildly improbable), and this suggests that the impossibility of virtue is an
empirical possibility that has to be taken seriously. So while the evidence doesn’t
refute an empirically modest version of virtue ethics, it is plausibly taken to suggest
that the burden of argument has importantly shifted: The advocate of virtue ethics
can no longer simply assume that virtue is psychologically possible. If she can’t
offer compelling evidence—very preferably, more than anecdotal evidence—
favouring the claim that virtue is psychologically possible, then she is in the awkward
position of forwarding a view that would be undermined if an empirical
claim which is not obviously false were to turn out to be true, without offering
compelling reason to think that it won’t turn out to be true.
Suppose the realization of virtue were acknowledged to be impossible: it might
yet be insisted that talk of virtue articulates ethical ideals that are well suited—
presumably better suited than alternatives, if virtue ethics is thought to have distinctive
advantages—to facilitating ethically desirable conduct (see Blum :
–). Asserting such a practical advantage for virtue ethics entails an empirical
claim: reflection on the ideals of virtue can help actual people behave better. For
example, it might be claimed that talk of virtue is more compelling, or has more
motivational‘grip’, than abstract axiological principles. We know of little systematic
evidence favouring such claims, and we are unsure of what sort of experimental
designs are fit to secure it, but the only point we need to insist on is that even this
empirically modest rendering of virtue ethics may bear contentious empirical commitments.
If virtue ethics is alleged to have practical implications, it cannot avoid
empirical assertions regarding the cognitive and motivational equipment with
which people navigate their moral world.
Even without an answer to such practical questions, it might be thought that
virtue ethics is fit to address familiar conceptual problems in philosophical ethics,
such as rendering an account of right action. In Hursthouse’s (: ; cf. –)
account of virtue ethics, ‘An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would
characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances.’ Hursthouse
(: –, , ) further insists that an action does not count as‘morally motivated’
simply by dint of being the sort of thing a virtuous person does, done for
reasons of the sort the virtuous person does it for; it must proceed ‘from virtue’,
that is, ‘from a settled state of good character’. If this requirement is juxtaposed
with the observation that the relevant states of character are extremely rare, as an
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
empirically modest rendering of virtue ethics maintains, we apparently get the
result that ‘morally motivated’ actions are also extremely rare (a virtue-theoretic
result, interestingly, with which Kant would have agreed). This need not trouble
Hursthouse (: –); she seems to allow that very often—perhaps always—
one sees only approximations of moral motivation. It does trouble us. We think
that less than virtuous people, even smashingly less than virtuous people, sometimes
do the right thing for the right reasons, and these actions are fit to be honoured as
‘morally motivated’. It may not happen as often as one would like, but morally
motivated conduct seems to happen rather more frequently than one chances on
perfect virtue. Oskar Schindler, the philandering war profiteer whorescued
thousands of Jews from the Nazis, is a famous example of the two notions coming
apart (see Kenneally ), but with a little attention to the history books, we can
surely adduce many more. The burden of proof, it seems to us, is on those asserting
that such widely revered actions are not morally motivated.
There are also serious questions about the competitive advantages enjoyed by
empirically modest virtue ethics. It has seemed to many that a chief attraction of
character-based approaches is the promise of a lifelike moral psychology—a less wooden
depiction of moral affect, cognition, motivation, and education than that offered by
competing approaches such as Kantianism and utilitarianism (Flanagan : ;
Hursthouse : –). Proponents of virtue ethics, perhaps most prominently
MacIntyre () and Williams (, ), link their approach—as Anscombe (:
–) did in a paper widely regarded as the call to arms for contemporary virtue
ethics—to prospects for more psychological realism and texture. We submit that this
is where a large measure of virtue ethics’ appeal has lain; if virtue ethicists had tended
to describe their psychological project along the lines just imagined, as deploying a
moral psychology only tenuously related to the contours of actual human psychologies,
we rather doubt that the view would now be sweeping the field.
We contend that for virtue ethics to retain its competitive advantage in moral
psychology it must court empirical danger by making empirical claims with enough
substance to be seriously tested by the empirical evidence from psychology. For
instance, the virtue theorist may insist that while perfect virtue is rare indeed, robust
traits approximating perfect virtue—reliable courage, temperance, and the rest—
may be widely inculcated, and perhaps similarly for robust vices—reliable cowardice,
profligacy, and so on.¹⁰ To defend such a position, the virtue theorist must
somehow discredit the critic’s empirical evidence. Various arguments might be
thought to secure such a result: (i) The situationist experiments might be methodologically
flawed; problems in experimental design or data analysis, for example,
might undermine the results. (ii) The experiments might fail standards of ecological
¹⁰ There is some question as to whether vices are expected to be robust in the way virtues are, but some
philosophers seem to think so: Hill (: –) apparently believes that calling someone weak-willed
marks characteristic patterns of behaviour.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
validity; the experimental contexts might be so distant from natural contexts as to
preclude generalizations to the ‘real world’. (iii) General conclusions from the experiments
might be prohibited by limited samples; in particular, there appears to be a
dearth of longitudinal behavioural studies that would help assess the role of character
traits ‘over the long haul’. (iv) The experiments may be conceptually irrelevant;
for example, the conceptions of particular traits operationalized in the empirical
work may not correspond to the related conceptions figuring in virtue ethics.
The thing to notice straight away is that motivating contentions like the four
above require evaluating a great deal of psychological research; making a charge stick
to one experiment or two, when there are hundreds, if not thousands, of relevant
studies, is unlikely to effect a satisfying resolution of the controversy. The onus, of
course, falls on both sides: just as undermining arguments directed at single experiments
are of limited comfort to the virtue theorist, demonstrating the philosophical
relevance of a lone study is not enough to make the critics’ day. Newspaper science
reporting notwithstanding, in science there is seldom, or never, a single decisive
experiment or, for that matter, a decisive experimental failure. General conclusions
about social science can legitimately be drawn only from encountering, in full
detail, a body of research, and adducing patterns or trends. Doris () has
recently attempted to approximate this methodological standard in a book-length
study, and he there concludes that major trends in empirical work support conclusions
in the neighbourhood indicated by the more programmatic treatments of Doris
() and Harman (, ). Whether or not one is drawn to this conclusion, we
think it clear that the most profitable discussion of the empirical literature will
proceed with detailed discussion of the relevant empirical work. If an empirically
vulnerable virtue ethics is to be shown empirically defensible, defenders must provide
much fuller consideration of the psychology. To our knowledge, extant defences of
virtue ethics in the face of empirical attack do not approximate the required breadth
and depth.¹¹ Hopefully, future discussions will rectify this situation, to the edification
of defenders and critics alike.
. Moral Motivation
Suppose a person believes that she ought to do something: donate blood to the Red
Cross, say, or send a significant contribution to an international relief agency. Does
it follow that she will be moved actually to act on this belief? Ethical theorists use
¹¹ For example, Kupperman () refers to nine items in the empirical literature in responding to
Harman, and Athanassoulis (), three.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
internalism to mark an important cluster of answers to this question, answers
maintaining that the motivation to act on a moral judgement is a necessary or
intrinsic concomitant of the judgement itself, or that the relevant motivation is
inevitably generated by the very same mental faculty that produces the judgement.¹²
One familiar version of internalism is broadly Kantian, emphasizing the role of
rationality in ethics. As Deigh (: ) characterizes the position,‘reason is both
the pilot and the engine of moral agency. It not only guides one toward actions in
conformity with one’s duty, but it also produces the desire to do one’s duty and can
invest that desire with enough strength to overrule conflicting impulses of appetite
and passion.’ A notorious difficulty for internalism is suggested by Hume’s (:
–) ‘sensible knave’, a person who recognizes that the unjust and dishonest acts
he contemplates are wrong, but is completely unmoved by this realization. More
recent writers (e.g. Nichols ) have suggested that the sensible knave (or, as
philosophers often call him, ‘the amoralist’) is more than a philosophical fiction,
since clinical psychologists and other mental heath professionals have for some time
noted the existence of sociopaths or psychopaths, who appear to know the difference
between right and wrong but quite generally lack motivation to do what is right. If
this understanding of the psychopath’s moral psychology is accurate, internalism
looks to be suffering empirical embarrassment.¹³
Internalists have adopted two quite different responses to this challenge, one
conceptual and the other empirical. The first relies on conceptual analysis to argue
that a person couldn’t really believe that an act is wrong if he has no motivation to
avoid performing it. For example, Michael Smith claims it is ‘a conceptual truth
that agents who make moral judgements are motivated accordingly, at least absent
weakness of the will and the like’ (Smith : ). Philosophers who adopt this
strategy recognize that imaginary knaves and real psychopaths may say that something
is ‘morally required’ or ‘morally wrong’ and that they may be expressing a
judgement that they sincerely accept. But if psychopaths are not motivated in the
appropriate way, their words do not mean what non-psychopaths mean by these
words and the concepts they express with these words are not the ordinary moral
concepts that non-psychopaths use. Therefore psychopaths ‘do not really make
moral judgements at all’ (Smith : ).
This strategy only works if ordinary moral concepts require that people who really
make moral judgements have the appropriate sort of motivation. But there is
¹² A stipulation: We refer to views in the neighbourhood of what Darwall (: ) calls ‘judgement
internalism’, the thesis that it is ‘a necessary condition of a genuine instance of a certain sort of
judgment that the person making the judgment be disposed to act in a way appropriate to it’. Space
limitations force us to ignore myriad complications; for more detailed discussion, see Svavarsdóttir
().
¹³ There is august precedent for supposing that the internalism debate has empirical elements. In
his classic discussion, Frankena (: ) observed that progress here requires reference to ‘the psychology
of human motivation’—‘The battle, if war there be, cannot be contained; its field is the whole
human world’. We hope that Frankena would have appreciated our way of joining the fight.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
considerable disagreement in cognitive science about whether and how concepts are
structured, and about how we are to determine when something is built into or
entailed by a concept (Margolis and Laurence ). Indeed, one widely discussed
approach maintains that concepts have no semantically relevant internal structure to
be analysed—thus there are no conceptual entailments (Fodor ). Obviously, internalists
who appeal to conceptual analysis must reject this account, and in so doing
they must take a stand in the broadly empirical debate about the nature of concepts.
Smith is one moral theorist who has taken such a stand. Following Lewis (,
), Jackson (), and others, Smith proposes that a concept can be analysed by
specifying the ‘maximal consistent set of platitudes’ in which the concept is
invoked; it is by ‘coming to treat those platitudes as platitudinous’, Smith (: )
maintains, that ‘we come to have mastery of that concept’. If this is correct, the conceptual
analysis defence of internalism requires that the maximally consistent set of
platitudes invoking the notion of a moral judgement includes a claim to the effect
that‘agents who make moral judgements are motivated accordingly’. Once again, this
is an empirical claim. Smith appeals to his own intuitions in its support, but it is of
course rather likely that opponents of internalism do not share Smith’s intuitions,
and it is difficult to say whose intuitions should trump.
In the interests of developing a non-partisan analysis, Nichols () has been
running a series of experiments in which philosophically unsophisticated
undergraduates are presented with questions like these:
John is a psychopathic criminal. He is an adult of normal intelligence, but he has no
emotional reaction to hurting other people. John has hurt, and indeed killed, other
people when he has wanted to steal their money. He says that he knows that hurting
others is wrong, but that he just doesn’t care if he does things that are wrong. Does
John really understand that hurting others is morally wrong?
Bill is a mathematician. He is an adult of normal intelligence, but he has no emotional
reaction to hurting other people. Nonetheless, Bill never hurts other people simply
because he thinks that it is irrational to hurt others. He thinks that any rational person
would be like him and not hurt other people. Does Bill really understand that hurting
others is morally wrong? (Nichols : )
Nichols’s preliminary results are exactly the opposite of what Smith would have
one expect. An overwhelming majority of subjects maintained that John, the
psychopath, did understand that hurting others is morally wrong, while a slight
majority maintained that Bill, the rational mathematician, did not. The implication
seems to be that the subjects’ concept of moral judgement does not typically include
a ‘motivational platitude’. These results do not, of course, constitute a decisive
refutation of Smith’s conceptual analysis, since Smith can reply that responses like
those Nichols reports would not be part of the maximally consistent set of
platitudes that people would endorse after due reflection. But this too is an empirical
claim; if Smith is to offer a compelling defence of it he should—with our
enthusiastic encouragement—adduce some systematic empirical evidence.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
A second internalist strategy for dealing with the problem posed by the amoralist
is empirical: even if amoralists are conceptually possible, the internalist may insist,
their existence is psychologically impossible. As a matter of psychological fact, this
argument goes, people’s moral judgements are accompanied by the appropriate
sort of motivation.¹⁴ A Kantian elaboration of this idea, on which we will focus,
maintains that people’s moral judgements are accompanied by the appropriate sort
of motivation unless their rational faculties are impaired. (We’ll shortly see that much
turns on the fate of the italicized clause.) Recent papers by Roskies (forthcoming)
and Nichols () set out important challenges to this strategy.
Roskies’ argument relies on Damasio and colleagues’ work with patients suffering
injuries to the ventromedial (VM) cortex (Damasio et al. ; Saver and Damasio
; Bechara et al. ). On a wide range of standard psychological tests, including
tests for intelligence and reasoning abilities, these patients appear quite normal.
They also do as well as normal subjects on Kohlberg’s tests of moral reasoning, and
when presented with hypothetical situations they offer moral judgements that concur
with those of normal subjects. However, these patients appear to have great difficulty
inacting in accordance with those judgements. As a result, although they
often led exemplary lives prior to their injury, their post-trauma social lives are a
shambles. They disregard social conventions, make disastrous business and personal
decisions, and often engage in anti-social behaviour. Accordingly, Damasio and his
colleagues describe the VM patients’ condition as ‘acquired sociopathy’ (Saver and
Damasio ).
Roskies maintains that VM patients do not act on their moral judgements
because they suffer a motivational deficit. Moreover, the evidence indicates that
these individuals do not have a general difficulty in acting on evaluative judgements;
rather, Roskies (forthcoming, ) maintains, action with respect to moral and social
evaluation is differentially impaired. In addition to the behavioural evidence, this
interpretation is supported by the anomalous pattern of skin-conductance
responses (SCRs) that VM patients display.¹⁵ Normal individuals produce an SCR
when presented with emotionally charged or value-laden stimuli, while VM
patients typically do not produce SCRs in response to such stimuli. SCRs are not
entirely lacking in VM patients, however. SCRs are produced when VM patients are
surprised or startled, for example, demonstrating that the physiological basis for
these responses is intact. In addition, their presence is reliably correlated with cases
in which patients’ actions are consistent with their judgements about what to do,
and their absence is reliably correlated with cases in which patients fail to act in
accordance with their judgements. Thus, Roskies contends, the SCR is a reliable
¹⁴ We prescind from questions as to whether the motivation need be overriding, although we suspect
formulations not requiring overridingness are more plausible.
¹⁵ SCR is a measure of physiological arousal, which is also sometimes called galvanic skin response,
or GSR.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
indicator of motivation. So the fact that VM patients, unlike normal subjects, do
not exhibit SCRs in response to morally charged stimuli suggests that their failure
to act in morally charged situations results from a motivational deficit.
On the face of it, acquired sociopathy confounds internalists maintaining that
the moral judgements of rational people are, as a matter of psychological fact, always
accompanied by appropriate motivation.¹⁶ Testing indicates that the general reasoning
abilities of these patients are not impaired, and even their moral reasoning seems
to be quite normal. So none of the empirical evidence suggests the presence of a
cognitive disability. An internalist might insist that these post-injury judgements are
not genuine instances of moral judgements because VM patients no longer know
the standard meaning of the moral words they use. But unless it is supported by an
appeal to a conceptual analysis of the sort we criticized earlier, this is a rather implausible
move; as Roskies notes, all tests of VM patients indicate that their language, their
declarative knowledge structures, and their cognitive functioning are intact. There
are, of course, many questions about acquired sociopathy that remain unanswered
and much work is yet to be done. However these questions get answered, the literature
on VM patients is one that moral philosophers embroiled in the internalism
debate would be ill advised to ignore; once again, the outcome of a debate in ethical
theory looks to be contingent on empirical issues.
The same point holds for other work on antisocial behaviour. Drawing on Blair’s
() studies of psychopathic murderers imprisoned in Great Britain, Nichols
() has recently argued that the phenomenon of psychopathy poses a deep and
complex challenge for internalism. Again, the general difficulty is that psychopaths
seem to be living instantiations of Hume’s sensible knave: although they appear to
be rational and can be quite intelligent, psychopaths are manipulative, remorseless,
and devoid of other-regarding concern. While psychopaths sometimes acknowledge
that their treatment of other people is wrong, they are quite indifferent about
the harm that they have caused; they seem to have no motivation to avoid hurting
others (R. D. Hare ).
Blair’s () evidence complicates this familiar story. He found that psychopaths
exhibit surprising deficits on various tasks where subjects are presented with
descriptions of ‘moral’ transgressions like a child hitting another child and ‘conventional’
transgressions like a child leaving the classroom without the teacher’s
permission. From early childhood, normal children distinguish moral from conventional
transgressions on a number of dimensions: they view moral transgressions
as more serious, they explain why the acts are wrong by appeal to different factors
(harm and fairness for moral transgressions, social acceptability for conventional
transgressions), and they understand conventional transgressions, unlike
moral transgressions, to be dependent on authority (Turiel et al. ; Nucci ).
¹⁶ Roskies herself does not offer acquired sociopathy as a counter-example to the Kantian version
of empirical internalism, but we believe the evidence is in tension with the Kantian view we describe.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
For example, presented with a hypothetical case where a teacher says there is no
rule about leaving the classroom without permission, children think it is OK to
leave without permission. But presented with a hypothetical where a teacher says
there is no rule against hitting other children, children do not judge that hitting is
acceptable. Blair has shown that while autistic children, children with Down
syndrome, and a control group of incarcerated non-psychopath murderers have relatively
little trouble in drawing the moral–conventional distinction and classifying
cases along these lines, incarcerated psychopaths are unable to do so.
This inability might be evidence for the hypothesis that psychopaths have a
reasoning deficit, and therefore do not pose a problem for internalists who maintain
that a properly functioning reasoning faculty reliably generates some motivation to
do what one believes one ought to do. But, as Nichols () has pointed out, the
issue cannot be so easily resolved, because psychopaths have also been shown to have
affective responses that are quite different from those of normal subjects. When
shown distressing stimuli (like slides of people with dreadful injuries) and threatening
stimuli (like slides of an angry man wielding a weapon), normal subjects exhibit
much the same suite of physiological responses. Psychopaths, by contrast, exhibit
normal physiological responses to threatening stimuli, but abnormally low physiological
responses to distressing stimuli (Blair et al. ). Thus, Nichols argues, it may
well be that the psychopath’s deficit is not an abnormalreasoning system, but an
abnormal affect system, and it is these affective abnormalities, rather than any rational
disabilities, that are implicated in psychopaths’ failure to draw the moral–
conventional distinction.¹⁷ If his interpretation is correct, it looks as though the
existence of psychopaths does undermine the Kantian internalist’s empirical generalization:
contra the Kantian, there exists a substantial class of individuals without
rational disabilities who are not motivated by their moral judgements.
We are sympathetic to Nichols’s account, but as in the case of VM patients, the
internalist is free to insist that a fuller understanding of psychopathy will reveal that
the syndrome does indeed involve rational disabilities. Resolving this debate will
require conceptual work on how to draw the boundary between reason and affect,
and on what counts as an abnormality in each of these domains. But it will also
require much more empirical work aimed at understanding exactly how
psychopaths and non-psychopaths differ. The internalist—or at least the Kantian
internalist—who wishes to diffuse the difficulty posed by psychopathy must proffer
an empirically tenable account of the psychopath’s cognitive architecture that locates
the posited rational disability. We doubt that such an account is forthcoming. But—
to instantiate once more our take-home message—our present point is that if
internalists are to develop such an account, they must engage the empirical literature.
¹⁷ Here Nichols offers support for the ‘sentimentalist’ tradition, which maintains that emotions (or
‘sentiments’) play a central role in moral judgement. For a helpful treatment of sentimentalism, see
D’Arms and Jacobson ().
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
. Moral Disagreement
Numerous contemporary philosophers, including Brandt (), Harman (:
–), Railton (a,b), and Lewis (), have proposed dispositional theories
of moral rightness or non-moral good, which ‘make matters of value depend on
the affective dispositions of agents’ (see Darwall et al. : –).¹⁸ The various
versions differ in detail,¹⁹ but a rendering by Brandt is particularly instructive.
According to Brandt (: –), ethical justification is a process whereby initial
judgements about particular cases and general moral principles are revised by
testing these judgements against the attitudes, feelings, or emotions that would
emerge under appropriately idealized circumstances. Of special importance on
Brandt’s (: –, –) view are what he calls ‘qualified attitudes’—the attitudes
people would have if they were, inter alia, () impartial, () fully informed
about and vividly aware of the relevant facts, and () free from any ‘abnormal’
states of mind, like insanity, fatigue, or depression.²⁰
As Brandt (: –) noted, much depends on whether all people would have
the same attitudes in ideal circumstances—i.e. on whether their attitudes would
converge in ideal circumstances. If they would, then certain moral judgements—
those where the idealized convergence obtains—are justified for all people, and
others—those where such convergence fails to obtain—are not so justified. But if
people’s attitudes generally fail to converge under idealized circumstances, qualified
attitude theory apparently lapses into a version of relativism, since any given moral
judgement may comport with the qualified attitudes of one person, and thus be
justified for him, while an incompatible judgement may comport with the attitudes
of another person, and thus be justified for her.²¹
Brandt, who was a pioneer in the effort to integrate ethical theory and the social
sciences, looked primarily to anthropology to help determine whether moral
attitudes can be expected to converge under idealized circumstances. It is of course
¹⁸ These views reflect a venerable tradition linking moral judgement to the affective states that people
would have under idealized conditions; it extends back to Hutcheson (), Hume (, ), and
Adam Smith .
¹⁹ A particularly important difference concerns the envisaged link between moral claims and affective
reactions. Firth (: –) and Lewis () see the link as a matter of meaning, Railton (b) as a
synthetic identity, and Brandt (: –) both as a matter of justification and, more tentatively, as a
matter of meaning.
²⁰ Brandt was a prolific and self-critical thinker, and the  statement may not represent his mature
views, but it well illustrates how empirical issues can impact a familiar approach to ethical theory. For
a helpful survey of Brandt’s career, see Rosati ().
²¹ On some readings, qualified attitude theories may end up a version of scepticism if attitudes
don’t converge under ideal circumstances. Suppose a theory holds ‘an action is morally right (or
morally wrong) iff all people in ideal conditions would judge that action is morally right (or morally
wrong)’. Then if convergence fails to obtain in ideal conditions, this theory entails that there are no
morally right (or morally wrong) actions.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
well known that anthropology includes a substantial body of work, such as the
classic studies of Westermarck () and Sumner (), detailing the radically
divergent moral outlooks found in cultures around the world. But as Brandt (:
–) recognized, typical ethnographies do not support confident inferences
about the convergence of attitudes under ideal conditions, in large measure because
they often give limited guidance regarding how much of the moral disagreement
can be traced to disagreement about factual matters that are not moral in nature,
such as those having to do with religious or cosmological views.
With this sort of difficulty in mind, Brandt () undertook his own
anthropological study of Hopi peoples in the American south-west, and found
issues for which there appeared to be serious moral disagreement between typical
Hopi and white American attitudes that could not plausibly be attributed to differences
in belief about non-moral facts. A notable example is the Hopi attitude
towards causing animals to suffer, an attitude that might be expected to disturb
many non-Hopis:‘[Hopi c]hildren sometimes catch birds and make“pets”of them.
They may be tied to a string, to be taken out and “played” with. This play is rough,
and birds seldom survive long. [According to one informant:] “Sometimes they get
tired and die. Nobody objects to this”’. (Brandt : ).
Brandt (: ) made a concerted effort to determine whether this difference
in moral outlook could be traced to disagreement about non-moral facts, but he
could find no plausible explanation of this kind; his Hopi informants didn’t believe
that animals lack the capacity to feel pain, for example, nor did they believe that
animals are rewarded for martyrdom in the afterlife. According to Brandt (:
), the Hopi do not regard animals as unconscious or insensitive; indeed, they
apparently regard animals as ‘closer to the human species than does the average
white man’. The best explanation of the divergent moral judgements, Brandt (:
) concluded, is a ‘basic difference of attitude’. Accordingly, although he cautions
that the uncertainties of ethnography make confident conclusions on this point
difficult, Brandt (: ) argues that accounts of moral justification like his
qualified attitude theory do end in relativism, since ‘groups do sometimes make
divergent appraisals when they have identical beliefs about the objects’.
Of course, the observation that persistent moral disagreement appears to
problematize moral argument and justification is not unique to Brandt. While the
difficulty is long familiar, contemporary philosophical discussion was spurred by
Mackie’s (: –) ‘argument from relativity’ or, as it is called by later writers, the
‘argument from disagreement’ (Brink : ; Loeb ). Such ‘radical’ differences
in moral judgement as are frequently observed, Mackie (: ) argued, ‘make it
difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths’.As we see it, the
problem is not only that moral disagreement often persists,but also that for important
instances of moral disagreement—such as the treatment of animals—it is obscure
what sort of considerations, be they methodological or substantive, could settle the
issues (see Sturgeon : ). Indeed, moral disagreement might be plausibly
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
expected to continue even when the disputants are in methodological agreement
concerning the appropriate standards for moral argument. One way of putting the
point is to say that application of the same method may, for different individuals or
cultures, yield divergent moral judgements that are equally acceptable by the lights of
the method, even in reflective conditions that the method countenances as ideal.²²
In contemporary ethical theory, an impressive group of philosophers are ‘moral
realists’ (see Railton, a,b; Boyd ; Sturgeon ; Brink ; M. Smith ).
Adherents to a single philosophical creed often manifest doctrinal differences, and
that is doubtless the case here, but it is probably fair to say that most moral realists
mean to resist the argument from disagreement and reject its relativist conclusion.
For instance, Smith’s (: ; cf. ) moral realism requires the objectivity of moral
judgement, where objectivity is construed as ‘the idea that moral questions have
correct answers, that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts,
that moral facts are determined by circumstances, and that, by engaging in moral
argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts are’. There’s a lot of
philosophy packed into this statement, but it looks as though Smith is committed
to the thought, contra our relativist, that moral argument, or at least moral argument
of the right sort, can settle moral disagreements. Indeed, for Smith (: ),
the notion of objectivity ‘signifies the possibility of a convergence in moral views’,
so the prospects for his version of moral realism depend on the argument from disagreement
not going through.²³ But can realists like Smith bank on the argument’s
failure?
Realists may argue that, in contrast to the impression one gets from the
anthropological literature, there already exists substantial moral convergence. But
while moral realists have often taken pretty optimistic positions on the extent of
actual moral agreement (e.g. Sturgeon : ; M. Smith : ), there is no
denying that there is an abundance of persistent moral disagreement. That is, on
many moral issues—think of abortion and capital punishment—there is a striking
failure of convergence even after protracted argument. The relativist has a ready
explanation for this phenomenon: moral judgement is not objective in Smith’s
sense, and moral argument cannot be expected to accomplish what Smith and
²² This way of putting the argument is at once uncontentious and contentious. It is uncontentious
because it does not entail a radical methodological relativism of the sort, say, that insists there is nothing
to choose between consulting an astrologer and the method of reflective equilibrium as an approach
to moral inquiry (see Brandt : –). But precisely because of this, the empirical conjecture that
moral judgements will not converge is highly contentious, since a background of methodological agreement
would appear to make it more likely that moral argument could end in substantive moral
agreement.
²³ Strictly speaking, a relativist need not be a ‘non-factualist’ about morality, since, for example, she
can take it to be a moral fact that it is right for Hopi children to engage in their fatal play with small
animals, and also take it to be a moral fact that it is wrong for American white children to do so. But
the factualist–relativist will probably want to reject Smith’s (: ) characterization of moral facts
as ‘facts about the reasons that we all share’.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
other realists think it can.²⁴ Conversely, the realist’s task is to explain away failures
of convergence; she must provide an explanation of the phenomena consistent
with it being the case that moral judgement is objective and moral argument is
rationally resolvable. For our purposes, what needs to be emphasized is that the relative
merits of these competing explanations cannot be fairly determined without
close discussion of actual cases. Indeed, as acute commentators with both realist
(Sturgeon : ) and anti-realist (Loeb : ) sympathies have noted, the
argument from disagreement cannot be evaluated by a priori philosophical means
alone; what’s needed, as Loeb observes, is ‘a great deal of further empirical research
into the circumstances and beliefs of various cultures’.
Brandt (: –) lamented that the anthropological literature of his day did
not always provide as much information on the exact contours and origins of
moral attitudes and beliefs as philosophers wondering about the prospects for
convergence might like. However, social psychology and cognitive science have
recently produced research which promises to further discussion; the closing
decades of the twentieth century witnessed an explosion of ‘cultural psychology’
investigating the cognitive and emotional processes of different cultures (Shweder
and Bourne ; Markus and Kitayama ; Ellsworth ; Nisbett and Cohen
; Nisbett ; Kitayama and Markus ). A representative finding is that East
Asians are more sensitive than Westerners to the field or context as opposed to the
object or actor in their explanations of physical and social phenomena, a difference
that may be reflected in their habits of ethical judgement. Here we will focus on some
cultural differences found rather closer to home, differences discovered by Nisbett and
his colleagues while investigating regional patterns of violence in the American North
and South. We argue that these findings support Brandt’s pessimistic conclusions
regarding the possibility of convergence in moral judgement.
The Nisbett group’s research can be seen as applying the tools of cognitive social
psychology to the ‘culture of honour’, a phenomenon that anthropologists have
documented in a variety of groups around the world. Although such peoples differ
in many respects, they manifest important commonalties:
A key aspect of the culture of honor is the importance placed on the insult and the necessity
to respond to it. An insult implies that the target is weak enough to be bullied. Since a
reputation for strength is of the essence in the culture of honor, the individual who insults
someone must be forced to retract; if the instigator refuses, he must be punished—with
violence or even death. (Nisbett and Cohen : )
According to Nisbett and Cohen (: –), an important factor in the genesis of
southern honour culture was the presence of a herding economy.Apparently, honour
cultures are particularly likely to develop where resources are liable to theft, and
²⁴ See Williams (: ):‘In a scientific inquiry there should ideally be convergence on an answer,
where the best explanation of the convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how things
are; in the area of the ethical, at least at high level of generality, there is no such coherent hope’.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
where the state’s coercive apparatus cannot be relied upon to prevent or punish
thievery. These conditions often occur in relatively remote areas where herding is
the main viable form of agriculture; the ‘portability’ of herd animals makes them
prone to theft. In areas where farming rather than herding is the principal form of
subsistence, cooperation among neighbours is more important, stronger government
infrastructures are more common, and resources—like decidedly unportable
farmland—are harder to steal. In such agrarian social economies, cultures of honour
tend not to develop. The American South was originally settled primarily by
peoples from remote areas of Britain. Since their homelands were generally unsuitable
for farming, these peoples have historically been herders; when they emigrated
from Britain to the South, they initially sought out remote regions suitable for
herding, and in such regions, the culture of honour flourished.
In the contemporary South police and other government services are widely
available and herding has all but disappeared as a way of life, but certain sorts of
violence continue to be more common than they are in the North. Nisbett and Cohen
() maintain that patterns of violence in the South, as well as attitudes towards
violence, insults, and affronts to honour, are best explained by the hypothesis that a
culture of honour persists among contemporary white non-Hispanic southerners. In
support of this hypothesis, they offer a compelling array of evidence, including:
G demographic data indicating that () among southern whites, homicides rates
are higher in regions more suited to herding than agriculture, and () white
males in the South are much more likely than white males in other regions to
be involved in homicides resulting from arguments, although they are not
more likely to be involved in homicides that occur in the course of a robbery
or other felony (Nisbett and Cohen , ch. );
G survey data indicating that white southerners are more likely than northerners
to believe that violence would be ‘extremely justified’ in response to a variety
of affronts, and that if a man failed to respond violently, he was ‘not much of
a man’ (Nisbett and Cohen , ch. );
G legal scholarship indicating that southern states ‘give citizens more freedom
to use violence in defending themselves, their homes, and their property’ than
do northern states (Nisbett and Cohen : ).
Two experimental studies—one in the field, the other in the laboratory—are
especially striking.
In the field study (Nisbett and Cohen : –), letters of inquiry were sent to
hundreds of employers around the United States. The letters purported to be from
a hard-working -year-old Michigan man who had a single blemish on his otherwise
solid record. In one version, the ‘applicant’ revealed that he had been convicted
for manslaughter. The applicant explained that he had been in a fight with a
man who confronted him in a bar and told onlookers that ‘he and my fiancée were
sleeping together. He laughed at me to my face and asked me to step outside if I was
man enough.’ According to the letter, the applicant’s nemesis was killed in the
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
ensuing fray. In the other version of the letter, the applicant revealed that he had been
convicted of motor vehicle theft, perpetrated at a time when he needed money for his
family. Nisbett and his colleagues assessed  letters of response, and found that
southern employers were significantly more likely to be cooperative and sympathetic
in response to the manslaughter letter than were northern employers, while no
regional differences were found in responses to the theft letter.One southern employer
responded to the manslaughter letter as follows (Nisbett and Cohen : ):
As for your problems of the past, anyone could probably be in the situation you were in. It
was just an unfortunate incident that shouldn’t be held against you. Your honesty shows
that you are sincere. . . . I wish you the best of luck for your future. You have a positive attitude
and a willingness to work. These are qualities that businesses look for in employees.
Once you are settled, if you are near here, please stop in and see us.
No letters from northern employers were comparably sympathetic.
In the laboratory study (Nisbett and Cohen : –) subjects—white males
from both northern and southern states attending the University of Michigan—
were told that saliva samples would be collected to measure blood sugar as they
performed various tasks. After an initial sample was collected, the unsuspecting
subject walked down a narrow corridor where an experimental confederate was
pretending to work on some filing. Feigning annoyance at the interruption, the
confederate bumped the subject and called him an ‘asshole’. A few minutes after
the incident, saliva samples were collected and analysed to determine the level of
cortisol—a hormone associated with high levels of stress, anxiety and arousal, and
testosterone—a hormone associated with aggression and dominance behaviour. As
Figure 5.1 indicates, southern subjects showed dramatic increases in cortisol and
testosterone levels, while northerners exhibited much smaller changes.
control insult control insult
culture of honour subjects non-culture of honour subjects
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
0
15
10
5
0
%changeincortisollevel
%changeintestosteronelevel
Fig. 5.1. The results of an experiment by Nisbett and Cohen in which levels of
cortisol and testosterone increased much more substantially in culture of honour
subjects who were insulted by a confederate.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
The two studies just described suggest that southerners respond more strongly to
insult than northerners, and take a more sympathetic view of others who do so, manifesting
just the sort of attitudes that are supposed to typify honour cultures. We think
that the data assembled by Nisbett and his colleagues make a persuasive case that a
culture of honour persists in the American South. Apparently, this culture affects
people’s judgements, attitudes, emotions, behaviour, and even their physiological
responses. Additionally, there is evidence that child-rearing practices play a significant
role in passing the culture of honour on from one generation to the next, and also that
relatively permissive laws regarding gun-ownership, self-defence, and corporal
punishment in the schools both reflect and reinforce southern honour culture (Nisbett
and Cohen : –, –). In short, it seems to us that the culture of honour is
deeply entrenched in contemporary southern culture,despite the fact that many of the
material and economic conditions giving rise to it no longer widely obtain.²⁵
We believe that the North–South cultural differences adduced by Nisbett and
colleagues support Brandt’s conclusion that moral attitudes will often fail to
converge, even under ideal conditions. The data should be especially troubling for
the realist, for despite the differences that we have been recounting, contemporary
northern and southern Americans might be expected to have rather more in
common—from circumstance to language to belief to ideology—than do, say,
Yanomamö and Parisians. So if there is little ground for expecting convergence
under ideal conditions in the case at hand, there is probably little ground in a good
many others. To develop our argument a bit further, let us revisit the idealization
conditions mentioned at the beginning of this section: impartiality, full factual
information, and normality.
Impartiality. One strategy favoured by moral realists concerned to explain away
moral disagreement is to say that such disagreement stems from the distorting
effects of individual interest (see Sturgeon : –); perhaps persistent
disagreement doesn’t so much betray deep features of moral argument and judgement
as it does the doggedness with which individuals pursue their perceived
advantage. For instance, seemingly moral disputes over the distribution of wealth
may be due to perceptions—perhaps mostly inchoate—of individual and class
interests rather than to principled disagreement about justice; persisting moral disagreement
in such circumstances fails the impartiality condition, and is therefore
untroubling to the moral realist.
But it is rather implausible to suggest that North–South disagreements over
when violence is justified will fail the impartiality condition. There is no reason to
²⁵ The last clause is important, since realists (e.g. Brink : ) sometimes argue that apparent
moral disagreement may result from cultures applying similar moral values to different economic
conditions (e.g. differences in attitudes towards the sick and elderly between poor and rich cultures).
But this explanation seems of dubious relevance to the described differences between contemporary
northerners and southerners, who are plausibly interpreted as applying different values to similar
economic conditions.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
think that southerners would be unwilling to universalize their judgements across
relevantly similar individuals in relevantly similar circumstances, as indeed Nisbett
and Cohen’s ‘letter study’ suggests. One can advocate a violent honour code without
going in for special pleading.²⁶ We do not intend to denigrate southern values;
our point is that while there may be good reasons for criticizing the honour-bound
southerner, it is not obvious that the reason can be failure of impartiality, if impartiality
is (roughly) to be understood along the lines of a willingness to universalize
one’s moral judgements.
Full and vivid awareness of relevant non-moral facts. Moral realists have argued
that moral disagreements very often derive from disagreement about non-moral
issues. According to Boyd (: ; cf. Brink : –; Sturgeon : ),
‘careful philosophical examination will reveal . . . that agreement on nonmoral
issues would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of moral issues
which arise in ordinary moral practice’. Is this a plausible conjecture for the data we
have just considered? We find it hard to imagine what agreement on non-moral
facts could do the trick, for we can readily imagine that northerners and southerners
might be in full agreement on the relevant non-moral facts in the cases
described. Members of both groups would presumably agree that the job applicant
was cuckolded, for example, or that calling someone an ‘asshole’ is an insult. We
think it much more plausible to suppose that the disagreement resides in differing
and deeply entrenched evaluative attitudes regarding appropriate responses to
cuckolding, challenge, and insult.
Savvy philosophical readers will be quick to observe that terms like ‘challenge’
and ‘insult’ look like ‘thick’ ethical terms, where the evaluative and descriptive are
commingled (see Williams : –); therefore, it is very difficult to say what the
extent of the factual disagreement is. But this is of little help for the expedient under
consideration, since the disagreement-in-non-moral-fact response apparently
requires that one can disentangle factual and moral disagreement.
It is of course possible that full and vivid awareness of the non-moral facts might
motivate the sort of change in southern attitudes envisaged by the (at least the
northern) moral realist; were southerners to become vividly aware that their culture
of honour was implicated in violence, they might be moved to change their moral
outlook. (We take this way of putting the example to be the most natural one, but
nothing philosophical turns on it. If you like, substitute the possibility of bloodyminded
northerners endorsing honour values after exposure to the facts.) On the
other hand, southerners might insist that the values of honour should be nurtured
even at the cost of promoting violence; the motto ‘Death before dishonour’, after all,
has a long and honourable history. The burden of argument, we think, lies with the
²⁶ The legal scholarship that Nisbett and Cohen (: –) review makes it clear that southern
legislatures are often willing to enact laws reflecting the culture of honour view of the circumstances
under which violence is justified, which suggests there is at least some support among southerners for
the idea that honour values should be universalizable.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
realist who asserts—culture and history notwithstanding—that southerners would
change their mind if vividly aware of the pertinent facts.
Freedom from abnormality. Realists may contend that much moral disagreement
may result from failures of rationality on the part of discussants (Brink :
–). Obviously, disagreement stemming from cognitive impairments is no
embarrassment for moral realism; at the limit, that a disagreement persists when
some or all disputing parties are quite insane shows nothing deep about morality.
But it doesn’t seem plausible that southerners’ more lenient attitudes towards
certain forms of violence are readily attributed to widespread cognitive disability.
Of course, this is an empirical issue, and we don’t know of any evidence suggesting
that southerners suffer some cognitive impairment that prevents them from understanding
demographic and attitudinal factors in the genesis of violence, or any other
matter of fact. What is needed to press home a charge of irrationality is evidence of
cognitive impairment independent of the attitudinal differences, and further evidence
that this impairment is implicated in adherence to the disputed values in the
face of the (putatively) undisputed non-moral facts. In this instance, as in many
others, we have difficulty seeing how charges of abnormality or irrationality can be
made without one side begging the question against the other.
We are inclined to think that Nisbett and colleagues’ work represents a potent
counter-example to any theory maintaining that rational argument tends to convergence
on important moral issues; the evidence suggests that the North–South
differences in attitudes towards violence and honour might well persist even under
the sort of ideal conditions we have considered. Admittedly, our conclusions must
be tentative. On the philosophical side, we have not considered every plausible
strategy for ‘explaining away’ moral disagreement and grounding expectations of
convergence.²⁷ On the empirical side, we have reported on but a few studies, and
those we do consider here, like any empirical work, might be criticized on either
conceptual or methodological grounds.²⁸ Finally, we should make clear what we
are not claiming: we do not take our conclusions here—even if fairly earned—to be
a ‘refutation’ of moral realism, in as much as there may be versions of moral realism
that do not require convergence. Rather, we hope to have given an idea of the
empirical work philosophers must encounter if they are to make defensible conjectures
regarding moral disagreement. Our theme recurs: Responsible treatment of
the empirical issues requires reference to empirical science, whatever the science is
ultimately taken to show.
²⁷ In addition to the expedients we have considered, realists may plausibly appeal to, inter alia,
requirements for internal coherence and the different ‘levels’ of moral thought (theoretical versus popular,
abstract versus concrete, general versus particular) at which moral disagreement may or may not be
manifested. Brink (: –) and Loeb () offer valuable discussions with considerably more
detail than we offer here, Brink manifesting realist sympathies and Loeb tending towards anti-realism.
²⁸ We think Nisbett and Cohen will fare pretty well under such scrutiny. See Tetlock’s ()
favourable review.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
. Thought Experiments
Ethical reflection is often held to involve comparing general principles and
responses to particular cases; commitment to a principle may compel the renunciation
of a particular response, or commitment to a particular response may compel
modification or renunciation of a general principle (Brandt : –; Rawls
: –, ). This emphasis on particular cases is not peculiar to ethics: ‘intuition
pumps’ or ‘thought experiments’ have long been central elements of philosophical
method (Dennett : –). In the instances we consider here, a thought experiment
presents an example, typically a hypothetical example, in order to elicit some
philosophically telling response; if a thought experiment is successful, it may be
concluded that competing theories must account for the resulting response.²⁹ To
extend the imagery of experimentation, responses to thought experiments are
supposed to serve an evidential role in philosophical theory choice; the responses
are data competing theories must accommodate.³⁰
In ethics, one—we do not say the only—familiar rendering of the methodology
is this: If an audience’s ethical responses to a thought experiment can be expected
to conflict with the response a theory prescribes for the case, the theory has
suffered a counter-example. For instance, it is often claimed that utilitarian prescriptions
for particular cases will conflict with the ethical responses many people
have to those cases (e.g. Williams : ). The ethics literature is rife with claims
to the effect that ‘many of us’ or ‘we’ would respond in a specified way to a given
example, and such claims are often supposed to have philosophical teeth.³¹ But
who is this ‘we’? And how do philosophers know what this ‘we’ thinks?
Initially, it doesn’t look like ‘we’ should be interpreted as ‘we philosophers’. The
difficulty is not that this approach threatens a sampling error, although it is certainly
true that philosophers form a small and peculiar group. Rather, the problem
is that philosophers can be expected to respond to thought experiments in ways
that reflect their theoretical predilections: utilitarians’ responses to a thought
²⁹ There are substantive questions as to what sorts of responses to thought experiments may properly
constrain philosophical theory choice. For example, what level of reflection or cognitive elaboration
is required: are the responses of interest ‘pre-theoretical intuitions’ or ‘considered judgements’?
We will have something to say about this, but in terminology we will mostly favour the generic
‘responses’, which we mean to be neutral regarding issues such as cognitive elaboration.
³⁰ This analogy with science is not unique to our exposition. Singer (: ; cf. ) understands
Rawls’s () method of reflective equilibrium as ‘leading us to think of our particular moral judgments
as data against which moral theories are to be tested’. As Singer (:  ff.) notes, in earlier
treatments Rawls () made the analogy with scientific theory choice explicit. We needn’t hazard an
interpretation of Rawls, but only observe that our analogy is not philosophically eccentric.
³¹ For appeals of this kind, see Blum (: ); G. Strawson (: –); P. Strawson (: );
Wallace (: –); Williams (: –; : ).
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
experiments might be expected to plump for maximizing welfare, integrity and
loyalty be damned, while the responses of Aristotelians and Kantians might plump
in the opposite direction. If so, the thought experiment can hardly be expected to
resolve the debate, since philosophers’ responses to the example are likely to reflect
their position in the debate.
The audience of appeal often seems to be some variant of ‘ordinary folk’ (see
Jackson : , ; Jackson and Pettit : –; Lewis : –). Of course,
the relevant folk must possess such cognitive attainments as are required to understand
the case at issue; very young children are probably not an ideal audience for
thought experiments. Some philosophers may want to insist that the relevant
responses are the ‘considered judgements’ or‘reflective intuitions’ of people with the
training required to see ‘what is philosophically at stake’. But there is peril in insisting
that the relevant cognitive attainments be some sort of ‘philosophical sophistication’.
Once again, if the responses are to help adjudicate between competing
theories, the responders must be more or less theoretically neutral, but this sort of
neutrality, we suspect, is rather likely to be vitiated by philosophical education.
(Incredibly enough, informal surveys suggest that our students are overwhelmingly
ethical naturalists!)
However exactly the philosophically relevant audience is specified, there are
empirical questions that must be addressed in determining the philosophical
potency of a thought experiment. In science, not all experiments produce data of
evidentiary value; sampling errors and the failure of experimental designs to effectively
isolate variables are two familiar ways in which experiments go wrong. Data
resulting from such experiments is tainted, or without evidential value; analogously,
in evaluating responses to a thought experiment, one needs to consider the possibility
of taint. In particular, when deciding what philosophical weight to give a
response to a thought experiment, philosophers need to determine the origins of
the response. What features of the example are implicated in a response—are people
responding to the substance of the case, or the style of exposition? What features
of the audience are implicated in a response—do different demographic groups
respond to an example differently? Such questions raise the following concern:
Ethical responses to thought experiments may be strongly influenced by ethically
irrelevant characteristics of example and audience. Whether a characteristic is
ethically relevant is a matter for philosophical discussion, but determining the
status of a particular thought experiment also requires empirical investigation of its
causally relevant characteristics; responsible philosophical discussion cannot rely on
guesswork in this regard. We shall now give two examples illustrating our concerns
about tainted origins, one corresponding to each of the two questions just asked.
Tversky and Kahneman presented subjects with the following problem:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill  people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are
as follows:
If Program A is adopted,  people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a / probability that  people will be saved, and a
/ probability that no people will be saved.
A second group of subjects was given an identical problem, except that the programs were
described as follows:
If Program C is adopted,  people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a / probability that nobody will die and a /
probability that  people will die.(Tversky and Kahneman : )
On the first version of the problem most subjects thought that Program A should
be adopted. But on the second version most chose Program D, despite the fact that
the outcome described in A is identical to the one described in C. The disconcerting
implication of this study is that ethical responses may be strongly influenced
by the manner in which cases are described or framed. Many effects of framing
differences—such as that between  of  people being saved and  of 
dying—we are strongly inclined to think, are ethically irrelevant influences on ethical
responses (compare Horowitz ; Sinnott-Armstrong ). Unless this sort of
possibility can be confidently eliminated, one should hesitate to rely on responses
to a thought experiment for adjudicating theoretical controversies. Again, such
possibilities can only be eliminated through systematic empirical work.³²
Audience characteristics may also affect the outcome of thought experiments.
Haidt and associates (: ) presented stories about ‘harmless yet offensive violations
of strong social norms’ to men and women of high and low socio-economic
status (SES) in Philadelphia (USA), Porto Alegre, and Recife (both in Brazil). For
example:‘A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken. But
before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. Then he cooks it and
eats it’ (Haidt et al. : ). Lower SES subjects tended to ‘moralize’ harmless and
offensive behaviours like that in the chicken story: these subjects were more
inclined than their privileged counterparts to say that the actor should be ‘stopped
or punished’, and more inclined to deny that such behaviours would be ‘OK’ if customary
in a given country (Haidt et al. : –). The point is not that lower
SES subjects are mistaken in their moralization of such behaviours while the
urbanity of higher SES subjects represents the most rationally defensible response.
To recall our previous discussion of moral disagreement, the difficulty is deciding
which of the conflicting responses to privilege, when both sorts of responses may
be the function of more or less arbitrary cultural factors.
³² Some authors—most notably Baron ()—have argued that the distorting influences of
‘heuristics and biases’ like those uncovered in the recent psychological literature on reasoning, judgement,
and decision-making are widespread in everyday ethical reflection. For overviews of the
relevant psychological literature, see Nisbett and Ross (); Kahneman et al. (); Baron ().
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
In presenting the Haidt group’s work to philosophical audiences, our impression
is that they typically decline to moralize the offensive behaviours, and we ourselves
share their tolerant attitude. But of course philosophical audiences—by virtue of
educational attainments if not stock portfolios—are overwhelmingly high SES.
Haidt’s work suggests that it is a mistake for a philosopher to say, as Jackson (:
 ff.; cf. ) does, that ‘my intuitions reveal the folk conception in as much as I am
reasonably entitled, as I usually am, to regard myself as typical’. The question is:
Typical of what demographic? Are philosophers’ ethical responses to thought experiments
determined by the philosophical substance of the examples, or by cultural
idiosyncrasies that are very plausibly thought to be ethically irrelevant? Once again,
until such possibilities are ruled out by systematic empirical investigation, the
philosophical heft of a thought experiment is open to question.³³
The studies just described raise provocative questions about how responses to
thought experiments are generated, but there may be equally provocative questions
about what responses people actually have. And, to sound our now familiar theme,
this question is one not credibly answered by guesswork. Indeed, we suspect that
philosophical speculations about what responses to thought experiments are conventional
may be wrong surprisingly often. We’ll now report on one study
conducive to such suspicions.
One of the most famous of philosophical conundrums, that of determinism and
responsibility, can be derived—on one way of formulating the difficulty—from the
juxtaposition of three claims that are individually quite plausible, but seem impossible
to hold jointly:
(MRT) Moral responsibility thesis: Human beings are sometimes morally
responsible for their behaviour.
(CT) Causal thesis: All human behaviour is linked to antecedent events by deterministic
causal laws. (See Scanlon : .)
(PAP) Principle of alternate possibilities: A ‘person is morally responsible for what
he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. (See Frankfurt : .)
Here’s one way of putting it: If CT is true, it looks as though it is never the case that
people could have done otherwise, but then, given PAP, MRT must be false.³⁴ There
³³ We applaud Jackson’s (: –) advocacy of ‘doing serious public opinion polls on people’s
responses to various cases’. However, we expect this may be necessary more often than Jackson imagines.
According to Jackson (: ),‘Everyone who presents the Gettier cases [which are well-known
epistemology thought experiments] to a class of students is doing their own bit of fieldwork, and we
all know the answer they get in the vast majority of cases’. Yet Weinberg et al. () found that
responses to epistemology thought experiments like the Gettier cases varied with culture and SES; this
suggests that philosophers need to be more systematic in their fieldwork.
³⁴ Our formulation is meant to be quite standard. Kane (a: ) observes that statements of the
difficulty in terms of alternative possibilities have dominated modern discussion. A recently prominent
formulation proceeds not in terms of PAP, but by way of an ‘ultimacy condition’, which holds
that an actor is responsible for her behaviour only if she is its‘ultimate source’ (see McKenna , esp.
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
are three standard responses to this trilemma. Two sorts of incompatibilists hold
that MRT and CT cannot be held simultaneously: hard determinists (see Smart
: –) reject MRT,³⁵ while libertarians (e.g. Kane ) insist that CT admits
of exceptions in the case of human behaviour, and are thus able to maintain MRT.
Compatibilists, on the other hand, assert that MRT and CT can be simultaneously
maintained; one well-known expedient is to reject PAP, and insist that people may
be legitimately held responsible even when they could not have done otherwise
(see Frankfurt : –).
The literature is voluminous, and the proffered solutions range from controversial
to deeply unsatisfying; indeed, there is heated disagreement as to what exactly the
problem is (Dennett : –). Discretion being the best part of valour, we won’t
review the arguments here. Given our present concerns, we instead consider objections
to the effect that compatibilism is in some sense badly counter-intuitive. One
way of forming this complaint is to say that people’s ‘reactive attitudes’—ethical
responses like anger, resentment, guilt, approbation, admiration, and the like—
manifest a commitment to incompatibilism.³⁶ Here is Galen Strawson (: )
on what he calls the ‘incompatibilist intuition’:
The fact that the incompatibilist intuition has such power for us is as much a
natural fact about cogitative beings like ourselves as is the fact of our quite
unreflective commitment to the reactive attitudes. What is more, the roots of
the incompatibilist intuition lie deep in the . . . reactive attitudes. . . . The
reactive attitudes enshrine the incompatibilist intuition.³⁷
Let’s do a little unpacking. On Strawson’s (: ; cf. , –) rendering,
incompatibilism is the view that the falsity of determinism is a necessary condition
for moral responsibility. To suggest that the ‘incompatibilist intuition’ is widespread,
then, may be thought to imply that people’s (possibly tacit) body of moral
beliefs includes commitment to the claim that CT is incompatible with MRT.³⁸
–). This does not impact the present discussion, however. First, notice that although some may
maintain an ultimacy requirement and reject PAP, the two commitments need not be incompatible;
Kane (, b) holds them both. Secondly, as should become clear, the empirical work we describe
below is relevant to both formulations.
³⁵ As Kane (a: –) observes, relatively few philosophers have been unqualifiedly committed
to hard determinism; Smart’s () views on responsibility, for example, are complex.
³⁶ Peter Strawson () did the pioneering philosophical work on the reactive attitudes; he appears
to reject the suggestion that such attitudes manifest a commitment to something in the spirit of
incompatibilism.
³⁷ G. Strawson puts the point rather emphatically, but similar observations are commonplace. Cf.
Nagel (: , ); Kane (: –).
³⁸ There is again a question about the scope of ‘people’; Strawson’s reference to ‘natural facts’ may
suggest that he is making a boldly pancultural attribution, but he might be more modestly attributing
the theory only to those people who embody something like the ‘Western ethical tradition’. We will not
attempt to decide the interpretative question, because the empirical work we describe troubles even
the more modest claim.
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
This is an empirical claim. Moreover, it is an empirical claim that looks to entail
predictions about people’s moral responses. What are the responses in question?
Like many other philosophers making empirical claims about human cognition
and behaviour, Strawson says relatively little about what predictions he thinks his
claims entail. We won’t put predictions is Strawson’s mouth; instead, we’ll consider
one prediction that looks to follow from positing an incompatibilist intuition, at
least on the familiar rendering of incompatibilism we’ve followed. Attributing a
widespread commitment to an incompatibilist intuition is plausibly thought to
involve the following prediction: For cases where the actor is judged unable to have
done otherwise, people will not hold the actor responsible for what she has done.³⁹
In as much as this prediction is a good one, people should respond to thought
experiments depicting an actor unable to do otherwise by abjuring attributions of
responsibility and the associated reactive attitudes.
In a compatibilist spirit inspired by the work of Harry Frankfurt (),
Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley () hypothesized that observers may hold actors
responsible even when the observers judge that the actors could not have done
otherwise, at least in cases where the actors appear to manifest ‘identification’. Very
roughly, the idea is that the actor is identified with a behaviour—and is therefore
responsible for it—to the extent she ‘embraces’ the behaviour (or its motive), or
performs it ‘wholeheartedly’.⁴⁰ Woolfolk et al.’ suspicion was, in effect, that people’s
(possibly tacit) theory of responsibility is, contra Galen Strawson and others,
compatibilist.
In one of the Woolfolk et al. studies, subjects read a story about two married
couples vacationing together. According to the story, one of the vacationers has
discovered that his wife is having an affair with his opposite number in the foursome;
on the flight home, the vacationers’ plane is hijacked, and armed hijackers
order the cuckold to shoot the man who has been having an affair with his wife. In
a ‘low identification’ variation, the story contained the following material:
Bill was horrified. At that moment Bill was certain about his feelings. He did not want to kill
Frank, even though Frank was his wife’s lover. But although he was appalled by the situation
and beside himself with distress, he reluctantly placed the pistol at Frank’s temple and
proceeded to blow his friend’s brains out.
Conversely, in a ‘high identification’ variation, the embittered cuckold embraces his
opportunity:
Despite the desperate circumstances, Bill understood the situation. He had been presented
with the opportunity to kill his wife’s lover and get away with it. And at that moment Bill
³⁹ G. Strawson (: –; ) may favour formulations in terms of ultimacy rather than PAP
(see n.  above). This doesn’t affect our argument, since the empirical work we recount below
looks to trouble a prediction formulated in terms of ultimacy as well as the alternative possibilities
formulation we favour.
⁴⁰ For some discussion, see Velleman (); Bratman (); Watson (); Doris (: –).
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
was certain about his feelings. He wanted to kill Frank. Feeling no reluctance, he placed the
pistol at Frank’s temple and proceeded to blow his friend’s brains out.
Consistent with Woolfolk and colleagues’ hypothesis, the high-identification actor
was judged more responsible, more appropriately blamed, and more properly subject
to guilt than the low-identification actor.⁴¹
It is tempting to conclude that at least for the Woolfolk group’s subjects (philosophy
and psychology undergraduates at the University of California and Rutgers
University), the incompatibilist intuition does not appear to be deeply entrenched.
But at this point the incompatibilist will be quick to object: The above study may
suggest that responsibility attributions are influenced by identification, but it says
nothing about commitment to the incompatibilist intuition, because subjects may
not have believed that the actor could not have done otherwise, and subjects therefore
cannot be interpreted as attributing responsibility in violation of PAP. People
may think that even when coerced, actors ‘always have a choice’; in the classic ‘your
money or your life’ scenario, the person faced with this unpleasant dilemma can
always opt for her life. (We hasten to remind anyone tempted in such a bull-headed
direction that the disjunct need not be exclusive!)
To address this objection, Woolfolk et al. attempted to elevate perceived
constraint to the ‘could not have done otherwise’ threshold:
The leader of the kidnappers injected Bill’s arm with a ‘compliance drug’—a designer drug
similar to sodium pentathol, ‘truth serum.’ This drug makes individuals unable to resist the
demands of powerful authorities. Its effects are similar to the impact of expertly administered
hypnosis; it results in total compliance. To test the effects of the drug, the leader of the
kidnappers shouted at Bill to slap himself. To his amazement, Bill observed his own right
hand administering an open-handed blow to his own left cheek, although he had no sense of
having willed his hand to move. The leader then handed Bill a pistol with one bullet in it. Bill
was ordered to shoot Frank in the head. . . . when Bill’s hand and arm moved again, placing
the pistol at his friend’s temple, Bill had no feeling that he had moved his arm to point the
gun; it felt as though the gun had moved itself into position. Bill thought he noticed his finger
moving on the trigger, but could not feel any sensations of movement. While he was
observing these events, feeling like a puppet, passively observing his body moving in space,
his hand closed on the pistol, discharging it and blowing Frank’s brains out.
Strikingly, subjects appeared willing to attribute responsibility to the shooter even
here: once again, a high-identification actor was judged more responsible, more
appropriately blamed, and more properly subject to guilt than a low-identification
actor. No doubt this is not the most ‘naturalistic’ scenario, but neither is it outlandish
by philosophical standards. And it certainly looks to be a case where the
actor would be perceived to fail the standard for responsibility set by PAP.⁴² Indeed,
⁴¹ Woolfolk et al. () obtained similar results for the prosocial behaviour of kidney donation: an
identified actor was credited for making a donation even when heavily constrained.
⁴² It also looks as though the actor fails an ultimacy condition (see nn.  and  above).
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empirical perspectives on ethics 
Woolfolk et al. found that subjects were markedly less likely to agree to statements
asserting that the actor ‘was free to behave other than he did’, and ‘could have
behaved differently than he did’, than they were in the case of simple coercion
described above. These results look to caution against positing a widespread commitment
to the incompatibilist intuition. Deciding empirical issues concerning
habits of responsibility attribution will not, of course, decide the philosophical
dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Yet in so far as the incompatibilist
is making claims to the effect that compatibilists cannot accommodate
entrenched habits of moral response, the empirical evidence is entirely relevant.
Once more, some philosophers may insist that the responses of interest are not
the relatively unschooled or intuitive responses of experimental subjects like the
Woolfolk group’s undergraduates, but the tutored judgements of philosophers.
We’ve already given some reasons for regarding this strategy with suspicion, but it
seems to us especially problematic for the particular case of responsibility.
Philosophical arguments about responsibility, it seems to us, often lean heavily on
speculation about everyday practice. For example, Peter Strawson’s (: , )
extremely influential exposition repeatedly stresses the importance of reactive
attitudes in ‘ordinary inter-personal relationships’. While it may not be too much of
a stretch to imagine that philosophers sometimes indulge in such relationships, it
is a stretch to suppose that they are the only folk who do so. It is very plausible to
argue—as indeed those who have deployed something like the incompatibilist
intuition have done—that the contours of the everyday practice of responsibility
attribution serve as a (defeasible) constraint on philosophical theories of responsibility:
if the theory cannot accommodate the practice, it owes, at a bare minimum,
a debunking account of the practice. One might insist that philosophical theorizing
about responsibility is not accountable to ordinary practice, but this is to make
a substantial break with important elements of the tradition.
There are a couple of ways in which philosophers can avoid the sorts of empirical
difficulties we have been considering. First, they can deny that responses to particular
cases have evidential weight in ethical theory choice, as some utilitarians—
unsurprisingly given the rather startling implications of their position—have been
inclined to do (e.g. Kagan : –; Singer , p. xviii). Alternatively, they can
appeal to the results of thought experiments in an expository rather than an
evidential role; for example, a thought experiment might be used by an author to
elucidate her line of reasoning without appealing to the responses of an imagined
audience like ‘many of us’. To some philosophers, such solutions will seem rather
methodologically draconian, threatening to isolate ethical theory from the experience
of ethical life (see Williams : –, esp. –). But our point here is less
grand: many users of thought experiments in ethics apparently have been—and we
strongly suspect will continue to be—in the business of forwarding an imagined consensus
on their thought experiments as evidence in theory choice. For these philosophers
we offer the following methodological prescription: a credible philosophical
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 john m. doris and stephen p. stich
methodology of thought experiments must be supplemented by a cognitive science
of thought experiments that involves systematic investigation with actual experiments.
There are just too many unanswered questions regarding the responses
people have, and the processes by which they come to have them. We’ve no stake in
any particular answers to such questions. What we do have a stake in, as we have
throughout, is the observation that responsible answers to such questions will be
informed by systematic empirical investigation.
. Conclusion
We needn’t linger on goodbyes; the main contours of our exposition should by
now be tolerably clear. We have surveyed four central topics in ethical theory where
empirical claims are prominent: character, moral motivation, moral disagreement,
and thought experiments. We have argued that consideration of work in the biological,
behavioural, and social sciences promises substantive philosophical contributions
to controversy surrounding such topics as virtue ethics, internalism, moral
realism, and moral responsibility. If our arguments are successful, we have also
erected a general methodological standard: philosophical ethics can, and indeed
must, interface with the human sciences.⁴³
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